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Abstract
There is money to be made in saving the planet. A whole host of actors, such as investors,
entrepreneurs, engineers, and policy makers have mobilized around our ecological problems,
seeking to innovate new ‘green’ and ‘clean’ technologies that can serve a rapidly changing
environment. The presumption that such technologies are both necessary and necessarily
profitable anchors visions of a ‘green’ capitalism that can and must be brought into existence.
However, just as free markets have never been all that free, why should we presume that
green capitalism would be all that green? Instead of attempting to arbit whether or not the
greening of capital is or can ‘work’ – this work seeks to understand whether and how ‘green
capitalism’ coheres around new justificatory frames, or what Boltanski and Chiapello call a
new spirit of capitalism. The emerging spirit of green capitalism is positioned somewhere
between the maintenance of the current neoliberal form of accumulation and a desire to
return to romanticized visions of more stable, centrally coordinated economic systems. It is
an attempt to make sense of capitalism in crisis, and a crisis caused by capitalism.
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This research focuses specifically upon individuals within the broad field of green
capitalism who are actively grappling with the ways in which the infrastructure of global
capitalism has irrevocably shaped world ecology, and who are experimenting, in thought and
practice, with a wide range of new techno-social configurations intended to mitigate, or even
reverse, these negative ecological effects. The project is divided into two parts. The first is
grounded by a critical discourse analysis of mass-market texts published over the past 25
years that advocate for green capitalism. Four distinct ‘motifs’ can be found in this literature,
each of which is analyzed in turn. These are: Planetary Improvement; Eco-Utopian
Socialism; EcoFordism; and Green Developmentalism.
This critical discourse analysis then connects with an ethnographic investigation of the
‘cleantech space’ in New York City. Through my ethnographic work I explore the
performativity of abstract market imperatives in this field, which encompasses a wide array
of technologies that boast some form of material or energetic efficiency over prevailing
norms. The cleantech space is filled with innovative entrepreneurs, inventors and investors,
all of whom want to see new technologies succeed. And yet, in the eyes of capital (or the
fiduciary responsibility of investors) not all innovations are created equal. Only those
innovations that promise sizeable and rapid returns are likely to receive support. In other
words, there are many good technologies out there that make for bad investments. And so,
while it may be the case that we will need new technologies to provide the infrastructure for
any ecologically viable future economy, it is not so clear that the specific technologies being
produced by the prevailing funding streams will ever be able to get us there.
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Chapter	
  1:	
  Introduction	
  

Dark	
  Days	
  

Despite a growing concern about global climate change, which continues to accelerate
at a terrifying pace, and despite the substantial growth of renewable energy and other ‘clean’
industrial sectors, there is little ‘green’ about our planetary society, now or in the foreseeable
future. Quite to the contrary, the specter of ecological disaster has intensified its grip on the
popular imagination. Massive environmental disruptions – forest fires, floods, droughts,
hurricanes, extinctions – are occurring with increasing regularity. CO2 emissions continue to
accelerate with no signs of weakening despite the growth of a renewable energy sector. This
is all now part of a new normal that portends unprecedented catastrophe in the not too distant
future. The 5th Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report (2014) offers a
chilling prognosis for our future. This is not the place to rehash their grim findings. Instead I
will summarize: the climate has changed and our time is short. Our time was likely short two
decades ago, and with the unabated growth of the very techno-industrial system that lies at
the root cause of our environmental problems, matters have only intensified.
There is little question, outside the orbit of reactionary wealth and the faux populism
it funds, that ecological disasters will continue and that they are a direct result of actuallyexisting industrial capitalism. On this point, very little separates those seeking to transform
capitalism and those seeking to supersede it. Calls to 'green' the economy range from the
proliferation of new green markets and jobs, the funding of new technological innovation,
and initiatives targeting recycling, re-use and regulation, to more radical critiques calling for
1

de-growth, or even an outright end to the capitalist mode of production. All told, green is
rapidly emerging as the new spirit of the age, a global landscape of crisis, protest and hope
upon which competing narratives of humanity’s possible futures are being rehearsed.
If only these were simply technical questions. A whole host of actors and institutions
– some more powerful than others – have mobilized around our planetary problems, seeking
to innovate new ‘green’ and ‘clean’ technologies that can serve a rapidly changing
environment, whose worth will be measured by the profits derived from their sale. There is
money to be made in saving the planet. Such is the hope of investors, entrepreneurs,
engineers, and policy makers committed to pursuing the rapid development of green
technologies, or as we will come to be introduced, cleantech.1
The presumption that new green technologies are both necessary and necessarily
profitable anchors visions – in many shapes and forms – of a new green capitalism that can
and must be brought into existence. Luminaries of the modern environmental movement,
from Amory Lovins and Gustave Speth to Fred Krupp and Lester Brown have embraced this
vision and for over two decades have been attempting to establish the conceptual and
ideological viability of a happy marriage between environmentalism and capitalism, or as
Thomas Friedman (2008) puts it, between “Mother Nature and Father Profit.”
Gains have surely been made: for instance, solar and wind power have established
themselves as a viable growth industry, and meeting the standards of green building codes
has become an almost unquestioned element of world class architecture and construction. But
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This is not the only vector of potential profitability, only the one focused on in this present
study. We might also consider the global land grab that is taking place, and with it attempts to
secure control over riparian and mineral rights – preparing for the scarcities that are
beginning to mount.
2

are these pyrrhic victories? If Shell Oil produces a LEED certified, environmentally advanced
corporate office building, will this offset the emissions generated from their ongoing
extraction business? As solar and wind become an increasingly large share of the world’s
energy mix, will this offset the fact that total energy consumption is on the rise?

Green	
  capitalism	
  

Though it would be difficult to argue that anything resembling ‘green’ or ‘clean’
capitalism already exists – or for that matter, that such a formation is even possible - this
chimera is nonetheless the object of the present study. So what do I mean by green
capitalism?
Green capitalism refers to numerous political and economic strategies that aim to
redress environmental problems, broadly defined, through market-based, profit-driven
processes of one form or another. This “managed scarcity synthesis” (Schnaiberg, 1980)
includes, but is not limited to, entrepreneurial and financial investments in processes and
technologies that are less polluting than existing alternatives, regulation of land and other
resource use with the intent of mitigating toxic discharges and over-exhaustion, and
investments in public infrastructure that either preserve or attempt to improve existing
ecological conditions (Prudham 2009; Kovel 2007; Schnaiberg et al. 2003). In other words,
any attempt to make the global economy less ecologically damaging (however defined)
without fundamentally altering the way that this economy operates.
Accordingly, we could say that growth and entrepreneurialism coordinated by
financial markets, who are in turn supported and encouraged by the state, are the stated
‘fundamentals’ of the capitalist economy that are to remain unchanged through any process
3

of greening. Further, we might also recognize a number of unstated fundamentals that also
remain unquestioned: the ubiquity of wage labor and the sanctity of value-as-capital are both
implied through the commitment to the growth of productivity in and through a profitseeking economy, issues we will turn to below.
Much of this greening process functions through state formations at various scales,
from the municipal to the global. ‘Green governance’ is therefore intimately entangled with
the making of a green political economy, from municipal efforts to green specific cities to
international efforts to implement climate policy at a planetary scale. To the extent that these
initiatives fall back upon a pragmatic attempt to ‘harness the power of the market’ to achieve
their environmental ends, they also represent attempts to ‘green’ capitalism, whose sanctity,
rationality and superiority have achieved the status of sacred truths.2

Green	
  Capitalism	
  in	
  the	
  Social	
  Sciences	
  

Discussions within the social sciences can largely be bifurcated between those for or
against green capitalism. Supporters of green capitalism advocate for an economic paradigm
that correctly attributes values to the goods and services (the ‘natural capital’) provided by

2

There are some who will point out - pace Polanyi - that ‘the market’ has existed in many
different forms throughout history - the capitalist, price-setting market representing only one
specific manifestation of this much broader principle. This is an important observation. Is it
possible that some markets are better than others? And in fact, as I will show; there is
actually a contradiction in the ways that green capitalist discourses engage with the market.
On the one hand markets represent the motive force of economic progress, and on the other
hand their actually existing price-setting has created massive obstacles to the project of
greening the economy. In many ways, as will be shown, green capitalists are calling for a
very different market altogether.
4

the planet (Hawken et al. 1999; Barnes 2001; Daly et al 1994). This work is buttressed by the
field of ecological economics, which departs from the neoclassical school by accepting the
dependence of production on valuable yet exogenous, or non-producible resources (Burkett
2009; Costanza 1980). At the extreme, work within this paradigm applies the second law of
thermodynamics to economic analysis, contending that all human societies are necessarily
entropic, with capitalism accelerating this inevitable ‘heat death’ to globally dangerous
levels. Efforts to slow down this process therefore become the only socially viable response
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). Ecological economists have raised
these concerns with recourse to the work of 19th century economist Stanley Jevons, who
identified a paradox in relation to the use of coal: as power generation became more efficient
(hence requiring less coal to accomplish the same tasks) the result was an increase in total
coal consumption, as these micro-efficiencies made increased throughput economically
attractive, therefore leading to an overall increase in use.
Alan Schnaiberg (1980) offers a more granular investigation of these contradictions,
which he names the treadmill of production. Schnaiberg outlines the ways in which scientists
and engineers are not simply innovating in a bubble, but are instead beholden to institutional
forms and funding streams that privilege only those technologies and directions of research
that are most likely to result in commercially viable (a.k.a. profitable) commodities. In other
words, not all innovations are created equal, and not all solutions are addressing the same
problems. Even if there is ultimately some sort of consensus that ‘saving the planet’ is an
important objective, we still must ask what exactly is meant by the planet, and what exactly is
meant by saving. For many people, capitalism – however defined – has been naturalized as
the only viable form of human social property relations. Therefore saving the planet entails
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saving capitalism, as an extension of this nature-under-threat. Unfortunately, this may not be
a nature we can afford to save.
Along these lines, ecological modernization theorists are somewhat less pessimistic,
holding out faith in a ‘truly’ green capitalism, resulting from the rise of an ecological
rationality that can and must emerge to subsume capital within a broader, and more humane
orbit (Mol 2000; Spaargaren 1992). Though there is a lot of support for ecological
modernization in both academic and policy circles, many critical scholars have largely
dismissed any such possibility, arguing that capitalism is inherently anti-ecological (Gould et
al. 2004; Katz 1998; Smith 1998; Foster 2000). While ecological economists and ecological
modernization theorists take a Polanyian position (Polanyi 1985), arguing that we must slow
down the pace of industrialism and entropic decay, those opposed to green capitalism focus
on the irreconcilability of an economy predicated on expanded reproduction with the
possibility of achieving ecological sustainability at a global scale. They regard the suggestion
that ecological disruptions can be slowed down as a false solution, instead dismissing green
capitalism, tout court, as little more than an extension of capital’s underlying tendencies
(Kovel 2007; O'Connor 1998) or an ideological façade allowing business as usual to proceed
(York 2005). Hence the marketization of carbon emissions, the shift towards “clean
technologies” and the interest in large scale organic food production, to take a few key
examples, all become subsumed under a relentless drive for growth, a “treadmill of
production” (Schnaiberg 1980) that pervades the global capitalist economy, making green
capitalism, as a project, either technological fetishization and naïve optimism, or the
calculated emergence of new markets and the greenwashing of old ones. (O'Connor 1998;
Clark and Foster 2009; Schnaiberg et al. 1994).

6

The issue of what capitalism is, is the unspoken crux of this entire debate. Those
critical of green capitalism essentially argue that the advocates of green capitalism or
ecological modernity have got it wrong, rejecting many creative attempts to reform the global
economy, technologically and socially, on the grounds that capitalism cannot ever be ‘truly’
green. But what is capitalism? And is ‘it’ singular? Do the laws of value and their attendant
countertendencies mutate over time? While I largely concur with the ecological critiques of
capitalism mentioned above, I believe that the strong determinism (Williams 1977) of such
arguments is not only theoretically unwarranted, but can at times be politically retrograde –
reifying both capitalism and nature through narratives of eco-catastrophe, presented with a
clarity and affective force that erases the messiness of actually existing capitalism, as well as
the messiness of actually possible social change (Harvey 1998; Gibson-Graham 2006; Katz
2006).3 Without denying the continuities in capital accumulation – and their anti-ecological
implications – one is left wondering whether the discontinuities in this process – the many
countertendencies that arise in historically, geographically specific ways; the various regimes
of accumulation resulting from the historical specificity of class struggle (inter and intra);
might each have their own peculiar social-ecological implications.
I raise this to suggest that somewhere between the ecological modernization theorists
and the eco-Marxist/treadmill critique of capital (green or not) is an unmet need for critical
inquiries into the possibility that green capitalism may emerge as a post-neoliberal form of
capital accumulation, the specificities of which cannot be reduced to either an ecological
critique of capitalism writ large or an optimistic assessment of ecological modernization
aspirations. Our planetary ecosystem has already been irrevocably transformed, and its

3

While Harvey makes this argument against the eco-catastrophe current in Marxism, Gibson Graham and Katz
are actually making an argument that is critical of Harvey as well.
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capacity to maintain ‘business as usual’ is reaching an end. Neoliberal capitalism will not last
forever, and it is our job to begin discerning what might come next.

Neoliberalism	
  in	
  Crisis	
   	
  

Capital’s anti-ecological tendencies are always coupled with multiple and persistent
countertendencies that help maintain the relative stability of an economy oriented towards
self-inflicted crisis (Marx 1991). Efforts to understand these counter-tendencies as a double
movement (Polanyi 1985) tend to focus on regulatory regimes (Lipietz 2002; Chester 2010)
or legitimizing discourses and practices (Prudham 2009; Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). This
has led to a number of inquiries into the ecological relations specific to neoliberalism
(Heynen 2007; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Castree 2008), and related attempts to
understand green capitalism as a new form of governmentality (Watts 2002; Agrawal 2005).
This work attempts to make sense of the transformations that are occurring to the interactions
between the human and non human world, as opposed to the eco-Marxist tendency to reduce
these relations to the relative continuity of capital’s “metabolic rift,” understood as the
disequilibrium of relations between humans and the non-human world upon which we
depend (Burkett 2000; Foster 2000; Clark and Foster 2009).
Here however, the conceptual status of neoliberalism, relative to that of capitalism,
begins to blur, demanding pause to consider what exactly neoliberalism is in the first place.
Specific definitions vary, placing relative focus on ideology, institutions and economic or
political processes. Much of the heterogeneity associated with the term may result from the
nature of neoliberalism itself as necessarily incomplete (Peck 2009), resulting in either a
8

“parasitical co-presence with other social formations” (Peck 2004) or a “hybrid assemblage”
(Ong 2006). Others go still further, arguing that the very attempt to define neoliberalism is
itself problematic, for such a singular thing does not exist outside of the imaginations of
vulgar or malestream Marxists deploying the concept (Barnett 2005; Gibson-Graham 2006).
While such critiques provide an important caveat to overly deterministic and structural
accounts of capitalism, they essentially defer the question of how actually existing capitalism
operates with recourse to complexity and heterogeneity, and fail to deal with the relative
coherence of capitalism on a global scale – and the possibility that this relative coherence
might itself be undergoing transformation.
When discussing neoliberalism, some dominant themes do emerge, such as a
complete faith in market based solutions, an attack on labor and social welfare state
provisioning, and the predominance of finance on a global scale, all motivated by a general
effort to concentrate wealth into fewer and fewer hands (Leitner et al. 2006; Krinsky 2007;
Saad-Filho and Johnston 2004). In terms of global politics, neoliberalism is seen as financial
and military imperialism, largely anchored by the ‘Washington Consensus’ whose hegemony
operates through multinational institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, working in
conjunction with the U.S. state to produce a ‘new world order’ where all borders are opened
to flows of dollar denominated capital (Duménil and Lévy 2004; Gowan 1999). Cheap labor
and cheap resources are made available through the dismantling of developmental states,
accomplished largely through the manipulation of sovereign debt, and backed by military
force when necessary – a process that David Harvey has called accumulation by
dispossession (Harvey 2005a, 2005b).
Though I will largely avoid using the term neoliberalism throughout this work, it is
nonetheless important to identify the ways in which we are experiencing a neoliberal period
9

of capital accumulation. That said, the increasing ubiquity of the term seems to have the
unintended effect of conflating actually-existing capitalism with capitalism understood in a
more historically broad (and changing) context, leaving critical scholars without the
conceptual tools required to interrogate a dynamic and rapidly changing present. It should be
stated up front that my goal with this project is to look for hints as to what some of the
possible dimensions of a post-neoliberal capitalism might look like.

A	
  Green	
  Spirit	
  of	
  Capitalism	
  

There is a lot of excellent work examining different facets of green neoliberalism,
green governance, green consumerism, ecological modernization, and other more specific
dimensions of this emerging preoccupation with being green. For those critical of the process,
a good deal of attention has been directed at the ways in which efforts to ‘go green’ often
function as ideological veneer and good public relations work. While this is undoubtedly
occurring, there may be another level at which to analyze these green discourses, as
something more than clever marketing and false consciousness. In other words, there may
also be ways in which people involved in the green economy actually believe in what they
are doing, that far from simple fooling a simple minded public with good public relations,
they actually see themselves as working to create a better, more sustainable, or more ‘green’
world. There may be an emerging green common sense, a hegemonic and normalized sense
of what is good, what is right, and what is possible (Therborn 2008).
To this end, I ask whether and how ‘green capitalism’ coheres around new
justificatory frames, or what Boltanski and Chiapello call a new spirit of capitalism.
10

Boltanski and Chiapello’s work, The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), re-energizes Weber’s
classic analysis of the Protestant ethic (2001), drawing on a long history of commentary and
critique of his work, and applying this to a broad attempt to understand the ideology of
capitalism, its justificatory frameworks and legitimizing discourses. In other words, the ways
people justify why their actions are ‘good, right, and plausible,’ not only for themselves (this
was Weber’s focus: how individuals justify their individual actions with recourse to an
individual relationship with God) but also for their sense of social value (Hirschman 1997).
In other words, understanding how people justify the ways in which their actions are good for
‘society’ - and how they are therefore contributing positively to the social world.
This is particularly important, Boltanski and Chiapello argue, in light of an economic
system that privileges selfishness, greed, and the individual accumulation of wealth. These
are all, historically anti-social behaviors, and so in order to feel justified in pursuing them as
legitimate, socially valued ends, a “spirit,” or legitimizing discourse, is necessary to help
make sense of this seeming contradiction. Classic political economy can be read in just this
way - with private vices leading to public virtues - and other explanations of how the
individual pursuit of maximum financial gain actually benefits society at large.
And so I ask: Is there a new green spirit of capitalism? In this work I will assess green
capitalism as an emergent ideology, stuck somewhere between the maintenance of the current
neoliberal form of accumulation and a desire to return to a romanticized vision of a more
stable, centrally coordinated economic relations. I see green capitalism as a fraught terrain, an
attempt to make sense of capitalism in crisis, and crisis caused by capitalism. It is a discourse
that simultaneously wants to perpetuate the market relations that have undergirded centuries
of wealth accumulation and whose logic has permeated so much of the realm of state

11

planning, and that attempts to leave this logic behind, to forge out new value relations that
could ground a new more ecologically stable regime of accumulation.
Whether humanity will untether itself from the grips of capital’s self-destructive market
logic remains to be seen, and the retrograde forces of neoliberalism are formidable to say the
least, yet I think it is important to see how green capitalism, as both an ideology and even
perhaps as a nascent form of social production, is an attempt to grapple with these failures
and with the transformations that will have to occur as the current phase of accumulation
reaches the outer limits of its viability.
None of this is to suggest that green capitalism already exists, or for that matter that it
is even clear what a ‘truly’ green capitalism would even entail. Nor is it to suggest that
capital is or can be ‘green’ in any strong, ecological sense of the term. My hope is that we can
set these debates temporarily aside. There is a need to develop a more generous – while still
critical – analysis of this idea and this project – of greening capitalism – for what it is and
what it may become. Just as free markets have never been all that free, why should we
presume that green capitalism would be all that green? The work that follows is not an
attempt to assess whether or not the greening of capital is or can ‘work’. It is instead an
attempt to understand an emerging spirit, along with some of its historical precedents and its
main presuppositions, and to ascertain what the dominant themes within this discourse might
tell us about the shifting terrain of capital accumulation.
And so I ask, how are people engaged in the green economy managing the
contradictions between their ideals and the institutional demands of competing in a free
market system? How is a single spirit of capitalism able to capture the energy of a spirited
multitude? How do the manifold, polyphonic dreams and desires of a social body come to be
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contained, narrowed, and focused in some ways and not others? Towards some ends and not
others?
Perhaps ‘how’ is the wrong question – or the unanswerable question. There have been
attempts – many attempts – to understand the production of ideologies, the apparatus
involved in their reproduction and the social political and psychological underpinnings of
their effective and affective force. It is less my intention to jump to the how, but instead to
begin with a first, more modest step – describing the what: a new ideological formation in its
first stages of becoming (Gramsci 1971).
In subsequent work we can then ask whether these discourses and practices are
merely changes in the legitimization of business as usual, or if they are a reflection of
emergent changes in the ways business will ‘usually’ be conducted as neoliberal capital gives
way to a new ‘postneoliberal’ composition of class relations. By critically examining the
ideas and practices of this emergent field, my research can support a number of important
investigations into the changing natures of capitalism, as well as the changing natures of what
it will take to successfully transform the world in substantively just, humane and eco-centric
ways.

Overview	
  of	
  the	
  study	
  

My research has focused specifically upon individuals within the broad field of green
capitalism who are actively grappling with the ways in which the infrastructure of global
capitalism has irrevocably shaped world ecology, and who are experimenting, in thought and
practice, with a wide range of new techno-social configurations intended to mitigate, or even
reverse, these negative ecological effects.
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The research is divided into two parts. The first deals more broadly with the
discourses of green capitalism and is grounded by a critical discourse analysis of mass market
texts published over the past 25 years that advocate in some way or another for green
capitalism. These texts can be considered part of third wave environmentalism (Dowie 1995)
or what I will call business environmentalism. Section One opens with a brief historical
account of the origins of this particular form of pro-market environmental thought, focusing
primarily on the US in the 20th century. This is then followed by a lengthy chapter that
reviews Boltanksi and Chiapello’s conception of a new spirit of capitalism, relating it to the
present analysis, and then continuing on to delineate four distinct ‘motifs’ that can be found
in the green capitalist texts that I analyzed. These are:
Planetary Improvement
Eco-Utopian Socialism
EcoFordim
Green Developmentalism

As explained in Appendix C, these four motifs are not meant to constitute a rigid or
mutually exclusive typology, but instead represent four recurring themes, often overlapping
and intermixing with one another in specific texts, yet still discrete enough to merit separate
analysis.
Sections Two and Three then connect this investigation of green capitalist texts with a
more focused analysis of the “cleantech space,” specifically in New York City. Chapter Four
gives a brief history of cleantech. As a term, cleantech first came into use in the early 2000s –
though much of the technology that counts as cleantech was already under development for
quite some time. As we will go into in some depth below, cleantech was a way for venture
capital to brand their interest in alternative energy, distinguishing it from nearly identical
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failed commercial projects and “appropriate technology” initiatives of the 70s. The field is
growing significantly and is increasingly important for investors, entrepreneurs and policy
makers. It is an estimated € 2 trillion industry set to grow to € 4 trillion by 2020
(Henzelmann 2012).
Cleantech is focused on energy technologies – renewable energy, improved efficiency
of non-renewable energy generation, energy-use monitoring and energy storage. That said, it
is not limited to energy, and any technologies or services that increase the efficiency of
material or energetic throughput of a process - whether production, consumption or
distribution, could be considered a clean technology. It is – we can say – industrial efficiency
focused on non-human resource management. As should be clear, cleantech is a broad
category, encompassing any technology that can boast some form of material or energetic
efficiency over prevailing norms. In other words, clean technologies - taken on their own are less dirty than current alternatives.
I spent 2 years conducting ethnographic fieldwork in the New York City cleantech
space. My primary site was a monthly event called the NY Energy and Environment Funder’s
Forum, or the Funder’s Forum for short. Through regular attendance at this breakfast
meeting, along with attendance at a number of other networking events and conferences
associated with the cleantech field, I was able to engage with a professionally diverse range
of participants in the cleantech field, from fantastically wealthy investors and influential
lawyers to exciting and excited inventors and entrepreneurs to a whole range of unemployed
“strategic consultants.”
At the first Funder’s Forum that I attended, a company called Vegawatt was
presenting their technology, and pitching the room for a round of early stage financing. The
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Vegawatt converts fry grease into liquid fuel, which then powers a diesel generator in the
back of your fast food restaurant, producing both hot water and a small amount of electricity.
On their first slide, next to a picture of their system, a small graphic depicted an electrical
cord being plugged into a french fry, accompanied by their sales pitch: “Out of the deep fryer
into your pocket!” They continue to explain:

Your Benefits When You Run Your Restaurant On Vegawatt™ Power
Save over $700 every month off your utility bills!
Produce Free electricity onsite
Produce Free hot water onsite
Save on Waste Vegetable Oil disposal fees
Reduce your Electricity Demand charges
Reduce the CO2 emissions of your restaurant
Reduce the dependence on fossil fuels
Save the Planet
This, as will be demonstrated below, is a typical cleantech progression: from incremental
gains (monthly savings) to systemic transformations (saving the planet). While this is easy
enough for Vegawatt’s founders to put on a slide, in actual practice the path between these
poles, from the prosaic to the profound, is riddled with contradictions and tensions. As I will
show in Section Two, these are tensions that have to be actively managed. Saving the planet
is a noble goal, but if a company like Vegawatt wants to attract investors, they will have to
prove that their primary focus is on making incremental gains in already established markets.
In fact, as Vegawatt’s CEO presented the above progression, one of the lawyers in the room
interrupted his pitch: “We’re not here to save the planet. We’re here to help you gestate
something that can afford expensive NYC lawyers [like me].”
Chapter Five begins the ethnographic portion of this project with an examination of
how a single concept, “Impact,” is used to capture a range of often contradictory aspirations
and legitimizing frames of cleantech as a project. Through this one term, individuals are able
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to express the ‘spirit’ of cleantech as an attempt both to make an impact-as-capital as well as
an impact-beyond-capital. What it means to be ‘impactful’ is largely defined through its
negation; I identify four negations in particular: not boring, not Wall Street, not small and not
hippie.
If Chapter Five is about a concept that allows for the tensions and contradictions of
the cleantech project to be sutured together, Chapter Six focuses on the opposite, the ways in
which contradictory ideas are separated from one another, and how those separations are then
strategically managed. Coincidentally, there are also four separations highlighted in this
chapter:
Personal vs Professional
Now vs Later
Concrete vs Abstract
Thinking vs Doing

Boltanski and Chiapello describe the emergence of a new spirit of capitalism through
the dialectic of capital and critique, or specifically the ways in which capital recuperates its
dominant critiques, incorporating them into a new legitimizing discourse. In Section Two, my
aim is to show that this recuperation is not simple or straightforward, but an ongoing, actively
managed process. To make sense of this, I turn to recent work by Kari Norgaard on the
sociology of climate denial. Norgaard’s study, Living in Denial (2011) takes place in a small
Norwegian ski village where climate change is both understood and very palpably present;
there is not enough snow in a town whose cultural and national identity is built around snowrelated activities. Norgaard tries to understand the townspeople’s silence and inaction
regarding climate change as a form of climate denial; not the type we commonly think about,
funded by right wing billionaires like the Koch brothers, but a more subtle, everyday form of
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denial, the management of uncomfortable information. If Norgaard is looking at the
rationalization of inaction, for me, the focus is on justification of action; the two are clearly
intertwined. I close this section suggesting that in the cleantech space, while there is little
sign of climate denialism, there is a different sort of denial, one that might best be understood
as capital denial, or refusal to acknowledge the realities of the global economy within which
cleantech entrepreneurs hope to make an impact.
Section Two focuses on the everyday vernacular of the green spirit of capitalism in
the cleantech space, along with the strategies of individual and collective identity formation
that allow cleantech professionals to feel good about their ‘project.’ In Section Three, the
focus shifts away from motivating and legitimizing ideals towards market imperatives and
the specific mechanisms through which they are enacted and performed. This section is about
market discipline, or what Moishe Postone (1993) calls “abstract domination.”
The laws of the market exert a powerful, almost gravitational force over the cleantech
market. These are not however, immutable physical laws, but messy social realities that have
to be negotiated and enacted through everyday interactions. Hence, this section attempts to
understand the performativity of abstract market imperatives in the cleantech space.
Though there are a range of different types of investors active in the cleantech market,
venture capitalists are the most influential - culturally if not always financially. Chapter seven
provides some context on how this particular venture capital marketplace operates. First I
provide a general review of the funding options that are available to early stage cleantech
companies, and then dig into some of the peculiarities of the venture capital investing model including the ubiquitous concept of “fiduciary responsibility” which binds the investors of
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other peoples’ money to a set of expectations as how to how that money is most responsibly
tended.
During my fieldwork, I repeatedly found venture capitalists being referred to (and
themselves identifying) as “smart money.” As opposed to other more passive investors,
venture capitalists take an active role in managing their portfolio of investments, helping
entrepreneurs make connections and navigate the difficult process of commercializing a new
business. This active management is lauded by economic sociologists and business scholars
as a crucial piece that determines the success of an innovation ecosystem (Ferrary and
Granovetter 2009; Florida and Kenney 1998; Gompers and Lerner 2001a, 2001b). However,
it is important to see how this active management also functions as a disciplinary pressure,
exerted upon the entrepreneurs lucky enough to receive funding. There are strings attached to
this money - invisible strings that impose a very discrete set of market imperatives, financial
expectations and commercial temporalities upon startups and their process of development.
Chapter Eight looks more closely at the idea of ‘smart money’ and the way it reveals a
general (or abstract) disciplinary logic that permeates the cleantech market, determining not
only how venture capitalists operate, but also inflecting the actions of a much broader range
of consultants and service providers who aim to prove - to investors and entrepreneurs, that
even though they do not personally have direct access to smart money, they are nonetheless
smart-without-money. The Funder’s Forum provides an opportune venue to observe this
performance, functioning as something like a rehearsal space for strategic consultants and
entrepreneurs alike.
Chapter Nine then explores the political economy of fiduciary responsibility, the very
discrete forms of discipline and control that investors impose upon startup entrepreneurs, and
the narrowing of creativity that results. Here we end up with a conundrum. On the one hand,
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the truism that ‘capitalism spurs innovation’ is hard to contradict. The cleantech space is
filled with innovative entrepreneurs, inventors and investors, all of whom desperately want to
see new technologies succeed. And yet, in the eyes of capital (or the ‘fiduciary responsibility’
of investors) not all innovations are created equal, and only those innovations that promise
sizeable and rapid returns are likely to receive support. In other words, there are many good
technologies out there that make for bad investments. And so, while it may be the case that
we will need new technologies to provide the infrastructure for any ecologically viable future
economy, it is not so clear that the specific technologies being produced by the prevailing
funding streams will ever be able to get us there. Hybrid cars, electric cars or fuel efficient
cars will never help us achieve a world without cars.
Consider where business environmentalism has gotten us. The first Earth Day event
was held in 1970, at the high point of the US environmental movement’s strength (Dowie
1995). At the event, activists buried a few cars in the ground to symbolize their opposition to
the polluting, unsustainable and alienating status quo that automobiles made possible. As one
radical environmentalist put it, “the key to alternative transport lies in the alternative to
transport” (Rivers 1976, quoted in Jamison 2001: 126). Now fast forward to 2013. I am
having coffee with one of my research participants, a strategic consultant in the cleantech
space. Somehow the topic of a future without cars arises.
PC: Are you serious about what you're saying? That we should move away
from cars? Is this a serious question?
JG: I live in New York city, I like not having a car.
PC: Yeah but I live in New Jersey… I don't find it to be a very meaningful
question because it is ridiculous, it has no basis of meaning… This is how
people fall out of bed: you are asking a legitimate question that is stupid and
meaningless to me, and I would argue for a lot of other people. It is not
meaningless, but I thought we were going to have a discussion of what we are
actually going to do. It’s fine, its an esoteric discussion and you can have it, its
not invalid. I'm trying to find where does that apply to boots on the ground.
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In Chapter Nine, we see how cleantech, no matter how innovative its participants, will
only ever help us realize some possible futures and not others.

Technology	
  and	
  Innovation	
  for	
  the	
  Anthropocene	
  

People ‘earn their living’. And yet again we ask ourselves: ‘What life do we
earn when we earn our living?’ (Lefebvre 2008: 70)

Capitalism – or an economic logic predicated on the necessity of growth and the
churning of cheap inputs (land and labor) into sellable goods – may be the motor of this
systemic destabilization, but our problems – understood at a planetary scale – extend far
beyond one particular social logic or political economy, into all of the ways that our
landscape has been built to support this economic system and the modernity that it has very
unevenly delivered; supporting it and naturalizing it at the same time.
Geologists have begun to see this thoroughly produced nature as a new planetary
epoch, with the many thousands of years of the Holocene giving way to a new period of our
own creation: the Anthropocene (Crutzen 2006). Kevin Surprise (2013) suggests that a more
apt description may be the ‘capitalocene’ as it is largely due to our global organization of
production and consumption that humanity has begun to have such debilitating planetary
effects. Perhaps along these lines we can see the climate crisis as a crisis of fixed capital:
capital has literally fixed itself in and upon the land we live on, the air we breathe, and the
earth we inhabit. Bill McKibben (2012) explains that even oil still sitting in the ground has
already been financially accounted for; the promise of its future extraction already circulates
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in the present as a fictitious, financialized commodity. Ever increasing portions of the world
are coming under the sway of capital’s profit-maximizing logic, either as potentially valuable
commodities or as a devalued sink for the wastes that our throughput entails. With increased
discussion of geo-engineering entering into the halls of global ‘green’ governance, capital’s
logic seems poised to ensnare the whole planet - as well as the planet as a whole - in its
ineluctable web.
In 2013 I went to an event at the 16 Beaver social center in Lower Manhattan, where
a young man from Tokyo was explaining his presence in New York as an environmental
refugee. He had decided to evacuate his home, to leave everything and everyone he knew and
loved, to escape the radioactive fallout from Fukushima that was crippling his health. He
recounted his last conversation with his father. When he told his father of his decision, the
elder had a one word response.
“Cockroach.”
After some silence, his father added, “You are like a cockroach, just living to live.”
This short vignette offers an important lesson about the power of everyday rhythms
and the social infrastructure that defines the lives we live; to leave this behind is to leave
behind one’s life, to enter into something altogether new. Climate change writ large will
demand similar evacuations from all of us; a wholesale exodus from this life, so we might
turn towards another. Were we to embark on such a migration – an exodus from capital’s
abstract and abstracting rhythms – we could expect to be called cockroaches – dirty, filthy,
anti-social creatures, rejecting all that is good, all that we know to be normal and right and
modern. And yet we must ask, as Sylvia Federici asked later during this event, what life will
we be entering into? What lifestyle, in common, might welcome us?
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As Kari Norgaard’s work on climate denial suggests, in the face of immediate and
knowable danger, sometimes it is easier to deny than to act. Instead of giving it all up, we
wait for it all to be taken from us. It is so hard to let go. So long as the everyday is
salvageable, then all efforts are made to maintain it. So long as it is viable to suggest that all
should stay and can stay as it has always been, then that is what many will choose – and that
is what the state and corporate power with direct financial interest in the maintenance of the
status quo will advocate for. It becomes a question of national identity. Our “American way
of life” is simply off the table.
This is not simply a matter of information vs. mis-information in the mass media. It is
about a production of normalcy, complacency, and willful denial.

An everyday rhythm that

allows for what Lefebvre calls the survival of capitalism, its continual reproduction of its
relations of production.
And yet, with or without capitalism, we will still have the wreckage that was
Fukushima. With or without capitalism, we will still have an urbanized planet where the
social reproduction of the majority depends upon resources procured from afar; extracted,
grown and delivered.
It is depressingly, frighteningly humorous to acknowledge how collectively incapable
we seem to be in preventing our self-annihilation. For all of the earnest, well intentioned
sentiment, all of the scientific alarms, all of the expressed desire – and will – to make the
world a better place, we’ve done too little, too late. Like Wile E. Coyote, we’re still running,
but we’ve already past the edge of the cliff, and it’s just a matter of time before we fall.
These planetary problems are all of ours to bear and we have failed to tackle it. Of
course, this reveals the problem – there is currently no globally coherent ‘we’ beyond that
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which speaks as and for capital, demanding little more than its own self expansion and
knowing little of the world beyond the universal claim that all can and should enter into this
economic orbit. This is the only global ‘we’ that is currently operating with any modicum of
power and effect. As I will suggest in my conclusion, increasingly there is a different ‘we’
surfacing, one that is coming to realize that this dominant ‘we’ - capital and its self obsessed
logic - is not making very good decisions. Within the cleantech space, and more broadly
reflected in some aspects of the new green spirit of capitalism, there is a sense that nonmarket coordination is both necessary and desirable, and that ‘we’ need to re-claim control
over our planetary fate from the supposed superiority of the free market and its logic.
Here then is my provocation, which I ask you to carry with you in reading this text.
Are all those committed to realizing green capitalism - imagined in any number of shapes and
forms - looking for capital to save the day? Or is it that people are putting their faith in the
power of accumulated social wealth and our collective capacity to engage in collaborative,
social production - a power that capital has hoarded into a near monopoly, but that we may be
readying ourselves to reclaim?
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Chapter	
  2:	
  A	
  Brief	
  Pre-‐History	
  of	
  Green	
  Capitalism,	
  or	
  the	
  Rise	
  of	
  Business	
  
Environmentalism	
  

This chapter will provide some historical context for ‘green capitalism’ by tracing it
through the history of environmentalism, as well as a more general history of economic
development and industrial transitions. My intention is not to provide a comprehensive
history of the global or even US environmental movement, but to trace the lineages of
environmentalism that lead up to and contextualize the emergence of concepts (and attendant
institutions and practices) such as renewable energy, sustainable development, green
capitalism, and cleantech. This is a history of technology, of ‘nature’ and its transformations,
of economic imperatives and prerogatives, of social movement victories and defeats - far too
large an endeavor for me to take on in any substantial detail. Instead I offer the general
contours of this story, enough to provide an adequate sense of what ‘green capitalism’ or
‘business environmentalism’ is, where it comes from, and how it is situated within the
broader context of the neoliberal present.
Of course the biggest difficulty with writing a history such as this is the instability and
ever shifting terrain of the current conjuncture. When I began this research, cleantech was a
proud buzzword - at events business men and woman of all stripes would proudly proclaim
that what they do - whether brokering, consulting, lawyering or venture investing, was in and
of the cleantech space. At the time I’m writing this - two and a half short years later cleantech has been devastatingly marred by the spectacular failures - accompanied by equally
spectacular partisan vitriol - of US government supported cleantech firms such as Solyndra
and MiaSole. At the same events, “cleantech” is now only uttered when necessary, emptied
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of its triumphalism and colored by a knowing sense that this project, or at least one iteration
of it, may have slipped away. New terms, such as “clean web” or “clean economy” circulate
with more tried and true variants such as “renewable energy” and “alternative energy.” This
is not surprising; the development of alternative energy and material technologies have been
rebranded every decade since the 1970s: solar energy, the 1980s: renewable energy, the
1990s: sustainable development. ‘Cleantech’ has simply claimed the next available decade,
only to be superseded in turn, as new and newly applied monikers such as ‘resiliency’ and
‘green growth’ begin to lay claim to the present decade.
And so, while the Promethean hubris of the cleantech space may have been knocked
down a notch or two, it has not subsided completely. The current glut of photovoltaic panels
coming out of China coupled with new securitized financing mechanisms has solar power
poised to make exponential gains in the developed world. New advances in energy storage
and energy management are slowly creeping into an industry that has been historically held
antithetic to innovation and change. And of course, countless new projects - new cleantech
projects, whether they choose to go by this name or not - continue to emerge, despite an
increasingly hostile funding environment for early stage ventures in the field.
I will begin with a general overview of environmental thought, leading up to the rise of
the modern environmental movement in the mid-20th century. The 1970s, then, present a
pivotal moment in the narrative - as both a peak of the contemporary environmental
movement as well at its eclipse. The emergence of neoliberal ideologies and institutional
practices dramatically set the environmental movement back throughout the 1980s (Kazis and
Grossman 1982), fundamentally transforming environmentalism in the process. One of these
transformations was the professionalization and corporatization of environmentalism - a shift
from antagonistic to cooperative strategies - and the rise of business environmentalism 27

which espoused the possibility of green capitalism - or what in academic circles has been
referred to as ecological modernization. This transition begins as early as the 70s, but gains
force through the movement’s retrenchment during the 80s. With the emergence of a ‘new
economy’ in the 90s, faith in the free market reached new heights, and market-based
solutions to environmental problems seemed to be well within the realm of feasibility. This
set the stage for global attempts to implement carbon markets, and an increased focus on the
development and commercialization of new ‘cleaner’ technologies. During the 90s these
technologies remained under the shadow of far more robust technological fields such as
information technology (infotech) and biological sciences (biotech), but after the dot.com
bust in 2001, venture capital embraced the field, and the decades old pursuit of energetically
and materially efficient technologies took on the name ‘cleantech’.

Conservation	
  and	
  Preservation:	
  the	
  20th	
  century	
  prior	
  to	
  the	
  1970s	
  

In the US, the history of green capitalism is often traced through the history of
environmentalism and its emergence out of two competing early 20th century paradigms of
land management (Dowie 1995). The first is associated with naturalists such as John Muir
(2011) and Aldo Leopold (1970), who extolled the beauty of untouched nature, and
advocated for its preservation, in pristine form. As such, they followed in the tradition of 19th
century British and American land owners and romantics such as William Morris (Thompson
2011), Henry Thoreau (2012), and William Blake (1977), who bemoaned the impact that
industrial development was having on the pastoral landscape, and sought to preserve
depopulated, scenic expanses of wilderness for the enjoyment of people like them (Olwig
1984). Donald Worster traces this position through the “arcadian” tradition of ecological

28

thought - which saw the natural world as a complex whole that was intrinsically valuable, as
demonstrated by its beauty and fecundity (Worster 1994).
Worster contrasts this arcadian spirit with an ‘imperial’ ecology, committed first and
foremost to the domination, control and productive use of nature-as-resource. The second
paradigm of resource management, associated with men such as Gilford Pinchot and his
“conservation ethic,” has echoes of this imperial tradition. Pinchot (2009) saw in nature a
productive resource to be managed effectively – used, but also maintained. Through his early
20th century work in the U.S. Forestry Service, Pinchot experimented with state-led efforts to
regulate and curtail the most unsustainable land use practices, and to manage, from the topdown, the long-term productivity of the United States’ natural resource base (Dowie 1995;
Hays 1969). As founding chief of the National Forest Service, Pinchot became a vocal
proponent of efficient use of natural resources – railing against the wasteful practices of the
timber industry, and extolling instead scientific management. Pinchot hoped to convince
industry that more efficient scientific management of their resources could actually improve
their profitability in the long run, thus avoiding the boom and bust cycles of ‘extractivist’
capitalism (Hvalkof 2000).
This resource base went through dramatic transformations in the first decades of the
20th century, as oil discoveries became increasingly central to the national and global
economy. Accelerated by the development of a national highway system, industrial capital
gained unprecedented access to wilderness preserves in the U.S., both national forests and
Bureau of Land Management holdings, leading to an outright assault upon these newly
accessible natures (Cronon 1992; Dowie 1995). Access to this vast wealth of geological
resources helped fuel a supercharged industrial economy in the US and beyond, whose
material and energetic excesses far surpassed the magnitude and intensity of any prior human
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transformations of the geophysical world. This era initiated what Schnaiberg and Gould
(1994) term the ‘treadmill of production’. Over the ensuing decades, two world wars, the
green revolution in agriculture, the rise of the automobile and a suburbanized landscape of
consumption and disposability remade the world (Wilson 1991). But this golden age of
capital and consumption, was also a golden age of waste and pollution. Vance Packard’s The
Waste Makers (1960) gave popular articulation to what by then had become an increasingly
obvious ‘inefficiency’ built into the profit-seeking economy. Simply put, disposability and
waste were good for business.
Packard focused primarily on the cultural, social and psychological adulterations that
planned obsolescence and excessive disposability had on an otherwise productive U.S.
society. He argued that natural resources were being squandered unnecessarily and that they
were not, contrary to corporate beliefs and growing profit margins, being used wisely.
Packard’s work represents a progressive take on the ‘imperial’ or ‘conservationist’ critique of
20th century industrialism, appealing to his readers’ sense that social production can and
should be more rationally managed.
While Packard focused on the deleterious effects of mass consumerism on society,
Rachel Carson, with her publication of Silent Spring (1962), brought attention to the negative
implications that industrial production was having on the non-human world. In different
ways, both Carson and Packard each articulate a critique of industrial production from their
respective scientific backgrounds. Silent Spring focused on the effect that pesticides were
having on creatures beyond those deemed pests, and the misinformation that the chemical
industry promoted to conceal these potentially devastating side effects. And so whereas
Packard challenged the conscious planning of obsolescence and waste-making, Carson
focused on the unintended (and unacknowledged) wastefulness of industrialism, whose
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‘externalities’ were degrading the natural environment. Her book is an homage to nature-atrisk, a beautiful non-human world that industrial production threatens to destroy.
As such, Carson’s book re-invigorated the arcadian or preservationist tradition of
ecological critique, and is often credited with galvanizing - or at the least coming to define the emergence of modern environmentalism, which began to take shape in the 1960s (and
which was, from the outset, attacked by the business community) (Gottlieb 2005).
Throughout this decade, socio-natural disasters, including the partial meltdown at the Fermi
nuclear power plant in 1966, an oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara in 1969, and in the
same year Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River bursting into flames, provided vivid evidence of the
deleterious effect that industrial production was having on the earth as a natural system.4
The first Earth Day celebration was held in 1970, and despite extreme corporate
backlash (Kazis and Grossman 1982) a string of successful environmental regulations passed
through the newly formed Environmental Protection Agency, from the Clean Air Act of 1963
to the Clean Water Act of 1977. Environmentalists increasingly turned to pre-enlightenment
conceptions of the earth as a living entity, provoking not only fears of its death, but also a
sense that greater care could and should be taken to prevent irreversible harm (Lovelock
1988; Lovelock 2006; Merchant 2005).

4

While the wildlife conservation and preservation movements can trace their lineage to
Pinchot and Muir, the public health and anti-pollution dimensions of modern
environmentalism trace their lineage back to the urban sanitation movements of the 19th
century (Cohen 2006; Gottlieb 2005; Melosi 2000; Tarr 1996). By the turn of the 20th century
much of this work had become professionalized and bureaucratized – leaving less space for
urban environmental social movements to thrive. This changed by the 1960s with a growing
public awareness of the threats posed to public health by industrial toxicity and pollution.
This reawakening of anti-pollution sentiment conjoined with the already well established
wildlife conservation movement to form the modern environmental movement in the US
(Cohen 2006; Dunlap and Mertig 1992).
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While Carson’s work is most directly credited with helping to spark the modern
environmental movement, threads of Packard’s critique also resonated with popular
environmentalism, social movements and counter cultures that were dissatisfied with the
dehumanizing, anti-ecological brutality and irrationality of the industrial system. A
thoroughgoing social, political and ecological critique was in formation, as people expressed
dissatisfaction with the hegemonic post-war cultural, economic and political order, as well as
the techno-scientific infrastructure that supported it.
The war effort that led up to and through the Second World War had dramatically
strengthened the relationship between science, technology and politics (Noble 1979). The US
government enlisted scientists in their war effort, tasking them with the development of new
weapons and materials technologies, from atomic bombs to synthetic rubber, that
industrialists were then tasked with producing for the military. During the war, much of this
research was coordinated and funded through the US Army’s Military Planning Division, led
by Georges Doriot. When the war ended, the research did not. Doriot took his expertise into
the private sector, founding the American Research Development Corporation (ARDC),
whose explicit objective was to fund the development of commercial applications for military
technologies. Doriot is largely considered to be the father of modern venture capital
investing, and his firm ARDC, is considered to be one of the first two private venture capital
firms (Ante 2008).
“Big science” had become a major force in the industrial economy, what John
Kenneth Galbraith termed a “technostructure” in which scientific labs increasingly resembled
the scale - and productivity - of industrial factories (Galbraith 2007). Throughout the 1960s
critical theorists - many of whom had fled Europe to escape the Nazis during the war leveled fierce criticism of this new techno-social configuration of society. The Frankfurt
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School theorists, from Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (2009) to
Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1991), tried to lay bare the dehumanizing,
alienating effects born of the commercialization of science and creativity. Social critics such
as Lewis Mumford (2010), and C. Wright Mills (1961) critiqued the scientific-technological
state and the subjugation of knowledge production to what was becoming known as the
“military industrial complex” and “the colonization of technological rationality by
commercial interests” (Jamison 2001: 66; Jamison and Eyerman 1995). Mumford argued that
knowledge making had become authoritarian, thoroughly dominated by a commercial ethos
and its hierarchical logic, threatening more democratic forms of making and thinking, or
“technics” (Mumford 2010; Jamison 2001).
Whereas the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School focused their writings on a
wholesale critique of technology, Mumford offered a more positive vision forward. He
writes,
A good technology, firmly related to human needs, cannot be one that has a
maximum productivity as its supreme goal: it must rather, as in an organic
system, seek to provide the right quantity of the right quality at the right time
and the right place for the right purpose. To this end deliberate regulation and
self direction, in order to ensure continued growth and creativity, must govern
our plans in the future, as indefinite expansion and multiplication have done
during the past few centuries. The center of gravity is not the corporate
organization, but the human personality, utilizing knowledge, not for the
increase of power and riches, or even for the further increase of knowledge,
but using it, like power and riches, for the enhancement of life (Mumford
1979: 167; cited in Jamison 2001: 67)

Across the world, “new social movements” emerged that were committed to pursuing
an alternative approach to technological development and knowledge-making along lines
sympathetic with Mumford’s vision of good technologies, aimed at the enhancement of life.
Their response to mounting environmental concerns was to create alternative or appropriate
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technologies that could demonstrate - and instantiate at a small, or human, scale - other
possible techno-social configurations conducive to a more meaningful, less alienating modern
existence. Experimentation with alternative building forms, renewable and distributed energy
systems, as well as new means of coordinating social life and new venues for sharing and
disseminating knowledge all proliferated in and through the relatively autonomous (though
loosely connected) countercultural communities (and communes) that emerged during this
time (Carr 1985; Hollick 1982; Jamison 2001; Morrison 1980; Pursell 1993; Willoughby
1990).
Rejecting capitalism, sexism, racism and militarism required accepting, developing and
improving new and alternative forms of technological infrastructure that could support such
alternatives. As Glover (2006) argues, “At its extreme, the counter culture rejected the
conventional energy system and, importantly, everything it stood for” (252). Sites such as the
New Alchemy Institute, which occupied a small dairy farm in Cape Cod, became centers of
experimentation for the burgeoning investigation into appropriate technologies. In one of its
bulletins, they explain:
Our programs are geared to produce not riches, but rich and stable lives,
independent of world fashion and the vagaries of international economics. The
New Alchemists work at the lowest functional level of society on the premise
that society, like the planet itself, can be no healthier than the components of
which it is constructed. The urgency of our efforts is based on our belief that
the industrial societies which now dominate the world are in the process of
destroying it (Bulletin of the New Alchemists, Fall 1970: at
www.thegreencenter.net/newalchemy.html accessed 2014-02-12).

E.F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (1999
[1973]) and Ivan Illich’s Tools For Conviviality (2009 [1973]) gave theoretical articulation to
the embrace of appropriate technologies and small-scale socio-economic alternatives as
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practices that provided the necessary cultural and intellectual grounds for a re-humanization
of the modern, industrial world.
These authors published their works in the same year as the first oil shock hit the
world. In October 1973 members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo against the US in retaliation for their support of Israel
during the Yom Kippur War. The ensuing fuel shortages and sudden price rise brought
energy production, consumption and distribution into the limelight. The US’s domestic
supply of petroleum was on the decline, and the increasing reliance on foreign sources of oil
became painfully clear (Yergin 2009).
And so, while countercultural movements experimented with appropriate
technologies, mainstream culture - and mainstream environmentalism - became increasingly
concerned with limits. Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1970 [1968]) provided an
alarming neo-Malthusian account of coming resource scarcities due to impending overpopulation of the planet, and in 1972 the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth, which applied
systems theory to questions of planetary ecology, reported on the results of their computer
based model, predicting a future of instability and resource scarcity. Coupled with the acute
problems caused by the oil crisis, environmental concerns moved from the periphery to the
center of political and economic life.
During the Carter administration, alternative energy - then referred to as solar energy
- was seen as an essential component of a national energy policy - the very idea of which
Carter introduced when he first took office in 1977 (and out of which was formed the
Department of Energy) (Yergin 2009). Carter took seriously the threat of looming resource
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scarcity, and presented a grim picture to the American public. Energy was a challenge
marked by sacrifice and difficulty.
Under the guidance of the newly formed Department of Energy, Carter’s
administration with the support of Congress created tax incentives, grants and regulations to
support the development of solar energy and other sources of alternative energy. They also
formed a new national research laboratory, the Solar Energy Research Institute, appointing
Denis Hayes - who had helped create the first Earth Day in 1970 - as its first director. In
1979, Carter famously held a press conference on the roof of the White House, dedicating a
solar hot water heating system, and proclaiming, “No one can ever embargo the sun” (Yergin
2009: 527). Also during this time, the anti-nuclear movement was at its prime, presenting a
trenchant critique of the technological industrial complex and engaged in direct actions and
the largest mass protests of the post-Vietnam era (Joppke 1993).
Yet just weeks after this rooftop spectacle, amidst the second oil crisis and the Iranian
revolution, Carter’s commitment to solar energy waned, and he switched his focus to synfuels
made out of coal or oil shale, before losing in his reelection bid to Reagan in 1980 (Yergin
2009).
The Reagan Administration directly countered Carter’s fixation on limits and
sacrifice, offering instead an upbeat message of abundance and possibility. The sociologist
Daniel Bell’s vision of post-industrial society (2008 [1976]) inspired a number of thinkers
and futurologists who foresaw the emergence of an innovation based economy that would
supersede the material limits predicted by the Club of Rome, which had largely been
accepted by the broader environmental movement of the time. An explicitly anti-Malthusian,
Julian Simon, asked, “Why shouldn’t the boundaries of the system from which we derive our
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resources continue to expand in such directions, just as they have expanded in the past?”
(Simon 1996[1981]: 66)
With the transition to the Reagan White House, there was a discernable backlash
against the environmental and renewable energy agendas promoted during the 70s. Backed
by the traditional energy and extraction based industries, the new administration was
determined to undo as much of the environmental legislation that had been enacted in the
prior decades as possible, seeing it all as an imposition upon the free market and its optimal
allocation of goods and services (Kazis and Grossman 1982). Over the ensuing decades,
Carter’s agenda, focused on “harnessing the power of the sun,” would come to be displaced
by a business agenda, focused instead on harnessing the power of the market.

Renewable	
  Energy	
  80’s	
  

By the time Reagan took office, the environmental movement was largely dominated
by large national organizations such as the Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, Greenpeace
and the Audubon Society, commonly referred to as the ‘Group of 10’ (Dowie 1995). As part
of a broader environmental movement during the 70s, these groups had helped to win a
number of legislative and regulatory victories that the new President, Ronald Reagan, vowed
to dismantle. Industries that relied upon ready access to North America’s vast stock of natural
resources had been actively opposing the regulation, management and protection of natural
resources for decades (Kazis and Grossman, 1982). These challenges were buttressed by an
ascendant neoliberal assault on Keynesian economics and welfare state politics (Peck 2001),
allowing the extractive industries to successfully push back against restrictions on land-use.
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With Reagan’s government firmly committed to free market principles, industry and state
together orchestrated a huge land grab known as the Sagebrush Rebellion, resulting in
millions of acres of formally protected federal lands being made accessible to rampant
development and resource extraction – in many ways a domestic analogue to the structural
adjustment policies that were simultaneously being imposed upon debt-bound foreign nations
(Tsing 2005; McNally 2006; Schnaiberg 1980; Gould et al. 1995; Dowie 1995).
With regard to land management, the ideological face of this early neoliberal
offensive became known as the “Wise Use Movement,” an astro-turfed populism (similar to
the Tea Party today) funded by the major extractive industries, who were more concerned
with conserving profits than nature (McCright and Dunlap 2010; McCarthy 1998). Through
this faux populist front, industry leaders successfully lobbied to be included in the discussion
of what sorts of ‘wisdom’ would govern restrictions (and the lack thereof) on the use of
natural resources (Vaughn 1997; Dunlap et al. 2001).
Land was not the only resource that Reagan’s administration made available to
capital. In turning attention away from renewable energy, Reagan’s administration embraced
other forms of innovation and technology, specifically information technology and
biotechnology. Important transformations in the legal status of non-human life forms as
potential property (Jasanoff 2012) as well as transformations in the legal structure governing
innovation bolstered the hi-tech economy. For instance, court decisions such as Diamond vs.
Chakrabarty (1980) and Moore vs. Regents of the University of California (1990), allowed
for a redefinition of bacteria and living human cells as property (Jasanoff 2012), and the
Bayh Dole Act (1980) allowed for the private possession and commercialization of
intellectual property created through publicly funded research institutions (Rajan 2012;
Cooper 2008).
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These fields of technological innovation were funded by an emboldened venture
capital industry, awash with money after changes to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) in 1979 allowed pension funds to invest in a diversified portfolio that
included a portion of high risk assets such as venture capital (Longstreth 1986; Gompers
1994). This represented a major shift in technology funding, which had largely flowed
through the research labs of major corporations (such as the famous Bell Labs) throughout
the preceding decades. However, corporate research and development was under attack in the
80s, stigmatized as an example of corporate largess and wasteful expenditures, shepherded by
careless managers who did not - so the narrative went - have the best interest of shareholders
in mind (Ho 2009).
The model under attack was that of a publicly minded corporation, whose managers
balanced the needs of multiple constituencies – from shareholders and lenders to workers,
consumers and even local and national communities (Berle and Means 1991). The undoing of
this model occurred through the rise of institutional investors, able to wield their power as
‘activist shareholders.’ This ‘shareholder revolution’ was a major element in the growing
financialization of the economy. Publicly held companies were to answer to the dictates of
their shareholders, who expected maximum financial returns and high stock prices above all
else. Any managerial decisions that did not immediately increase short-term share prices,
such as long-term research and development initiatives and basic science research, were seen
as financial inefficiencies (Ho 2009). Commercialization of early stage technologies
increasingly became the dominion of venture capital firms, who answered directly to the
dictates of financial markets.
The nadir for the U.S. solar energy industry came in 1986, when a global oversupply
of oil in the world market dropped the price of oil from $34 to $10 a barrel, all but destroying
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the chance for alternative energy technologies to reach cost-parity with conventional
alternatives. That said, during the 80s, solar energy fared better in other nations, such as
Japan, where the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) established a new
agency, the New Energy and industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) in
1979. Throughout the 80s, NEDO continued to develop renewable energy technologies. In
Germany, the environmental movement of the 1970s resulted in the rise of the Green Party in
the 1980s, who implemented programs such as feed-in-tariffs, dramatically accelerating the
development of a market for renewable energy technologies (Yergin 2009).
As environmentalism became increasingly professionalized, a number of important
think tanks emerged during the 80s, such as The World Resources Institute, created by
former Carter advisor Gustav Speth, the Worldwatch Institute, founded by Lester Brown, and
in India, Anil Agarwal’s Centre for Science and Environment (Jamison 2001). These
organizations gave voice to a generalized concern for global or planetary environmental
issues, such as climate change, ozone depletion and biodiversity. In conjunction with (and
often in collaboration with) their colleagues in corporate public relations, they helped frame
the emerging discourse of sustainable development, which was most notably expressed by the
World Commission on Environment and Development, whose 1987 report, Our Common
Future, defined sustainable development as a global imperative.
Around this time, climate change was solidifying its status as a global political and
economic issue. In 1988, James Hansen debuted on the world stage, offering dire predictions
of devastating anthropogenic global warming at a US Senate hearing on global warming.
That same year, in Geneva, Switzerland the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) was inaugurated, issuing their first Assessment Report to the United Nations in 1990.
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Global summits in Rio (1992) and Kyoto (1997) extended this dialogue of global
climate governance and sustainable development into the 90s, with what in hindsight were
largely unsuccessful efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions at a planetary scale by
deploying market mechanisms such as a global market in carbon offsets - proposed in lieu of
politically unfeasible regulations - such as bans, taxes or firmly imposed limits. Anything
resembling the latter was disparagingly referred to as a vestige of a failed model of
‘command and control’ regulations, which somehow came to take the blame for all prior
failures of climate regulation and economic stagnation (despite the fact that such regulations
were the only approaches with a proven track record of success in the environmental arena)
(Dowie 1995). Such policies were seen to be unfit for the new economy, and actually
provided something of a foil for neoliberal common sense to position itself against, what in
another context, Patricia Hill Collins (1999) might call a controlling image; a negative
stereotype meant to reinforce racist, sexist - and in our case economic - prejudices.
Beyond these global summits, environmental organizations continued to develop their
non-confrontational, collaborative relationships with the business community, whose
corporate social responsibility efforts appeared to dovetail with their global planetary
concerns. After the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, business leaders formed the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development, identifying ‘eco-efficiency’ as an important
new dimension of economic development (DeSimone and Popoff 2000; Jamison 2001).
This laid the groundwork for green capitalism as an ideological and policy framework
that eschewed state-led regulatory efforts in favor of market-making policies, such as setting
appropriate price-signals or creating new financial vehicles such as tradable environmental
credits, and hoping that such efforts could facilitate green technological innovation born out
of market competition. If ‘wise use’ was a buzzword of the 1980s, pro-business
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environmentalists in the 90s offered a discourse of even-wiser use, arguing that material and
energetic efficiencies would be both good for the planet, and for the bottom line. Publications
such as the Journal for Cleaner Production embraced the possibilities of mobilizing large
corporations and their vast capacity to create more environmentally responsible technologies
which, so long as they could prove their value socially, environmentally, and economically
(the ‘triple bottom line’) were sure to find their markets, transforming our techno-social
infrastructure in the process.
Whereas the environmental movement had, up to this point, maintained a relatively
staunch anti-corporate agenda (whether expressed in the need for regulations or more far
reaching transformation), the dominant environmental paradigm had now been framed with
concepts such as “sustainability” that provided blanket legitimization for environmental
positions that no longer had to specify just what exactly should or should not be sustained
(Redclift 2002).
Here - as we will explore in more depth below - a gap began to open between the
abstract expression of global problems - or global problems expressed as abstract concerns and the concrete, particular efforts of individual corporations (or people) to ‘make a
difference’ with isolated demonstrations of their environmental commitments kept safely at a
distance from any core (and fundamentally energy intensive, waste making or polluting)
business or consumer activities. There was a general shift away from public policy and
collective action towards individual and voluntary alterations of corporate and consumer
behavior (Stauber and Rampton 1995; Rampton and Stauber 2002). Somehow it became
possible for a company like Shell Oil to both anchor the energy intensive economy that was
causing climate change, and be actively committed to saving the planet. Or more recently for
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British Petroleum, which was then and continues to be now one of the largest fossil fuel
processors on the planet, to rebrand themselves as ‘beyond petroleum.’

Green	
  Capitalism	
  

Just as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring is associated with the emergence of the modern
environmental movement, Amory Lovins’s Soft Energy Paths (1977) is considered a seminal
text in the mainstream and corporate embrace of renewable energy technologies. Though
emerging out of the anti-corporate social movements of the 70s, Lovins’s text outlines plans
for a transition into a renewable energy economy, one that recognizes the need to partner
with industry, in order to realize the massive infrastructural shifts that would be required. The
five foundations of Lovins’s soft energy path were:
1) Renewable energy flows rather than stocks;
2) Diverse, modest, and specifically applied sources;
3) Flexible and relatively low technology;
4) Output matched in scale and distribution to end uses; and
5) Energy quality matched to end-use needs (Lovins 1997; Glover 2006)

Creating local autonomy for energy users - the extreme case of which would be
aspirations of going “off the grid” - was central to this vision. Energy production would be
distributed, incorporating a diverse array of technologies suited to specific energy needs and
circumstances, including the ability of local users to manage, maintain, and ultimately control
their energy infrastructure.
These renewable energy systems were not meant to replace conventional energy
sources directly. They were never intended to support the massive centralized power
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generation required for the auto-suburban complex of mass consumer society. Instead, such
alternative systems would be designed to meet more modest, particular local needs, with the
hope that such de-centralized (de-massified) and de-commodified forms of social
provisioning would provide an alternative way of life, not just an alternative energy system.
Renewable energy was, as Glover writes, “the technical means to social ends” (254).
But Lovins’ work attempts to imagine how such a transformation might actually
occur - at a global scale. In so doing, he proposes a ‘transition period’ in which renewables
and conventional energy would coexist. It is in the details of this transition, Glover argues,
that the project shifts, from a transition away from corporate control and mass consumerism
to a transition into these powerful engines of economic growth and control.
The key - as we will explore in more depth below - lay in Lovins’s presentation of the
possibility of utopian transformations of social life without the complete overhaul of the
economic system and its most sacrosanct institutions. It would be a radical revolution,
without the need for any politically radical confrontations. Lovins’s argument, which sets the
tone for the entire genre of green capitalism, is that simply removing market imperfections subsidies, improper price signals - will result in a transition to the soft energy path due to its
fundamentally sound and incontrovertible economic advantages over the status quo. Simply
put - any ‘feasible’ transition would entail renewable energy being embraced by the existing
economic system and incorporated into its patterns and objectives.
Lovins’ work was followed by a whole range of texts picking up on the upbeat, probusiness implications of his text. In 1981, Lester Brown’s Building a Sustainable Society,
published by his Worldwatch Institute, argued for the increased use of renewable energy
technologies. In 1983, Paul Hawken wrote The Next Economy, followed a decade later by his
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seminal work The Ecology of Commerce. Gustav Speth, another veteran of the mainstream
environmental movement added his text in 1985: Protecting our environment : toward a new
agenda, and in 1989 Bill McKibben published The End of Nature (2006).
Through the 90s there was a shift away from the apocalyptic, Malthusian undertones
of the environmental debates of the 60s and 70s, as the mainstream environmental movement
embraced the Promethean optimism of the business community. The cold war was over,
which seemed to prove once and for all the infallibility of capitalism, consumerism and the
increasingly global markets of what would then be deemed, ‘the new economy’ (Henwood
2005). Limits to growth and population bombs were supplanted by more positive, hopeful,
messages - less concerned with external constraints than with internal potentials (Norgaard
2006).
The new economy, also called globalization or global capitalism, knew no bounds. It
could, and it would create a new green capitalism. The new economy was considered
unstoppable; it provided an endless wellspring of innovation, coupled with the capacity to
realize any new ideas at the largest imaginable scales… so long as they were profitable.
Mainstream environmentalism was on board. The business community demonstrated
world-making capacities that those concerned with planetary-scale environmental problems,
such as climate change and biodiversity loss, simply could not afford to alienate. The
environmentalist agenda should - the argument went - harness this world-making power of
the markets, and direct it towards more ecologically desirable outcomes.
Around this time, the ‘greening’ of human society emerged as a new paradigm,
alongside yet distinct from both traditions of conservation and preservation (Dobson, 2007).
From conservation it borrowed the commitment to rational management - only now instead
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of managing external nature alone, more emphasis was placed on the management of second
nature - the built industrial environment with its processes of production, distribution and
consumption. From preservation comes the sense that this greening of an internal, civilized
world, is necessary in order to save, or protect the external, ‘natural’ world. Hence, efforts to
green industrial society are motivated - in principle at least - by a desire to ’save the planet.’
As I will explore in depth in the following chapter, we can read this as a shift from
protecting ‘nature’ to improving the economy. The greening of the economy began with a rearticulation of environmental problems as general concerns - and therefore general
opportunities. In this way, particular and isolated environmental problems can be recast as
generally available opportunities to green our industrial economy. Global greening would
require global markets, and therefore the success of individual firms within these markets,
whose collectively individualized pursuit of profit - their ‘private vices’ - would lead to the
‘public virtue’ of a greener, cleaner economy.
That said, the commitment to greening the economy was not - nor is it yet completely generalized. During the 90s a powerful climate denial infrastructure emerged out
of seeds planted decades earlier (Rampton and Stauber 2002). Funded by the right, as well as
those with a direct stake in various dimensions of the fossil fuel sector, the science of climate
change was targeted and delegitimized through the specter of inconclusivity and informed
doubt. Furthermore, this embrace of environmentalism has occurred within and through the
uneven development of global capitalism, where spaces of privilege can and do insulate
themselves from the extractive and polluting materiality of their ‘post-industrial’ order. As
the developed world embraced the greening of its economy, environmental destruction only
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continued to intensify elsewhere in this ‘post-industrial’ economy, including - though not
limited to - the global south (Agarwal 2005; Jamison 2001)5.

Ecological	
  Modernization	
  and	
  its	
  Critics	
  

This general optimism about the potentials of economic development and the ongoing
progress of modernity fed into the social sciences as well. In 1986 Ulrich Beck (2007) first
described our new age as the “risk society” and in the 90s Beck, along with Giddens and
Lash (1994) have promoted the idea of “reflexive modernity.” Related to this, others theorists
such as Arthur Mol (2002, 2003) promoted the concept of ecological modernization, which
emphasizes the potential of new technologies and new forms of social cooperation to
dramatically reshape our ecological condition (Spaargaren and Mol 1992).
The ecological modernization paradigm emerged in the mid-80s, initially proposed by
Joseph Huber, a German sociologist, and was subsequently developed by Northern European
social scientists (Janicke 1985; Simonis 1989; Mol and Spaargaren 1993). From its earliest
formulations to the present – technological innovation figures centrally to ecological
modernization and its visions of a better possible economy. New, groundbreaking or
“disruptive” environmental technologies such as zero emission vehicles and closed loop
manufacturing would fix “design flaws” of the modern era (Cohen 2006). Advocates of

5

The U.S. public continues to demand environmental and health protections (through the
very same “command and control” style of regulations that had been effective since the 60s).
The result was the outsourcing of production processes with environmental and health risks
to less powerful regions – both domestically and internationally.
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ecological modernization consider nations such as Germany and the Netherlands to have
already accomplished a weak form of ecological modernization (Cohen 2000, 2006; Dryzek
et al. 2003; Janicke and Weidner 1997).
Cohen (2006) lauds the European environmental vanguard, who “have largely
replaced their command and control regulatory frameworks with flexible systems designed to
facilitate continuous improvement and spur technological innovation” (541). These nations
have realized that
the static, conflict-ridden approaches of the prior era are no longer appropriate
or effective. The perpetuation of environmental harm by industrial operations
is steadily coming to be viewed not as an inexpensive way to externalize
certain costs of production and to promote economic competitiveness, but
rather as a mark of unnecessary waste, inelegant design, and longer-term
comparative disadvantage (541).
Here in a nutshell is ecological modernization as a new discourse of planetary
improvement – one that is more European, and more academic and policy focused, but whose
analogue can clearly be seen in the green capitalist literature of the US. It is not that
ecological modernization is not alive in the US, it is that it exists in a different form for this
different institutional context – a thoroughly neoliberal environment in which all motive
force and socio-cultural legitimacy lies with the market and corporations, and not the
thoroughly maligned state.
In many respects, ecological modernization can appear to be a reprise of the rational,
efficiency maximizing resource management of Pinchot. What is different, or at least new,
about ecological modernization - or green capitalism for that matter - is a shift in the
conception of what sorts of resources can and should be managed. Whereas Pinchot was
primarily concerned with forestry management - specific repositories of raw materials ecological modernization calls for the management of planetary resources - or more
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specifically - the planet as a general, generally necessary resource. Further, the current focus
on technological innovation cannot be reduced to the conservationism of Pinchot, but instead
emerges out of the broad tradition of techno-optimism and Promethean hubris of
Enlightenment thought. In this regard, figures such as Edward Bellamy (1996) and Alvin
Toefller (1970) must also be considered forbears of this tradition.
While advocates of ecological modernization remain optimistic that such reforms can
succeed in ecological, economic and social terms, critical scholars have largely dismissed any
such possibility, arguing that capitalism is inherently anti-ecological. Definitions of ‘green
capitalism’ vary accordingly. For the latter camp, it entails the incorporation of ecological
conditions, however defined, into the circuits of capital accumulation; with the presumption
that it is ecology, and not capitalism, that changes through this process (Boyd et al 2001;
Kloppenburg 2005; O’Connor 1998; Prudham 2005; Smith 1984). Hence the marketization
of carbon emissions, the shift towards “clean technologies,” and the interest in large scale
organic food production all ultimately become subsumed by the relentless drive for growth, a
‘treadmill of production’ (Schnaiberg 1980) that pervades the global capitalist economy,
making green capitalism, as a project, little more than technological fetishization, naïve
optimism, the emergence of new markets, greenwashing, or most likely, some combination of
these all.
Nature is “really subsumed” by capital, but capital is never “really subsumed” by
ecology. Faith that the latter is possible motivates ecological modernization theorists – who
maintain that a distinct ecological rationality could subsume capital within its broader and
more humane orbit, transforming the economy and furthering the project of modernity – seen
here as a humanistic faith in technological advances leading to substantive equality, freedom
and relative prosperity. Schnaiberg (1980) critiques the naiveté of assuming that new –
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radically transformative technologies will be supported in labs whose funding, and therefore
existence, depend upon the perpetuation and expansion of the economy that is purportedly
the problem.
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3.1:	
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The	
  Spirit	
  of	
  Capitalism	
  

Before turning, in the following two sections, to a closer look at cleantech, the remainder
of this first section will be devoted to an exploration of the different ways that business
environmentalism has and continues to envision a happy marriage between capitalism and
planetary health. This is not an exploration focused on the actual practices of ‘green’
capitalism or a critique thereof, but of the discourses attempting to make sense of these
practices, couching them within a broadly defined and ambitious project that justifies
continued economic growth as a path towards planetary salvation.
Many books have been published over the last two decades that advocate, in one form or
another, for a greener capitalism, outlining how it can and must be possible for industry and
governments to shift gears and begin to build an ecologically responsible world. Many of the
proposals put forth in this green capitalism literature are distinctly at odds with capitalism as
we know it, or as they write, “business as usual.” To a large extent, this work is informed by
similar desires to those on the anti-capitalist left - to significantly transform our collective
relationship to the planet, to 'green' our social lives, and to save the planet from imminent
destruction.
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Yet despite the incorporation of seeming radical anti-systemic critique, these texts
ultimately help legitimize unsustainable practices such as suburban mass consumerism, or
increased energy production and consumption, even in the face of overwhelming evidence
that such practices are actually threatening the viability of life as we know it.
Accordingly, this section examines the justificatory frameworks or legitimizing
discourses that undergird the ‘spirit’ of this emerging green economy. While related, this is
not quite ‘the’ spirit of capitalism that Weber (2001) so famously identified. For Weber the
spirit of capitalism was about a puritan commitment to bettering oneself through work, so
long as that work was being financially remunerated. With the Protestant Reformation came
the belief that religious duty could be performed through practicing an occupation, working
in and on the world. This was in contrast to the ritualistic and symbolic “extra mundane”
activities privileged by the Catholic Church. Work was, Weber argues, beruf meaning that it
was “a religious vocation demanding fulfillment.” The Protestant ethic saw work as justified
in and of itself, allowing individuals to elide any examination of the purpose or direction of
the actual work they were engaged in - whether waged labor or the unbridled pursuit of
profit.
Of course Weber’s thesis, central as it is to the discipline of sociology, has
precipitated wide-ranging debates. Issues include whether and to what extent Protestantism
actually influenced the development of capitalism or more broadly religious beliefs in general
as well as the general concept that capitalism requires an external morality or legitimizing
force at all (Wood 1995; Lehmann and Roth 1995).
While Weber stresses the need for individual justifications of capitalist activities,
Albert Hirschman emphasizes the ways in which individual justifications may in fact be
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voiced in terms of the common good. Hirschman (1997) reconsiders Weber’s question,
asking how activities such as commerce and banking - moneymaking pursuits which had
traditionally been seen as barely tolerable morally - could become, pace figures like
Benjamin Franklin, a “calling”. In other words how is it that greed becomes good?
Hirschman points to a history of profitable activities that were highly esteemed according to
the political benefits that accrued. For Hirschman it is the secularism of the Enlightenment
that enables profit-making activity to be framed as contributing to society's common wealth.
The spirit of green capitalism that I identify has less to do with self-improvement than
with planetary improvement, and therefore with an excitement to produce a new world,
socially and ecologically. Here I follow in the path laid out by Boltanksi and Chiapello’s
work, The New Spirit of Capitalism (2007). Boltanksi and Chiapello’s work focuses on the
ways in which capital’s spirit has developed and transformed since the period Weber
analyzed. Instead of defining the spirit of capitalism as the specific allegiance to work
encapsulated by the Protestant Ethic, they argue that the capitalist economy has historically
relied upon a legitimizing set of non-capitalist values, motivating the bearers of wealth and
setting limits on the appropriate bounds of accumulation. To be effective, this legitimizing
discourse must not only create a sense of individual self worth, but a collective and social one
as well. In other words, the motivating spirit of capital is not merely about doing good for
oneself, but doing good for the social collective with which one identifies. While they
consider this to be a dominant ideology, they are careful to distance themselves from any
sense of ideology as false consciousness or “a mere subterfuge by the dominant to ensure the
consent of the dominated” (11), asking that we “acknowledge that a majority of those
involved–the strong as well as the weak–rely on the schemas in order to represent to
themselves the operation, benefits and constraints of the order in which they find themselves
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immersed” (11). For Boltanski and Chiapello, ideology relates to a Gramscian notion of
common sense, or as Therborn (2008) writes, a hegemonic and normalized sense of what is
good, what is right, and what is possible; not only for individuals themselves but also for a
shared sense of social (not just religious or spiritual) value (Hirschman 1997).
This is particularly important - Boltanski and Chiapello argue - in light of an economic
system that privileges selfishness, greed, and the individual accumulation of wealth. These
have all historically been considered anti-social behaviors, making capitalism, in many ways,
a fundamentally immoral system. Wage laborers are essentially resigned to permanent
dispossession and subordination. Capitalists “find themselves yoked to an interminable,
insatiable process, which is utterly abstract and dissociated from the satisfaction of
consumption needs, even of a luxury kind” (7). Hence for both parties there is a lack of
justification inherent to capitalism itself. Marx (1976) and many following him presume that
there is a material motive for participating in the capitalist economy. In the case of wage
laborers this is the basic necessity to survive. Boltanksi and Chiapello do not believe that this
is sufficient. Instead or perhaps in addition, a set of beliefs and arguments must be cited that
confirm the advantages both individually and collectively that would be conferred upon the
individual for participation in capitalist accumulation process. This is what they consider the
Spirit of capitalism–an ideology that justifies engagement.
And so in order to feel justified in pursuing them as legitimate, socially valued ends, a
“spirit” or legitimizing discourse is necessary to help make sense of this seeming incongruity.
Classic political economy can be read in just this way - with private vices leading to public
virtues - and other explanations of how the individual pursuit of maximum financial gain
actually benefits society at large (Dumont 1977; McNally 1990; Perelman 2000). Liberal
political economy succeeded in establishing the direct connection between private gain and
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public good. Utilitarianism for instance establishes the idea that as individuals accumulate
more and more utility through profit making and wealth generation, that the total sum of
utility for society increases and therefore society as a whole has benefited. The overall
increase of wealth, regardless of who benefits from this wealth, is seen as a common good.
Furthermore, it is argued that capitalist organization of economic activity is more efficient
than other, non profit-motivated alternatives. Here the drive of competition towards the most
efficient production of commodities is seen as a general social good – and hence the
commodification of everything can be pursued as a means of maximizing efficiency and
avoiding waste in all aspects of our social lives.
Boltanski and Chiapello focus specifically on professional and managerial workers, or
capital’s ‘cadres’. They are “simultaneously wage earners and spokesmen for capitalism”
(15) and must therefore preserve “a culturally tolerable distance between their own condition
and that of the workers whom they have to manage” (15). The key for Boltanski and
Chiapello is to understand how and in what ways the individuals who become cadres rest
content with this role – how it is that they find, on a personal level, that the commitment is
worthwhile. It must, they suggest, provide avenues for self-realization and fulfillment, and
for freedom of action. Despite the bald necessities – whether culturally constructed or not –
of wanting to provide for oneself accordingly to existing social standards – there is beyond
this a sense that one still needs to feel good about what it is that they do – either by relishing
the money making pursuit, or accepting on some level the social responsibility and mission of
their firm, or by plugging into to some general sense that capitalism actually does benefit
society – that what they are doing furthers the common good.
The New Spirit of Capitalism argues that this spirit does not stay static, but must
constantly adjust to cultural and economic conditions, and accordingly outlines a historical
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progression through three spirits of capitalism - each providing a justificatory frame for
capital’s cadres to buy into the system and feel good about their work on behalf of other
people’s money. The first spirit is closely connected to familial enterprises, the second is
associated with large corporations and the role of managers, or the white collar workers that
Mills (2002) famously analyzed, and the third spirit - which is the focus of their text - comes
with the shift towards neoliberalism and the embrace of entrepreneurship. They explain these
shifts as a dialectic of capital and critique. Each spirit of capitalism is accompanied by a
critique specific to its form and to its historical conditions. Eventually if/when this critique
threatens to delegitimize the spirit of capitalism, the latter transforms by absorbing key
dimensions of this critique, molding them into a new legitimizing discourse. In The New
Spirit of Capitalism, they demonstrate how much of the anti-authoritarian cultural tropes of
the late 60s and early 70s come to be repurposed in management texts of the following
decades, no longer presenting an alternative to capital, but now an alternative capitalism –
one better able to meet the challenges of a changing economy.
Entrepreneurial culture represents a recuperation of this radical, countercultural critique
of capitalism into a new spirit that embraces the entrepreneur as a symbol of individuality,
freedom, fluidity and flexibility. This figure is a self-made, self-directed creative, making a
new world day in and day out, and bringing the revolutionary spirit to bear on the
revolutionary potential of capital’s innovative growth and accumulation.

A	
  Green	
  Spirit	
  of	
  Capitalism	
  

This is all to frame my argument - that green capitalism represents another, newer spirit
of capitalism, still in formation. I build upon Boltanski and Chiapello’s work by asking how
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and in what ways ‘green capitalism’ broadly defined, represents a new, emergent spirit of
capitalism, in which critiques of capitalism as an inherently anti-ecological system (in both
human and non human terms) have been recuperated into impassioned calls for an
enlightened, ecological capitalism that can leave behind these toxic legacies and be reenvisioned as a new, clean and green economy. The rise of modern environmentalism largely
coincides with the same countercultural movements of the late 60s and early 70s that
Boltanski and Chiapello discuss. This is not to reduce the one to the other - environmentalism
has its own unique history - but to acknowledge that by the 70s - and especially in the
shadow of the oil embargo and related energy crisis - there was a strong anti-industrial, anticapital environmental critique circulating in cultures around the world. As examined in
Chapter 2 - this radical environmental critique is recuperated through the 80s and 90s into a
new expression of business environmentalism - no longer concerned with saving the planet
from capitalism, but instead committed to saving the planet with capitalism.
The shift is well exemplified by the work of Amory Lovins. Soft Energy Paths (1977)
was, and is, a tremendously important and insightful text - laying out a framework for a
fundamentally transformed conception of energy use and consumption (Milani and Berry
2000; Schnaiberg 1980). His proposals focus on minimizing need, localizing production and
storage, improving efficiency; essentially ‘right-sizing’ and ‘re-localizing’ the economy in
order to dramatically curtail our resource needs. Lovins took these ideas from radical
approaches to science and technology such as the appropriate technology movement, which
was largely framed as a critique of the hierarchical, regimented industrial economy (Turner
2008; Schumacher 1999). This alternative vision critiqued the dominant economy’s
centralization, expansion and growth – countering with a vision of distribution, minimization
and localization.
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The problem, or recuperation, lay in Lovins’ idea of ‘transition’. In order to achieve
radical transformative goals, Lovins argued that we need to work with and through industry,
and therefore with and through the profit-motivated wage labor economy. On one level,
Lovins may have been right; the industrial might of capitalist industry would need to be part
of a transition - central even - considering that their production and distribution more than
anything else, is precisely what needed to be changed. But there is a difference between
needing to change industry and partnering with industry as themselves agents of change. This
was the slippage that Lovin’s work allowed for - a sense that because industry needed to
change, and because industry was newly remaking themselves as entrepreneurial agents of
change, it should therefore follow that industry should lead their own self-transformation.
This at least, was the narrative embraced by large environmental organizations as well as a
host of environmentally minded businesses, and politicians - all of whom saw the potential
for a new, green approach to business to contribute to economic growth while saving the
planet in the process (Dowie 1995). Further, this message of non-confrontational politics
resonated with large portions of the environmental movement that had emerged out of a
peace-loving, anti-violence counterculture of the 60s and 70s, that hoped to achieve systemic
change through personal transformation (Gould et al. 1993; Turner 2008).
Had the power of incumbent fossil fuel interests (such as the Koch brothers) not been so
strong or had Al Gore won his bid for presidency, we might now be in an even more
thoroughly green period of capitalism. Nonetheless, over the past four decades, the logic of
business environmentalism has slowly and surely found expression in global governance –
where there is currently excitement about the green growth paradigm (Hallegatte et al 2012) as well as the increasingly wide range of corporate sustainability efforts, green consumerism,

58

and new “green” or “clean” technologies and services - that are rapidly entering into the
mainstream of business and finance.
So is a new green spirit of capitalism emerging? That is ultimately my question. But here
I should highlight one major difference between my approach and that of Boltanksi and
Chiappello. Whereas their narrative presents a succession of spirits, one following upon the
next, in what follows I will instead present a collection of four distinct - yet clearly related varieties of green capitalism. While each is grounded by a distinct historical moment, they do
not supersede one another, but operate simultaneously in and through the discourses of green
capitalism. As explained in Appendix C, I will refer to these four forms of green capitalism
as motifs, each representing a coherent theme with its own unique characteristics and traits,
but also a fair amount of overlap and similarities. I do this to emphasize that these motifs are
not, as with many typologies, mutually exclusive, but often times coextensive and interlinked
within specific green capitalist texts.
While I also find the dialectic between capital and critique to be centrally important, we
must also acknowledge that this is a messy dialectic. If we leave the narrative as a simplistic
shift from saving the planet from capitalism to saving the planet with capitalism - as I believe
is too often the case in critiques of ‘green capitalism’ - then we would miss all of the
interesting ways in which this transition has and continues to be articulated, and the
fascinating imaginaries stemming not only from critique, but from capital as well. As I said
from the outset - I am trying to move away from presuming any singular or stable conception
of “green” or “capitalism” that can serve as a singular object of critique. Hence I am not only
interested in a variety of ‘greens’ - approaches to sustainability, green growth, etc. - that
attempt to modify and inflect capitalism, but as well as a variety of ‘capitalisms’ that are
envisioned as the best means through which green ambitions can be achieved.
59

The	
  Texts	
  

On the back cover of Amory Lovins, Hunter Lovins and Paul Hawken’s book, Natural
Capitalism, the lead blurb reads:
If Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations was the bible for the first industrial
revolution, then Natural Capitalism may well prove to be it for the next.
There may be some truth to this claim; the ideas in Natural Capitalism have already
begun to resonate within the realms of green growth and global governance, and in many
ways the text has proven to be a touchstone for the entire genre of green capitalist texts.
Natural Capitalism is a well written and well argued book - which is much more than can be
said for some of the other texts analyzed in this study - many of which comprise what Marx
might have considered the ‘vulgate’ of green political economy, a broad remainder who fill
out the field, reducing complex ideas into the simplistic, easily popularized arguments that
perform so much of the everyday discursive work that an emerging ideology needs in order to
survive.
Just as Boltanski and Chiapello base their research on a close analysis of mass-market
managerial texts, I have grounded this dimension of my research in a close reading of the
green capitalism genre. These are books published from the 80s through to the present that
advocate in some form or another for a vision of a capitalist economy that can and should be
more environmentally stable than our current model. Taken altogether, this is the discursive
field under investigation, a broadly defined set of green capitalist texts, from the profound to
the perfunctory, out of which these four motifs of green capitalism emerge, recurring in what
can often feel like a well rehearsed, almost predictable score.
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I conducted a careful qualitative analysis of these texts, in alignment with a grounded
theory methodology. Appendix B lists all of the texts chosen for this study and Appendix C
provides more detail on my methodological approach. Whereas Boltanski and Chiapello
focus on the core similarities amongst managerial texts that lend credence to their vision of a
new spirit of capitalism, my work also aims to tease out differences amongst these works, to
identify both shared beliefs as well as crucial points of divergence.
I have divided what follows into four distinct motifs displayed by these texts. Each
represents a distinct vision of how the economy can and should function, and therefore how
the economy can and should become green. These four are:

Table 1: Four Motifs of Green Capitalism

Green Capitalist Motif
Planetary improvement
Eco-utopian socialism
EcoFordism
Green developmentalism

Historical Referent
Agricultural improvement in the 17th and 18th
centuries
Utopian socialism in the 19th century
Taylorism and industrial efficiency in the early 20th
century
20th century social welfare/warfare Keynsianism

I should be clear: these four motifs emerged out of my research, which as Appendix C
shows, did not begin with any such framework. And to reiterate, this is not a mutually
exclusive typology. In each of the texts analyzed these motifs intersect in unique ways,
creating a far more nuanced conception of green capitalist discourses as a complex,
contradictory whole. As Table 1 shows, each motif has a unique identity as well as a unique
historical referent. The latter is important, as it helps push back against periodizing concepts 61

including the current ubiquitous, and overused concept of “neoliberalism” - by revealing the
multiple traces of past political and economic frameworks that persist in and through presentday economic discourses. Here it is worth acknowledging the absence of this pervasive term,
neoliberalism. This is not an oversight, nor am I suggesting that all of these varieties of green
capitalism can equally feed into an unquestionably neoliberal discourse. In fact, a subtle
intention of this project is to bracket off the term, ‘neoliberalism,’ which may, in its ubiquity
and seeming inescapability, do an injustice to critical analysis. When everything is neoliberal
and neoliberalism is everything, where is the space to engage in critical analysis beyond
confirming that indeed, we have found this one particular set of ideas, yet again?
Table 2 provides a summary of key vectors of difference distinguishing the four motifs,
which can serve as a reference point for what follows. This chapter proceeds with six more
parts. The first provides an overview of the dialectic of capital and critique in the green
capitalist literature. The next four then address each of the four motifs of green capitalism in
turn, and the final part provides a brief conclusion.
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3.2	
  The	
  Recuperation	
  of	
  Critique	
  

In following with Boltanski and Chiapello’s argument that the spirit of capitalism
emerges through a dialectic of capital and critique, I begin by outlining the centrality of
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forceful anti-capitalist critique and visions of post, or at least decidedly non capitalist futures
and alternatives. I then explore two of the primary ways in which these critiques, and visions
of a greener possible world, are recuperated into justifications for green capitalism, or a new
legitimizing discourse. Through such rhetorical strategies, radical critiques of capitalism are
re-conceptualized as radical reformulations of better, cleaner and greener varieties of
capitalism.

Critique	
  of	
  Industrial	
  Capitalism	
  

Capitalism, as practiced, is a financially profitable, non-sustainable aberration
in human development (NATCAP: 5).6
If we continue with business as usual, civilizational collapse is no longer a
matter of whether but when. We now have an economy that is destroying its
natural support systems, one that has put us on a decline and collapse path. We
are dangerously close to the edge (EDGE: 10).
Working only within the system will, in the end, not succeed when what is
needed is transformative change of the system itself (SPETH: 86).
There are few refrains more common in the green capitalism literature than a
thoroughgoing, unrelenting critique of 20th century industrial capitalism and mass consumer
society. In some ways this would have to be the case - ‘green’ capitalism can only be a
solution if some other form of capitalism presents a problem. As Lester Brown, director of
the Worldwatch Institute and a major figure in the mainstream environmental movement
writes,

6

Texts included in the critical discourse analysis of green capitalism have each been given a
short descriptor, in all caps. See Appendix B for a complete listing.
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We need an economy for the twenty-first century, one that is in sync with the
earth and its natural support systems, not one that is destroying them. The
fossil fuel based, automobile centered, throwaway economy that evolved in
Western industrial societies is no longer a viable model (EDGE: 183).
In place of this abberant system, Brown continues,
We need to build a new economy, one powered with carbon free sources of
energy–wind, solar, and geothermal–one that has a diversified transport
system and that reuses and recycles everything (EDGE: 183).
Gustave Speth, another veteran of the environmental movement, concludes that working
within the system is no longer an option, but that a “deeper critique of what is going on”
(SPETH: xii-xiii) is now required. In his book, The Bridge at the Edge of the World, he asks,
“how can the operating instructions for the modern world economy be changed so that
economic activity both protects and restores the natural world” (SPETH: 7)? He continues,
Today's system of political economy, referred to here as modern capitalism, is
destructive of the environment and not in a minor way but in a way that
profoundly threatens the planet;… So the system will be forced to change
(194).
Speth appears unequivocal in his critique, stating outright, “The planet cannot sustain
capitalism as we know it” (116). In many ways Speth’s text is an anti-capitalist assessment of
the need to move beyond capitalism, so as to create another possible world. Speth identifies
“modern capitalism” as the root of our problems – even naming this system as an economy
anchored by wage relations and predicated upon endless growth. The commitment to
economic growth at any cost, investment in technologies designed without regard for their
environmental impact, corporate interests whose objective is to grow through increased
profits created by any means possible, markets that fail to recognize environmental costs,
governments subservient to corporate interests, rampant consumerism spurred “by
worshiping of novelty and by sophisticated advertising” all results in “an ever growing world
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economy that is undermining the planet's ability to sustain life” (8). He concludes, “the
fundamental question thus becomes one of transforming capitalism as we know it” (8).

But	
  don’t	
  worry,	
  I’m	
  not	
  a	
  communist	
  

Searing indictments of capitalism are dangerous, especially in a pro-business genre of
texts. One cannot be against the very premise upon which their audience coheres. And so,
upon presenting a thoroughgoing critique of industrial capitalism, it then becomes necessary
to distance oneself from less savory critics of capitalism, whether these be hippy
environmentalists or even worse, communists. Gary Hirshberg, CEO of Stoneyfield Yogurt
and author of Stirring it Up! makes it clear that capitalists, not hippies, will save the world,
and he is most definitely the former:
Lest you dismiss my enthusiasm as nothing more than the delusional rants of a
child of the 60s, I hasten to remind you that I am a passionate capitalist who
has created thousands of jobs and millions of dollars of capital appreciation
for hundreds of investors in Stonyfield Farm (HIRSH: xiii).
Similarly, Woody Tasch doesn’t want to “[run] the risk of seeming naïve, as wellintentioned but ineffectual as an old hippy at an annual shareholders meeting of Intel”
($LOW: 44).
Auben Schendler, director of sustainability at Aspen Mountain Resort, writes that modern
environmentalism is "pragmatic, businesslike, collaborative, and climate-focussed" and has
been "hamstrung by historical environmentalism, which was often shrill, exclusionary,
irrational, and microfocused” (ASPEN: 115). Schendler then makes fun of a woman who
says at a meeting "I cry for the earth every day." He wants nothing to do with her:
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Being mischaracterized as a tree-hugger is something that makes my job, and
the jobs of others in my field, much more challenging than it would be
otherwise (ASPEN: 115).
Peter Barnes, an environmentalist and entrepreneur who founded a solar energy
company in the 80s and also served as president of Working Assets, an environmentally
conscientious telecom company, begins his book Capitalism 3.0 by asserting his allegiance to
capitalism: “I am a businessman. I believe society should reward successful initiative with
profit” (CAP3.0: 2). Barnes’ proposal involves the creation of a massive commons sector,
where most of the ecological, social and cultural wealth of the planet (that is currently
accessed by capital free of charge) would be held in trust, to be preserved, maintained and
nurtured for the benefit of humankind. His proposal amounts to nothing less than a massive,
system-wide redistribution of property, claiming all of the ‘free gifts of nature’ that capital
accumulation currently depends upon. And yet, he writes,
Not everything, however will change. Winners in the marketplace will still
enjoy privileges. Government won't over regulate our private lives or
businesses. Nobody's private property will be expropriated. Markets will
remain dynamic (165).
After advocating for a complete rewriting of the ‘operating system’ that runs our
economy, Barnes later assures his reader, “Most of what's in our current code is fine as is,
and shouldn't be tinkered with” (13). By the end of his text, he’s backed off completely,
arguing that capitalism 3.0 does not require revolution or wholesale sudden transformation.
Instead, it can be implemented piecemeal:
Indeed, we’re not even replacing most of the old operating system, which is
fine as it is. Rather, we’re attaching add-ons, or plug-ins, that allow for a
gradual and safe transition (163).
One of the major shifts leading to business environmentalism in the 80s was an effort by
the mainstream environmental movement - which centrally includes figures like Speth and
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Brown, to assure that they have “a seat at the table” (Dowie 1995). But in order to claim this
space, that meant they must speak the right language, and therefore work with the system that
supported corporate and financial interests, as opposed to outright rejecting the system as
fundamentally flawed. The traces of the Cold War’s red scare run deep for these authors, who
know they risk being dismissed and delegitimized if their texts can be associated with a
communist or Marxist rejection of capitalism, tout court (Brulle 2000).
Speth explicitly references this failed strategy that he was a part of, to work within the
system, and yet even still, his “deeper critique” cannot go too deep. So for instance, when he
mentions a concept such as socialism, he quickly re-assures his readers that the variant he
supports “does not propose any expropriation of private property” (190). In fact, he explains,
[C]ommunism is largely irrelevant. We live in a world dominated by a variety
of capitalism's. In the end, no form of economy does well on the environment
unless forced to by vigorously enforced rules and powerful incentives and
penalties created by government and consumers (58).
John Michael Greer takes a slightly different approach, suggesting that while in theory a
complete transformation of the economy from the bottom up might be a good idea, “we no
longer have time for grand schemes of that sort” (GREER: 223)7. As far as Greer is
concerned, we’ve already hit the iceberg, and so there is no time to build a new ship. Amory
Lovins, Hunter Lovins and Paul Hawkens end their text, Natural Capitalism, with an explicit
rejection of anything resembling revolution: “Natural capitalism is not about fomenting social

7

Greer is a unique figure. He currently holds the title of seventh grand archdruid of the
Ancient Order of Druids in America and has been active in the alternative spirituality
movement for over two decades. He is a popular non-fiction writer, focusing on mystical
traditions, alternative spirituality and environmental politics – often focused on peak oil
arguments.
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upheaval. It is about choices that can start to tip things in positive directions” (NATCAP:
322).
Hence, all of these proposals defining the green capitalist literature will not be a rejection
of capitalism writ large, but only a rejection of one specific variety of capitalism that has
been so devastating to our planet. And as we will see, in place of this one problematic form
of capitalism, a variety of green capitalisms will be offered in its stead.

Naturalizing	
  Capital	
  

Barnes makes a distinction between progressive iterations of capitalism. As he writes,
“Although capitalism started as a brilliant solution, it has become the central problem of our
day. It was right for its time, but times have changed” (CAP 3.0: xiii). Barnes demarcates
three forms of capitalism. The first, which ended shortly after WWII, was actually quite good
he argues, but the version that followed, Capitalism 2.0 (what Schnaiberg (1980) calls the
post-WWII treadmill of production), “devours nature, widens inequality, and makes us
unhappy in the process” (xiv). This is a systemic flaw, requiring a systemic solution, which is
what he proposes with an upgrade to Capitalism 3.0, a complete re-writing of our economic
operating code.
Frances Lappe names this errant form, or period, ‘industrial capitalism,’ and asks her
readers to consider that it is a mere blip on the geological timeline. Industrial capitalism is
not, she argues, business as usual, but in fact, it is “a huge and failing experiment, a sudden,
radical detour” (ECOMIND: 4). The problem with industrial capitalism is “a deep ‘design
flaw’ in our killer version of the market–one putting private over public interest–that is
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killing us” (29). This “one rule economy” that places profit maximization above all else
“violates nature’s laws” and should be revealed as “the waste generating aberration that it is”
(23). Markets are not the problem, she argues, only the particular variety of profit driven
markets that we have become accustomed to, and which only respond to economic signals
and not environmental or social signals as well.
So how can these critiques of ‘one rule economics,’ and calls for entirely transformed
economic operating systems be folded back into proposals for new iterations of a capitalist
economy? By framing the critique of capitalism as a critique of actually-existing capitalism,
the door is open to advocate for both radical transformation as well as a maintenance of the
underlying system of economic relations, which must be fixed or improved. Radical critiques
are paired with an equally radical vision of a ‘pure’ or ‘perfected’ capitalism, one that has
matured out of its dirty, consumer driven, wasteful industrial manifestation into a cleaner,
ecologically responsible variant.
In fact, many of these green capitalist visions are anchored by a portrait of a socially and
ecologically benign world in the making. Natural Capitalism presents a paradigmatic
example. The text opens with a utopian vision worth quoting at length:
Imagine for a moment a world where cities have become peaceful and serene
because cars and buses are whisper quiet, vehicles exhaust only water vapor,
and parks and greenways have replaced unneeded freeways. OPEC has ceased
to function because the price of oil has fallen to five dollars a barrel, but there
are few buyers for it because cheaper and better ways now exist to get the
services people once turned to oil to provide….
…Living standards for all people have dramatically improved, particularly for
the poor and those in developing countries. Involuntary unemployment no
longer exists, and income taxes have been eliminated (NATCAP: 1).
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The narrative continues: there are no more landfills, worldwide forest cover is increasing,
dams are coming down, CO2 levels are decreasing. And there are social changes as well: a
new living wage social contract, promoted by an active and progressive union movement, a
strong social safety net that few people ever actually need to use. They ask,
Is this a vision of utopia? In fact, the changes described here could come about
in the decades to come as the result of economic and technological trends
already in place.
Utopian visions such as these are presented as a perfected form of green capitalism, even
though much of what they imagine could just as easily be interpreted as a vision of a new
post-capitalist social formation. This results in an important ambiguity underlying green
capitalism proposals, which simultaneously present a call for a beyond-capitalism and a
renewed capitalism. Or, we might say, visions of a post industrial-capitalism are quickly
entangled with justifications of how and why what is really being proposed is a postindustrial capitalism.

Figure 1: Post Industrial Capitalism
[Post] Industrial-Capitalism ------------------------ [Post-industrial] Capitalism
(beyond capitalism?)

(renewed capitalism?)

The logic behind this slippage, which presents one of the key mechanisms by which a
critique of capital is recuperated into a new legitimizing discourse, has to do with operating
within a conceptual frame that has naturalized capitalism as the only viable form of economic
system, and then proceeds pragmatically by suggesting that any alternative to (this specific)
economy must therefore itself be a another variety of capitalism.
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What results is a somewhat selective terrain of critique. Some aspects of the economy are
simply not up for negotiation, and therefore leveling a critique at these facets of the economy
would be like criticizing the sky for being blue. For instance, while Barnes suggests that
capitalism needs a new operating system, he recognizes that some reprogramming is just not
possible:
One possible way out of this dilemma is to reprogram corporations, that is, to
make them driven by something other than profit. This, however, is like
asking elephants to dance–they are just not built to do it. Corporations are
built to make money, and the truth is as a society we want them to make
money (47).
Greer finds himself faced with a similar reality. Though he considers his work an update
of Schumacher’s seminal work Small is Beautiful, he is not willing to accept all of
Schumacher’s suggestions. While the latter was interested in employee ownership and
cooperatives,
No one has yet found a way to convince stockholders and corporate executives
to voluntarily accept a reorganization that would sharply decrease their wealth
and influence, and until some such means can be found, Schumacher’s
approach seems unlikely to make a large difference (209).
The effect of naturalizing capitalism in this way is to conflate business in general with
the specific form that business takes as capitalist enterprise. As a result, there is a general
sense that “If business is in large part the cause of the planet's problems, then it can also be
the solution” (ASPEN: 6). Schendler lays out this argument well:
Business is designed to make money, and making money means creating more
carbon emissions, often through growth… This doesn't mean business is bad.
Quite the opposite. Business gives people the prosperity to thrive and provides
communities with the tax base to protect the local environment, and anyway,
it's not going away. It's one of the oldest human endeavors, perhaps second
only to love. What we need to do is find a way to make business a positive
force across the board (18-19).
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By naturalizing capitalism as the only form of business to ever exist, one is left with no
choice but to embrace this peculiar and destructive form and focus on its improvement.
Capitalist greed is both the problem and the solution. The power of markets are both the
object of ire and the source of change, and any viable vision of a new and improved economy
therefore “includes and respects, the power of markets” (Tasch: 38).
This is a key dimension of green capitalist logic: the power of the capitalist market is
seen as an important natural force that must be harnessed for noble ends. The problem, as
Lovins, Lovins and Hawkens explain, is that “Markets are extremely good at what they do,
harnessing such potent motives as greed and envy” (260). But they are so good that they
often lead to runaway growth. Their solution is not to regulate or slow markets down. Instead
they suggest that “Many of the excesses of markets can be compensated for by steering their
immense forces in more creative and constructive directions” (260-1). Similarly Andres
Edwards writes,
Commerce is the most influential force on the planet. It is also responsible for
a great deal of the environmental destruction caused by “business as usual.”
Reinventing the way we design, manufacture and deliver products presents an
opportunity to reverse this destruction (THRIVE: 47).
Though the forces of capitalism seemingly undermine our ecological health and
wellbeing, they are a natural and therefore unavoidable foe:
So, like practitioners of aikido, who learned not to block opposing forces but
rather to join the incoming thrusts and redirect them toward a different
outcome, we need to act harmoniously with our planet by engaging the forces
of capitalism to help create truly sustainable societies (HIRSH: xiv-xv).
Slow	
  it	
  down	
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In The Great Transformation (1971), Karl Polanyi details the rise of capitalism,
arguing that once set in motion, the rapacious logic of price-setting markets was poised to
unmoor and violently disrupt most of society, were it not for the countervailing force of
government regulation. This “double movement” has become a common motif in liberal and
progressive thought. Market logics are not bad, they are simply in need of guidance and
control; they must be “embedded” within social - and for our purposes ecological - modes of
regulation. Embedding the market in this way will not, Polanyi argues, fundamentally change
what the market is or where it directs society, but it will slow down the process of
transformation to a less disruptive, and therefore less violent pace (see also Schnaiberg 1980;
Stretton 1976).
This sort of Polanyian liberalism is readily apparent in the green capitalist texts,
whose calls for radical transformation are often tempered with much less ambitious
suggestions that we at least slow the process of waste-making down, as much as we can.
When an author finds themselves committed to an argument that leads too directly into anticapitalist conclusions, one way to pull back from this dangerous (communist, hippy,
revolutionary) precipice is to shift from a categorical critique to a relative critique. In other
words, the fundamental problems with a specific social form become grounds for strategies to
make that form relatively less worse than it currently stands. As Barnes writes,
Perhaps capitalism will always involve a Faustian deal of some sort: if we
want the goods, we must accept the bads. But if we must make a deal with the
devil, I believe we can make a much better one than we presently have (14).
Speth provides a good example of this with his critique of the corporation, which
seems to suggest a challenge at the scale of a new bourgeois revolution. He writes, “we must
dramatically change the publicly traded, limited liability global Corporation, just as previous
generations set out to eliminate or control the monarchy” (173). He then acknowledges the
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extremity of his conclusions, and begins to recuperate the critique back into an endorsement
of a new green capitalism. He continues,
This is a powerful critique of corporate capitalism as we know it. Tone it
down, and it is still a powerful critique. And there are many others. What,
then, should be done to tame the Corporation–to make it an instrument of
environmental protection rather than a force for environmental destruction?
(173)?
In one paragraph, Speth shifts from a critique of the corporation, which should be
eliminated as previous generations eliminated their monarchies, to a suggestion that we tame
the corporation, attempt to make it operate in less environmentally and socially destructive
ways. These newly envisioned corporations would barely resemble those we know today, but
would instead harken back to the vision of a public corporation of the early 20th century, as
elaborated by Berle and Means (1991) (the very same corporations, we might add, that have
been at the center of the unsustainable, environmentally destructive economy that is in need
of transformation)8. As Speth explains,
The corporation of the future… must be built around the idea that the wealth
produced by the corporation is the joint product of all resources providers –
shareholders, employees, unions, future generations, government, customers,
communities, and suppliers. Each provides resources for wealth creation over
time, and each has a right to expect returns for his contribution (181).
Parts	
  for	
  the	
  whole	
  

8

The civil rights movement provides an important metaphor for total transformation without
systemic change. Barnes explains, “it's not that businesses pursue profit; that's what they are
designed to do and what we want them to do. The problem is that private capital rides in the
front of the bus while everyone else rides in the back” (81). Considering the enduring legacy
of racism, the brutal repression and government infiltration of some of the most visionary and
committed organizations involved in the struggle, this is hardly a reassuring precedent.
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If the above recuperation strategy entails a shift from categorical to relative critique,
this next strategy entails a shift from holistic and systemic to isolated and incremental
critique. Visions of entirely transformed economies are set aside about as fast as they are
proposed, and in their place examples of specific solutions to specific problems take their
place, under the presumption that these smaller scale solutions could eventually add up to the
large scale transformations proposed. As a result, arguments that are initially presented as
having potentially system-transforming (and in many instances explicitly anti-capitalist)
implications are recast as a collection of proposals for radical transformation of individual
parts within a fundamentally unchanged whole.
For instance, Edwards offers a promising holistic critique of the transportation sector.
He writes,
In certain industries, scalability requires shifting the emphasis from the
product or service to the system as a whole. In the transportation sector, for
example, this shift involves moving from the idea of a car as a means of
independent transportation to the idea of a comprehensive mobility system
(151).
And what exactly is this comprehensive mobility system? It is not a transition to public
transportation or a redesign of urban spaces, but instead he envisions a ‘smart grid’ for
individually owned, battery powered cars. In other words, in his holistic critique of the
transportation sector, all we are left with is a new power source for the same form of
individualized mobility. One small part of the transportation system is radically transformed,
and everything else is left exactly the same. Edwards is content with his solution, which
“shows how a scalable approach can thrive, moving beyond our concept of car use to an
environmentally friendly, efficient transportation system” (THRIVE: 152).
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Thomas Friedman, in his green capitalist text, Hot Flat and Crowded, makes a similar
argument. He suggests that “we need a whole new system for powering our economy. This is
a systems problem, and the only answer is a new system” (HOTFLAT: 181). The previous
system, which he calls the “dirty fuel system” treated natural resources as if they were
infinite. He argues that we cannot solve the problems that this system has created in a
piecemeal fashion but must instead create an entirely new system to replace it. Here he then
makes a number of holistic suggestions - shifting away from automobiles and towards mass
transit for instance. He writes,
As it is in nature, so it is with energy, climate, poverty, biodiversity, and petro
politics: to influence them in the most efficient and effective manner possible,
you need to think and act in a systemic way. We need to mimic nature–the
ultimate complex adaptive system (184).
From here, Friedman continues to his ultimate example, a Toyota Prius hybrid. This car,
he explains, was rebuilt from the bottom up, creating “a whole new function that is greater
than the sum of its parts” (185). Even after writing about the need to move away from cars
and towards mass transit, Friedman’s ability to get 50 miles to the gallon then ultimately
suffices as an example of holistic, system changing solutions.
McDonough and Braungart’s Cradle to Cradle provides another example of the ways
in which parts are substituted for the whole. The now famous design text focuses very
specifically on re-envisioning individual commodities, one at a time, so as to incrementally
build a better world. Cradle to Cradle asks us to switch from a worldview based on things to
one based on processes, and to conceive of objects within a lifecourse, re-tethering their
production and consumption. Yet the operative word here is ‘objects.’
They reimagine individual commodities, and in a gesture of self-reflexivity they focus
on the book, or more specifically their book, whose first edition was printed on reclaimable
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plastic. Though no system is in place - then or now - to actually reclaim these books and
‘upcycle’ them into new products, such contextual issues remain out of their purview.9 They
focus on the material composition of their book without ever considering the general
production and distribution of books as commodities. What would be more ecological: a
million copies of their plastic text or 1000 libraries serving these same potential readers with
much fewer paper copies?
Each of these authors take for granted the existing stock of commodities and their
already existing markets. Each, in their own way, argues for sustaining and reproducing the
very economy that they would otherwise critique for being unsustainable. Solutions such as
these support a path dependency that goes largely unacknowledged. The more ecologically
efficient our cars are, the harder it will be to justify a transformation at the systemic level
away from cars. The same can be said of so many technologies – improvements at the
commodity level are imagined to propel incremental change towards a truly transformed
world, and yet there may be as much if not more of a chance that they entrench us on paths
that are fundamentally misaligned with any truly transformative visions.

Conclusions	
  

The difficulty with envisioning a fundamentally transformed world is in deciding
which “fundamentals” will be changed, and which will persist. The latter is necessary in
order to allow for some sense of continuity with the present, whose better possible future is

9

The same is true for all of the potentially biodegradable products that they profile compostable goods without a compost system do not necessarily nourish the planet.
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being envisioned. Here, a split between nature and society expands to encompass a split
between naturalized and mutable social and economic relations. Some parts of our economy
and our “American way of life” avoid critique, providing the basis for a radical re-imagining
of whatever hasn’t been reduced to our innate human nature. But we can see, in particular
with Lappe’s work, how slippery of a concept nature can be; it represents all that is good, all
that is un-challengable, all that we must struggle to preserve. Saving the planet is about
saving this virtuous ‘nature’ and therefore to the extent that capitalism is naturalized as the
only viable form of human social productive intercourse, it is about saving capitalism. There
is no distinction between planetary salvation and human salvation. Accordingly, Barnes
explains how his work “has a higher purpose: to help both capitalism and the human species
achieve their full potential” (185-6).
That said, there is more than one way to naturalize capital, or we might say, more than
than one conception of capitalism to attempt to save along with, for and as our planetary
nature. Hence in what follows I will detail four distinct paths that this logic of green
capitalism takes. As will become clear the primary distinction between these four motifs of
green capitalism rests on a number of core differences regarding how capitalism can and
should optimally function, and which agents in our social system are most likely to create
change. While there is no question that these agents will be entrepreneurial, will this manifest
in small scale, local and artisanal entrepreneurs, large corporate and industrial entrepreneurs,
or an entrepreneurial state?

3.3	
  Planetary	
  Improvement	
  

In describing the post modern condition, Frederic Jameson (1991) points to the flattening
out of historical trajectories and their re-articulation as pastiche. In many ways, the four
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motifs of green capitalism detailed below intentionally present a similar sort of historical
infidelity. Each maps to a distinct historical moment, and my presentation of these four
motifs will proceed as if tracing a timeline from the earliest referent - enclosure and
agricultural improvement in the early modern period - through to 19th century utopian
socialism, early 20th century industrialism and finally mid twentieth century
developmentalism. In future work, I could trace a fifth motif of green capitalism back to the
financialization of the past four decades, bringing us back to the present, where all of these
motifs fall back upon their historic legacies as legitimizing rationale for their claims on the
future.
With ecoFordism and green developmentalism, references to their historical progenitors
are intentional and explicit, whereas with planetary improvement and eco-utopian socialism,
the references can only be implied through the similarities of argumentation and rationale.
The prior chapter gave an overview of the rise of business environmentalism primarily
through tracing the history of environmentalism in the 20th century. These next four sections
will introduce additional histories that must also be considered if we are truly to understand
the complex genealogy of green capitalism as more than a generic ideological reappropriation of radical environmentalism, or as a cohesive recuperation of critique, but as an
attempt to spell out a new political economy - a new conception of how and in what ways the
‘operating system’ of the capitalist economy might successfully function in less wasteful, and
therefore more ‘green’ ways.
With that said, we begin with the first of these motifs, or varieties of green capitalism,
which I have named planetary improvement.
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An	
  earlier	
  history	
  of	
  land	
  management:	
  Enclosure,	
  Colonialism	
  and	
  Improvement	
  

Gilbert Pinchot was not the first to advocate for the rational and efficient use of North
America’s natural resources. From the moment of its colonization through to the beginning of
the 20th century, the land that would become the United States (and in different respects, the
same is true for most if not all of the two American continents) was resource rich, and those
who colonized these lands would derive their economic power accordingly. North America
was teeming with fertile soil, with wildlife and with lumber. This was in stark contrast to
Europe, where the forests had largely been cleared over the past few hundred years, and
where the rural population, with their customary access to the land, provided a formidable
barrier to expanding agricultural profits (Cronon 1983; Neeson 1996).
At this time, wood was the primary fuel source and building material, and agriculture was
the largest sector of the economy (Cronon 1983). The New World had the potential to
remedy the most pressing material and energetic shortcomings of an over taxed European
landscape.10 For instance, the powerful British navy was running desperately low on timber
large enough to be milled into the giant masts of their military vessels; the old growth forests
of New England were a veritable windfall (Cronon, 1983).
The New World was not only teeming with natural resources, but also with an indigenous
population who were, according to prevailing colonial wisdom, wasting these precious
natural resources by not using them in an efficiently profitable manner. Locke’s treatment of

10

Food, fuel, and even fertility were mined from the Americas. European farmers were
running out of local sources of soil amendments that could support the increasingly intensive
farming practices of capitalist agriculture. When massive islands of guano were discovered
off of the coast of Peru, a massive, and massively important international trade in bird shit
ensued (Foster and Clark 2009).
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this ‘problem’ in his Second Treatise of Government (1980) is exemplary. To understand
Locke’s work, context is important: Locke and his contemporaries were writing during a time
of great colonial expansion. The European powers were sailing across the world in search of
gold, goods and territory. European political theorists were tasked with making sense – and
providing legitimacy – for this acquisitive, and often violent process (N. Wood 1984). So for
instance, Grotius, a Dutch political theorist, who most famously argued for the freedom of the
seas (due to their indivisibility they could never be possessed as property), argued that unused
things, land or otherwise, held no property within them, and could therefore be appropriated
by others (Wood 2003). His theory had affinities with the Roman principle of res nullius –
which stated that any empty thing is common property until put to use. However, ‘until put to
use’ leaves a few important matters up to interpretation: which sorts of uses? Used by whom?
These are the questions that Locke’s theory attempts to resolve, by shifting discussion
from an absolute to a relative conception of disuse. It is not that the lands and resources of the
New World are unused, but that they are being improperly and inefficiently used – wasted –
by the natives currently working upon them. Locke compares this native use of the land to the
improvement of enclosed land in England:
I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to
nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield
the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten acres
of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated (24)?
Locke saw that the European farmer, engaged in improved agriculture, was able to extract
far more value out of a given parcel of land than the natives of the New World, thereby
“increas[ing] the common stock of mankind” by freeing up otherwise wasted land for others
to deploy in an equally efficient manner:
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[H]e that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life
from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be
said to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with
provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in
common (24).
Improvement is the key concept to unpack. Agricultural improvement was a set of
discourses and practices intimately connected to enclosure, engrossment and the
transformation of the English countryside over the course of the 15th through 18th centuries.
Prior to being enclosed, the majority of agricultural land in the English countryside was held
through relations of common right and custom, which set strict parameters around how land
could be used, when, and by whom. Customary land-use, encoded in local ‘bye-laws’
determined production practices, and while such rules were not immutable, they nonetheless
insulated the vast majority of agricultural land, and the people working upon that land, from
‘innovative’ experimentations - whether shifting crops, rotation schedules, the use of
technology, or labor relations (Comninel 2000; McNally 1990; Wood 2002).
Acts of enclosure ‘freed’ the land (and those working upon it) from these customary
restrictions, parceling out common lands and establishing that the owners of the resulting
plots had a ‘real interest’ in their holdings - allowing them to use what was now ‘real estate’
however they chose. In the 15th century, this largely meant converting un- and underpopulated common lands into sheep runs, so as to supply meat to growing urban markets
(Comninel 2000; Yelling 1977). Subsequently, focus began to turn to efficiency
maximization of arable land, which meant increasing crop yields and decreasing costs - the
most substantial of which was labor.
For many small holders and yeoman farmers, improvement was a constant tinkering
with the complex system that they tended - an attempt to maximize its productivity, while
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maintaining a fidelity to its long term health and management. Today, we would consider
them to be organic farmers of the highest magnitude (Duncan 1996, 2009). As such, they
were some of the first proponents of what Donald Worster (1994) calls the Arcadian
tradition. Yet despite a seeming reverence for nature, there was a coldly calculative,
efficiency maximizing logic undergirding this work.
In some ways, we could say enclosure unleashed a first wave of agricultural
entrepreneurs upon the British countryside. Many farmers were now independent business
men, experimenting with new production practices and determined to find the most efficient,
most profitable approaches to their work (Duncan 1996). As enclosure and agricultural
improvement gained momentum, farming journals, societies and associations began to
emerge, providing a space for this nascent entrepreneurial community to support one another
in their common pursuit of optimally improved agricultural production (Barrell 2011).
The pursuit of ‘proper’ profits, the property relations that would support them, and the
dispossessions that would liberate them, is fundamental to the spirit of improvement.
Improvement was more than a justification of dispossession - it was also a legitimizing
discourse - a way for those involved with enclosure to feel proud of their work, and to see it
as part of a broader national economic project. In 1793, the British Parliament created a
Board of Agriculture to serve as the unified mouthpiece for land reform domestically and
abroad. The Board’s first director, Sir John Sinclair, writes:
We have begun another campaign against the foreign enemies of the country .
. . why should we not attempt a campaign against our great domestic foe; I
mean the hitherto unconquered sterility of so large a proportion of the surface
of the kingdom? ... Let us not be satisfied with the liberation of Egypt, or the
subjugation of Malta, but let us subdue Finchley Common; let us conquer
Hounslow Heath, let us compel Epping Forest to submit to the yoke of
improvement (1837:111).
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Perhaps more so than anything else, agricultural improvement - and the various forms of
colonial development and domestic enclosures that supported it - were cast as a large scale
war against waste. All non-capitalist forms of agricultural production, from the common
fields of Europe to the hunting and foraging grounds of North America were re-cast as
unimproved lands, or what I have elsewhere termed terra economica - a vast sea of potential
profits, waiting to be improved, or otherwise left to waste (Goldstein 2013).
Their potential productivity - and profitability - was being allowed to go to waste, due to
the ignorant, careless, and lazy actions (or inactions) of those irresponsibly tending to the
land. As Locke forcefully argues, these are offenses to mankind, and to God, whose
injunction to be fruitful is being left unrealized.
Throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, enclosure was zealously pursued in the name
of improvement, a direct challenge to the immorality and impropriety of waste. Commoners
were derided as lazy, slothful and a threat to National health. Indigenous peoples were
similarly derided, and without any formally established customary rights (in the eyes of the
European colonizers) they could be rightfully (and beneficially) dispossessed of their lands,
so as to make them available to God-fearing Europeans who would heed the lord’s command
to maximize output of any lands under tenure (Goldstein 2013; Mies 1998; Wood 2003).

From	
  Agricultural	
  to	
  Planetary	
  Improvement	
  

Discourses of waste and efficiency are not limited to this early form of agricultural
improvement, but have persisted throughout the development of capitalism, taking on
numerous forms. As the economy has transformed over the years, so too has the prevailing or
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dominant forms of improvement. In this way we can see it as more than an ecological world
view, but as a more general way of engaging with the human and nonhuman world as a space
of wasted potential - available to be profitably improved or otherwise wasted. We can
identify a number of different ways in which waste and efficiency have been mobilized
through various discourses of improvement.

Industrial Improvement

Labor efficiency translated almost directly from the agricultural to the industrial sector,
and largely shaped the development of the industrial revolution, and the development of labor
saving technologies and processes. Accordingly, labor and industrial improvement traces a
line of continuity from Adam Smith’s account of the division of labor (2003) through to
Taylorism, all the while lending truth to Ben Franklin’s dictum that time is, in fact, money.
This was, and still is, a war against wasted (labor) time, and provides a more secular context
for the spirit of capitalism identified and explored by Max Weber (2001).

Municipal Improvement

By the mid 19th century, a new form of improvement began to emerge in response to both
working class pressure and the shifting employment needs of industrial production. Public
sanitation and welfare state provisioning (health, education, housing, infrastructure) were the
focus of an emerging biopolitical regime that feared the wasting of lives: physically,
mentally, and socially (Foucault 1977, 2010). While this was still largely an effort to preserve
and improve upon labor time, it was increasingly becoming clear that conditions of life - both
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within the workplace and without, were an essential component of minimizing social unrest,
as well as producing and maintaining an engaged and obedient work force. If the prior form
of improvement resulted in unliveably low wages and precarious working conditions, this
form can be seen as something of a counter-movement, motivated by the recognition that
workers must live in order to work. Or as Foucault writes, “make live, let die.”
This led, by the early 20th century, to Fordist efforts to combine Taylorism in the
workplace with moral and social regulation in the domestic sphere, so as to avoid wasting
any ounce of potential work that waged employees might provide (Grandin 2010; Lacey
1986). This “gospel of efficiency” also encroached upon the realms of resource management,
lending itself well to wartime rationing efforts and to the conservationist work of men like
Gilford Pinchot (Hays 1969).

Home Improvement

However, by the turn of the 20th century, this gospel of efficiency was already losing
ground to a form of improvement that embraced the necessity of building demand through
marketing and ‘the sales effort’ (Slade 2006; Strasser 1999; Packard 1960). After the First
World War, productive capacity threatened to outstrip effective demand. New and more
efficient markets were needed to absorb industrial output. Hence a new sort of market
efficiency gained stature, based upon eliminating wasted sales opportunities, and resulting in
what Baran and Sweezy (1966) have termed ‘monopoly capitalism’. Here a tendency towards
disposability, planned obsolescence, or what Vance Packard termed “waste making,” gripped
the social imagination, as convenience and time-efficiency displaced durability and materialefficiency in public discourses and consumer markets (Stauber and Rampton 1995). While on
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the one hand this vector of improvement represents the embrace of certain forms of waste, in
other respects it can still be seen as a war against waste. Consumers’ “wasted time” due to a
lack of maximally efficient home improvements was used to justify a relentless effort to
decrease turnover times, thereby increasing the speed and intensity of capital’s circulation –
or in other words, avoiding wasted sales opportunities.

Financial Improvement

In many ways, the time-space compression of financialization (Harvey 1991), where
turnover times are reduced to infinitesimally small fractions of a second, represents the
pinnacle of the tendency towards disposability. But it also represents a distinct form of
improvement of its own. Beginning in the late 1970s with the “shareholder revolution,” Wall
Street investors argued that the managers of publicly owned corporations were not always
looking out for the best interests of their shareholders. They were, in fact, ‘wasting’
opportunities to realize short-term profits, and therefore to boost short term share prices. An
entire industry of leveraged buyouts, initiated by the ‘corporate raiders’ of Wall Street, would
attempt to remedy this perceived inefficiency by taking over control of corporations, selling
off valuable assets, dramatically reducing labor costs, and in general retooling all remaining
operations towards the maximization of immediate revenue and short term profits. If, in the
prior form of improvement, commodities were ‘improved’ by being made more disposable,
here we might say, corporations were improved in similar fashion - long term stability, or we
might say institutional durability, was sacrificed for the need for short term profits (Ho 2009).
This was a war against wasted short-term profits which could potentially be realized in
and through the financial markets.
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Planetary Improvement

What could be more in our own strategic interest? What could be more
genuinely profitable than using business power and know how to literally save
the world? (HIRSH: 8)
The above iterations of improvement should be seen as a gradual accumulation of layers
of complexity, contributing to an increasingly polyvalent, complex conception of waste,
efficiency and improvement. Each of these forms of improvement were, and are, wars against
waste – against all of the inefficiencies, improprieties, immoralities and insubordinations
feared to threaten the value(s) of modernity and progress. This is not, as is typical of
regulationist accounts, an attempt at periodization (Aglietta 1979; Jessop and Sum 2006). The
wastes that emerge with each subsequent form of improvement layer upon one another,
forming a many-sided ‘incitement to value’ (Gidwani 2008) that exerts a negative force, like
fluid rushing to fill a vacuum, and propelling a movement towards the particular forms of
‘progress’ considered good, and right. Together, they create a complex, contested and everchanging web of socio-spatial relations, grounding the vicissitudes of actually existing
capital, and motivating the actions, in multiple and often contradictory ways, of actually
existing bearers of capitalist wealth.
It is within this context that we can consider this first motif of green capitalism to be the
next iteration of improvement. Planetary improvement focuses on protecting, improving,
maintaining and profiting upon a planet in serious need of greening. If home improvement
was about generating waste - increasing throughput in the ‘treadmill of production’
(Schnaiberg 1980), and financial improvement was also in many ways about the liquidation
of unprofitable corporations (a different sort of disposability - but still disposability), then
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planetary improvement represents a rejoinder to these trends and a return to the municipal
improvement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, focused on making viable conditions of
production. If this first round of municipal improvement understood that workers must live if
they are to be able to work, planetary improvement might be seen as a recognition that the
planetary ecosystem must also ‘live’ if the labor force will continue to be put to work.
150 years ago urban spaces could still be imagined to be place-specific, bounded entities
(London, New York, Paris, etc), yet we now live in a world, as Lefebvre (1976) writes, that is
thoroughly urbanized - hence the improvement of urban spaces transforms into the
improvement of an irreversibly urbanized planet. That said, this is not simply a shift in scale
from the municipal to the planetary, for the conditions of production - the target of
improvement - have been fundamentally altered. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the first
iteration of municipal improvement created much of the infrastructure that has made possible
the subsequent rise of the waste-making economy. For instance, urban sanitation systems and
waste management practices have provided that cleverly concealed place we simply call
‘away’ that provides a necessary condition of possibility for the disposability economy
(Clapp 2002).
With the turn towards planetary improvement, the search for wasted potential now
operates in a wholly different vein. It is no longer inefficient commoners or inefficient
laborers who are guilty of wasting our collective potential, but now it is capital itself that is
guilty of being wasteful, and therefore targeted for improvement. Capital in general, the
whole system, is seen to be wasting our planet, or as Barnes writes, “Capitalism as we know
it is devouring creation” (26).
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Saving	
  Nature,	
  Saving	
  the	
  Planet,	
  Saving	
  Capitalism	
  

To save the planet from calamity, innovation and deployment of known
technologies must occur now at a pace as intense and a scope as vast as the
settlement of the western frontier (ERTHSQL: 248).
In 1972, a United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in
Stockholm. At the conference, an image of the earth taken from the moon, during the 1969
manned landing visually marked the conference. The recently published Only One Earth
(Ward and Dubois 1972) written by a biologist and an economist, set the conference agenda.
In it, the authors write, “Now that mankind is in the process of completing the colonization of
the planet, learning to manage it intelligently is an urgent imperative” (25). They conclude,
The planet is not yet a center of rational loyalty for all mankind. But possibly
it is precisely this shift of loyalty that a profound and deepened sense of our
shared and inter-dependent biosphere can stir to life in us (298, also in
Jamison 2001).
Locke admonished the native population of North America for wasting their lands, for not
entering into a community of agricultural improvers focused on maximizing their yields.
Ward and Dubois admonish all of mankind for not yet entering into a planetary community.
We are all lazy, wasteful natives. There are so many opportunities to be so much more
environmentally efficient out there; opportunities that are currently being wasted.
This means waste to fuel, waste elimination, waste repurposing, and all of the many
technological solutions that we will soon hear about as cleantech. Planetary improvement is
not so much a critique outright of prior forms of the economy as it is a belief that these prior
forms provide a terrain of wasted potential; a source of endless profits that can be realized in
the name of planetary salvation by making them more green.
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Planetary Improvement embraces waste-making culture as is, and sees it as a terrain
of potential improvement. For planetary improvers, the whole world is not-yet green. Or as
Jim Rogers of Duke energy tells Thomas Friedman “I look out on the rooftops of my
customers and I see future power plant sites” (HOTFLAT: 289). Planetary improvers
embrace large scale nodes of the consumer economy - these are not examples of the
irrationality of a wasteful economy, but instead they are opportunities, at the planetary scale,
for massive efforts to go green. For instance, Natural Capitalism discusses Wal-Mart’s
experiment with creating an eco-store in Lawrence Kansas. To the extent this store is
successful, it means that the rest of their thousands of box stores represent an “untapped
source of potential savings” (89). Wal-Mart is simply not-yet green.
The wasteful commodities that have come to define 20th century capitalism and the
consumer-driven lifestyles that demand their consumption are now targeted as themselves the
terrain of terra economica, able to be improved or otherwise left to waste. This consumption
based lifestyle and the industries supporting it are not considered to be inherently wasteful in
a uniformly negative sense - as unsalvageable excess or an irrevocable part of the problem.
Instead, their waste - as with the wastelands targeted by Sinclair and the early agricultural
improvers - represents a profitable opportunity to go green. In each and every aspect of the
waste-driven economy of excess and disposability there lies a potential to become more
efficient and therefore to become more green and therefore more profitable in this one
virtuous and ‘right’ way. This is planetary improvement, expressed as an embrace of nature,
which is seen as the pinnacle of environmental efficiency. In fact, there is no such thing as
waste in nature and creating a green economy requires “eliminating the concept of waste and
toxicity” (NATCAP: 27).
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With planetary improvement there are two distinct forms of efficiency to be balanced,
ensuring that only profitable green solutions will be targeted and pursued. The first efficiency
is economic, and about maximizing financial returns. The second efficiency strives for the
most efficient use of inputs. The field of lifecycle assessment has grown up around the
latter, with numerous complex databases and formulas that aim to determine the total
ecological footprint, or lifecycle, of specific processes and products. Hirshberg argues that
economic efficiency is a human invention, whereas engineering efficiency is natural. “Nature
is the most efficient and cost-effective system in the universe” (58). If efficiency is about
waste avoidance, than nature is exemplar, “In nature, there is no waste - period… It’s just
amazing how efficient nature is, once you start paying attention to it” (135). Similarly Lappe
tells us that there is no shortage of energy or materials that can be organized in infinite ways but it is just that some ways of organizing this material and this energy are better than others.
Hence we must “tak[e] inspiration from the laws of biology and physics” (63).
For Lappe, ‘nature’ is a repository of all that is not capital, all of the qualitative values
and potentials that are either missed or denied by the “one rule economy.” Nature is
materially, energetically, and even socially ‘efficient.’ In many ways, it becomes an empty
vessel upon which almost any positive desire can be grafted, as one further efficiency we can
and should learn from our non-human environs. For Locke, improvement was justified in
terms of god’s injunction to be (maximally, efficiently) fruitful, and therefore maximally
profitable. Planetary improvement is similarly justified, only instead of god’s injunction, we
have nature’s wisdom, compelling us to be maximally, efficiently sustainable, as well, of
course, as maximally efficiently profitable.
‘Nature’s’ wisdom is not limited to trees and birds and the non-human domains, but to all
that is naturalized, which includes, for planetary improvers, the decision making capacities of
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the market. In conceptualizing the waste-driven economy as the terrain out of which
planetary improvement is derived and upon which it operates, there must be an explicit
acceptance or naturalization of this wasteful way of life. The accepted norms of consumer
society - and particularly western, even North American consumer society, for whom these
books are written - are considered to be a natural, or at least unquestionable condition established by the natural force of the markets, and the unquestionable gravitational force of
consumer sovereignty (Szasz 2007).
For planetary improvement it is consumer sovereignty, above all else, which functions as
a naturalized, unquestioned source of market forces that can and should propel our economy
forward. In typical neoclassical or neoliberal fashion, the market is seen as an infallible, ideal
decision making institution, and any attempts to go green must both defer to and harness this
natural, coordinating force.
In Cradle to Cradle, McDounough and Braungart explain that “Throwing something
away can be fun, let’s admit it; and giving a guilt-free gift to the natural world is an
incomparable pleasure” (109). Cradle to Cradle is about embracing our desire for change and
disposability by creating green materials whose disposal can be considered a “guilt free gift
to the natural world.” Biodegradable and compostable materials are the prime example
offered. In direct contrast to what we will later see (in eco-Fordism and eco-Utopian
socialism) as an embrace of durability and longevity, they argue that “The durability of many
current products could even be seen as a kind of intergenerational tyranny” (114).
Auben Schendler also addresses this in his text, Getting Green Done. Schendler is the
sustainability director for Aspen Ski Resorts, and his book details the many sustainability
efforts he has been undertaken in his professional work. At one point, he discusses the need
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to renovate their ski slope, “You can’t run a world-class resort with forty-year old chairlifts”
(20)11. Schendler then addresses the seeming hypocrisy of trying to make a green ski resort.
He is well aware that skiing, by its very nature, is an incredibly energy intensive activity, far
more so than say, snowshoeing or bird watching. And yet, he is willing to defend the
necessity, or at least inevitability of a place such as Aspen. He argues that we cannot simply
demand that Aspen should not exist, because the next logical step would be to outlaw the
Marriot, then the Motel 6, and then all forms of Western vacation accomodations, which are,
when measured against the “slums outside of Mexico City and Bangledesh” (48), still
relatively wasteful.
The fact is that when you spend a dollar in this planetary economy, a portion
of that dollar creates more climate-changing carbon emissions. So we're not
going to solve this problem by picking and choosing what businesses are
acceptable (48).
Measured against absolute zero, which for Schendler is the slums of Bangladesh, all
forms of habitation are guilty of resource exhaustion. Therefore since ‘we’ are all guilty to
one extent or another, the very possibility of choosing between different forms of habitation
is untenable. Schendler attempts to legitimize the status quo by denying the feasibility of
making extra-market decisions about what the market should and should not provide.
Certainly Aspen's lifestyle is lavish. But then, so is the entire U.S. lifestyle...
So what do we do? Close down Aspen, then close down the United States?…
In the absence of God-like qualities of judgement over the world, we have to
fix the whole system, not pick and choose (81-82).
Schendler’s market fundamentalism positions the decision making authority of the market
as the best available option, in the absence of god.

11

Nor can you run a world class ski resort without low-waged, immigrant workers,
apparently (see Park and Pellow 2011).
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Conclusion	
  

Planetary improvement is about innovating our way out of the problems that we’ve
created, developing newer, greener and cleaner technologies to replace those that currently
exist. It is largely about techno-fixes and seldom questions the centrality of the market or for
that matter the consumer driven culture that it currently supports. As Friedman explains,
We can only innovate our way out, and the only way to do that is to mobilize
the most effective and prolific system for transformational innovation and
commercialization of new products ever created on the face of the earth - the
US marketplace (243-4).
Friedman continues, “there is only one thing bigger than mother nature and that is father
profit, and we have not even begun to enlist him in this struggle” (244). If, as we will see,
other varieties of green capitalism critique the unbridled free market, the planetary improvers
suggest that in fact it has not been sufficiently tapped, that the only way to create a green
economy will be to fully enlist the forces of self-interest and profit maximization to the
cause. In this sense, planetary improvement is the least critical of the four motifs - and
instead embraces the prospect of a new industrial revolution. As Krupp and Horn write,
A revolution is on the horizon: a wholesale transformation of the world
economy and the way people live. This revolution will depend upon industrial
technology - capital intensive, shovel in the ground industries - and will
almost certainly create the great fortunes of the 21st century (3).
As we will see in sections 2 and 3, cleantech is very much an offshoot of this spirit of
planetary improvement.
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3.4	
  Eco-‐Utopian	
  Socialism	
  

The second motif of green capitalism turns to 19th century utopian socialism and visions
of a market mediated, yet un-alienated economy. This utopian socialist work spanned an
entire century, from the militant and some would argue proto-communist work of Thomas
Spence, to the paternalistic and perhaps pre-figurative experimentation of Robert Owen, the
anarchist-reformist proposals of Proudhon, and towards the end of the century the urban
industrial visions of BSingle ellamy and the more rural socialism of William Morris.

A	
  Brief	
  History	
  of	
  Utopian	
  (Petty	
  Bourgeois)	
  Socialism	
  

Though Thomas More is credited with coining the term ‘utopia,’ the presentation of an
ideal community through literature and myth can be traced much further back, from biblical
accounts of the promised land or the lost bounty of Eden, to Plato’s Republic and more
popular fantasies such as The Lands of Cockaygne, “where larks fly into one’s mouth already
cooked, and the rivers flow with wine” (quoted in Bruce 1996: xi). Early Modern Utopias,
such as More’s Utopia (1516), Bacon’s New Atlantis (1627) and Neville’s Isle of Pines
(1668) were a product of the age of exploration, each situating their ‘no-place’ in a fictional
yet potentially real location; islands that could be discovered, mapped and approached
spatially (Bruce 1996). By contrast, the utopian aspirations voiced towards the end of the 18th
century and through the 19th are born of an ascendant liberalism and the ever-present
possibility of revolution. As such these utopias focus on future-possibilities. For them, utopia
is a world arrived at through social transformation; a world to be produced, as opposed to
found.
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While liberalism promised a freedom born of markets and plenty born of industry, both
were a far cry from the reality of the late 18th and early 19th century. As more and more
people found themselves unable to provide for their most basic needs, calls for a basic right
to subsistence in works such as Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man (1906 [1791]) and Thomas
Spence’s The Real Rights of Man (1793) grounded the popular radicalism emerging during
the time (McNally 1993). This right to subsistence was less a right to be provided for than it
was a right to have the conditions and resources available to provide for oneself. For instance,
while Spence wrote of a possible system based upon common ownership of the land, this
utopian future was not meant to produce a communal existence. It was simply seen as way to
establish a world in which “all would be little farmers and little mastermen” (McNally 1993,
quoting Spence: 69).
By the turn of the 19th century, enclosure and engrossment had all but entirely
transformed rural life in Great Britain. Common field agricultural systems were a thing of the
past, as were the small, independent cottagers with their ‘cottage industries.’ Rid of its
actually existing commoners, land that had formerly sustained common right communities
could now serve as a blank canvas for romanticized, pastoral visions of a simpler life, where
cottagers and farmers were envisioned as virtuous craftsmen, intimately connected to their
land, their tools, their work and their product (Olwig 2002). Utopian socialists saw in this lost
country life a model for simpler, smaller and more meaningful production than the alienating
forms of industrial work that made such practices economically untenable (McNally 1993).
Robert Owen, a successful textile manufacturer-turned-philanthropist, rose to prominence
in the 1820s, with a fully elaborated vision of utopian socialism, presenting both a systematic
critique of capitalism as well as a concrete vision for the better possible world that could
supplant it. Owen envisioned a world of small scale producers operating within small, self98

sufficient market systems where free and equitable exchange could flourish. Owen’s ideas
captured the radical imagination; between 1829 and 1834, hundreds of Owenite experiments,
from cooperative stores and societies, to publications, conferences and organizations, sprung
up throughout England and the United States, all seeking to create viable micro-economies
within which independent proprietors could thrive as a community united through relations of
equal exchange (McNally 1993). Similarly, the French philosopher Charles Fourier
envisioned well planned communities that would allow all of the many types of people (he
identified 810) to live together in well organized model communities, where various social
functions could be separated from one another and optimally organized (Levitas 2010). From
the 1830s through the 50s, intentional communities inspired by the work of Fourier emerged
in places as disparate as Citeaux in France, Oliviera in Brazil, and in North America, where
Albert Brisbane and Horace Gresley alone initiated over 37 experiments.
These experimental communities, whether inspired by Owen, Fourier or some
combination of the two, were intended to be well ordered industrial villages – productive,
efficient and humane – as an alternative to the chaotic, polluted and inequitable conditions
that prevailed in urban and industrial centers of the time. Both saw enlightened, well planned
reforms as a means of avoiding less desirable forms of social transformation steeped in
violence, conflict and revolution (McNally 1993). Whereas Spence had advocated for nothing
less than “mutiny on the land,” by the 1820s less insurrectionary voices prevailed, deemphasizing worker militancy and instead imagining that radical transformations could be
realized through a series of far reaching reforms. Their faith in management had overt
paternalistic implications. Owen addressed his texts to “fellow manufacturers” (in McNally
1993: 112) and “men of influence” (113) whose role as managers and visionaries would be
essential in the realization of well-structured social experiments, and who would educate,
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lead and direct the working masses, showing them how to realize a virtuous world that they
may not even know that they want.
Petty bourgeois socialism presented the market freedoms promised by liberal thought as
an ideal to really achieve through perfecting the functioning of markets, eliminating parasites
and artificial values, and by creating the conditions whereby equal exchange between directly
productive individuals could occur. This was to be a world of craftsmanship, local production
and durable, well made goods. Their utopias were well designed and well coordinated by the
managerial oversight of benevolent patrons, where small scale artisanal producers could
flourish. This was the fantasy of a market mediated and yet un-alienated economy.
The clearest connection between utopian socialism and more recent forms of green
capitalism is in the many works advocating for local, community based solutions as an
antidote to large scale, centralized industrial production. Bill McKibben is the most well
known promoter of these ideas in the US, and in England, Robert Hopkins’ Transition Town
Movement offers a similar vision, grounded in community resilience for an anticipated postpetroleum world. In many respects, this argument boils down to differences in scale.
Business is not the problem, but big business is. As McKibben writes,
The size of your institutions and your government should be determined by
the size of your project. The second point is more subtle: The project we’re
now undertaking - maintenance, graceful decline, hunkering down, holding on
against the storm - requires a different scale. Instead of continents and vast
nations, we need to think about states, about towns, about neighborhoods,
about blocks (124).
McKibben laments the loss of community and the ways that mass consumerism and
industry destroys community and therefore our innate humanity. He advocates for small,
local businesses to develop, hoping to achieve “a sweet spot, that produces enough without
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tipping over into the hyper-individualism that drives out careening, unsatisfying economy”
(210).
Yet there is much more to eco-utopian socialism than this focus on the local or
community scale. In what follows we will focus on three specific characteristics of this
variety of green capitalism: First, an embrace of the ‘true’ value of nature. Second, a
distancing from usurious financing systems and the implementation, in their stead, of a more
ecologically and socially grounded investment paradigm. Third, visions of a market that
supports de-alienated production and consumption of well-made and ecologically sustainable
durable goods.

True	
  Value	
  

Owenite experiments were predicated on developing a currency system that would allow
‘true’ prices to reign supreme. Following Cobbett, Owen distinguished between the artificial
and speculative value of paper-money, backed by precious metals, and the true, natural and
sturdy value of labor (McNally 1993). Labor was the real source of all wealth and the only
true standard of value. Were this to be reflected in the economy’s monetary system, all social
problems would find their remedy. A pamphlet of 1831 reads, “let us open labour banks…
make arrangements for exchanging your labour with each other, as by doing so you will
become self-producers, self-employers, self-consumers” (in McNally: 115). Owen was
convinced that labor exchanges were the key to a peaceful transition to socialism, for they
alone could address this central flaw of the capitalist system. The Operative Builder’s Union,
an Owenite project, writes in their manifesto: “the present artificial, inaccurate and therefore
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injurious circulating mechanism for the exchange of our riches, may be superseded by an
equitable, accurate and therefore rational representation of real wealth” (in McNally: 138).
Proudhon was similarly convinced of the importance of currency reform. Marx opens the
Chapter on Money of his 1857 manuscripts, which we now know as the Grundrisse (1973),
with a critique of Alfred Darimon, a Proudhonist social reformer, who advocated for bank
reform as a means of moving towards a more equitable, even socialist, economy. At the time,
Europe was experiencing a paralyzing financial crisis. Credit markets had frozen, leaving
banks with hoards of money and nowhere profitable to invest. Darimon’s solution entailed
opening access to credit by breaking the privilege of gold and silver as the main forms of
money-wealth, and in so doing, abolishing the evils of the money system. This would be
accomplished with the time-chit, essentially, a paper note whose value was determined by a
definite quantity of productive labor time, as opposed to the vagaries of a finance-controlled
marketplace.12
Just as these 19th century reformers looked to concrete labor as the true source of value,
eco-utopian socialists look to concrete nature. In both cases, valuing the unvalued is at the
core of their prescription for a better economy and therefore, a better society. As the title of
Natural Capitalism suggests, valuing nature as natural capital is one of work’s overarching
themes. The authors ask,

12

Marx continues on to explain how and why the time-chit could not function in the ways
Darimon wished. Essentially, to the extent that it represented a definite quantity of productive
labor, it could not function as money, and to the extent that it functioned as money, it could
not represent a definite quantity of productive labor. Hence, Darimon’s solution required both
the abolition and persistence of the money form; a price setting market and the abolition of
prices.
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What would our economy look like if it fully valued all forms of capital,
including human and natural capital? What if our economy were organized not
around the lifeless abstractions of neoclassical economics and accountancy but
around the biological realities of nature (9)?
The answer, of course, is the utopian world outlined above, a world in which we’ve been
able to supersede social and environmental problems alike. This world is, they tell us, well
within our reach, and “will arise from the birth of a new type of industrialism, one that differs
in its philosophy, goals, and fundamental processes from the industrial system that is the
standard today” (1-2). At the center of this new economy is a willingness to value nature - not
just the resources that become commodified raw materials for production, but all of the inputs
to production, including the more general conditions that make production possible in the
first place; ecosystems and the services that they provide.
Whereas 19th century utopian socialists wanted a new bank, green capitalists just want a
new set of accounting principles. For as we all should know, “A healthy economy needs… an
accurate balance sheet” (NATCAP: 61). The need for rational accounting has become a
standard trope within green discourses, both those for and against capitalism. Nature
(understood as the non-human world) and social reproduction are currently un-valued by
capitalist production, hence leading to their wasteful expenditure. Further, measures such as
GDP actually value eco-destructive processes, making their expansion signify a healthy
economy as opposed to a dangerous and persistent trend towards planetary destruction.
Capitalism must therefore be practiced differently:
What might be called “industrial capitalism” does not fully conform to its own
accounting principles. It liquidates its capital and calls it income. It neglects
to assign any value to the largest stocks of capital it employs – the natural
resources and living systems, as well as the social and cultural systems that are
the basis of human capital (NATCAP: 5).

103

Lester Brown explains, “The key to restructuring the economy is to get the market to tell
the truth through the full cost pricing” (183). He suggests that the full costs of gasoline would
be $12 per gallon on top of the price at the pump. “If we can create an honest market, then
market forces will rapidly restructure the world energy economy” (185). Since we rely on the
market for price signals that guide behavior, we therefore need better information informing
those signals. In the absence of such information, “We are being blindsided by a faulty
accounting system, one that will lead to bankruptcy” (185).
While these authors acknowledge the difficulties inherent in valuing nature, the perils of
allowing nature to remain not-valued are too much to ignore. Lovins et al. do not presume to
have a good way to determine the price of natural capital, yet they warn that behaving as
though nature is priceless “has brought us to the verge of disaster” (NATCAP: 6). The choice
is simple, we either value nature or we perpetuate the fiction that nature is a free gift to be
exploited at will. Hence, by naming and then pricing various isolated parts of the natural
world as natural capital, society will embark on a gradual path towards finding the true,
sustainable value of nature. If not only raw materials, but pollution sinks and all of the
myriad ‘ecosystemic services’ were fully accounted for by a new pricing system, then the
normal operations of the market would be able to correct our most glaring social and
ecological problems. Whereas in Natural Capitalism the focus is on valuing nature and the
many ecosystemic services it performs, currently free of charge, for industrial society, other
writers such as McKibben, Tasch and Barnes put equal focus on the negative cultural effects
of industrial production and therefore the devaluation of ‘cultural capital.’
While at face value, the idea of pricing all of the many devalued social and ecological
facets of our economy seems promising, there is an important way in which these seemingly
post-capitalist and truly transformative proposals come to be recuperated into a legitimizing
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discourse for the expansion of capital as we know it. What begin as proposals to embrace a
form of value that is qualitatively distinct from the form that value takes in and as capital is
mobilized as justification for expanding commodification to encompass ever more aspects of
our social and ecological lives.
Here we run up against a contradiction at the core of the capitalist economy, and the way
in which it values its inputs to production. As feminist-Marxists have argued, capital’s value
form is not independent from the many forms of not-value that provide its conditions of
possibility (Federici 2004; Mies 1986). This includes the living of labor, and the ‘living’ of
land. In other words, socio-ecological reproduction is a necessary and necessarily not-valued
dimension of the production of value-as-capital. The benefits an employer receives from the
work of an employee take for granted/gratis the labor that went into the social reproduction of
that worker. Likewise with the appropriation of non-human inputs to production. The general
intellect, the liveliness of people and the use-fullness of things (including the usefulness of
living labor) are all ‘free gifts of nature’ that capital depends on for its expanded
reproduction.
Portions of this socio-ecological reproduction can be commodified – and readily are – but
as a totality, this socio-ecological system could never be fully reduced to a set of discrete,
knowable, and commodifiable parts. As Vaclav Smil (2003) explains in his critique of pricing
ecosystem services, the complexity of biospheric flows defies any efforts to know ‘nature’ in
its entirety. “The incessant flows of countless goods and services among millions of species
and their interactions with abiotic environment maintain the biosphere. Valuing all those
myriad links and feedbacks that have no direct benefits for humans is impossible both
logistically and noetically” (257).

105

Particular natures – discrete portions of the world – can and are priced on a regular basis.
But general nature, or nature in general – in other words, the viability of the planet as a
habitable planet – can never have its value expressed as a price.13 The problem lies in the
mathematics of the situation. To the extent that nature-in-general, or the health of the planet
is infinitely valuable (in other words, there is no amount of money that ‘we’ as a civilization
would be willing to exchange for the planetary ecosystem, since the former would be
meaningless without the latter) then its value can never be priced. Infinity cannot be broken
into aliquot parts, which is a precondition for creating a price system. Prices are only
meaningful relative to one another, they must always be multiple and comparable if they are
to facilitate market exchanges. But infinity does not work that way. Half of infinity is
infinity. One millionth of infinity is infinity. It can never work.
Natural Capitalism, and for that matter all of the eco-utopian socialists, cannot reconcile
this tension between pricing nature so as to protect its non market values, and valuing nature
as the non-priceable, infinitely important foundation of life. Instead, they begin with paeans
to the infinitely valuable wealth of the planet, only to then operationalize this wealth - as a
matter of market pragmatism - in terms of specifically priced ecosystemic services. Yet no
amount of discretely measured ecosystem services can ever add up to infinity, and therefore
can never reflect anything resembling the ‘true value’ of planetary nature.

Papacy	
  of	
  Green	
  Production	
  

13

This is to the dismay of environmental economists such as Costanza, whom Smil is
directly critiquing, who have notoriously attempted to value - in USD - the total value of
planetary ecosystemic services (Costanza et al 1998).
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The question remains, should eco-system services be priced or not? On the one hand, unpriced nature is vulnerable as a free gift to be exploited at will. On the other hand, pricing
nature only serves to enter it into a commodity logic, where it can still be exploited at will.
Whether priced or unpriced, the real issues remain: 1) Where are these prices (or lack
thereof) derived from? 2) Who gets the privilege of being in possession of ‘nature’ whether
priced or not? Will prices serve, as green capitalists seem to intend, as a countervailing force
to the market, or as Polanyi would say, part of the ‘double movement’ pushing back against
the unbridled forces of capital? Probably not, so long as these prices are set internally, by the
very markets that they are supposed to regulate. And who gets to ‘sell’ eco-system services at
their prevailing price? Much of the current forms of ‘nature-saving’ land grabs presume that
once priced, nature-as-capital will then be turned over to private hands, making the maneuver
a clear case of new enclosures, or accumulation by dispossession (Peluso and Lund 2011;
White et al. 2012).
Whereas Naturalism Capitalism never directly addresses who can or should claim
possession of the newly defined stock of ‘natural capital,’ Barnes, in his work Capitalism 3.0,
does offer a compelling suggestion. Barnes argues that all of this newly priced natural wealth
can and should be owned, in common, by regular people. Barnes proposes that we
Fix capitalism’s operating system by adding a commons sector to balance the
corporate sector. The new sector would supply virtuous feedback loops and
proxies for unrepresented stakeholders: future generations, pollutees, and
nonhuman species (65).
This common sector will emerge out of the commons we already share – the dark matter
that pervades the economic universe, invisible and yet essential to the functioning of our
economy. Barnes’s description of this dark matter runs remarkably parallel to the concept of
the common presented by autonomist Marxists Hardt and Negri (2009). It ranges from the
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general intellect to the totality of ecological entities and relationships, all of which capital has
been permitted to treat as ‘free gifts of nature.’ Barnes suggests that we protect such assets
with non profit-maximizing property rights such as community land trusts, based upon shares
that are contingent on membership in a community, as opposed to being bought and sold
within a market. He calls this propertization without privatization. These non-market shares
would be held in large public trusts, administered by trustees bound to uphold a fiduciary
responsibility to manage the common wealth for the betterment of the world, human and nonhuman alike.
There are unintentionally revolutionary implications to Barnes’s proposal, which amounts
to a massive, system wide process of land reform, whereby all of the natural (and cultural)
resources that corporations enjoy gratis are put into the possession of common trusts,
administered for their beneficiaries, human and non human alike.
The imminent revolutionary possibilities lurking in Capitalism 3.0 are akin to the same
sorts of implications that Marx found in Darimon’s proposal for a reformed banking system.
Darimon’s proposal featured a new currency, the time-chit, which would always measure the
true intrinsic value of concrete labor expended in the production of goods. Marx tries to
imagine the implications of a time-chit system, were it to be implemented. For the currency
to work, a central bank (or banks) would have to always guarantee sales, or convertibility of
labor, goods, everything, into this new currency – so as to avoid the possibility of price
fluctuations on an open market. As a result, the bank would essentially fall into the role of
universal buyer and seller of all commodities, including labor – making it de facto society’s
general producer. Marx writes,
Either it would be a despotic ruler of production and trustee of distribution, or
it would indeed be nothing more than a board which keeps the books and
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accounts for a society producing in common. The common ownership of the
means of production is presupposed, etc., etc. The Saint-Simonians made their
bank into the papacy of production (1973: 155-6).
As with Darimon’s proposal, Barnes’ solution to industrial capital’s bad accounting, were
it substantively put into effect, would likewise entail the dissolution of capital and a new
‘papacy of green production’ administered in the name of the commons.

Un-‐alienated	
  economies	
  

This brings up an important thread that weaves through each of these motifs of green
capitalism in somewhat distinct ways, namely this issue of coordination and control. Whereas
the first variety we explored - planetary improvement, suggests that we leave control in the
hands of the market (and its enlightened consumers) eco-utopian socialism, as well as the two
varieties to follow, each seek to establish the need for an extra-market form of coordination.
For Hopkins and McKibben this control comes from a commons understood as somewhat
autonomous communities. For Barnes it is a commons organized as a state-like trusteeship
(which, as we will see, allows his work to dovetail nicely with green developmentalism).
For Woody Tasch, this coordination comes from enlightened investors-like-him.
Tasch was the former director of Investors Circle, a network of socially conscientious,
“impact investors” that make small, ‘angel investments’ in early stage technologies. Since
leaving Investors Circle, he wrote his manifesto, Slow Money, and has since formed a
network of investors and entrepreneurs that have rallied around his investment model.
In Slow Money, Tasch rails against finance, the parasites propelling fast money and
the violence it enacts across the globe. These Wall Street financiers
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are stubbornly and intently affixed to their computer screens, maximizing the
growth of financial portfolios and the speed of capital, promoting a culture of
moneytheism and short-term thinking, maximizing circulation, minimizing
percolation, diverting irrigation from the seeds of sustainability (xxii).
Instead, Tasch wants to
steer money… which is deployed in the making of money, toward life, toward
enterprises that enhance the quality of life, that preserve and restore fertility,
biodiversity, and the health of bioregions and communities and households
that live in them… (93)
He envisions local stock exchanges funding local organic businesses, with financing from
slow money investors who are willing to prioritize community health over maximizing
returns. Tasch sees this as a new breed of investor “who refuse to accept unnatural returns”
(x). As we will see, this motif of slow money will be picked up in green developmentalism,
which also advocates for patient capital, only looking to the enlightened state as a source of
this financing, as opposed to enlightened individuals.
For Tasch, his “earthworm school of finance” envisions an economy where from soil
to farm to small business to investor, all are connected in a symbiotic web of life. Investment
money should be used like manure, he argues, building healthy soil out of which healthy
economies can flourish.
To the extent that eco-Utopian socialists such as Tasch can both provide a trenchant
critique of capitalism while holding on to it as the best of all possible systems, there has to be
a way to define a ‘pure’ or as yet unrealized potential capitalism that has not yet been
achieved. For Lovins et al. this is natural capitalism, for Barnes it is capitalism 3.0 and for
Tasch it is the slow money economy. Central to each is a vision of pure capitalism that is
purged of its wasteful, parasitic elements. Here there is a close connection to their 19th
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century progenitors. From Owen through to Proudhon, visions of a purified capitalism
entailed an economy of small scale production and direct exchange between producers,
rendering merchants and moneylenders irrelevant (or at least subservient to community
needs).
The dematerialization of those able to sell everywhere will be matched by the
maintenance work of those unable to sell anywhere. Tasch’s slow money economy is
presented as a realm of un-alienated production, where producers have direct connection to
their land and consumers have direct connection to the slow products that they consume.
Hence, Tasch explains, he and his fellow slow money investor-consumers are “terroire-istes,”
intimately connected to the land, to farmers, and to the food that they purchase and consume.
Investors such as Tasch and his slow money network may not grow food directly or provide
other tangible goods to exchange in this economy - but instead they provide capital. Not fast
money, the evil and violent form of wealth that is at the core of so many of the world’s
problems, but the qualitatively distinct slow money, which is willing to invest in such small
scale economies and the earthly delights they produce. Hence, Tasch and his fellow investors
are to be seen as the earthworms of this soil-based economy, part of the intricate web of life
that allows soil to provide the basis of life.
Likewise, in Natural Capitalism we are told that the economy needs four types of capital:
human capital, financial capital, manufacturing capital, natural capital. Money, people,
production, and nature. Missing is the process of sales, or what Marx called merchants
capital. For Tasch as well, all of the wasteful dimensions of capitalism – can be attributed to
this seemingly unnecessary moment, or form of capital. Marketing and the production of
excessive consumer desires, products designed to be disposable, and even the financial
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pressures imposed upon producers all seem to fall into this commercial, non-productive – and
therefore not necessary - side of the economy.
Natural Capitalism even goes so far as imagine a world in which things are no longer
sold. Shifting to a service economy will avoid sales, and avoiding sales will avoid alienation
between producers and their products. When you sell something, they explain, this means
you no longer want it, or are at least willing to part with it, and will therefore cease to care
about and for this good. This leaves producers with every incentive to makes things that are
good enough to sell, but no better – and even worse, to make things that are rapidly in need of
replacement. However, if producers never actually sold their goods, then they would never
cease caring about them. This is the service utopia they present – a world where producers
are incentivized to make functional, durable goods, and to service them endlessly, so as to
push any possible disposal – hence waste – off indefinitely.14
Their vision of a service economy is one that begins and ends with production, and
therefore without any space for frivolous desires or the disposable goods that might sate
them. And yet, it is an economy without sales, so that sales can be everywhere:
In an economy of service and flow, an entire company may end up owning
little or nothing but accomplishing more, while being located nowhere to sell
everywhere…. An economy where we grow by using less and less, and
become stronger by being leaner (143).
Elite	
  Green	
  Consumption	
  

Tasch quotes Carlos Petrini, founder of the Slow Food movement,

14

These ideas have led to a number of interesting policies that encourage “extended
producer responsibility” by requiring the producers of goods to be responsible for their
eventual disposal.
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Think about the period of the Renaissance, the period of the enlightenment,
when investors would invest in things of beauty… Producers were, for the
most part, artisans, and they worked in small scale type of economy, in a local
economy… I think we have to look more closely at that model (xxvi).
Tasch’s embrace of artisanal production comes not from the perspective of an aspiring
artisan, but from the perspective of an elite consumer who would like to purchase artisanal
goods, and enjoy artisanal services, both materially and affectively. He recounts a trip to
Italy, where he came across a memorable cheese monger. At his shop stood a picture of the
man, now in his 60s, standing at the very same spot when he was eight. Tasch is
overwhelmed by the authenticity and durability of this mans relationship with place,
“suffused as I was not only with the visual and olfactory richness of the moment but also with
a sense of tradition, of continuity, of culture” (xxiv). Throughout this trip, his senses are
aroused; foods, smells, vistas, all came together into a vision of the way we should and could
be living. He recounts a stream of consciousness:
When did we forget our connection to the land? How can this taste so damned
good?... How much longer would I live if I ate like this every day? Who cares
about longevity – that’s another numbers thing! This is all about quality?!
How does he tend this place so artfully?... Why does the earth smell and feel
so good? Where was it that I was in such a rush to go to yesterday? When did
we lose our way? Can I take you home with me? How about a hug? Why can’t
I live here (51)?
This is then followed with a recognition, “Of course, everyone can’t live on an organic
farm.” Elsewhere in the text he has a similar recognition, that the slow food economy could
not feed all of the people on the planet. There will still be people getting industrially
produced food from the Wal-Marts of the world - it just won’t be him.
The fascinating thing about Tasch’s stream of consciousness is how it ends with a
desire to possess the land, its produce, and the people that supply that produce, that work the
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land, all as one complex assemblage of organic delight. This is an aesthetic consumption, an
aesthetic of consumption -- organic foods, earth, artisans, these are good consumption
practices, as opposed to the adulterated variants offered to the masses. We can call this a
form of elite green consumption. Throughout the green capitalist genre, there is an interesting
tension between the acknowledged privilege that allows for such elite consumption and a
general critique of mass consumer society based on the ideas that, as Speth writes, “the best
things in life are free” and that “money can't buy love” (161).
In the same way, Lappe asks us to rethink luxury. This is something she realized on a
family vacation to the Amazon. Her eco-tour offered a glimpse of a simpler life, one
luxurious in its natural beauty in a hotel without much electricity or private baths or
chandeliers but instead tucked away in a corner of pristine jungle.
My need for creature comfort was more than met–it was indulged, as I savored
local dishes and rocked in the colorful hammock watching the monkeys play.
And my mind was stimulated delightfully by encounters with scientists
studying the rain forest and my own observations of the flora and fauna along
the jungle paths (51).
Her epiphany lay in “redefining luxury as beauty.” She describes it as “being intimate
with the natural world” (51).
Similarly, Tasch lives ‘off the grid’ and derives pleasure from the chores of social
reproduction, such as chopping wood for the stove. “There is something pleasing about them,
a ritual, manual, down-to-earth rhythm that punctuates the day…” (126) There is something
important here – something about a reworking of what work, labor, social reproduction even
means. Tasch is enjoying self provisioning… but when would this become too onerous?
When is the walk to the forest too long to make it a pleasing way to heat his home? Here, the
pleasurefulness of social reproduction has to be seen as a privilege – perhaps one we should
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all attempt to embrace – but not one that is evenly distributed. There is no distinction made –
ever really – between voluntary simplicity and unavoidable simplicity.
With clear roots in the new communalism (Turner 2008) of the back to the land
movement in the 1960s and 1970s, Tasch might risk seeming like a hippie himself. So he is
careful to distance himself from such associations. He is an investor, he reminds his readers,
who consumes these ‘natural’ forms of social reproduction and simpler life they evoke.
Implicit in these texts is the caveat that fast money, dirty money or ‘normal’ consumer
preferences can’t buy love, but slow, green money, motivated by enlightened consumer
preferences, can. Hence this anti-consumerist message comes to be transformed into a call
not simply for less consumption, but for the right type of consumption. Speth looks to the
CEO of Patagonia for a more enlightened approach to consumerism. Yvon Chouinard
advocates for an economy of abundance, one in which we understand when we have enough.
This is in distinction from an economy of not enough that always pushes us to accumulate
more. He writes,
In the economy of abundance, wild salmon are given back rivers in which to
run. Trees grow to their natural height. Water is clean. A sense of mystery and
enchantment is restored to the world. We humans live within our means and,
best of all, we have the time to enjoy what we have (162).
What is left unsaid is that living within our means will mean very different things to
different people. There are no collective human means, only particular and highly uneven
means. Hence the universal argument - that we should all live within our means as a
planetary society - essentially justifies the privilege of those with the ability to live well, and
therefore to live simply, as the eco-utopian socialists propose.

115

As a discourse of elite green consumption, eco-Utopian socialism frames the
privileges of the rich as an example of the right, green life - performed in the name of
humanity. There is some truth here: if we all lived like they propose it would certainly be a
utopic world. But in the face of actually existing inequalities, these arguments amount to a
trickle-down utopianism, where we humans will appreciate the health of nature, even if only
a very small sliver of actually existing humans will directly appreciate this natural health and
beauty through ecotourism and artisanal consumption. As Tasch reminds us, most of us will
still be shopping at Wal Mart.

Conclusions	
  and	
  connections	
  

So far we’ve now reviewed two varieties of green capitalism. Their differences - and
similarities should be readily apparent. If planetary improvement focused on large scale
transformations of the industrial economy, eco-utopian socialism instead counters with
visions of distributed, local antidotes to this global economy. If planetary improvement is a
discourse of efficiency maximization, eco-utopian socialism is about the qualitative relations
that are lost through such narrow focus on efficiency.
Planetary improvement hails the coordination of enlightened consumer sovereignty,
where consumers will choose the right green products. In eco-utopian socialism there is a
similar gesture towards enlightened consumers, but in this case it is the elite consumption of
artisanal, local, de-alienated goods and services, as opposed to the consumption of large
scale, energy efficiency and resource minimizing technologies.
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Eco-utopian socialism is about perfecting the market, ridding it of parasites and the
economic violence of fast money. Planetary improvement by contrast is about harnessing that
speed, the world making capacity of capital and its global ambitions, which must be directed
in positive ways. As should be clear, as distinct as these two motifs are, they are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, we’ve used Natural Capitalism as a prime example of each. Likewise,
these same texts will continue to emerge in the following descriptions of eco-Fordism and
green developmentalism. This is why I have cautioned against reading these varieties as a
strict typology. It is better to understand them as four coherent themes that combine in
various ways to define the diverse, creative and sometimes predictable field of green
capitalist texts.

3.5	
  EcoFordism	
  

Henry Ford looms large in the mythology of American industrialism. Ford’s Model-T,
the ‘tin lizzie,’ inaugurated the automobile era that we continue to endure/enjoy. Between
1909 and 1927 Ford sold just over 15 million Model Ts, which were the most affordable,
durable and functional automobile of its time. Ford himself was an enigmatic figure,
presenting himself as a simple-minded, hard working engineer, content with the basic
necessities of a good Christian life. Historians Nevins and Hill (1954) describe Ford thus,
As a mechanical genius, perhaps the greatest of his time, [Ford] was intensely
practical, [but] he had very little interest in competition. The integrity of the
product was always the first consideration; consumer demand came second,
and any thought of profits was incidental (in Slade 2006: 33).
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Ford’s ‘incidental’ profitability is nothing short of phenomenal. Through selling his
Model Ts, (as well as controlling the market in peripheral add-ons and replacement parts for
the vehicle) Ford amassed a huge personal fortune. He notoriously pushed his workers to the
absolute limits of mental and physical exhaustion, vigorously resisted unionization, and
created an industrial empire that was, at the time, unrivalled on the planet (Nevins and Hill
1954; Grandin 2010; Lacey 1986). And so while it would be difficult to convincingly argue
that Ford the industrial tycoon had little interest in competition, it is nonetheless true that
Ford was, as well as a profitable capitalist, a committed engineer – and it is this commitment,
to the production of basic, durable, well crafted goods at a mass scale – that pervades the
mythology of Ford that persists through to the present, and that informs the variety of green
capitalism I am calling ecoFordism15.
The industrial practices (and mythology) of Henry Ford are a recurrent theme in green
capitalist texts. Ford is regularly referenced as an example of a pioneering engineer-producer,
who produced a durable, well made and functional machine - the Model T - and built a global
market around his product. Ford did not capture an already existing market - he created one,
inspiring entrepreneurs today who hope to introduce ‘disruptive’ technologies that will, like
Ford’s Model T, transform the global economy. Ford famously quipped, “If I had asked my

15

To be clear, my use of the term ‘Fordism’ differs considerably from its more common
presentation as a periodizing concept, defined by regulationists as the form of industrial
production that largely came into its own after New Deal labor reforms and the post-WWII
“comprimise” between labor and capital that resulted in the modern, bureaucratic union
movement and a relatively generous (though highly unevenly distributed) social wage for
working men and women. As Simon Clarke (1992) convincingly argues, this period of
industrial capital actually arises out of the defeat of Henry Ford and his distinct “pre-Fordist”
mode of industrialism.
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customers what they wanted, they would have told me faster horses.16” Henry Ford, and
therefore the Fordism I am referring to here, offered a productivist vision of a world made
anew by enterprising individuals. These powerful figures are not bound by the consumers
whose preferences they will ultimately shape and this shaping will not occur through the
trickery and deception of marketing and sales, but instead through the sheer force of their
virtuous, superior products and services.
As will become clear, ecoFordism is, in many ways a blend of the first two motifs of
green capitalism, Planetary Improvement and Eco-Utopian Socialism. Like Planetary
Improvement, it is very much positioned as a war against waste and inefficiency, and
envisions a world of wasted potential, available to be tapped by enterprising industrialists.
The main distinction between these two motifs has to do with ecoFordism’s focus on
producers (not parasites), as opposed to markets and profit-seekers, as the central agents of
transformation. Here there are affinities with Eco-Utopian Socialism and its critique of
finance, or “fast money,” which serves as an example of the market’s parasitical effects on
social and environmental health. However, instead of turning towards models of small scale,
artisanal production, EcoFordists share with planetary improvement a focus on large scale
industrial transformation. Instead of appealing to a small subset of enlightened consumers,
then hope to produce for the average consumer, transforming or making a new, greener
consumer marketplace by introducing the cheapest, best made, and most environmentally
responsible products available, a craft ethic at the industrial scale, or big in the style of small.

16

Here mythology may trump reality, and I have chosen to follow suit. It is quite likely that
Ford never actually uttered these words, and if he had, there has yet to be written proof
(Vlaskovits 2011). Nonetheless, the quote does speak to Ford’s general economic views and
has become integral to his most recent reputation as a disruptive technologist.
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Big	
  in	
  the	
  Style	
  of	
  Small	
  

Though the automobile has become a core technology of mass consumer society and
the conspicuous consumption of the 20th century that has greatly accelerated our planetary
environmental problems (from fossil fuel use to suburbanization) (Duany et al. 2010; Jackson
1985; Kahn 2000) Henry Ford is still nonetheless heralded as a model for green production
and a staunch opponent of the planned obsolescence and disposability that would come to
define the 20th century marketplace, and that ultimately defeated Ford and his well made
Model T (Grandin 2010; Slade 2006).
Henry Ford’s business model focused on producing one core product - the Model T as fast and as cheaply as possible, without jeopardizing its quality or durability. While Ford’s
initial design of the Model T incorporated a number of innovative design features, once the
product was established, Ford’s attention shifted to innovating ever-more efficient means of
producing the vehicle, as opposed to continually improving the vehicle itself. As a result,
Ford was able to continually drop the price of the Model T, making what had previously been
a luxury good available to an ever-widening segment of the American public (Seltzer 1928;
Nevins and Hill 1954).17

17

Ford’s entire business model was based on out performing his competitors by having the
most innovative, most efficient production facilities in the world. Ford developed innovative
single function machines to facilitate this production process, and in general was willing to
invest more money into fixed capital than most of his competitors. Henry Ford did not just
engineer machines, he engineered the mass industrial process of producing machines – hence,
Henry Ford was as much a social engineer as he was a mechanical engineer. It was at the
Crystal Palace that Henry Ford’s company perfected the methods of Taylorized assembly line
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Competitors were unable to match the low prices that Ford could offer for the Model
T, and instead had to explore other means of remaining competitive. During the 1920s, as
Ford continued to roll out Model Ts that were barely distinguishable from those produced a
decade earlier, General Motors for example, developed a number of sales strategies that we
now take for granted in the automobile industry. For instance, they established the General
Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and institutionalized the practice of allowing
automobiles to be purchased with credit. Ford on the other hand, was distrustful of bankers
and therefore of debt arrangements, and refused to sell the Model T on credit. Instead he
offered a savings plan, where a potential customer could gradually deposit money into a Ford
account, and when they had finally deposited enough money to afford a car, only then would
a sale be made (Nevins and Hill 1954).
Perhaps even more importantly, General Motors offered vehicles at numerous price
points, creating a status hierarchy amongst their many brands: Chevrolet, Oakland (Pontiac),
Buick, Cadillac, and encouraging a culture where social mobility could be realized through
consumption (Slade 2006). They also embraced the emerging consumer culture and the
privileging of style and novelty by instituting the practice of creating (and promoting) annual
model changes. GM began to see that their market was already saturated with cars – that they
were selling ‘new’ cars, not simply cars – and this required an embrace of the logic of
planned obsolescence. Ford on the other hand, simply continued to sell the relatively
unchanged and unimproved Model T, eventually saturating his market to such an extent that
the surfeit of used Model T’s available for purchase (as their owners chose to replace these

production that have since come to define the modern industrial period (Hooker 1997; Nevins
and Hill 1954).
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increasingly stigmatized, old fashioned vehicles with newer models) became Ford’s most
threatening direct competition.
As successful as Ford was, for a time, the decline of the Model T in the late 1920s
betrays a naivete to Ford’s business model that ultimately carries forward into ecoFordism.
Namely, that the production of goods (by good producers employing good workers) can resist
tendencies toward disposability, cost cutting, cheap manufacturing and the environmental
costs that such efficiencies entail, while nonetheless attempting to scale-up through markets
defined by this very same commodity logic.
Hirshberg’s work provides a choice example of this ecoFordist contradiction, which
arises from the embrace of both a craft, or engineering ethic and large scale industrial
production. Hirshberg’s firm, Stoneyfield Yogurt, began as a darling of the Slow Money
movement. However, as Stoneyfield began to grow, its claims to being local and organic
were stretched thin. In 2001 the global food conglomerate Group Danone bought a 40% stake
in the company, which they then increased to 85% in 2003. Stoneyfield Farms is now one
(very popular) brand out of many in a multinational’s lineup. Yet for Hirshberg (and even for
Tasch, who defends his friend’s decision) there is no reason that slow, organic, even local
food production cannot scale up. He argues against, “the myths that ecology and economy are
somehow mutually exclusive, or that big is bad and small is inherently good” (HIRSH: xiv).
Hirshberg believes that if organic food is to become more than a small local pursuit for
enclaves of activists, then firms such as his will have to accommodate the US system of
supermarkets and food distribution. This belief “led to friction with various friends who
seemed more interested in fighting culture wars than seizing new commercial opportunities”
(116). While Tasch wants to embrace a community that does not need to shop at Wal Mart,
Hirshberg wants to embrace the potential of producing for Wal Mart.
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Hirshberg’s personal narrative of becoming a green capitalist begins with his exploits
as a “windmill-building hippie” (Goodman 2003). He worked at the New Alchemy Institute,
which had been one of the centers of the appropriate technology movement in the US during
the 70s, becoming its executive director in the early 80s.When Hirshberg was there, he
worked on the Institute’s greenhouse, which was capable of feeding ten people for a year.
Everything changed for him in 1982, when on a visit to the Epcot Center in Florida he
happened upon a pavilion that envisioned the future of farming. The exhibition included
rivers of chemical fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides swooshing around the
naked roots of anemic looking plants grown hydroponically in plastic tubes. In
this paean to fertility, there was not a single grain of actual soil (HIRSH: 2).
The problem, Hirshberg realized, is that 25,000 people went through this Kraft Foodssponsored pavilion on a daily basis, more than visited the New Alchemy Institute in an entire
year. Hence, his epiphany:
I have to become Kraft… To change anything, we needed the leverage of
powerful businesses like Kraft. If we had their cash and clout, people would
listen and change would begin (3).
It is worth summarizing his argument: change requires power, corporations have
power, therefore we need to become a corporation in order to make change. The alternate
conclusion, that we have to take power away from corporations in order to make change, is
carefully avoided.
Hirshberg wants to sell a local product at the global scale, and he sees no
contradiction with this effort, to both honor family farms and to ‘think like Kraft.’
If I go on and on about the soil saving, health giving, life enhancing practices
of family farmers, it's because I don't believe we can continue to exist on this
earth without them. I am emotionally as well as intellectually committed to
saving family farms. But business runs on hard numbers, not emotion, and I'm
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also sure that Stonyfield hasn't lost any of its virtue as it has become bigger. If
anything, the larger we grow, the more good we can do (185).
This desire to produce ‘goods’ (in this case local and organic food, in Ford’s case durable
and cheap cars) at a global scale is the crux of ecoFordism. For the ecoFordists, business is
the only viable actor at a global scale, and therefore since we have to act globally, we have to
act with as global businesses:
Global warming was the bad habit of an entire global culture, too big for
individuals to change effectively. Only business could do it. The good news is
that it has (190).
The	
  Frederick	
  Taylor	
  Paradox	
  

This desire to reproduce artisanal (small, local, organic, etc.) quality at a massindustrial scale represents a common ecoFordist contradiction with roots that extend back to
the industrial efficiency of Frederick Taylor. In his instructions to students of his approach to
industrial efficiency, Taylor suggested that students should first accustom themselves to the
total, interconnected art of complex production, suggesting that they apprentice for some time
in a small workshop, where individual craftsmen artfully produce goods from start to finish
(Hooker 1997). By understanding the holistic process of the craftsman, they would be better
equipped to efficiently break his work up into individual processes divided amongst many
workers and specialized machines. Hence, Taylor suggested that his students study the very
craftsmanship that they would ultimately then work to destroy. Not directly of course, but by
making such craftspeople relatively inefficient in economic terms and letting the market take
care of the rest.
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In Hirshberg’s case, and here he is not alone, the local craftsmanship in question is
small scale organic farming. Family farmers are stewards of the earth who provide us “our
most essential and important link to nature and the earth’s bounties” (164). Hirshberg even
tells us that government policies have all but destroyed the viability of family farms by
selling out to multibillion-dollar agribusiness (his sale to Group Danone excluded). And yet,
he then continues on to advocate for government regulations that will provide strict standards
for organic food production: “we found that higher costs and government standards yielded
higher profits to ensure the superior, genuinely organic yogurt that our customers gladly pay
more for” (13). As many have shown, the higher costs associated with certification standards
threaten to put most small, local organic producers, such as the small dairy producers that
Hirshberg is so proud to source milk from, out of business (Hatanaka et al. 2012; Konefal and
Hatanaka 2011; Konefal and Mascarenhas 2005; Rogers 2013).
Janine Benyus provides another example of this paradox with her examination of
biomimicry (BIOMIM). Instead of learning from small organic farmers, Benyus details the
work of innovative scientists attempting to learn from ‘nature’ itself, which has had 3.8
billion years to develop a formidable research and development program that we humans are
only now beginning to understand. Each chapter of her text presents examples of biomimetic
work that attempts to learn from some aspect of the more than human world, whether this is
the way that plants are able to photosynthesize sunlight into starch at a cellular level, or the
way that a specific species of spider is able to produce a silk that is far stronger than any
currently existing industrial equivalents. However, in each of these cases, the process of
knowing these particular aspects of ‘nature’ is not aimed at supporting or preserving these
life forms or their ecosystems, but in furthering the very same industrial and military
processes that one might identify as the very cause of eco-systemic decline. The spider silk is
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meant to produce bullet-proof fabrics for the military, the efforts to industrially mimic a
plant’s photosynthesis reactor is meant to produce new fuels for our industrial machines.
Though Benyus presents biomimicry as a way to collaborate with and therefore respect
nature, in actual practice the collaboration seems highly unequal. In the chapter on
photosynthesis, she even asks rhetorically, why we would bother to attempt to recreate a
process that plants already seem to accomplish rather well. She explains,
With all due respect to plants, sugar and starch are not what we humans had in
mind (plants already do a fine job of making those for us). What does interest
us is the possibility of producing hydrogen gas from sunlight and water (84).18
Two	
  Efficiencies	
  

This Taylor paradox represents a transformation of craft goods into industrial
commodities, whose larger scale justifies any ‘minor’ adjustments of the actual craft
involved. And in general, ecoFordism’s commitment to artisanal production is refracted
through a prioritization of quantity over quality. However, there remains in ecoFordism a
connection with the idea of production as itself the source of positive change and the
romanticized character of the entrepreneurial producer who makes this happen. In this regard,
ecoFordism resonates with the objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand, whose work also glorifies
the eminently rational, powerful and self-made titans of an ideal industrial society. Whereas
for planetary improvement the commitment to large scale industrial production has to do with
a faith in markets and a need to harness greed and competition as natural forces that can drive

18

Hydrogen, were it possible to produce economically and environmentally, is a preferred
potential fuel source for a green economy; converted to electricity through fuel cell
technology, it produces oxygen and water as byproducts, as opposed to the greenhouse gasses
produced by the combustion of fossil fuels.
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a transformation of the economy, here the focus is instead upon powerful productive
innovators, entrepreneurs who are producers and creators before they are profit maximizers
and owners.
EcoFordism outlines a difference between two forms of efficiency, economic and
engineering. For engineers, efficiency is defined in terms of output per unit of input and
therefore with doing more with less. For economists on the other hand, efficiency is
measured in terms of money. What they don’t seem willing to admit is that here too the goal
is to do more with less, only in terms of financial as opposed to material and energetic inputs.
After establishing that there are these two qualitatively distinct forms of efficiency they then
treat our problem - over-reliance on economic efficiency, under-reliance on engineering
efficiency - as a matter of choice (as opposed to a structural condition, as Schnaiberg (1980)
makes clear). Hence, ecoFordists can then chastise our economy for not producing as
efficiently as we are capable as if this is a conscious decision, easily remedied. And while
they then present examples of ways in which engineering efficiency could be good for
business, they simply gloss over the correlate truth - that disposability, waste making and all
of the engineering inefficiencies that they bemoan are also - quite often - good for business.
Hence as with eco-utopian socialism, there is a refusal to recognize the role that circulation
and turnover plays in the overall economy. This was, as we saw above, a contributor to the
Model T’s downfall as well. In this case, engineering efficiency ensured that there would be a
robust market in used Model Ts that would ultimately undermine future sales.

Producer	
  not	
  parasite	
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There are two distinct ways that the concept of entrepreneurialism is approached. The
first, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, is motivated by more than just making money, but also
by status, prestige and perhaps most importantly, the joy of creating something new. The
second, the neoclassical entrepreneur, is more narrowly focused on finding new and
innovative ways to make money. To be overly reductive, for the neoclassical entrepreneur,
innovation is a means to make money, and for the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, money is a
means by which to innovate. In Section Two I will introduce these two conceptions of
entrepreneurship in much more detail. While each of the four motifs of green capitalism
embrace the concept of entrepreneurship, ecoFordism (and eco-utopian socialism) are more
closely associated with a Schumpeterian conception of the entrepreneur, whereas planetary
improvement is more closely aligned with a neoclassical conception of the entrepreneur. One
of the characteristic motivations of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, that may as well have
been written of Ford directly, was what Schumpeter called “the will to conquer,” by which he
meant an that an entrepreneur’s effort to succeed might be motivated by power and status
more so than money. The latter merely becomes a means of achieving productive goals and a
measure of success. Ford writes, “Gold is the most useless thing in the world… I am not
interested in money but in the things of which money is merely a symbol” (quoted in
Brinkley 2003: 250).
Krupp and Horn’s Earth: The Sequel profiles a wide range of companies that are
attempting to commercialize new energy technologies - what we will introduce as cleantech
firms in the next section - and which represent the potential for “a 2nd Industrial Revolution
as sweeping as that affected a century ago by the likes of Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and
John D Rockefeller” (9). The entrepreneurs profiled in their text exude the same sort of
world-making aspirations that have defined the cybernetic culture of Silicon Valley, and that
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can also be traced back to their reverence for Henry Ford. Jack Newman, for instance, is a
former employee of Earth First! and the founder of Amyris Technologies, a biofeul startup in
Silicon Valley (and one of the early darlings of the cleantech boom). He explains that his
motivation for founding and developing this biofuels company is not simply to make money,
but more importantly, to make the world:
If we’re successful, we’ll be wealthy, which means we’ll be in a position to
impact politics. That may be a massive rationalization. But part of my agenda
has been to create a power base to change the world. The skill set I have to do
that is technological, but I know that in the end it’s all about the money
(quoted in ERTHSQL: 88).
Here, ecoFordism picks up on another important legacy of Henry Ford - his complete
disdain for Wall Street financiers and his efforts to keep them as far away from his business
as possible. Perhaps the single most defining aspect of Ford’s mythology (as well as the
single most damning reality of Ford’s actual, virulently anti-semitic legacy) was his assertion
that he was a producer, not a parasite.19
This principle, and Ford’s ability to act upon it, was not incidental to his success (and
eventually, his failures). It allowed him to sink profits back into the expansion of his plant,
and to focus on longer term profitability than investors will usually tolerate. It also allowed
him to remain in complete, dictatorial control over his firm, well past the point at which any
active board of directors would have ever allowed. EcoFordists understand, as did Ford, the

19

Ford’s war against social waste manifest in his virulent anti-semitism. For Ford, the Jew
was a repository of all irrational and parasitical forces of nature – whether immoral life,
immoral union organizing, or immoral financial profiteering. It was all waste, and it was all
due to the international Jew. Ford had a collection of anti-semitic works ghost written and
published as “The International Jew” which Hitler ultimately reproduced as standard reading
for the Nazi youth programs.
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need to be wary of investment capital taking over control of their work. Schendler puts this
well:
Corporations, by definition, are singularly focused on profit and shareholder
returns. Thus, environmental efforts that cost shareholder value in the short
term (and they all do) often die in infancy. To preserve the ability to make
ethical decisions, many sustainable business leaders have remained private,
like Patagonia, or reverted to private ownership, like Levi Strauss (119).
Tasch similarly recognizes how many ‘slow money’ successes are not actually able to
expand the scale of their operations, without accepting financing that will risk fundamentally
transforming the principles that they hoped to expand in the first place. He references Ford
directly in this regard: “Henry Ford railed with almost Islamic implication and poetic fury
against the idea of arbitrary interest rates and speculative finance” (67). The problem, as
Tasch explains, is that smaller firms “wish to expand their impact, but they are opposed to
growth forced by outside capital and they abjure an “exit strategy” that would put control of
their business in the hands of absentee shareholders” (52).
As we will see in section three, this struggle over cash and control is a central tension in
the world of cleantech entrepreneurialism, essentially pitting an ecoFordism that derives from
the excitement of innovation against the strong pull of planetary improvement, anchored by
market pragmatism or what we will come to understand as “smart money.”

The	
  $5	
  Day,	
  pre-‐empting	
  regulation	
   	
  

Financiers were not the only parasites that Ford attempted to keep away from his
company. Organized labor was equally problematic, and while Ford could not operate
without a huge workforce, he was committed to hiring that workforce on his own terms. At
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the height of the Model T’s success, when Ford’s Highland Park production facility was
running at full capacity, Ford began planning a new and improved facility that would allow
his company to reach new heights of efficiency. This new facility, the River Rouge Plant,
would be the largest, most advanced, and most vertically integrated auto manufacturing
facility the world had ever seen. Once up and running, Ford would be capable of producing
cars at unheard of speeds, eventually reducing the number of man-minutes per vehicle from
728 to 93 (Brinkley 2003).
Such gains were however limited by the quality of his workforce and their ability to
keep the plant’s machines running at break neck speeds. By 1913 turnover rates had reached
380% in Highland Park, meaning Ford had to hire 963 men over the course of a year to keep
every 100 positions filled. A Christmas bonus for men with three years service or more was
applicable to 640 out of 15000 employees. Workers throughout the industry were beginning
to organize against the low wages and unsafe conditions they were made to endure, and Ford
was intent on avoiding unionization at his plants by whatever means necessary (Brinkley
2003).
This led, in 1914, to the pronouncement that Ford would pay its workers five dollars a
day, near double the industry standard of the time. This, more so than any of his other
innovations, thrust Ford into the national spotlight - and presents an important model for
ecoFordism. Cradle to Cradle authors McDonough and Braungart write of Ford’s $5 a day
wage that “in one fell swoop… [Ford] actually created his own market, and raised the bar for
the entire world of industry” (24).
Beyond the fact that Ford’s move was a massive publicity stunt for a man who
relished attention, many interpreted the move as a form of enlightened Keynesian social
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justice. By paying workers enough to afford luxuries such as an automobile, Ford would raise
the wage floor throughout the economy and create a larger market for his products. Others
interpreted the wage as a calculated move to thwart his competitors, whose manufacturing
processes were not as labor-efficient as Ford’s and who therefore would not be able to
compete. Regardless of the exact motivation, by paying such a high wage Ford was able to
avoid the main thrust of unionization drives, as he would now be paying workers more than
union contracts were providing in competitors’ firms. He would also be able to attract the
best workers - both in terms of their innate work ability, as well as their willingness to be
molded - by Ford - into his conception of how a good, hardworking American should live.
But the five dollar day came with a catch. $2.34 would be the basic wage, and the
other $2.66 would be paid through a profit sharing plan, but only to those workers deserving
of this benefit - only to “Ford Men.” Workers receiving the extra money had to prove that
they were saving or investing this extra money in ways that would be of “permanent benefit”
to himself and his family. Further, the Five dollar wage was available only to married men
over the age of 22. To enforce these conditions, Ford launched his Sociological Department.
Investigators from the department would visit a workers’ home to see that they were living
properly. These investigators would follow workers wherever they went, they would question
wives and neighbors, they knew few bounds. Ford Men were assimilated into an American
culture of Ford’s approval. English classes were provided, as were loans to help workers
move into appropriate dwellings. Housing boarders was unacceptable, unclean homes,
underfurnished homes, unkempt homes… all were unacceptable, and if detected by a
sociological inspector, these were all grounds for losing one’s extra $2.66 daily. This was the
price of the five dollar day (Brinkley 2003; Grandin 2010).
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Ford’s $5 wage was a pre-emptive form of labor management. For ecoFordism, there
is a similar pre-emptive form of resource management, focused on non-human inputs to
production. Green capitalist texts laud the benevolence of corporations whose internal
process of corporate sustainability has them monitoring or even curtailing CO2 emmissions,
or working with consultants - such as the authors of Cradle to Cradle, to certify the
sustainability of their work. Throughout there is a sense that corporations cannot wait for
government regulation to force their hand, and must therefore take action now, to voluntarily
accomplish at the level of the firm what the state is not willing or able to accomplish at the
level of the economy. If Ford’s five dollar day was an effort to avoid unionization while
presenting himself as a bona patrias familias, the same is true of ecoFordists today, who
instead present themeselves as bonus pater naturae.
Krupp and Horn’s text, Earth: The Sequel shows how Google attempted something of
this sort in 2007, with its effort to internally set a theoretical price for carbon that would be in
line with potential regulations in the future. Google’s pre-emptive move is far wiser, and
more productive, they argue, than any potentially overbearing legislation that will slow down
the process of innovation. In distancing itself from the environmentalism of the 70s,
ecoFordism must not only distance itself from hippies and radical counterculture, but also
from the environmental movement’s successes of the time - which are decried as relics of a
failed, command and control strategy of state-led mitigation efforts. In another example, they
detail the ways in which environmental regulations threaten to derail a promising tidal energy
company, who should be left to negotiate directly with local (in this case indigenous)
communities regarding the protection of the oceanic ecosystem in which they intend to
operate. In general then, this dimension of ecoFordism relates to the much broader neoliberal
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strategy of avoiding regulations through voluntary guidelines and self-managed corporate
discipline (Andrews 1998; Maxwell et al. 2000; Steinzor 1998).

Consumer	
  Puritanism:	
  Making	
  good	
  men,	
  markets,	
  and	
  consumers	
  

Ford made men - good, hardworking, uncomplaining, non-unionized men - that were part
of good, law abiding, hetero-normative families. He put his immigrant employees through
rigorous Americanization training and rituals, he built public infrastructure where they lived
(incuding schools and hospitals). Later in his career, he would even experiment with building
an American town in the heart of the Amazon, to support his attempt at creating a rubber
plantation. After the complete and utter failure of this Amazonian enclave, Fordlandia, he
committed himself to developing idyllic rural factory towns in the Midwest, where industry
and agriculture could find an ideal balance (Grandin 2010).
Just as Ford was committed to producing ‘good’ workers, ecoFordists are similarly
committed to producing good consumers. Here Schumacher’s (1999) distinction between
primary and secondary needs grounds a moralizing discourse about what people should and
should not consume. The desire to impose an austere, pure way of life upon the laboring
population has its roots in both the industrial reforms of figures such as Ford as well as the
earlier utopian socialist experiments, many of which - especially the most enduring - imposed
monastic conditions upon their members. Hence, there are parallels here between ecoFordism
and ecoUtopian socialism, with the main distinction being between a vision of enclaves of
right-consumers, themselves choosing to spend their money accordingly, versus an industrial
scale production of cheap, durable and environmentally friendly goods, compelling even the
average consumer to ‘go green.’ And so, while EcoFordism also presents a range of opinions
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as to what comprises right, good and green consumption, here is it less about a privilege for
the minority than it is about prescriptions for the majority.

Conclusions	
  and	
  Connections	
  

Much of the green capitalist work that focuses on technological fixes (including
cleantech, as will be introduced in the next section) takes this ecoFordist position recognizing that consumers ultimately care most about the bottom line - and so instead of
appealing to the enlightened consumer who is willing to pay more for non-financial reasons,
they instead hope to see technological advances bring the price of environmental
technologies and services down to a point where they are price competitive. Alternative
energy generation and alternative fuels need to compete in a market that is largely agnostic
about the sources of their commodities - clean energy is indistinguishable from dirty energy
at the point of consumption and therefore consumers are less likely to take qualitative factors
into consideration when making their purchasing decisions, focusing instead on the base
price.
As mentioned, the issue of control and coordination is going to emerge as the core
vector of difference distinguishing these four motifs. Whereas planetary improvement
focuses on market coordination and eco-utopian socialism on local coordination, ecoFordism
focuses on industrialists, the self made men of Ayn Rand’s fictional universe, as the rightful
coordinators of our transformation to a green economy. Instead of elite consumers, we have
elite producers. Instead of small scale and local enclaves, we have large-scale global
industries. And while ecoFordism shares with planetary improvement a commitment to large
scale industrial transformation led by private sector actors, planetary improvement focuses on
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the power of the market, whereas ecoFordism focuses on the power of producers, who are
able to make the markets that they deem best; a difference between market-makers and the
market-as-maker.

3.6	
  Green	
  Developmentalism	
  

The 20th century economy ends up offering two very distinct, and rarely interlinked
legacies to green capitalist discourses. On the one hand, this was a century of waste-making.
The height of the industrial economy and mass consumerism, or the ‘American way of life’
unleashed upon the planet a “treadmill of production” (Schnaiberg 1980) where convenience,
disposability and perhaps most importantly - the ubiquity of petroleum - were entrenched (at
ever-expanding scales) within the normal, everyday functioning of the global economy. For
this reason, this economy is the most common object of green capitalist critique. It is the
specific form of industrial capitalism that we must save our planet from.
And yet, as if descended from a parallel universe, disconnected from this inimical history,
the same 20th century economy, and even more broadly the legacy of progressive era reforms,
developmentalist policies and infrastructural development upon which it rests, is considered
to be a source of inspiration and hope, a model for positive state intervention and industrial
policy that can help guide the economy towards a safer, greener future.
Unlike the first three varieties of green capitalism, Green developmentalism focuses on
state institutions at any number of scales - from the local and municipal to national and global
- and the role that they can and should play in the making of a green economy. This is
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commonly understood as advocating for a “Green New Deal” or a “WWII-scale
mobilization” but can be seen as a more general embrace of state-led economic solutions,
providing a reminder that neoliberalism’s current laissez-faire rhetoric has not been faithfully
adhered to when it comes to industrial policy, and that it not the only available governance
option for capitalist economies (Block and Keller 2011; Hess 2012).
Accordingly, Green developmentalism is not only, or even directly, connected to the
specific history of the New Deal per se, but to a much broader range of active state-led
development trajectories, from the progressive era’s municipal improvements to cold war
industrial policy and the WWII mobilization of the economy into a war machine that could
also provide the (domestic) population with a centrally coordinated, rationed and yet still
“technically” free market system of provisioning. To the extent that these war-time
economies are invoked, Green developmentalism can actually be read as a way for Green
Capitalists to advocate for central economic planning (and nationalized financial and
industrial efforts) while remaining loyal to the idea of the free market and suffused with a
requisite patriotic aversion to anything that could potentially be interpreted as anti-market,
therefore anti-capitalist, and therefore pro-communist. As a general governing principle,
efforts at central planning, just like “command and control” regulations, are categorically
derided, while at the same time the state is looked to for leadership and direction. Here a
distinction should be made between neoclassical models - in which this state support is seen
as part of a temporary transition or state of exception, and Schumpeterian or Polanyian
models in which the state’s leadership and guidance is actually an ongoing necessity for a
successful “division of innovative labor” (MAZZ: 13). In either case, a strong
developmentalist state serves as the only agent conceivably able to coordinate the planetary
scale transformations that will be needed for the survival of life as we’ve come to know it.
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And so, green developmentalism focuses on the central role that the state can and has played
in correcting market imperfections (whether isolated and temporary or structural and
permanent) and mobilizing massive resources for basic science and infrastructure in ways
that capital, or the private markets, would not find sufficiently profitable, strategic or derisked.

Strong	
  States,	
  Rapid	
  Mobilization	
  

Numerous green capitalist proposals explain how massive state-led investment will
provide jobs, distribute wealth, and dematerialize the economy through energy efficient
infrastructure and technology. For instance, Lester Brown and the Earth Policy Institute have
a green developmentalism plan which they continue to update (the current iteration is Plan B
4.0). In Plan B 3.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization (2008) Brown argues for a “WWII scalemobilization” for global redevelopment for which he has calculated the hundreds of billions
of US$ (modest in respect to our current, financialized economy) necessary to enact his
proposed portfolio of energy efficient technologies. The many failed and failing states of the
world present the exact opposite of what this state-led redevelopment plan can and should
look like. His text opens with a nightmarish description of “failed states” such as Somalia,
which is ruled by tribal leaders and jihadist groups, therefore leaving no one in charge of the
social and ecological crises that they face. The opposite of a failed state is China.
China is spending $120 billion on high-speed rail in 2010, whereas the United
States is spending $1 billion. When the United States allocated $8 billion for
high-speed rail from the stimulus package, China allocated $100 billion
stimulus funding to this cause (111).
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In Hot, Flat and Crowded (2008), Thomas Friedman advocates for the US to emulate
China – just for one day – because we need government to provide a rational and far reaching
development plan focused on nurturing an innovation-based economy. Friedman proposes a
plan he calls “Code Green.” If the nation was mobilized by a red threat in the 50s and 60s
that led the country to build up a military-industrial highway-railroad-port-airporteducational-and-scientific base than the same must be true for the green threat today. He does
then temper his optimism, suggesting that he is not interested in the McCarthyism that
accompanied this mobilization, only “the seriousness and determination to build a society
that can face the overarching threat of our day (6).”
Instead of the typical view of Keynesian New Deal policies for correcting market
failures or something resembling a centralized innovation plan such as the Manhattan Project,
Friedman envisions a state-supported market where “10,000 innovators, all collaborating
with, and building upon, one another to produce all sorts of breakthroughs in abundant, clean,
reliable, and cheep electrons and energy efficiency” (243-4). Friedman asks us to consider
markets as if they are a garden. “You have to intelligently design and fertilize them–with the
right taxes, regulations, incentives, and disincentives–so they yield the good, healthy crops
necessary for you to thrive” (244). His vision is very similar to that presented by Luis SuarezVilla in Technocapitalism (2012) and to William Janeway (2012), whose work we will more
carefully explore in section three, as well as to the work of Marianna Mazzucato’s, which we
will explore below.
Moving further to the left, Bill McKibben in his recent book Eaarth (2012) tells us that he
fully supports such massive state led projects, even while focusing on a more local,
distributed model for a better economy. Even Christian Parenti, an unlikely contributor to the
genre, argues in Tropic of Chaos (2011) that although capitalism may be an enemy of nature,
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“either capitalism solves the crisis, or it destroys civilization” (241). He suggests that
addressing the climate crisis “will require a re-legitimation of the state’s role in the economy”
and we must therefore “make the effort to force our political leaders to act” (2012). Parenti
sums up this argument in an online essay titled: “Why Climate change will make you love
big government” (2012).
To adapt to climate change will mean coming together on a large scale and
mobilizing society’s full range of resources. In other words, Big Storms
require Big Government. Who else will save stranded climate refugees, or
protect and rebuild infrastructure, or coordinate rescue efforts and plan out the
flow and allocation of resources? It will be government that does these tasks
or they will not be done at all.
For Parenti, as well as Brown, Friedman, and others writing in this vein, the potential for
government to ‘go big’ and address our planetary problems becomes a pragmatic call for
immediate solutions within the existing social, economic and political relations. Here I
should be clear: there is no question that disaster relief and public infrastructure are crucial to
our collective lives. Further, there is nothing wrong with pragmatism, or for that matter with
attempting to rework existing social and political infrastructure towards the production of
more ecologically viable and socially just futures. However, there is a crucial distinction that
needs to be made between reworking the state and merely re-loading it. Calls for green
developmentalism tend to focus on the latter: more investment, more jobs, more
infrastructure, without ever really pausing to question whether this will merely resuscitate the
very social, technological, economic and political system that is responsible for accelerating
(or possibly even causing) our planetary problems. As with the ecological modernization
literature, these calls to pursue state facilitated green growth seem to avoid the ecological
implications of growth and the increased material and energetic throughput that it both
requires and facilitates (Schnaiberg 1980).
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Planning	
  Vs	
  Design	
  

There is clear discomfort with proposing a solution that entails a strong centralized
state-authority within a post-Chicago school neoliberal milieu that denies the necessity of
state-support in an economy that is ‘supposed’ to function most optimally as a market free
from all interference. For Friedman this is about being China… but only for one day. For
Barnes (as well as Greer) it is about advocating for a strong state without calling it a state
(instead it is a series of public trusts, whose trustees have the same sort of sovereign power
that one would expect of a state.) For Mazzucato, it is redefining the negative conception of
state-coordination in a positive vein, as the provenance of an entrepreneurial state.
Numerous texts call for addressing problems at the “whole house” (NATCAP) or
societal level, and since the idea of a planned economy rings of communist pasts that cannot
be tactfully resurrected, the word ‘planned’ is switched out for the word ‘designed’. For
many green capitalist authors, design is the accepted way to discuss holistic planning as if it
is simply a skill learned from the creative economy, and not a call for non-market
coordination and control. Though seldom directly acknowledged, these calls for better
holistic approaches to whole system design amount to calls for a strong non-market
institution, capable of coordinating social-ecological production. As mentioned in the first
section, such ideas are often recuperated into a less aggressively anti-market position by
redirecting the ‘systemic’ design gaze from society at large to an individual commodity such
as an automobile or a building and then marveling at the success of individual design teams
that have revolutionized these specific commodities. The difference between a whole
building and a whole planetary economy/ecology is left unacknowledged.
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For Lovins et al. in Natural Capitalism, their vision is of a well designed - but not
centrally planned - economy, led by an entrepreneurial mayor. Curitiba, Brazil serves as an
example of this focus on design as opposed to centralized planning. They explain that
Curitiba has succeeded
Not by central planning but by combining farsighted and pragmatic leadership
with an integrated design process, strong public and business participation,
and a widely shared public vision that transcends partisanship (288).
What is the difference?
Curitiba is not a top-down, mayor-dominated city; everyone respects the fact
that, while it is served by leaders, many of the best ideas and most of their
implementation come from its citizens. It encourages entrepreneurial solutions
(290).
Lovins et al. present Curitiba as a model entrepreneurial state, run by principles of design.
As opposed to principles of hierarchical planning and top-down decision making, problems
are solved with collaborative and inclusive charrettes, and a spirit of experimentation that
allows the city to “improv[e] as assiduously as any startup company” (300). Central design is
entrepreneurial, flexible and creative whereas central planning is top-down, hierarchical and
bureaucratic.20
More recently, Mazzucato has gone on to define the entrepreneurial state as a
fundamental element of any viable transition to a green economy - though she is willing to
admit that distinctions such as those presented above are largely rhetorical. As she explains,
much of what we know to be the top-down, overbearing state derided by neoliberals and free

20

In actual fact, many of the key elements of Curitiba’s transformation were instituted under
a military dictatorship with no public input and against the will of much of the business
community (Stretton 1976).
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market advocates has in fact, through most of the 20th century and beyond, exhibited many of
these developmentalist qualities.
Mazzucato’s vision of an entrepreneurial state focuses on the active role that states can
and sometimes do play in the development of new commercial technologies. She focuses
specifically on the US state, and its successes in funding and directing basic research and
early stage high risk innovations that have been instrumental to information technology,
biotechnology and clean technology - the three fields that venture capital typically takes
credit for as the fruits of their risk-taking activities. To the contrary, Mazzucato argues that
venture capital is actually quite risk-averse, and more likely to fund incremental gains to
already established technologies (and therefore already established markets) then they are to
fund truly cutting edge, high-risk early stage technologies with the potential to actually
transform our society in meaningful ways.
Though she treats the US economy as an example of a successful entrepreneurial state,
when it comes to green or clean innovations, the US state has not done nearly enough. Here
Mazzucato makes a critique by analogy:
In 2012 China announced its plan to produce 1000 GWs of wind power by
2050. That would be approximately equal to replacing the entire existing US
electric infrastructure with wind turbines. Are the US and Europe still able to
dream so big? It appears not (11).
What is missing is “patient finance” - investments that are willing to take a long term
perspective and invest in the very earliest stages of development of new technologies without
needing to be immediately rewarded with short term gains.
Mazzucato rehashes the same distinction between producers and parasites found in both
eco-utopian socialism and ecoFordism, identifying as parasitic public-private partnerships in
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which “the private sector is able to leech benefits from a state that it simultaneously refuses
to finance” (23). She distinguishes between symbiotic and parasitic innovation ecosystems. In
the former, the state takes on the role of providing bold leadership, direction, and the
entrepreneurial willingness to embrace true uncertainty by investing in the riskiest, earliest
stage technologies with patient capital. Her proposal has similarities with Barnes’s imagined
partnership between a corporate and a commons sector of the economy, with the latter
tending to what the former cannot and should not be left responsible for.
By contrast, the current system allows private corporations to benefit from state
expenditures without ever having to directly pay the state back - with royalties, equity, or
anything equivalent - essentially resulting in what has come to be seen as a form of
privatization typical of neoliberalism: the socialization of risk and privatization of returns.
Here Mazzucato faults the shareholder revolution and the corporate practice of using excess
funds to buy back stock instead of reinvesting in R&D (or in contributing to the state-funded
research to which much private innovation is indebted) (Lazonick 2012).

Five	
  Year	
  Plans	
   	
  

Friedman takes reverence for Chinese industrial policy to an extreme. He ends Hot Flat
and Crowded with a chapter called “China For a Day (but not two),” essentially suggesting
that the US needs long term industrial strategy, similar to the directives that China provides
its domestic economy with regular Five Year Plans (the most recent of which included
explicit targets for the development of clean and green infrastructure). He asks, “why doesn't
America have a government that can just put all the right policies in place to shape the energy
market” (372)? Friedman wants a clear set of directives coming from the top down, such as
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stable long term price signals for carbon and a clearer picture of what support the national
market for clean technologies will be. With such policies in place, “We would finally have
some long-term clarity for investors to make big bets” (372).
Friedman calls this “intelligent design”:
We want government setting the right tax policies, regulatory policies, and
education policies, and funding the basic research that pushes out the
boundaries of materials science, chemistry, physics, biology, and
nanotechnology – preparing all the soil, so the market and venture capitalists
can pick off whichever sprouts look most likely to make the difficult transition
from drawing board to marketplace. That's what intelligent design is all about
(246).
Green developmentalists counter the ecoFordist focus on benevolent and visionary
corporations and industrialists with a focus on benevolent and visionary states. Where
ecoFordists attribute the rise of automobility to the cunning and disruptive technologies of
Henry Ford, a Green developmentalist is more likely to point out the strategic state-led efforts
to create a national highway system and build the infrastructure that makes Ford’s car worth
owning in the first place. (Neither perspective, we might add, would be quick to point out the
less triumphant and far more sinister history of General Motors, Firestone and Standard Oil
working to systematically dismantle municipal light rail systems in an effort to help
accelerate the shift away from public transit and towards private ownership of automobiles.)
Mazzucato is also enamored by the Chinese developmentalist state. China’s 12th 5-year
plan (2011-15) is described as “visionary and ambitious” and involves spending $1.5 trillion 5% of GDP - in a range of industries that feed into the alternative energy economy. “Real
courage exists in those countries that use the resources of government to give a serious ’push’
to clean technologies, by committing to goals and funding levels that attempt seemingly
impossible tasks” (137).
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For Mazzucato, it is the developmental state that is cast as a producer, in opposition to a
weak neoliberal state, beholden to free market ideology and the risk aversion of private
investors. It is the entrepreneurial state, she argues, and not private investors such as venture
capitalists, that truly display the ‘animal spirits’ that account for the economy’s technological
dynamism. The state is the true market disruptor, as opposed to the individual private
industrialists heralded by ecoFordism.
To be clear, what makes the entrepreneurial state entrepreneurial is not directly creating
and running new disruptive businesses, but having the courage to invest in new disruptive
businesses - doing what venture capital claims as their provenance but is in fact too riskaverse to actually accomplish. The entrepreneurial state is then, for Mazzucato, a venture
capital state, only with the ability to make patient investments and to invest in infrastructure
as well as new commercial technologies. This is precisely the sort of leadership - or visionary
direction - that Mazzucato and Friedman are looking for in the state, and romanticizing in
their conception of Chinese industrial policy. If Eco-utopian Socialism promotes the elite
consumption of enlightened individual consumers, green developmentalism instead looks to
the state as an enlightened collective consumer. For McKibben this is a more direct
Keynesian focus on public sector procurement, or the state as a consumer in commercial
markets. But for Mazzucato, Friedman and others21 focus is instead on the state as an
enlightened investor (which could be considered a consumer of equity in early stage research
and development).

21

As mentioned, Janeway’s work will be explored in Section 3. Another source of this
entrepreneurial vision comes from the Breakthrough Institute, which also argues for a
renewed Keynesianism focused on innovation, growth and technology (cf Atkinson 2011).
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A	
  Post-‐political	
  Paralysis?	
  Forcing	
  our	
  Leaders	
  to	
  lead	
  

Green developmentalism runs up against a persistent, and seemingly intractable
problem. On the one hand, these authors want good, strong states to make good strong
decisions that will lead us towards a greener future. And yet on the other hand, they are well
aware that the reality of actually existing states - save romanticizations of China and its 5year plans - are presently incapable of such grand visioning. Recourse to war-mobilization is
essentially the fantasy of a state of economic exception, a condition where normal market
rules and the ‘coercive laws of competition’ abrogate their sovereignty. But who then, will
rule instead? This becomes a difficult wild card to factor in, and is quite often deferred with
what Swyngedouw (2010) calls “post-political” gestures.
Swyngedouw defines the post-political condition as a managerial consensus sustained by
apocalyptic fears, where technocrats and scientists are presumed to know what's good for all
of us. He argues that climate change politics have become a prominent marker of this postpolitical ascent, colonizing spaces of political activity with a depoliticized state of nature best
left to technocratic control. Climate science crosses over from necessary information into
fetishized and desensitizing spectacle, with litanies of scientific facts that detail our planetary
ecosystem’s decline projecting out towards grim apocalyptic scenarios of a world completely
out of balance. This leads to demands that at every scale, human civilization must become
more “sustainable” or “environmentally friendly” and that well informed experts,
entrepreneurs and politicians can and must lead the way while the rest of us dutifully press
our leaders to lead, our governments to govern.
Many of these traits can be found in the green capitalism literature, often expressed in and
through desires for massive state-led developments, or green developmentalism. For instance,
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though Auben Schendler was earlier presented as a planetary improver, this is all just a
temporary strategy, that gives well intentioned people like himself something positive to do
“while we wait for government leadership” (88). Schendler firmly believes that ultimately
government will have to lead the charge, with a “WWII size investment.” Our role, as regular
citizens, is to force government into this decision. "We need to get out in the streets, we need
to bring our letters to the post office, and we need to force the leaders to lead” (99).
Schendler finds it irrational that our government paid for a war against communism and a war
against terrorism – both potential threats only – and won’t pay for the equivalent war against
climate change. He sees his role as working on the massive marketing campaign that will
mobilize the public will for such an engagement.

Government	
  Against	
  Democracy	
  

While post-political arguments champion civic participation - at least in terms of
voting or writing letters to one’s elected officials, these somewhat limp calls for participation
actually conceal a pervasive anti-democratic sentiment. For instance, in Barnes description of
the common trusts that he hopes to see reclaiming natural and social wealth for the people, he
emphasizes the important role played by the trustees. His model for these trustees is based on
his understanding of the Federal Reserve, which is a part of our democratic government that
is largely shielded from popular sentiment, allowing it to make tough and sometimes
unpopular decisions such as raising interest rates. He continues,
When I was in college, my economics professors talked of fiscal and monetary
“levers” that wise policymakers could use to fine-tune the economy.… I
imagined an economic control room full of gauges and valves, staffed by
tweedy academics. Handsome, brainy men (it was still mainly men in those
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days) would scan readouts, puff on their pipes, and twist a few dials. Others
would murmur praise. All would remain calm (86).
Importantly, for Barnes, the Federal Reserve, or likewise his proposed common trusts,
succeed by avoiding the limitations of democratic accountability. As he explains, capitalism
distorts democracy because democracy is an open system, hence “economic power can easily
infect it” (34).
The problem with democracy, at least as it is currently constituted, is the undue influence
that money provides corporations and other powerful interests. Since this is the democracy
we’ve been dealt, a viable green solution will have to be - Barnes argues - insulated from
these democratic machinations of wealth, lobbyists and privilege.22 Instead, the commons
sector should be governed by enlightened social leaders who will take it upon themselves, as
trustees of the common wealth, to administer our collective resources. He adds,
It might be argued that, by shielding trustees from direct political influence,
we'd make them–and commons trusts generally–undemocratic. The same
could be said, however, for our courts. The fact is, there are certain decisions,
both economic and judicial, this should be shielded from politics and markets
(100).
It is not that he wants anti-democratic decision making – what he wants is a respite from
the corporate-captured democracy that puts short term profits before people in all cases.
I'm not averse to a role for government in society. Yet history has convinced
me that representative government can't adequately protect the interests of
ordinary citizens. Even less can it protect the interests of future generations,
ecosystems, and nonhuman species. The reason is that most–though not all–of
the time, government puts the interests of private corporations 1st. This is a
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Ophuls (1977) discusses this as a vision of benevolent dictatorship meant to address
ecological scarcity.
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systemic problem of a capitalist democracy, not just a matter of electing new
leaders (ix).
There are clear parallels with the authoritarian, world making aspirations of
ecoFordism here - in both cases a benign tyranny of social engineers is imagined as the
central focus of coordination for a new green economy. For ecoFordists these engineers are
corporate producers, for Barnes, Mazzucato and green developmentalism, these engineers are
public servants - agents of state institutions, including those that refuse to identify as such.
Contrast this with the ecoFordist perspective, discussed above. For instance,
Hirshberg writes,
Business is the most powerful force on earth. Unlike governments, which are
usually bound by consensus and convention, business can lead. Unlike
churches, community groups, and think tanks, business has money to back up
its ideas. They can act quickly, get rules changed, and overcome entrenched
interests. In one of those ironic twists that make life so interesting, the same
boundless thirst for profit that got the planet into trouble can also get us out of
it (4).
For Hirshberg, it is business that can work quickly, making unilateral decisions that can
overcome entrenched interests. For green developmentalists, it is precisely business that is no
longer capable of such inspired action, since they are captured by the logic of financialization
and short term profit maximization. Both see finance as a parasite, as opposed to a more
virtuous productive force, but for the green developmentalists the producers - corporations have already been infected with the parasite, they are already beholden to the logic of
financialization. The ecoFordists hold out hope for virtuous, pure industrialists, the green
developmentalists hold out hope for a virtuous pure state.
Lappe argues that focusing on whether or not we should have growth avoids the real
questions:
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[It] keeps us from probing to the root of our global crises: the patterns of
power over decision-making that we ourselves choose, consciously or not, that
leave one kind of deadly economic model gaining in strength (41).
For Lappe the answer is “aligning our practices with nature,” which serves as a repository
of all that is socially and ecologically rational, sustainable and waste-free. Whether or not we
choose to accept this sort of metaphysical embrace of nature as the universal antidote to our
social ills, we can still appreciate how clearly she has identified the problem in terms that
clearly spell out both our domination by capital, and the ways in which ‘we’ make this
domination through our everyday choices and actions, though of course in conditions not of
our choosing.
Lappe offers an important corrective to green developmentalist’s somewhat uncritical
embrace of the state. Lappe wants to create “publicly held the government” (156) and to get
to this, she argues, “we have to face the beast” (156). Capitalism - which she defines as “one
rule economics” needs to give way to a more diverse expansive and “natural” set of rules.
There will always be rules she says but “the critical question for life is not whether there are
rules [there are] but who makes them, the process of forming and changing them, and what
purpose they serve” (114). She writes,
Reversing our downward trajectory demands effective, responsive government
more than ever, [but] we've been absorbing the notion of government itself–
not the forces making it less and less accountable to us–is our problem. In
sum, this worldview turns us not only against each other but against an
essential tool we have in common to meet our common needs (12).
Lappe focuses attention on the promise and need for radical democracy. She argues
that only a radically democratic world can be ecologically sustainable. This is a radical
proposition–revolutionary even. Unfortunately though, her radical proposals are recuperated
into a call for a progressive social democratic state where our votes matter, and civic society
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thrives. The mechanisms she suggests for reclaiming the state are rather benign - voting,
engaging in civil society, all of the basics of post-political civility:
Our longer-term answer requires selecting presidents and members of
Congress whom we can count on to choose Supreme Court justices sharing
this understanding. And this long-haul clarity makes it possible to see what's
needed right now to defend democracy (158).
Despite her criticism of actually existing democracy, Lappe defends the electoral
system:
Even the private act of voting isn't just about calculated self interest, it dawned
on me recently. It, too, is about meaning. Rationally, I can easily see that my
single vote isn't about to decide anything. But entering the voting booth, I feel
something more going on inside: a quiet sense of pride welling up because I
know I'm playing my part in a larger human drama (100).
Like the rest of the genre Lappe is participating in, revolution or any agonistic political
proposals are largely off the table. The problem with capitalism, or fast money as Tasch
would have it, is that it is violent, and therefore the proper response is non-violent opposition,
which comes to be interpreted as polite engagement within the already existing channels of
democracy23 and civil society.

Conclusions	
  and	
  Connctions	
  

Green developmentalism is, like ecoFordism, somewhat of an amalgam of Planetary
Improvement and EcoUtopian Socialism. From the former it takes on the mantle of a war

23

‘Democracy’ may not adequately describe the US political system; new research from
Martin Gilens and Bejamin Page (2014) suggest that the US political system should
technically be considered an oligarchy (‘economic elite domination’).
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against waste - only seeing this as a matter of national and planetary security and therefore a
campaign for concerned states - not just concerned markets - to take on.

From EcoUtopian

Socialism it takes a sense of paternalistic coordination, the idea that planning can and should
happen independent of market forces.
In many respects green developmentalism - especially the variant proposed by
Mazzucato or Hess - has a lot of merit - but the fundamental issue of whether growth can
ever be green is left unchallenged - this is the dimension of the capitalist economy that is
preserved and improved as a naturalized component of our eco-social lives. And yet, by
ruthlessly critiquing neoliberal capitalism, much of the green developmentalist critique
dovetails rather nicely with much of the critical - even anti-capitalist - criticism of
neoliberalism. In this regard, green developmentalism exposes a more general problem facing
the left today. When ‘neoliberalism’ displaces ‘capitalism’ as our object of critique, it can be
easy to romanticize prior forms of capitalist administration, such as the progressive era’s
municipal improvements or the Keynesian welfare (and warfare) state of the early 20th
century, and to forget that most of the ecological and social crises that we currently face were
produced by these seemingly less-worse regimes of accumulation. To take one example: the
progressive era laid the groundwork for a sophisticated waste management system that
dramatically improved the health and sanitation of public spaces. And yet, this same system
was quite possibly the single most important piece of a techno-cultural infrastructure that has
allowed for the subsequent rise of rampant disposability and planned obsolescence, which
requires no-longer desired commodities to be whisked away, out of site, out of mind.
This is, in many ways, the same problem plaguing ecological modernization theorists,
who imagine new approaches to green governance providing a Polanyian double movement
that can turn the innovative force of the free market towards solving our environmental
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problems. It is important to remember that Polanyi saw the state slowing down the rate of
capital’s expansion, therefore making the process less disruptive and more tolerable, but not
in any way radically transforming or re-directing the trajectory of these transformations.

3.7	
  Four	
  motifs	
  of	
  green	
  capitalism:	
  conclusions	
  and	
  connections	
  

It is difficult to argue or prove that it is ‘capitalism itself’ and not merely the
capitalism that currently predominates that is the source of our anthropogenic climatological
problems. There is no way to empirically distinguish between this more general and abstract
logic or conception of a set of patterning social relations, and its real instantiation in and as
our global economy. That said, it is possible to identify some points of congruence. With a
seeming consensus that democracy is broken and that in its current form it may actually be a
major part of our problem, each variety of green capitalism proposes that we break through
this political impasse by following the lead of their respective champion: markets,
communities, producers, states. Each of these champions becomes a vehicle for imagining an
agent capable of leading powerful and directed action, breaking free from the status quo, or
business as usual, and helping us realize a better, greener future.
In all of these cases, the issue is primarily about control and the central question
remains: how do we want to manage/coordinate/design/make/reproduce our lives together? In
some ways these questions are at the heart of every political opinion regarding climate
change. With the varieties of green capitalism presented above we’ve seen a few different
answers: The market should coordinate our lives. Producers should coordinate our industry.
The state should coordinate our markets. Communities should coordinate themselves.
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With all four varieties of green capitalism now examined, we can begin to see how
they intersect. Each variety proposes a different ‘enlightened’ subject or actor as savior and
motivating force behind any potential green economy. For the eco-utopian socialists it is
enlightened communities and localities, where small scale business and local artisanal craft
economies prevail. For the Planetary Improvers it is an enlightened market, and therefore
enlightened consumer preferences, that will - if properly embraced, lead to the technological
and commercial innovations that will usher in the new economy. For ecoFordists it is
enlightened producers and entrepreneurs who will make a better world. And for the Green
developmentalists, it is an enlightened, entrepreneurial state.
What should also be clear is that all four varieties of green capitalism have thoroughly
embraced an entrepreneurial spirit, they have just defined this spirit, and that which it
animates, in different ways. For the utopians, it is about local, small scale entrepreneurship,
for ecoFordists it is about large scale industrial entrepreneurship - and for each, the
entrepreneur is understood as a creative producer (what we will see, in the section to follow,
is a Schumpeterian conception of entrepreneurship). By contrast, the vision of
entrepreneurialism embraced by planetary improvement is primarily about profit
maximization, allowing “father profit” to motivate innovators who will then save us from
planetary destruction. This is, as we will see, a neo-classical conception of the entrepreneur
as first and foremost a profit-maximizer.
With green developmentalism the matter is more complicated. In a work such as
Natural Capitalism, the entrepreneurial state is a creative actor, a designer or at the least, the
initiator of a design process; hence a Schumpeterian entrepreneur. And in Friedman’s work,
or Brown’s for that matter, the entrepreneurial state is primarily responsible for harnessing
the creativity of others, making the markets within which entrepreneurs can profit through
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creating planetary improvements. Hence, the green developmentalist perspective can veer
sometimes towards planetary improvement - with a vision of the state’s role as unlocking
private creativity, and other times towards ecoFordism, with a vision of the state itself as a
creative producer.

Affinities	
  

Though Green developmentalism would seem diametrically opposed to eco-utopian
socialism, the two are often present in the same texts. For instance, though Hopkins’s work is
fundamentally about creating local community resiliency, he is also on board with the green
new deal paradigm, suggesting that Britain’s war time mobilization during WWII proves that
“when governments really want to, they can do almost anything” (67). Simirly, McKibben
who also focuses on local, distribution, community-controlled solutions, writes,
So for the record, I support a green Manhattan Project, an ecological New
Deal, a cleantech Apollo mission. If I had money, I’d give it to Al Gore to
invest in start-ups. These are the obvious and legitimate responses of serious
people to the most dangerous crisis we’ve ever encountered, and to a real
degree they’re working (52).
He continues,
The sole even remotely plausible way out of this box canyon would be, as I’ve
said, massive investment in green energy, but our mountains of accumulated
debt make that harder, not easier (70).
Other	
  Possible	
  Economies?	
  

Not only are alternative visions possible, but we may even find their incipient
expression within this body of green capitalist work. From Natural Capitalism to Barnes’s
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Capitalism 3.0 and John Michael Greer’s The Wealth of Nature (2011) there are now a wide
range of proposals for large scale, fundamental transformations of the capitalist economy
incubating in our cultural landscape. The majority of these texts ruthlessly critique industrial
capitalism – the waste and excess of a century of overproduction and overconsumption, of
financial swindles and corporate domination, of legions of lobbyists and decades of
unregulated pollution. They assuredly pronounce that actually existing capitalism, or
“business as usual” can no longer continue apace.
The parallels with ecological modernization theory are hard to miss (Mol 2002, 3). These
texts imagine a post-industrial capitalism that has moved beyond the negative traits of the
past century (excess, disposability, speculation, etc.) while holding on to the virtuous traits
that have allowed modernity to flourish (individual freedom, innovation, production, etc.).
Yet despite proposing solutions such as “green capitalism,” “climate capitalism,” “natural
capitalism,” or “Capitalism 3.0,” many of the texts offering proposals for a green economy
are passionately committed to superseding the present economic state of affairs, and even
arrive at some imaginative non-capitalist possibilities that directly contradict their otherwise
pro-capitalist, legitimizing discourse.
And so, while they may explicitly call for a post-industrial capitalism, the affective force
undergirding their rhetoric stems from imagining possibilities that are, or could only be
realized as an industrial post-capitalism. Fully excavating the liberatory and utopian visions
coursing through this new ‘green’ spirit of capitalism can be hugely illuminating. For
instance, Peter Barnes, in Capitalism 3.0 (2006), advocates for the creation of a commons
sector of the economy that would repossess all of the wealth that can and should be held in
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common; from land, resources and biodiversity to culture, intellectual property and even
market liquidity.24 This commons sector – functioning as a trust with ethical, as opposed to
fiduciary, responsibility, would then force the corporate world to pay for access that it
deemed acceptable. Alternately, Gustave Speth (2008) argues for nothing short of a
revolution against for-profit corporate control: “we must dramatically change the publicly
traded, limited liability global corporation, just as previous generations set out to eliminate or
control the monarchy” (173). He envisions a new economy dominated by corporations whose
sole aim is to serve the public good in terms of “sustainability, equity, participation and
respect for the rights of human beings” while being governed by the public, as opposed to
boards of directors, in a transparent, democratic process (182).
Of course we could easily read these same texts as thoroughly post-political. Speth and
Barnes both explicitly distance themselves from the redistributive implications of their
proposals, and artfully shift their seemingly anti-systemic discourses into more tempered
social democratic proposals for capitalism with a friendly face. Accordingly, Speth’s
suggestions reverberate through the discourses of corporate social responsibility, where
fantasy serves more to insulate from change than to promote any.
There are a number of other examples to be drawn on as well – in each case a truly
emancipatory vision overlays with a recuperative legitimization of business as usual. Janine
Benyus’s Biomimicry (1997) (as well as the eco-design classic, Cradle to Cradle (2002))
offer visions of a post-humanist techno-social engagement with social production. Benyus
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  collective	
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explicitly rejects the lineage of Bacon and the scientific domination of nature in favor of a
paradigm that looks to model human production upon non-human forms, as opposed to the
other way around. She asks us to extend our vision of possible democracies past the confines
of an anthropocentric world view, proposing instead a democratized ecosystem in which all
agents – human and non human alike – are able to come together in a “parliament of
species.” While Benyus asks us to undo the alienation between humans and the non-human
world, many other proposals focus instead upon undoing the alienation between producer and
product. Proposals for a service-based economy in Natural Capitalism, or a Slow Money
(2010) economy from Woody Tasch’s book by that name, each envision another possible
economy in which the alienation of work has been undone; where producers and consumers
have an ongoing relationship defined by mutual recognition and that privileges the quality,
durability and maintenance of that which is produced.
Again, as I have shown, these proposals are not without problems. The service economy
model presented in Natural Capitalism and repurposed in numerous subsequent texts relies
on a complete misunderstanding of capitalist circulation or the ways profit is created through
the very parts of the economy – sales and marketing – that they hope to circumvent.
Tasch’s slow money economy is ultimately an elite enclave where the wealthy are served
materially and affectively by artisanal producers. As for Benyus, her parliament of species is
about as democratic as the current US electoral system (Goldstein and Johnson,
forthcoming).
My point is simply this: while green capitalist texts certainly provide vulgar
legitimization of business as usual, they may also hold within them real expressions of postcapitalist ambitions that are important to identify and explore. We can read such reformist
proposals as a naïve call for the capitalist state and economy to be something it cannot be, or
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we can read them as a profound call for this actually existing set of relations to be superseded
by a new form of collective coordination, one that actually serves the public whose lives it
administers, as opposed to the narrow interests of capital. Similarly, we might ask: Do these
authors simply hope that capital will save the day? Or is it that they have placed their faith in
the accumulated power of collaborative social production that capital has hoarded into an
apparent monopoly? While its important to acknowledge the post-political tenor of
mainstream environmentalism, to reduce all climate politics to this one trajectory would seem
to have the unintended consequence of buttressing the very post-political (social) scientific
consensus making that has been named as ‘our’ collective problem. In other words, to apply
to the current state of climate politics the blanket label “post-political” is, ironically, a
decidedly post-political gesture.

Radical	
  Subjects	
  

Building a radical environmental subjectivity, a popular and popularly radical
environmentalism, may need to engage with the discourses and desires reflected in calls for
green capitalism. We must be able to rework these discourses from within, helping steer
readers away from these texts’ most recuperative implications, while recognizing, respecting
and amplifying the radical, liberatory aspirations that likely drew readers into these texts in
the first place. This process is messy, to say the least, which leads to one last point (which I
will return to at the end of this work). I will open with a small vignette:
It can be easy to paint a portrait of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement as a
relatively coherent anti-capitalist social movement, yet the reality of this conjuncture is
decidedly more complicated. A strange brew of politics percolated through Zuccotti Park (the
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node of this movement that I happen to have had the most direct contact with), from
Libertarian conspiracy theories and ardent Ron Paul supporters to anarchists, permaculturists,
liberal Democrats and a whole spectrum of less defined perspectives, each offering a unique
take on the possibilities inherent in our political moment.
The OWS Library in Zuccotti Park reflected this diversity. Over the term of the
occupation, it grew from one row of books along a marble embankment to a small
bookstore’s worth of material; plastic bins housing various sections: “non fiction” “politics”
“poetry” etc. The library wasn’t quite a library. There were no clear lending policies, and the
collection was entirely dependent on whatever people decided to bring down to the park. Nor
was it a free store, where you simply took whatever you’d like. It was somewhere in between,
and something altogether different. The Library got a lot of attention for being
indiscriminately tossed in a dumpster by Bloomberg during the clearing of the occupation.
With this transgression, it became clear that the library symbolized, in material form, Occupy
Wall Street’s general intellect. Bloomberg was not simply trashing a pile of books; he was
discarding the materially embodied form of the movement’s capacity to think, do and make
for itself.
So what sort of material did this ephemeral archive hold? One night, I was browsing
and came across the bin for “environment and sustainability.” The bin was a little light, there
were only four books in it. I opened one, called Strategies for the Green Economy by Joel
Makower (2008). Hand written inside the cover was the following dedication:
To occupy Wall Street, From my library to yours. Thank you for representing
me. I am working for you at a cleantech company. I am a Wall Street Broker
turned Cleantech exec. “Doing well by doing good,” but doing good comes
first.
I am the 99%
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How do we make sense of this? I cannot say I was shocked – I had just recently returned
from research at a green capitalism conference in San Francisco, where a network of
ecologically enlightened investors were convinced that they were building (investing in
building… but what’s the difference?) the new economy that the Occupy movement wanted –
even if the movement did not know yet that this is in fact what it wanted. A speaker
proclaimed, and was met by thunderous applause, “We are the 1% of the 1% that stand with
the 99%.” A bit less catchy than ‘I am the 99%,’ but the sentiment seemed to resonate.
I am not interested in debating whether these sorts of ‘green capitalists’ are or could
really be part of the 99%. Instead, I simply want to identify the confluence of real desires to
see the world fundamentally change, and real desires to remain in control of those changes –
whether occupiers or investors, boardrooms or general assemblies, each positions themselves
as the appropriate technocracy, best situated to address the global imbalances caused by an
out of control economy. And so, in regards to critical, left opposition to bourgeois
sustainability – my suggestion is not that we cease to ruthlessly interrogate and reveal its
most spurious claims, but that we also consider how and in what ways it is possible to tap
into its imaginative potential, its real hopes and desires for a world better than any capital
could provide.
Ironically, green capitalist texts represent some of the most anti-capitalist perspectives
currently circulating within a broadly popular discourse. Rejecting them outright because
they fail to understand the essence of capitalism is not a good option. There are some
interesting parallels between this green capitalist discourse and the popular radicalism of the
early 19th century, a period of political work that Marx and Marxists often disregard as
misguided petty bourgeois utopianism. These Marxist critiques are important, and resonate
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with many of the same present day concerns that Swyngedouw has with the post-political.
Yet there is also a more nuanced story to tell. E.P. Thompson (1966) for instance, shows that
despite their often patronizing tenor, spurious critique and crude economic analysis, the work
of utopian socialists such as William Cobbet and Robert Owen played an important role in
the making of a radical, militant, and self-conscious working class. While this sort of work
may not have provided an adequate critique of capital, it did offer something else, what
Thompson describes as “ideological raw material diffused among working people, and
worked up by them into different products” (789). As Thompson explains, “Owenism from
the late Twenties onwards, was a very different thing from the writings and proclamations of
Robert Owen. It was the very imprecision of his theories, which offered, none the less, an
image of an alternative system of society, and which made them adaptable to different groups
of working people” (789).
Utopian visions, then and now, serve as a repository of the impossible, a place for dreams
to percolate and mature, in common. As Frederic Jameson cautions, “this clearly does not
mean that, even if we succeed in reviving utopia itself, the outlines of a new and effective
practical politics for the era of globalization will at once become visible; but only that we will
never come to one without it” (2005: 36). Instead of focusing on the persistent post-political
calls demanding that our technocratic leaders lead, we can instead focus on the rather thought
out, even if at times naively utopian, prescriptions as to how and in what way this leadership
should be oriented. What if, through the process of making such demands heard, we come to
find that there are no technocratic leaders ‘out there’ capable of realizing our dreams, but that
in fact, we ourselves are the only leaders worth following?
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Imagine a world that gets progressively cleaner… (1999 Vivendi
advertisement, sited in Jamison 2001)

Cleantech as a term came into usage around the early 2000s, preceded by discussions of
‘cleaner production’ and ‘cleaner technologies’ in the 90s. After the dot.com bust, venture
capitalists embraced cleantech as a third pillar of their technology space, joining biotech and
infotech which had, for the past three decades, been the primary foci of high-tech venture
investing. It is used as an umbrella category for a wide range of services and technologies
that can claim to have some environmental benefit over existing alternatives – hence making
them relatively ‘cleaner.’ Most of the technologies that fall within the cleantech ambit have
much longer histories than the term itself. It would be impossible to recount them all in this
space: wind turbines have been a source of power for millennia, as has geothermal energy.
Much of the new advances in battery technologies build off of research well established over
the 20th century, and even new attempts to create distributed a-neutronic plasma fusion
reactors (which some project to be the cheapest, cleanest and most abundant form of energy
within reach of development) is grounded by a half century of research and development in
the field. Of course this is not unique to cleantech; many scientific advances are a product of
the accumulated knowledge of our collective social body.
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The cleantech ‘space’ – this is how business people refer to new markets or sectors – is
focused on energy technologies – renewable energy, improved efficiency of non-renewable
energy generation, energy-use monitoring and energy storage. That said, it is not limited to
energy, and any technologies or services that increase the efficiency of material or energetic
throughput of a process - whether production, consumption or distribution, could be
considered a clean technology. One report from 2005 defines cleantech as “any knowledgebased product or service that: improves operational performance, productivity or efficiency;
while reducing costs, inputs, energy consumption, waste or pollution” (LoGerfo 2005: 6).
Clean technologies are “innovative products or services that simultaneously reduce financial
and environmental costs while driving better performance” (LoGerfo 2005: 15).
Cleantech’s focus is on improving the physical, and therefore economic performance of
material and energetic processes of production, distribution and consumption. As such,
LoGerfo sees cleantech as “an extension of the industrial revolution begun over two centuries
ago” (15). However, there is one primary distinction: if the first era of industrial efficiency
(which we are still very much experiencing) has been primarily concerned with maximizing
the efficient use of labor, the cleantech ‘revolution’ suggests that industry will now shift
focus to the efficient use of energy and raw materials.25
While the last few decades have been dominated by discussions, practices and debacles of
financial ‘efficiency’ – the speed up transactions, the churning of debt, the acceleration of
leverage, and the creation of ever more creative ways to manage and profit upon risk and

25

This is only a shift in emphasis. Maximizing material and energetic efficiency can trace
roots back through the entirety of the industrial revolution, with a strong focus in the early
20th century. Gilbert Pinchot and the conservation movement of the time were committed to
material efficiency (Hays 1969) as was Henry Ford, who is lauded by green capitalist writers
for his ‘cradle to cradle’ approach to production (McDonough and Braungart 2002).
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instability – cleantech can be seen as a return to the more prosaic realm of industrial
efficiency – of making energy and materials, goods and services, in ways that reduce costs by
improving the management of non-human resources.
This is not to suggest that cleantech does away with labor-saving efficiencies, but after
four decades of neoliberal revanchism (Harvey 2005) targeting and successfully dismantling
much of the remaining power of labor, organized or not, it seems fitting that industrial
improvement might now be ready to shift its focus to the efficient use of non-human factors
of production.26
Nor does this imply that there have not been concerted efforts to maximize the efficiency
of material throughputs throughout the industrial era. It is more a matter of relative focus whereas new labor saving technologies have long justified massive investments in the fixed
capital required to realize them, the same has not been true of energy-saving technologies whose return on investment has, over the majority of the 20th century, been too low to justify
the expense. This is largely due to incredibly cheap and abundant access to fossil derived fuel
and electricity - produced by an industry whose incredibly well established infrastructure (as
well as government subsidies) have made most energy-reduction technologies appear - in
financial terms - to be a waste of precious resources. In fact, as Schnaiberg argues, the labor
savings of the 20th century actually came at the direct expense of increases in energy and
chemical use (and the comcomitant generation of waste) (Schnaiberg 1980).

26

The labor saving may already be presumed. In fact, in 2008 news broke that a Khosla
funded cleantech venture, The Brazilian Renewable Energy Company (Brenco), was under
investigation by Brazil’s slave-labor investigation unit. The ethanol producer was reported to
pay its workers less than 1$ an hour, “packing them cheek-to-jowl in substandard living
conditions, preventing them from leaving the unsanitary housing on their free time, feeding
them poorly, and (rather ironically for an ethanol manufacturer) banning alcohol (West
2008).” Bill Clinton, Ron Burkle and AOL founder Steve Case were also invested in the firm.
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A 2011 McKinsey Global Institute report (Dobbs et al 2011) clearly articulates this
vision. They begin with the presumption that we are entering a new phase of resource
scarcity:
During most of the 20th century, the prices of natural resources such as
energy, food, water, and materials such as steel all fell, supporting economic
growth in the process. But that benign era appears to have come to an end. The
past ten years have wiped out all of the price declines that occurred in the
previous century. As the resource landscape shifts, many are asking whether
an era of sustained high resource prices and increased economic, social, and
environmental risk is likely to emerge (1).

From here, they explicitly turn to Malthus, arguing that his fears were not so much
ungrounded as they were premature. Technological advances have put off the most dire
effects of potential carrying capacity limits for two centuries, a respite that may soon, they
argue, come to an end.
The next 20 years appear likely to be quite different from the resource-related
shocks that have periodically erupted in history. Up to three billion more
middle-class consumers will emerge in the next 20 years compared with 1.8
billion today, driving up demand for a range of different resources (2).

Cleantech is positioned accordingly, as a necessary shift away from a focus on labor
saving and towards material and energetic efficiency:
Companies in most sectors were able to benefit from declining resource prices
over the past century. This allowed management to focus attention primarily
on capital and labor productivity. But resource-related trends will shape the
competitive dynamics of a range of sectors in the two decades ahead. Many
companies need to pay greater attention to resource-related issues in their
business strategies and adopt a more joined-up approach toward understanding
how resources might shape their profits, produce new growth and disruptive
innovation opportunities, create new risks to the supply of resources, generate
competitive asymmetries, and change the regulatory context (4).
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Accordingly, cleantech is seen as the progression to a “smart” industrial revolution, one
in which design and manufacturing processes are reinvented with “lighter, smarter and
stronger” technologies that are “less expensive to manufacture and operate.” Here it is clear
that cleantech resonates with – and even provides the empirical might of ecological
modernization (Mol 2002, Mol and Spaargaren 2000) as well as a number of the motifs of
green capitalism reviewed in the prior section. However, the distinction between these more
utopian discourses of techno-social advance and the market pragmatism of cleantech (an
economic pressure that is often left undertheorized in both green capitalist and ecological
modernization theories) is important to flag. LoGerfo continues, explaining that most
importantly, cleantech will promote technologies that are “ecologically sustainable, or at least
less harmful” (LoGerfo 2005: 15).
This is the key: “at least less harmful.” That phrase encapsulates the efficiency
maximizing ‘cleanliness’ of cleantech - promoting any technology that is less worse than
existing alternatives.27 Even that might be a stretch. Ira Ehrenpreis, an early cleantech
venture capitalist and co-chairman of the Cleantech Venture Network’s advisory board,
explains, ''The reason we're allocating dollars to this sector is we think we can deliver
attractive returns… It's not because we want to do great things for the environment or great
things for the world,'' though he does admit that this would be a ''great byproduct” (quoted in
Rivlin 2005).

Cleantech	
  vs	
  envirotech	
  

27

It is worth noting that cleantech is one part of a larger strategy for dealing with increased
resource scarcity, or as is increasingly being referred to in the business world, “supply chain
risk.” Other related strategies include deregulation and massively expanded extractivism
(fracking, tar sands, deep sea drilling, etc.) The sum total of ecological costs is expanding at a
greater pace than ever (Bond 2008; Svampa 2013).
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Cleantech almost always entails a reduction in material and energetic input, as opposed to
a reduction in polluting discharges. While the latter is certainly desirable from an
environmental perspective, without regulatory constraints such as a price on carbon, pollution
restrictions, or any other sorts of targeted industrial regulation, such reductions don’t directly
translate into economic gains.
This is what distinguishes cleantech from its predecessor, which LoGerfo, as well as a
number of my research subjects, retrospectively refer to as “envirotech.” Here it is important
not to get too caught up with the term, envirotech. I’ve found little record of its use during the
actual pre-cleantech period it names, making it a periodizing neologism that functions as a
foil against which cleantech can be defined. At most, envirotech was something that a
handful of companies committed to in the 1990s, almost all of which went under as they were
not economically viable due to either a lack of regulatory supports, an un or underdeveloped
marketplace, or an inability to be price competitive with ‘dirtier’ competitors.
During the late 90s, projects that would soon be labeled as cleantech were referred to as
eco-tech, but envirotech refers to a generation of technologies prior to that, focused on
pollution control and other forms of mitigation, remediation, or hazardous waste management
(LoGerfo 2005). LoGerfo explains that these technologies answered to regulatory
requirements stemming from an earlier era of ‘command and control’ state interference - as
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opposed to market incentives. Hence he sees a shift from “regulatory” drivers to “economic”
drivers, and from “compliance based purchasing” to “productivity based purchasing.”28
From an industrial and financial standpoint, this may make sense. The wave of
environmental legislation passed in the 1970s did spur an industrial and technological
response, which could be called envirotech. The catalytic converter, which reduced noxious
exhaust from automobiles, is very literally the ‘end of the tailpipe’ device that exemplifies
this sort of technology as is the smokestack scrubber which removes sulfur from exhaust at
coal-fired power plants. Technologies such as these responded to regulatory impositions – the
1970 Clean Air Act in particular - as opposed to market opportunities (Sinclair 1997). Hence
the shift being described is, in effect, a retreat from pollution control, or mitigation.
Cleantech projects aim to achieve the most efficient use of expensive inputs while on the
other hand increased extraction seeks to drive down world market prices of those same inputs
– making the ‘value proposition’ for clean technologies that much more difficult to defend.
Here we should note that the distinction being made, between cleantech and envirotech,
rests upon a normalized division between production and waste. The market ‘naturally’
externalizes pollution, and so forcing industry to be more efficient with their discharges is a
regulatory imposition, as opposed to a pure market mechanism. Cleantech is distinguished
from envirotech along these grounds - it responds to the ‘true’ market incentives born of
maximizing productive efficiency. Any environmental benefits are “a significant but
secondary consequence” (LoGerfo 2005: 15).

28

Here he is explaining a shift in environmentalism that Dowie (1995) frames as a move
from second to third wave environmentalism – the former focused on regulatory controls and
opposing industrial interests, the latter aimed instead at working with, supporting and
‘greening’ these former foes.
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Of course, as we’ve already seen, along with the development of ‘envirotech,’ there was
also a burgeoning interest in renewable energy technologies, largely centered in
countercultural movements, where appropriate technologies would provide the infrastructure
for alternative lifestyles and livelihoods (Schumacher 1999; Turner 2010). From a cleantech
perspective, this was a bifurcation that needed to be fixed. ‘Hippies’ were tinkering with all
of the potentially profitable energy efficiency technologies, whereas industry was being
forced to focus on regulatory compliance and waste mitigation. Cleantech’s narrative of
emergence entails the freeing of renewable energy technology from this dual yoke of the state
and of hippies, each representing a set of non-market institutions and actors, innovating for
themselves or the environment, as opposed to innovating for the market.
During the 1980s and 90s, as “command and control” regulation came increasingly under
attack by the gaining hegemony of neoliberal thought, and as resources dwindled for the
regulatory oversight that would keep such ‘non-productive’ envirotech markets healthy and
growing, the conditions were set for cleantech’s emergence (Castree 2008; Dowie 2005;
Harvey 2005; Pellizoni and Ylonen 2012).

Venture	
  Capital	
  discovers	
  the	
  environment	
  

As was mentioned in the prior chapter, during the 80s and 90s, early stage technology
investors - in particular venture capitalists - were largely focused on biotechnology and
information technology, which proved to be dual engines of growth in the “new economy”.
These sectors had clear economic advantages, including well established public funding
streams through the NIH and the DOD (Cooper 2008; Jasanoff 2011; Rajan 2006, Pellizoni
and Ylonen 2012; Tyfield 2010).
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Biotech projects benefited greatly from these funding streams, as well as regulatory
‘innovations’ such as the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which allowed for the privatization of
intellectual property developed at publicly funded research sites such as university labs
(Tyfield 2010; Jasanoff 2011). Venture capitalists could essentially wait until government
funded research teams developed promising new compounds, only entering into the picture
once most of the ‘technology risk’ had already been accounted for.
Information technology - or infotech - largely benefited from its capital-structure. New
applications, services and software technologies could be developed with an extremely
modest outlay of initial capital relative to the potential returns that could be realized through
a successful public offering (IPO). Throughout the 80s and into the 90s, this is precisely what
happened, as venture capital flooded into the sector, providing financial support to countless
software and then internet startups, helping accelerate their commercial development towards
IPOs at valuations many times greater than where they began (Janeway 2012; Metrick and
Yasuda 2011).
By the end of the 90s, focus was on internet startups. Capital costs are relatively low,
development time is relatively fast, and projections of potential earnings are substantial,
especially considering the relative ease that a software or internet firm has in exponentially
increasing capacity, as opposed to a more traditional manufacturing or sales operation.
Success stories such as Google, Yahoo and AOL, not to mention the lesser known, and
shorter lived financial successes (and then flops) such as pets.com and eToys.com, fueled a
general mania in the information technology sector, which resulted in the internet bubble that
eventually peaked and then burst, in 2000 (Lowenstein 2004; Metrick and Yasuda 2011).
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Venture investing hit a peak in 2000, with a record $100 billion invested in start-up
companies that year alone, most of which went to infotech firms (See figures below). But as
we now know, the speculative bubble that had been allowing investors to exit investments at
astronomical valuations - all predicated on projected future growth as opposed to present day
revenue, was in the process of implosion. When the dot.com bubble burst, VC firms had to
rapidly find new investments to sink their freshly raised billions into. As a result, money
flowed into the physical sciences - cleantech included - through the first half of the 2000s.
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To some extent, this was a move born of desperation. As one investor put it, “There’s
nothing much else to look at” (quoted in Cortese 2003). And yet for others, it was a move
inspired by excitement with alternative energy and its potential to both realize massive
financial gains and to dramatically transform the world. Many of the early advocates of
cleantech had been reading the green capital texts. They were intrigued by the possibility of
harnessing the sun’s energy, or as one internet-entrepreneur put it, “hacking photosynthesis”
(Quoted in Cortese 2003). For these believers, alternative energy reminded them of the
internet a decade prior - on the verge of taking off, a disruptive technology waiting to
blossom, and to transform the world in the process. Steve Case, founder of AOL, explained,
"The green, sustainability movement is going mainstream, and we want to ride that wave”
(quoted in Shin 2006).”
Just as the oil crisis of the 70s had helped thrust renewable energy into the spotlight, the
9-11 catastrophe, and subsequently introduced ‘war on terror’ again put US dependence on
Middle Eastern oil into the spotlight. The darlings of the internet bubble were convinced that
past failures of alternative technology were different. As Dan W. Reicher, formerly an
assistant energy secretary in the Clinton Administration, before moving into cleantech
venture investing, explained at the time, “The technology just wasn’t ready (quoted in
Cortese 2003).” It would be just as apt to say that in fact, it was the markets that weren’t
ready for the technology. The drop in oil prices that extended from the end of the 70s through
the 80s, along with the general hostility to renewable energy coming from the White House,
created an environment in which perfectly ‘good’ technologies had no way to become
commercially viable. This spoke less to the immaturity of the technologies than to the
volatility of the political and economic context within which they had emerged. Yet as
Pellow (2004) argues, investment in such technologies responds to political and economic
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opportunity structures. And so, with a renewed threat of energy security and an increased
awareness of environmental threats, there was a pervasive sense that this time it would be
different; that this time it had to be different.
Cleantech began to take off in the early 2000s, with a few key venture capital firms, such
as Khosla, Kleiner Perkins and Vantage Point defining the space through their investments.
While environmental technologies were only 1% of VC funding in 1996, by the early 2000s
they had increased to 6% of VC investment dollars, a percentage greater than
semiconductors, financial services or media (LoGerfo 2005, see also Table 2).
The fate of Idealab, a Silicon Valley tech incubator, offers a paradigmatic example.
Through the 90s, Idealab helped launch infotech companies such as eToys, NetZero and
PetSmart.com, but in 2000, they had to pull a $300 million IPO as the dot.com sector melted
away. Shortly thereafter, Idealab reemerged in the cleantech space, promoting companies
such as Energy Innovations, which developed solar panels for commercial buildings.
Idealab’s founder, Bill Gross explains this transformation, "Reinventing energy is a
multitrillion-dollar opportunity. It's the next big disruption… It dwarfs any business
opportunity in history” (quoted in Gross 2006).
This first wave of cleantech investing brazenly announced a new energy economy that
was imminent, inevitable, and immeasurably profitable. Algae, wind, solar, smart grid,
batteries, nano-materials all found their places in these new cleantech portfolios. Venture
capital was ready to pronounce cleantech as their new sector, one in which they would, yet
again, lead the way. The market potential was huge. Electricity was the third largest industry
in the US, with a notional size of $300 billion annually at the time. And many of the
distributed renewable technologies under consideration were well suited for the over 2 billion
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people in the world without reliable access to electricity. China and India were immediately
pegged as potential markets of unimaginable proportions (Cortese 2003). At the 2006
Cleantech Venture Network conference, Kleiner Perkins’s John Doerr (who made his fortune
investing in companies such as Netscape, Amazon and Google) explained,
This is the mother of all markets… As those Asian economies rise, people will
move from rural to urban settings. All those people will want the same things
that you and I want clean water, power and transportation (quoted in Chea
2006).
Elsewhere, John Doerr argued that comparisons with the Apollo program or the
Manhattan project were not appropriate. Such comparisons “fail to capture the magnitude of
what we face. This cuts across all human behavior. This is like re-industrializing the whole
planet” (quoted in Davies 2007). Erik Straser, a partner at Mohr Davidow, explains,
You look at all the development that's going on in China and India right now,
and you realize that two-fifths of the world's population is going through the
kind of industrialization that one-fifth the world's population experienced in
the 20th century. 'The size of the opportunity here is immeasurable (quoted in
Rivlin 2005)
In the fourth quarter of 2005, three solar companies went public: Q-Cells, SunPower, and
Suntech, each with valuations around $1 billion. At that point, cleantech had finally
established itself as a major focus for VC investing, and for the next three years cleantech
start up financing rose more than 50% annually. By 2008, cleantech financing exceeded $4.5
billion, and large financial players were beginning to join in the cleantech chorus (Nordan
2001; See Table 5). In a 2008 report, Merill Lynch went so far as to proclaim cleantech
(along with biotech) to be the sixth industrial revolution (Milunovich and Rasco 2008).
And yet, there were already some early warning signs that the cleantech revolution was
not going according to plan. Already, by 2008 the investment landscape had begun to shift,
away from early stage investments. Early stage financing fell by 29% from 2007 to 2008, as
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venture firms were forced to put to their resources into later rounds of funding (Nordan
2011)29.
There were a few reasons for this shift. First, many of the technologies under
development, such as biofuels - were taking far longer to reach commercial viability than
expected, and were far more expensive than anticipated. Simply put - developing the
infrastructure to produce and refine industrial infrastructure - whether clean or otherwise - is
a much different business than creating software - and many of the VC firms had a rough
transition between the two. As technologies took longer to develop, VC firms found
themselves forced to commit more money and for longer amounts of time in each individual
investment they held. Early valuations were formulated with expectations of 5x to 10x
returns, which turned out to simply be impossible relative to the massive amounts of capital
that were necessary. As a cleantech expert and investor explains to me:
MX: The problem with most of the investment in clean tech is that everybody
looked at the eventual notional size of the industry - a trillion dollar
opportunity - and so they plowed billions of dollars into technology not
realizing the vast majority of the money that was going to be required was not
in technology - or it wasn't in the technology in the way that they understood
it, coming out of their roots in either the health care or IT fields. They thought
that you could buy yourself a whizbang patent it and protect it and then
everybody would beat a path to your door - and if you were only right 2 out of
10 times - you would be Kleiner Perkins - and in fact it turned out that that
value proposition was wrong. First of all winners weren't hundred X winners
they were 2X to 5X winners and you can't lose 8 out 10 and make any money
at that - and 2nd of all they didn't realize how capital-intensive it would be in
the deployment phase.

29

We will go into more detail about the venture capital funding model in section three. For
now, its important to know what venture funding is conducted in stages. A startup will first
get seed funding, then series A funding, and then a number of subsequent rounds of follow up
funding. What has been happening since 2008 in the cleantech space, and has been called the
“Series A crunch” is a shift away from early stage, or “Series A” financing towards later
stages. In other words, venture capital is increasingly focused on keeping existing
investments afloat, as opposed to finding new startups to begin investing in.
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Once the financial crisis hit in late 2008, investors of all types pulled out of the market.
Cleantech start up investment dropped by a third in 2009, and early stage funding fell by half.
The IPO market was frozen, the financial services industry was consolidated even further,
and public offerings became increasingly untenable for most venture investments in
cleantech, forcing them to shift focus and to begin focusing on ‘strategic partners’ who might
want to acquire specific technologies or businesses. As money moves away from early stage
funding towards the later, less risky stages of commercialization, the gap is filled – to the
extent that it can be – by the startups themselves. Now early-stage companies have to develop
and enact commercialization plans at a much earlier phase in their development. In other
words, they have to ‘de-risk’ their projects commercially, not just technologically, if they are
going to attract capital.
A new challenge has also come from the rise of the domestic natural gas industry. Due to
hydraulic fracturing finally coming online (it had been under development for decades, with
funding from the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee, Department of Energy, Bureau of
Mines and the National Energy Technology Laboratory (Shellenberger et al 2012)), the
domestic natural gas industry has experienced a serious supply glut, dropping prices to
historic lows and in the process, ruining the value propositions for a number of renewable
energy technologies and energy savings technologies, whose material efficiencies translated
into much lower potential savings (Trabish 2012). As a result, any technology that would
require an upfront purchase would now take much longer to recoup that initial capital outlay
through the gradual accrual of cost savings.
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There has however been an increase in public funding for cleanteach. The Advanced
Research Project Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) was established as part of the America
Competes Act of 2007 and funded in 2009. It was modeled after the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (DARPA) to fund new and innovative technologies in the energy
sector. Cleantech was also supported in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, with an estimated $51 out of $787 billion going to cleantech related projects (IER
2013). By 2010 there were signs of a recovery in the cleantech space. Stimulus money started
to have an effect, and while the venture capital supported cleantech space wanted to tap into
these funds, they found that they didn’t have enough “shovel ready” projects. The
Department of Energy wanted to spend its money on sure things, hence they preferred to
partner with large, established companies such as Johnson Controls. The Government could
offer loan guarantees and investment tax credits - since it was more politically feasible for the
government to forego revenue than to increase spending - but since only larger companies
have sufficient tax liability to benefit from these credits, it further insured that money would
have to flow through the larger players in the field, even if they would then partner with
smaller firms. Early stage funding remained stagnant - crowded out by the need to provide
ongoing, late-stage support to companies investors have already committed to.
In 2011 there was a brief resurgence of cleantech funding, largely due to the fact that
three significant incentive programs for renewable energy were nearing expiration. Project
developers rushed to finance projects to take advantage of this stimulus measures. The first
was the Federal Loan Guarantee Program, which closed to new applications in September
2011. This program covered $16.1 billion of debt for large projects, such as the 392 MW
Ivanpah solar thermal project in southern California. Second, the US Treasury 16903
Program, part of the 2009 Recovery Act, which provided a temporary substitute for the tax
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equity market, ended in December of 2011. Third, the production tax credit, which was the
main support for wind development, expired at the end of 2012 (U.S. Department of
Treasury). Beyond this federal support, state-level support has come from cleantech focused
investment vehicles and regulatory markets, such as those formed around renewable energy
credits (Berry 2002).
This was the context within which the massive failures of MiaSole and Solyndra
occurred, each defaulting on huge government guaranteed loans, initiated as part of the 2009
economic recovery plan. Right wing pundits attacked these failures as an example of
Obama’s free-spending excesses and the neoliberal consensus interpreted these loan
guarantees as a flawed approach to supporting new business, “picking winners” as opposed to
providing favorable market conditions (cf Howe 2011; FoxNews.com 2011). Focus in the
industry has shifted to ‘capital lite’ projects such as energy efficiency software, new
financing arrangements for solar and wind, and other software based services, which some
have begun to rebrand as ‘clean economy.’ Otherwise, most new cleantech projects are left
with government grants and private (non venture) investors as their main sources of capital and firms are expected to progress much further down the path to commercialization eliminating almost all technology risk - before venture capitalists will consider getting
involved. In 2010 late stage deals outnumbered early stage deals 2 to 1, the highest ratio
between the two since 1999 (Freed and Stevens 2011). Cleantech VC investment dropped
from over $3 billion in 2012 to $1.5 billion, and the average deal size dropped from $12
million to $8 million, confirming the general sense that the VC firms are shifting towards
“capital lite” or “clean web” technologies (PriceWaterhouseCooper).
As such - the paradigm shifting possibilities of cleantech seem to be receding; new
energy infrastructures as imagined in the early 2000s – such as large scale solar installations,
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electric vehicle charging stations and industrial scale alternative fuel production - simply cost
too much and take too long for private capital to develop - at least without significant state
support. As we will see however, this has not stopped those still involved in the cleantech
space from calling every new project and every new technology, ‘disruptive.’
All in all, the track record for venture investing in cleantech seems suspect. At a March
2013 conference hosted by the Wall Street Journal, CalPERS CIO Joseph Dear reported on
their decade of cleantech losses (amounting to negative 10% return on $900 million
invested). He remarks, “Just because it’s a good idea doesn’t make it a good investment …
This has been a noble way to lose money” (quoted in Bernhard Jr. 2013). While the cleantech
revolution began with the venture capitalists leading the way, it is currently proceeding
despite them, with numerous voices starting to suggest that the venture capital model was not
appropriate for cleantech at all. One cleantech professional I interviewed explained to me,
TW: I think there has been a shakeout, there is definitely a lot of walking
dead. Or walking wounded. One investor told me, ‘our portfolio is filled with
critically injured patients and we’re not admitting any new ones.

And yet, despite these failures - the cleantech revolution seems to continue apace (Murray
2014). Advances in solar technology have dropped the cost of new solar installations down to
price parity in many places, and strategic partnerships (acquisitions by larger firms) have
picked up where the public market has waned30. While the rise of Chinese solar

30

Many of these advances have to do with improved production techniques, such as new
methods of silk-screening super-fine components onto cells that replace more expensive
lithography techniques. Whereas producing solar panels at $1 a watt has been a longstanding
goal, the current price has already dropped below that level. Unfortunately, the current
oversupply of panels coming out of China may now be impeding the development of even
183

manufacturing may have helped dismantle Solyndra, the net result has been a glut of solar
production on the global market, and unchecked price competition in the Chinese market has
driven prices to unsustainably low levels - presenting a window of opportunity for solar
financing and installment to expand its market (Blankenhorn 2011).
Research into new clean technologies continues, with support from federal and state
agencies, as well as networks of private investors, many of whom are willing to absorb more
risk than their venture capitalist counterparts. And most importantly, there remains a
commitment to the idea and inherent inevitability of cleantech. For those who believe, it is a
fait accompli - a necessary response to mounting resource scarcity.
There cannot not be a clean tech revolution.

Cleantech	
  in	
  the	
  Big	
  Apple	
  

Much work has been done on technology and innovation clusters (Cooke 2007; Delgado
et al 2010, 2012); regional networks of businesses and service providers that mutually
support one another, as much through competition as through cross pollination - of ideas,
infrastructure, resources, and talent. Silicon Valley is heralded as the prime example of a high
tech cluster, or what cleantech venture capitalist Vinod Khosla refers to as an innovation
ecosystem (Lee 2000; Bresnahan and Gambardella 2004).
During the 1980s and 1990s (and still today), Silicon Valley and Boston have been the
two leading clusters of technological innovation, an effect that has partially carried over to

newer and more efficient solar technologies, which cannot compete with their less efficient
but also incredibly cheap competitors (Bullis 2013a, b).
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the cleantech space (Regalado 2013). The dense networks of funders, commercially-focussed
researchers (which has much to do with Stanford and MIT respectively) and service providers
that these two regions can offer have allowed them to transform into central hubs of cleantech
innovation. That said, the research, development, and commercialization of cleantech
projects presents a much different geography than that which had been patterned through the
infotech and biotech fields.
This has created an opening for other regions - both internationally and in the US - to
assert themselves as significant hubs of cleantech commercialization and development.
Austin, Texas has gained prominence as a center of wind-related cleantech development.
And New York State, where my research is based, has emerged as a major source of
innovation for energy storage, with the NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium leading
the way. The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA)
has become an increasingly important institution, helping coordinate research and
development across the state through numerous granting programs, and most recently, with
the development of proof-of-concept centers to rival those in Silicon Valley and Boston
(NYSERDA 2013). In conjunction with a sizable investment community (New York
currently ranks third in venture investing behind Boston and Silicon Valley (Regalado
2013)), this has made NY into an increasingly relevant space in the cleantech world.
Though the stars of Silicon Valley may have a larger deal flow, and may be more
fundamentally market initiators, they cannot make a market by themselves, not without
whole networks of people following suit. The cleantech space may have been initially
catalyzed by some major players on the West Coast, and their continued involvement may be
an important source of market legitimacy, but what really matters is whether and how broader
market participants follow suit; how they re-interpret, re-define, and re-imagine the cleantech
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project in and through their everyday efforts to build, piece by small piece, a cleaner
economy. And so, instead of spending time with high powered, fantastically powerful and/or
wealthy scions of a new energy economy, I mainly interacted with a much more diverse,
much less wealthy cleantech investment scene in New York; the slightly less influential,
slightly less kempt, slightly less important, slightly less connected sea of professionals that
make cleantech more than an elite activity or buzzword of global governance, but whom, as I
will show in the subsequent chapters, literally embody, perform and rehearse cleantech as a
market.

Overview	
  of	
  my	
  fieldwork	
  
It’s not on the cutting edge, but it’s certainly close.” (PL, organizer of the NY
Energy and Environmental Funder’s Forum)

My decision to conduct research in NYC, as opposed to Boston or Silicon Valley, was
grounded by the presumption that if, in fact, there is emerging a new, green spirit of
capitalism, then I should not have to look to central charismatic authorities or speak with only
its most prominent boosters, many of whose voices are sufficiently captured in the
mainstream media and reflected in the texts that define the green capitalism genre. In other
words, I did not feel it necessary to chase down high profile individuals, only to have 15
minutes with them where they can rehash sound bytes that would already have been available
to me through a simple internet search of their names.
I spent two years conducting fieldwork in the New York City cleantech space. This
entailed participant observation at a range of cleantech events, as well as a series of 45 indepth interviews with a wide range of professionals involved in cleantech. Interview subjects
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were largely comprised of individuals that I met at the various events I attended, and from
there I used snowball sampling to increase my sample size both in terms of quantity and
diversity of participants. While many of the individuals I interviewed waived their right to
confidentiality, I have chosen to keep all of my participants identities confidential, so as to
shift attention away from specific firms, specific technologies and specific deals, and to
instead focus on the more general and diffuse discourses and practices of the business
community I observed. Appendix A provides a listing of the 45 interview participants. I will
explain the breakdown of whom I interviewed below, after reviewing the different
professional roles present in this space.
The	
  Funder’s	
  Forum	
  

As a central component of my fieldwork, I attended the Center for Economic and
Environmental Progress’s (CEEP) monthly event, the NY Energy and Environmental
Funders Forum (Funders Forum)31. This event began in 2002 and has been running
continuously ever since, on the second Friday of every month, with about 10 meetings per
year (summer months are often taken off). January 2013 marked the 110th meeting.
CEEP was spun out of the NY State Environmental Business Association as a passthrough vehicle for deals that required a non-profit partner. The Funder’s Forum is the
primary (only) work that this non-profit currently does in support of its mission. PL got
involved after the first two or three meetings, and has been running the event ever since.
When the breakfast series first began, CEEP tried to expand with events in DC and Boston.

31

The program has since parted ways with CEEP. It is still run by GS and is now known as
the Greentech Investors Forum.
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But in Boston there was too much competition, and in DC after several successful years, the
law firm host moved and the crowd shrank, so both of those projects fizzled and the NY
breakfast became the only regular function of the organization. There has been constant talk
about expanding the program to other cities – such as Philadelphia and Indianapolis – but
without anyone specifically ready and willing to lead the effort, it seems unlikely that this
will happen anytime soon.
Anywhere from 12 to 30 people are in attendance at each meeting, most of whom pay the
$50 price of admission (exceptions are made for some first time attendees, and for a few
regulars “still waiting for a check” a.k.a. experiencing financial difficulty). This generates a
few hundred dollars each month, which is the only money PL is paid as the organizer of this
event. As with many of the self-employed ‘strategic consultants’ in the cleantech space, PL
pieces together an income between the monthly breakfasts, teaching a masters course in
environmental economics, some consulting, and a much more stable income from his wife.
Early on, PL teamed up with JB, who at the time had recently left a position as head of
project finance at a major Wall Street bank, and had begun practicing law at a series of highpowered NYC law firms. Each month JB would make a conference room at his current firm
available for the monthly breakfast. For the first year and a half of my research, JB hosted the
breakfast at one particular midtown firm. In March 2012, he left his job at this firm, and the
breakfast left its conference room. JB actually abdicated his hosting duties at this time, since
his new projects - a virtual law firm based out of Tel Aviv and a boutique investment bank
based in Illinois - did not have a central NYC location to offer. Since then, the breakfast has
been held at a large accounting firm (for half a year), and then moved again to a new law
firm, where the event is currently (as of February 2014) held.
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Despite all of these shifts, the breakfast has been held in midtown Manhattan for its entire
duration, in one large skyscraper or another, either directly on or within blocks of Times
Square. This is not exactly the environs I expected when first attending these meetings. Yet
there was something painfully honest about listening to cleantech pitches while peering out
onto Times Square at 8am, its pulsing lights and building scale LCD screens proving to all
that this is, in fact, the city that never sleeps. At this early hour, these lights cast a peculiar
glow over the street, just barely outcompeting the sun for the privilege of illuminating this
small stretch of Broadway. Business people scurry efficiently from subway to cubicle as the
pavement begins to accumulate its daily crop of tourists, who will spend the day crowding
the pedestrian spaces that Mayor Bloomberg carved out of Manhattan’s grandest boulevard
and most storied spectacle. Meanwhile, 20 floors up, we drink coffee, eat fruit and pastries,
and learn about new cleantech ventures.

Who	
  presents	
  at	
  these	
  meetings?	
  

Each month, an early stage cleantech company presents to the room. These presentations
are intended to be investment pitches: an explanation of the technology, the
commercialization strategy, the market opportunity, and then an overview of financial needs,
projections and investment opportunities. Almost all of the presenting companies are at an
early stage of development. Some are looking for venture capital and their “A round” of
funding, while others are still looking for angel investments as part of their “seed” stage
(these funding rounds will be explained in more detail in Section 3). A number of companies
that present are so early stage that they could even be considered pre-seed, funded by the
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entrepreneurs and inventors themselves, along with their personal network of “friends, family
and fools.”
Over 100 different companies have presented over this 12 year span, representing a wide
range of services and technologies, most of which are related to energy production,
distribution or storage in one way or another, and all of which could be considered part of the
broader “cleantech space.” My fieldwork began with attendance at breakfast #88 (December
2010) and while I continue, as of this writing, to attend regularly, my formal data collection
for this project ended at breakfast #109 (December 2012). Here is a representative sampling
of companies that have presented over these two years:
#91: Hardin Geothermal (Advanced Energy Group)
Hardin Geothermal has developed a patented geothermal piping that maximizes the
efficiency of heat-exchange and reduces installation costs for geothermal systems. They are
developing “GeoUtility” district level geothermal fields that can serve hundreds of separate
buildings. They installed their first GeoUtility system in Wyandotte, MI.
#93: Ener-G-Rotors
Ener-G-Rotors makes a device that transforms waste heat into usable electricity. While
there are a number of technologies that target high-heat exhaust, their technology is the first
to economically target lower temperatures. At the heart of their technology is a patented
Trochoidal Gear Engine which is used as an expander that replaces a turbine in an organic
rankine cycle. At the time of their presentation, the company had sold two small units and
one medium scale unit, and was looking for capital to begin commercial production.
#100: Energy Score Cards
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This company is creating a low-cost software based service that helps business owners
and managers track their energy performance, meet regulatory requirements and find energy
savings opportunities. As of the date of their presentation they had 30 clients, representing
2,500 properties, and were looking for capital to expand their operations from there.
#103: NOHMS
NOHMs stands for Nano Organic Hybrid Materials. They are developing new materials
and components for lithium-ion sulfur batteries that will make these batteries as cheap as
lead-acid batteries with 10 times the energy density. At the time of their presentation, they
were raising money to fund field-testing of their product and pilot commercial manufacturing
for low-volume niche market sales. The main market they are targeting is unmanned air and
spacecraft batteries.
#108: Energy Innovation Works
The company has distribution rights for an oil additive developed by Exxon and currently
in use in the transportation, construction and mining sectors. Their product is a proprietary
catalyst that improves combustion and minimizes the negative environmental impacts of
using low grade heating oil. They have exclusive rights to market and sell this product in the
heating-fuel market. They are focused on the New York City market, after recent legislation
has regulated the use of #6 heating oil and emission levels. At the time of their presentation
they were looking for seed funding to support pilot demonstrations and third party
verification of their results in the home heating market.
Who	
  attends	
  these	
  meetings?	
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Though the event is advertised as a ‘funders’ forum, this is not entirely accurate.

At any

given meeting only a small number of actual funders are present. The attendees include a
wide range of professionals, from academics and researchers such as myself, to inventors and
entrepreneurs (often past and future presenters), angel investors, managers of private equity
funds, lawyers and other professional service providers (broker-dealers, public relations
specialists, accountants). A template letter, sent to prospective presenters explains:
Every month, the non-profit Center for Economic & Environmental
Partnership presents the NY Energy & Environmental Funders breakfast,
hosted by [JB], a well-known clean energy attorney, and the law firm of
[Holder and Simons]. One emerging clean tech company—and it’s usually a
clean energy company—that is seeking capital to commercialize its
technology presents its business plan to an audience of angel and venture
investors, buy-side analysts, strategic partners, transactional attorneys,
engineers, policy makers and others who can help the company.
We gather at 8:00am and wrap up by 10:00am. The format calls for the
company to present its business plan for about 20 minutes, followed by a 10
minute Q&A. Then a Sector Expert presents for about 15 minutes, followed
by Q&A. The Sector Expert expands the discussion in terms of the
technology, market, regulatory drivers or similar topics. Then we throw it
open for discussion.
The audience generally ranges from 20 to 25. It is a collegial group, and the
discussions are animated and informative.
The charge is $50 for each attendee and the company pays $50 for each
representative there, and the $50 for the Sector Expert. People can call in for
$20. When possible, I send the presentation—or a sterilized version of it—to
those calling in, and to attendees.

It would be difficult to place all of the attendees into specific categories - many of them
function in multiple roles, and each has a somewhat unique story. There are retirees looking
for a second career, attorneys looking for clients (whether to help broker a deal or to provide
IP protection). There are professionals who work for larger companies as financial planners,
researchers and analysts. There are prospective presenters, coming to check the event out 192

this might include entrepreneurs, engineers, inventors, and financial officers in various
combination. There are a handful of investors: one regularly attending angel investor, and a
few other assorted money managers of one form or another (small private equity firm,
venture capitalists, private angel investors). To give a sense of this professional diversity,
Table 6 provides a rough breakdown of the attendees at five Funders Forum events
(corresponding to the five presenting technology firms listed above).
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The divisions between these different professional ‘types’ are rarely clean.

Individuals

flow in and out of different situations, projects, finances – and can operate as a consultant one
day, an entrepreneur or inventor the next. Even with the regular attendees, it is difficult to pin
them down with one professional designation or another. This is especially the case with the
category of participants I call strategic consultants. PL himself is a good example. Each
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breakfast begins with a round of introductions. Over the course of two years, PL’s intro
transitioned from “adjunct professor of environmental economics” to “board member of a
solar company” to “working with an interesting engineering firm upstate” to “CEO of a
modular farm business” to “I’m the guy that hosts these events”. That said, others provide a
more stable identity. FG is a chemical engineer turned patent attorney, KL is a “solar
financial analyst.” LM is there to “bring clean technologies to Africa and the developing
world.”
In this regard, the cleantech space is very much, as Boltanksi and Chiapello write, a
projective city; professional identities form around temporary affiliations with projects, as
much as they do around longstanding stable positions of employment.
When the breakfast first began in 2002 and for some years after, the majority of attendees
were new to the event, coming once or twice and then moving on. Over time, more and more
individuals would stick with the event, and become regular attendees - some for a few years,
a small handful for even longer. As a result, there is a fair amount of continuity from
breakfast to breakfast. This helped create a feeling of community amongst the regular
attendees. I found this myself, by the second year of my fieldwork. My initial terror at being
on the 32nd floor of a midtown skyscraper amongst well dressed business men slowly gave
way to a more comfortable participation; even if I was not one of them - I had no deals on
offer, no schemes to be sprung - I was still welcomed as a friendly contributor to their space;
an academic who would - they were convinced - help get the word out about the importance
of cleantech and of the work that they (though always framed as a ‘we’) were doing.
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As the above figures show, while individuals who attend once and then never return
represent the majority of the total attendees over the course of the event, at any particular
event there are a majority of return guests. The number of regulars at the event has grown
over the years, and over a third of the room is comprised of individuals who have been to
more than ten Funders Forum sessions, creating a somewhat familiar feeling to the room as
the event continues to expand.
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Data	
  Collection	
  

Attending the Funders Forum was my initial entry point into the New York Cleantech
space and remained my central field site for participant observation throughout my fieldwork.
That said, there are many other important nodes within New York’s “innovation ecosystem”
and as I developed stronger connections with participants I was able to gain access to
additional spaces, such as cleantech incubators, where startup firms are given cheap office
space in a co-working space, and perhaps most importantly, to venture capital firms. As the
previous chapter suggests, and subsequent chapters will bear out, venture capital plays a
central role in the functioning of the cleantech space. While I initially presumed that I would
meet venture investors at the Funders Forum, it readily became clear that they are infrequent
guests. PL, the organizer of the event, explained that the venture capitalists on his email list
tell him that they read his announcements, but that if they are interested in one of the
presenting companies, they will have a private meeting scheduled just for them. And so, in
order to find venture capitalists to interview for this project, I had to attend a number of other
events where venture capitalists were either presenting or serving as judges of a pitch
competition. I also used snowball sampling techniques to gain access to a few investors via
other contacts made in the space.
After five months in the field, I began approaching individuals for private, in-depth
interviews. In general, the individuals I approached were largely supportive, and did what
they could to make time for me. This ranged from 15 minutes between meetings at a loud
coffee shop to many hours spent pontificating over filet mignon at a restaurant in Grand
Central Station. The majority of my interviews were between 60 and 80 minutes long. All but
one was recorded (due to the request of the interviewee). As mentioned above, about half of
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the interviewees waived their right to confidentiality, but I have elected to keep all of my
participants confidential for the purposes of this study. Appendix A lists all 45 of the
individuals interviewed.
My presence in the New York City cleantech space was not entirely out of the ordinary.
After feeling under-dressed at my first Funder’s Forum, I made sure to have a uniform ready
for subsequent events: a blue suit jacket, dark slacks and one of about 6 button down shirts –
ironed as well as I could. Other students and academics would occasionally show up at these
events, as well as a peppering of journalists, on the prowl for interesting technology leads.
Hence, each time I introduced myself and explained my research, I was almost always
interpreted as yet another person attempting to tell the cleantech story - a story which was, in
their minds, unquestionably positive.
Here I faced a small ethical dilemma. I soon began to realize that no matter how I
explained my research, my critiques, my reservations about cleantech, so long as I ended with
a kernel of hopefulness or optimism, I would immediately be interpreted as having just
unequivocally endorsed the cleantech project. I found that there was little place for subtlety
or nuance while making small talk at a conference room buffet. As a result, I, along with
everyone else in the room, was presented in a somewhat one dimensional manner. Attendees
that I had already become friendly with or interviewed would occasionally proclaim to me
and the bystanders around us, or even on a few occasions to the entire room, that the work I
was doing was absolutely essential, or as one attendee took the liberty to pronounce, while
singing my praises to the entire room, “We have to show that sustainability is profitable –
that’s the only way this stuff will work.”
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There is truth to this on a number of levels. As they say, any press is good press - in this
regard it may matter less what I’m concluding about cleantech than the simple fact that I am
conveying legitimacy on the subject by writing about it at all. And on another level I could
say that yes, I do want sustainability to be profitable - only understood in a far more
expansive sense than the narrowly defined profits of financial accumulation (Wood 2002).
Here I’m reminded of lines from John Clare, the peasant poet from Northamptonshire,
lamenting the enclosure of his pastoral home. He writes,
Ah cruel foes with plenty blest
So ankering after more
To lay the greens and pasture waste
Which proffited before
Poor greedy souls—what would they have
Beyond their plenty given?
Will riches keep ‘em from the grave?
Or buy them rest in heaven? (Clare 2013 [1818]: 44)

I do not mean to suggest that the Funder’s Forum was dominated by ‘poor greedy souls’ in fact, the truth of the situation was quite to the contrary. Most of the individuals whom I
spoke with - not all, but most - viewed money as a means of achieving some vision of a new,
better, cleaner world. Riches will not keep them - or us - from the grave, but clean technology
- or so the story goes - may give us a few more years to enjoy a still inhabitable planet.
In the remainder of this section, I will explore this shared vision and commitment to
making a better, cleaner world – as expressed through a new, green spirit of capitalism.
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Interlude:	
  Spirit	
  of	
  cleantech	
  entrepreneurialism	
  
DG: The thing with biofuels, the thing with algae, is people want to believe in hindsight, people want to believe that there is a panacea out there that will
allow us to live the way we live and drive the way we drive and fly the way
we fly and be great and have no global warming or take us off of foreign oil.
And algae, you know, has the potential to do that. Obviously that's what
attracted me to the algae industry and as well, obviously, is money… I said I'd
rather be in a cleantech company that fails then sitting in a back-office
function in a mailing company and watch the mailing industry slowly die a
long death… You think you can come out and make a lot of money, you think
you can change the world. You know, it probably clouds the judgment of
investors. You know, you're not agnostic about it. It's not like I'm in the cup
business and its cyclical and so you get out of cups and get into paperclips, its
not like that; people want this stuff to work.

In following with Boltanski and Chiapello’s approach to understanding the new spirit of
capitalism, this study will not focus on the perspectives of the power elite, but instead upon
capital’s cadres, the managerial and professional workers who are conscripted to work on
behalf of this economic system, to maintain its expanded reproduction through faithful
adherence to a logic of accumulation that may not always appear to be the most logical,
social, or in this case environmental, choice.
Hence, the ethnographic work in the following two sections focuses specifically on these
white collar workers of the green economy. When C. Wright Mills (2002) wrote his
foundational text, the world of white collar workers - managers and office workers of large
corporations, played an instrumental role in defining the US economy. If we accept Berle and
Means (1991) or Peter Drucker’s (1993) conception of these managers, they were stewards of
distinctly public entities, answering not only to stockholders, but also to workers,
communities and even to the nation at large. Yet with the emergence of neoliberalism and the
shareholder revolution, this conception of the public minded manager, replete with polyvalent
commitments, came under attack (Lewis 1989; Ho 2009; O’Sullivan 2000).
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For Boltanski and Chiapello, this civic minded managerialism figured centrally in the
spirit of capitalism of its time, and with its undoing a new legitimizing discourse would have
to emerge. This new spirit, as we’ve seen, was (and is) focused on an embrace of
entrepreneurialism and characteristics of flexibility, fluidity, self determination and selfimprovement. And yet, as I will show, whereas Boltanski and Chiapello’s work leaves us
with a vision of anti-systemic critique seamlessly folded into a new legitimizing discourse, in
actual practice this is a tense and unstable unity, one which requires a fair amount of work in
order to maintain any semblance of coherence.
In this section, I focus on ways in which individuals within the innovation ecosystem
make meaning out of their work in the cleantech space, and specifically how they create an
internal coherence to the cleantech project. This involves reconciling the tensions between
environmental crusading and business pragmatism; suturing them into a seemingly coherent
spirit of green capitalism. As we will see, this coherence is not a given - it has to be actively
produced and managed.
This is an investigation at the level of what Henri Lefebvre (2008) calls everyday life the mundane, seemingly minor practices, discussions, actions and relations that are, at the
most concrete level, the physical embodiment of economic ‘laws.’ In Section Three I will
explore this connection between everyday practices in the cleantech space and the abstract
laws of capital accumulation in much greater detail. For now, the focus is instead on the
connection between these everyday practices and the legitimizing discourse, or ‘spirit’ that
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makes meaning out of work that might otherwise be seen as unstable, under (sometimes un)
compensated, and even at times unlikely to succeed32.

	
  

	
  

32

This portion of my research focuses specifically on the world of early stage cleantech
entrepreneurialism - specifically, those actively trying to commercialize clean technologies,
to create new financially sound enterprises that will both realize sufficient returns for
investors and contribute to the ‘cleaning’ of our wasteful, toxic and polluting economy. In
truth then, this part of my analysis is not looking at the spirit of green capitalism broadly
defined, but more specifically the spirit of cleantech entrepreneurialism.
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Chapter	
  5:	
  Entrepreneurialism	
  and	
  Impact	
  in	
  the	
  Cleantech	
  Space	
  
OG: My interest in cleantech lies at the intersection between impact and
business.
Whether you’re on the moral side or on the I want to make a lot of money
side, there’s something here for you. (Funders Forum Presenter)
I fully think the private sector is going to solve these problems. That’s why
I’m here. (Strategic consultant at the Funders Forum)

Cleantech professionals explain their commitment to the field in terms of wanting to
make a difference, wanting to help build a world that won’t just run itself into the ground,
that will be around for their kids and their kids’ kids. This desire to work towards a better
collective and planetary future manifests in the ubiquitous, contradictory and surprisingly
obtuse concept of “impact.”
From increasing energy efficiency and repurposing waste products to reducing emissions
and ultimately, ‘saving the planet’; all of the hopes, beliefs and assumptions that weave these
diverse aspirations and imaginaries together coalesce into this single concept. Impact. It is a
noun, an adverb, an adjective; a direction, an intention, a promise. All of the people I spoke
with in the cleantech space, from the socialist scientist-inventor to the climate change
denying angel investor, want to make an impact; most of them will tell you so explicitly.
This abstract desire to make a positive difference in the world, to be more than
individually, personally, financially successful, captures an important dimension of the
‘spirit’ of this cleantech space. It is, as Boltanski and Chiapello argue, that which motivates
and legitimizes participation, that which allows individuals without much personally at stake
to believe in the processes of capital accumulation, and to believe in the collective socioecological good of their work.
204

Nonetheless, ‘impact’ is not so simple to define. As we will see, it is hard for individuals
to directly explain the idea without recourse to tautology or self-contradiction. And yet, this
elusive, vague abstraction encompasses all that they understand to be good about cleantech
entrepreneurialism.
In this chapter I will introduce three distinct modes of ‘impact,’ two of which come
together to define the entrepreneurial sense of impact in the cleantech space. This
entrepreneurial spirit is about believing in something that is more than money. Cleantech
offers a variant on this entrepreneurial sense of impact, a way to pass judgment about what
new innovations are most desirable. In the cleantech space, not just any new things are
impactful – only clean new things; big, clean new things, commercially produced. The spirit
of cleantech entrepreneurialism, expressed as a distinct conception of impact, is opposed to
‘just making money’ like Wall Street bankers, or at the other extreme, ‘just crying for nature’
like pesky hippies and environmentalists. Cleantech professionals self identify between these
two extremes, as entrepreneurial subjects engaged in a war against waste - consumer,
financial, ecological. As such they are engaged in what we’ve called, in the previous section,
planetary improvement, and are also ecoFordists: producers not parasites.

Impact	
  

Since 2007, “impact investing” has become a buzzword of the socially and
environmentally conscious investment community, though here too the exact definition of
‘impact’ remains elusive. The Wikipedia entry (2014) on impact investing offers this
tautological definition: “Impact investments are investments made into companies,
organizations, and funds with the intention to generate measurable social and environmental
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impact alongside a financial return.” There are impact investing networks, such as Investors
Circle and Toniic, the latter of which offers testimonials on its website from some of its
members. Dr. Maximilian Martin explains, “To improve the state of the world in ways that
matter, we need to make impact the common denominator of our investment and real
economy activities (Toniic 2014).”
Measurement is meant to bring clarity to the term - the impact of impact investing entails
some quantifiable increase in social or environmental metrics, or at least the promise thereof.
The Global Impact Investing Ratings System (GIIRS) is one proprietary tool that has been
developed to meet this need, providing “a comprehensive and transparent system for
assessing the social and environmental impact of companies and funds” (GIIRS 2014). Its
promoters explain, “The impact investing industry is facilitating investments that are not only
socially responsible, but which also actively create positive social and environmental impact”
(GIIRS 2014). Their ratings measure performance in categories such as governance, workers,
community, and environment, essentially measuring how well the company treats all of its
stakeholders, human and nonhuman alike. To return once again to Berle and Means (1991) whereas the manager of a public company was once tasked with serving just such a diversity
of stakeholders that represented ‘the public interest,’ now in the wake of the shareholder
revolution, such multivalent considerations must be re-articulated, given a specific name and
quantifiable measure, as impact.
While clearly related, there is a somewhat different sense of ‘impact’ that operates in the
cleantech space. Whereas GIIRS rates companies according to the social and environmental
implications of their internal operations, in my field work I found that impact mainly referred
to the social and environmental implications of external effects - in other words, the impact
that a firm’s commercial success would have on transforming their customer’s operations, as
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opposed to their own. As a number of entrepreneurs (very self-consciously) explained to me,
this often entails environmentally unfriendly internal practices, such as flying executives and
salespeople across the globe and engaging Chinese manufactures with unclear environmental
standards, but their hope is that eventual success, at a meaningful enough scale, will more
than make up for this unfortunate footprint.
For instance, during one Funder’s Forum, two consultants gave a brief presentation
about a new model that they were developing with and for major global financial interests.
The model would attempt to provide a measure of environmental degradation, climate change
and resource depletion, that corporations could use to gauge their progress in becoming
green. The consultant explains, “I don’t mean green in terms of ‘we’re doing good’ or that
sort of thing, but in terms of whether or not you’re part of this industrial transformation.”
Green is, as with the discourse of planetary improvement, a new industrial paradigm, or as
the above cited Meryl Lynch report suggests, a 6th industrial revolution. It is not an
alternative or counterbalance to industrial profitability but simply a new approach and
therefore a new way to be impactful.
While it was easy for most of my respondents to proudly explain that they were in the
cleantech space because they wanted to make an impact, it was much harder for them to
articulate what exactly this impact would, or could be. Cleantech is “good for the country,”
“a noble place,” or simply “crucial.” But how, why and in what ways?
After reviewing all of the many interviews and conversations in which the idea of impact
arose, the best definition of impact I could develop may be the most abstract: Impact is the
something-more-than-money that makes the pursuit of money worthwhile. In this sense it
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encapsulates the spirit of cleantech, a supplemental ethical and moral commitment that helps
justify engagement with the market.
The relationship between these two commitments - to impact and to the market - takes on
a number of different forms; sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, and quite
often a bit of both. This fraught relationship maps directly to core contradictions of the green
capitalist literature between critiques of actually-existing capital and calls for a fundamentally
transformed world, created from within and by the current socio-economic system. As we
saw, texts such as Natural Capitalism begin with the utopian assertion that another world is
possible, only to then fall back upon the ‘pragmatic’ reality that another socio-economic
system is not. As a result, their anti-systemic critiques, along with their aspirations for a
radically transformed world, are folded back into a new legitimizing discourse for a greener,
cleaner capitalism.
As I will show, impact is expressed in various capacities as more than the market, the
power of the market, and a vision of an improved market.
Table 7: Three Expressions of Impact in the Cleantech Space
Endorsement
Critique
Critique

Impact-as-capital
Impact-beyond-capital
Impacting-capital

Impact-as-capital:

Harness the power of the market
More than the market/against the market
Visions of an improved market

The power of the market is evident in the commercialization of new

innovations and the incremental gains to be made through greening corporations.
Entrepreneurial developments of new clean technologies, corporate implementation of
existing green technologies (such as Wal-Mart’s commitment to compact fluorescent bulbs),
or any public policy predicated upon “harnessing the power of the market” fall under this
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category. Planetary improvement and ecoFordism most directly express this form of impact,
though to the extent that all four varieties of green capitalism presuppose the centrality of the
market, they all express some version of this impact-as-capital.
Impact-beyond capital: This form of impact emerges out of critique. It relates to a more
critical perspective on the actually existing mass consumer economy, whether a critique of its
inherent wastefulness or a more general sense that ‘just making money’ is not sufficient.
Explicit desires to clean or green the planet - irrespective of market or profit-making
possibilities - would fall under this category, as well as proposals that advocate for nonmarket, and even at times distinctly non-capitalist, economic solutions. Again, all four
varieties of green capitalism express some version of this desire to make an impact-beyondcapital.
Impacting-capital: This third form of impact also stems from critique, but instead of
seeing the market as deficient, it sees the market as temporarily misaligned. Hence, this form
of impact relates to reform-minded, regulatory approaches to clean and green
transformations. It entails working through non-market actors - most often the state at various
scales, including efforts at global governance - to alter, correct or somehow transform the
functioning of the market economy. Industrial policy, including investment in basic research
and production science, environmental market regulations (such as emissions guidelines,
subsidies, tariffs and taxes, or renewable portfolio standards) as well as efforts to create new
markets altogether (such as carbon markets), all fall under this category. Green
developmentalism is the variety of green capitalism most directly related to this form of
impact, as well as eco-utopian Socialism, albeit more focused on local forms of non-market
coordination, as opposed to national and global governance institutions.
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These three forms of impact are not to be interpreted as a mutually exclusive typology,
but as tendencies whose various combinations can account for a wide range of perspectives
on capital and the economy that are voiced or implied by environmentally engaged actors. As
Figure 4 suggests, green entrepreneurialism, environmental activism and green governance
can be situated in the three different intersections between these three dimensions of impact.
Anti-globalization environmental activism joins a sense of impacting capital (whether
through reform, revolution or revanchism) and a sense that one is fighting for an impactbeyond-capital (Guha and Alier 2013; Prudham 2013; Reitan 2012).33

33

By way of comparison – Schnaiberg (1980) presents a typology of three syntheses, or
ways in which the dialectical contradiction between capitalist expansion and ecological limits
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By contrast, green governance is typically less oppositional, and joins the effort to
impact-capital with a commitment to making an impact-as-capital. The goal is not to supplant
capital and the market system, but to put policies in place - often using market mechanisms that can stabilize and support a thriving market system while also attending to socioecological needs (Hallegatte et al. 2012; Popp 2012; Schmalensee 2012). The third discourse,
green entrepreneurialism is what we will explore in more depth below. It is situated between
impact-as-capital and impact-beyond capital, entranced by the innovative possibilities of
science and technology, which is understood to be both dependent upon commercial
production and at the same time capable of radically transforming this production, along with
society more generally (Carr 2013; Clark and York 2013; Huesemann and Huesemann 2013).
Each of these discourses contributes to a broadly construed spirit of green capitalism, and
merits its own careful examination. However, my research primarily focuses only upon green
entrepreneurialism. Hence, in this chapter I focus on the confluence of the first two of these
vectors - impact-beyond-capital and impact-as-capital, as they come together in the practices
and ideals of cleantech entrepreneurialism.34

can be reconciled. Each of these: the economic, the managed scarcity and the ecological,
represent varying degrees of state regulation and oversight of the social and environmental
implications of economic growth, from nonexistent (economic synthesis) to an extreme form
of “left social distribution (425)” (ecological synthesis). As three distinct forms of managing
the tension between growth (impact-as-capital) and regulation (impacting-capital) they would
all three fall in the intersection between these two forms of impact – though one might argue
that the ecological synthesis would, as Schnaiberg envisions it – actually represent a postcapitalist social formation.
34
It is certainly the case that many clean technologies target market opportunities that are the
result of regulatory regimes of one form or another as well as particular forms of public
investment. These non-market mechanisms directly contribute to the commercialization
prospects or opportunity structure of cleantech startups. However, they do not directly
contribute to the spirit of cleantech entrepreneurialism, which downplays any dependence on
such exogenous supports. Regulatory regimes and public funding are seen – in this specific
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Entrepreneurialism	
  

Over the past few decades, the figure of the entrepreneur has come to increasingly capture
the attention and imagination of a wide range of people, and has been associated with a wide
range of practices, from activism and charitable giving to contract work, self-employment
and the founding of new businesses (Broek et al 2012; da Costa and Saraiva 2012; Gregory
2013; Morris 2014; Ruebottom 2013).
The classic model, or myth, of an entrepreneur depicts a heroic, self-actualized figure,
forging new, uncharted terrain; taking risks and committing completely to the project at hand
(Anderson and Warren 2011; Dodd and Anderson 2007; Nasar 2013; Rehn et al 2013). This
is a thoroughly gendered, masculine figure - one without care giving responsibilities, or for
that matter any dependencies that might divert attention from the project at hand - and from
working towards its success (Hamilton 2013; Gupta 2009; Lewis 2006; Mirchandani 1999).
While the classic story of a heroic entrepreneur still captures the imagination of those who
aspire to such a role, it is increasingly clear that entrepreneurialism, especially in a field as
complex as cleantech, is a process that extends far beyond the individual ‘founders’ leading
their individual startups. As Ferrary, Granovetter and others have shown, entrepreneurialism
is a networked process, involving a wide array of actors and institutions coming together to
create conditions of possibility for successful commercialization (Burton 1999; Dubini and
Aldrich 1991; Ferrary and Granovetter 2009; Minkes and Foxall 1982; OECD 1999; Powell
et al 1996).

entrepreneurial environment - to be unpredictable, unreliable, and therefore only ever able to
provide temporary assistance.
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This is somewhat different than the argument put forth by Foucault (2010), who
suggests that neoliberal subjectivity is fundamentally entrepreneurial, that permanent selfimprovement defines our age (Read 2009). This enterprising spirit, considers selfemployment and deployment of the self to be normative conditions, as individuals are tasked
with creating their own economic opportunities. Boltanski and Chiapello’s concept of the
new spirit of capitalism dovetails with this analysis - for them it is characteristic of the
“projective city” - a legitimizing frame in which flexible subjects are constantly working to
improve their employability, as they navigate from project to project within a networked or
“connectionist” world.
While the projective city does very much define the cleantech space - selfemployment is a slightly more complicated factor. To the extent that self-employment
presumes that one is an entrepreneur, there is a huge difference between self-employment as
a founder of a start up company, and self-employment as a service provider, or ‘strategic
consultant.’ During my fieldwork, I found that for the latter, self-employment was as often a
sign of economic and professional precarity as it was a badge of honor. “Strategic
consultants” may be entrepreneurial selves, but they are also un- and under-employed
contractors and brokers, constantly on the prowl for work.
That said, almost all of these consultants I spoke with still identified with and as part
of a general or collective entrepreneurial project of and in the cleantech space, as opposed to
seeing entrepreneurialism as an individual badge of honor or identity. Not only do these
professionals shift from project to project within the cleantech space, but they also identify
with cleantech itself as a project worthy of their allegiance. Hence, if Foucault’s conception
of the enterprising self centers upon an individual focused inwards, towards selfimprovement (similar to the inward looking focus of impact investing), in the cleantech space
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we see instead an entrepreneurial focus extended outwards, towards commercial success and,
as detailed in the prior section, planetary improvement.
As the above implies, distinguishing precisely who is and is not an entrepreneur can be
tricky. Functionalist definitions of entrepreneurialism as a specific economic or class
position, or as a unique occupational role certainly provide an important anchor, but cannot in
and of themselves, account for the much broader array of individuals who associate with the
broader, networked process of entrepreneurialism and consider themselves, accordingly,
entrepreneurial.
Still, the status of being an entrepreneur in this narrower sense, as the founder of a startup company, does come with a fair amount of cache and respect. Many of the events serving
this cleantech space are focused upon the founders of small cleantech start-ups and their
carefully manicured pitches. Business plan competitions and pitch events alike tend to treat
participating entrepreneurs (in this narrower sense) as contestants on a game show or in a
spectator sport; the most valiant competitors will be noticed, and if they are lucky, funded.
My first experience with this dynamic was at a two-day green capitalism conference. The
second day of the conference opened with an ‘entrepreneurial showcase.’ A dozen
entrepreneurs were each given 6 minutes to pitch to the audience. The meeting’s host
announced the process - and the contestants - to thunderous applause. “These are the heroes,
the entrepreneurs, who are going to make the world that we want to see!”
Despite the centrality of this entrepreneurial hero-worshipping, one need not
‘technically’ be an entrepreneur to be considered entrepreneurial, but only to exhibit certain
qualities and commitments. This was explained to me during an interesting exercise where I
asked PL to help me typify the various attendees at the Funders Forum. Some roles and forms
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of employment are easy to identify: lawyers, accountants, venture capitalists, brokers,
entrepreneurs, inventors, but the problem is that most attendees aren’t so easily reduced to a
single designation. Some lawyers are also investors. Some inventors are also entrepreneurs.
Some brokers are also former entrepreneurs. After a half an hour spent going through the first
30 or so names in our attendance spreadsheet, all hopes of creating a clean, mutually
exclusive typology were shot. We ended up with a sprawling list of designations that
included:
Consultant
Alternative Media
Banker
Investor
Entrepreneur
One degree removed from an entrepreneur
Entrepreneurial
Engineer
Attorney
Professional
Deal Maker
Inventor
Networker
Second Career

What struck me was how PL needed three different categories to explain
entrepreneurialism. There are entrepreneurs - those directly involved in the making of a new
business or venture. Then there are those people - like himself - whom he would consider one
degree removed from entrepreneurs. This includes service providers that work intimately as
advisors to entrepreneurs, sometimes as entrepreneurial coaches, or whose work is informed
by their past experiences as an entrepreneur. Then beyond this, PL felt the need to introduce
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an even more general category, to describe those who may not directly service or work with
entrepreneurs, but who are nonetheless still entrepreneurial.35

What does it mean to be entrepreneurial?

Now that we’ve established that there is a general orientation towards, commitment to
and excitement about entrepreneurialism in the cleantech space, next we must ask what
exactly it means to be entrepreneurial. The study of entrepreneurship is a somewhat strange
field, spanning numerous disciplines - from economics to sociology, anthropology and social
psychology (Swedberg 2000). There is no space at present to offer an exhaustive review of
this literature, so instead I will outline the basic contours of two main approaches to
entrepreneurialism, which I will refer to as Schumpeterian and neo-classical.

Neoclassical entrepreneur

The first conception of entrepreneurship, which I am calling neoclassical, originates
with the 18th century writings of Richard Cantillon, and extends through 20th century

35

There are a few ways to distinguish yourself as even-more-entrepreneurial than the rest.
Individuals who have founded new start-ups often refer to themselves as ‘founders.’ And
anyone in the cleantech space, whether a founder, a lawyer or a strategic consultant, may
refer to themselves as a ‘serial entrepreneur’ suggesting that they have been doing this for
some time, they know the ropes, and have been weathered through experience.
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economists such as Knight, von Mises and Kirzner. It is focused on profit-maximization
through market arbitrage, and considers the entrepreneur to be a prime example of homo
economicus or the rational economic actor that populates their neoclassical theoretical
universe (Kalantaridis 2004a, 2004b; Kirzner 1979; Ripsas 1998).
Cantillon is regarded as the first person to write specifically of entrepreneurs, albeit in
a thoroughly mercantilist context. Cantillon (1931) regards the entrepreneur as a risk taking
arbitrager, willing to buy goods at a known price to later sell at an unknown price. In the mid19th century Johann von Thunen picked up Cantillon’s argument, defining entrepreneurial
gain as the portion of profits over and above paying interest on capital, wages of
management, and insurance premiums (Cuevas 1994). Hence, the rewards of
entrepreneurship are “returns for incurring those risks which no insurance company will
cover because they are unpredictable (Hebert and Link 1982: 45-7).” In the 20th century,
Knight elaborated on von Thunen’s work, specifically the difference between risk and
uncertainty (Blaug 2000; Cuevas 1994). Whereas many uncertainties can be translated
through actuarial calculations of probabilistic occurrence into a regular insurance premium,
other uncertainties - to the extent that they involve new or unprecedented circumstances,
cannot (Blaug 1985). It is this latter form of un-manageable risk, Knight argues, that
translates into the profits specific to entrepreneurialism. Notice how for these thinkers, the
specificity of entrepreneurialism is centered upon the unique financial gains that it can
account for. The entrepreneur, as a unique actor, is simply inferred by the observation of
surplus profits realized through innovative business practice.
The Austrian economist von Mises and his student Kirzner are important contributors
to this perspective. Von Mises argues that entrepreneurship is simply market arbitrage that is
ultimately beholden to consumer preferences. The consumers are sovereign - their tastes and
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wants determine which entrepreneurs succeed and which do not. The entrepreneur can only
introduce a new or innovative product to the extent that consumers will pay for it. Kirzner
takes this one step further, defining the entrepreneur simply as an individual who is alert
towards profit making opportunities. In this neoclassical perspective, the entrepreneur
exhibits a rational, opportunistic and acquisitive response to disequilibrium (Blaug 2000).

Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship

The term entrepreneur derives from the French, ‘entreprendre’ which translates as “to
do something (Swedberg 2000).” In the middle ages the term referred broadly to someone
“who is active, who gets things done (Hoselitz 1951).” While the work of Cantillon and
subsequent neoclassical theorizations of entrepreneurialism are still central to the modern
understanding of the term, studies of entrepreneurialism most often trace their lineage to the
early 20th century writings of Joseph Schumpeter (1934), whose canonical description of
capitalist dynamics places the figure of the entrepreneur as the prime agent of ‘creative
destruction’ (Swedberg 2000; Blaug 2000).
There is an irony to this; Schumpeter proposed his theory of entrepreneurialism as a
critique of and alternative to neoclassical economic theory, specifically figures such as Leon
Walras and Alfred Marshall (Swedberg 2000). For these neoclassical thinkers, the economy
was understood as a system which tended towards equilibrium - always adapting to new,
external pressures so as to maintain an ever changing equilibrium. The neoclassical
‘marginalist revolution’ held that all economic decisions could be understood as the product
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of rational decision makers, calculating the marginal utility of all available alternatives so as
to always arrive at an optimal allocation of capital (Hunt and Lautzenheil 2011). This figure,
often caricatured as homo economicus, was seen to be the only type of actor necessary to
explain the functioning of the capitalist economy and its price-setting markets. The
entrepreneur, as we just saw, was a prime agent of this equilibrating tendency and an
exemplary specimen of homo economicus.
Schumpeter fundamentally disagreed with this neoclassical approach, arguing that it
failed to account for the possibility that there might be disruptive agents internal to the
economic system, and that the economy did not, therefore, always tend towards equilibrium.
For Schumpeter, the entrepreneur was precisely this market-disruptor, responsible for
pushing the economy out of equilibrium, and in so doing, initiating the process of creative
destruction that is fundamental to the dynamism of the capitalist system. At the most basic
level, he introduces ego into the neoclassical conception of homo economicus, which is
otherwise an altogether lifeless and near selfless abstraction, concerned with rational
acquisition but nothing more. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur, on the other hand, wants to
produce, to experience the joy of creation, and to conquer the world. Power, creation and
conflict all find their voice in this egotistical figure (Swedberg 2000).
Schumpeter defines entrepreneurialism as the making of a new combination out of
already existing forces and materials (1934). He is careful to distinguish this combinatory
process of innovation from the related process invention. Invention entails the making of new
things and ideas, whereas innovation is about putting inventions together with other resources
- including capital - so as to create new economic formations - productive or otherwise.
Whereas the neoclassical economists could simply understand entrepreneurialism as an
extension of economic rationality, for Schumpeter entrepreneurialism was defined in
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distinction to this narrow logic, and must therefore be motivated by a different set of rational
principles. As Swedberg argues, this is where Schumpeter’s analysis begins to look
increasingly sociological. Around the same time, Max Weber (2001) was writing about a
spirit of capitalism that provides religious-cultural motivation for individual economic
activities. While Schumpeter does not offer any equivalent broad socio-cultural explanation
for his thesis, he does proposes a set of three primary motivations that factor into
entrepreneurial activity. These are:
The dream and the will to found a private kingdom (93): The accumulation of private
property, social wealth, and the power that accompanies its possession. Schumpeter argued
that industrial and commercial success was the closest one could get to the power
experienced in medieval lordship - but such power was always incomplete, entangled in
complex webs of fealty and reciprocal obligations - hence the modern accumulation of wealth
is seen as an attempt to create a private - or non-feudal - kingdom.
The will to conquer (93): The motivation to distinguish oneself, to prove one’s
superiority or social worth. As he explains, the entrepreneur aims “to succeed for the sake,
not of the fruits of success, but of success itself” (93). Here, Schumpeter begins to diverge
from neoclassical orthodoxy - for he is suggesting that there is a non-financial motivation
underlying the process of entrepreneurialism. As he elaborates, “The financial result is a
secondary consideration, or, at all events, mainly valued as an index of success and as a
symptom of victory” (93)…
The joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply of exercising one’s energy and
ingenuity (93): This third motivation directly relates to the above observation, that
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entrepreneurship is first and foremost an act of creative labor. This motivation is, Schumpeter
argues, “the most distinctly anti-hedonist of the three.”
To the extent that these last two motivations prevail, the entrepreneur exists in direct
contrast to the neo-classical conception of a rational, profit-maximizing, economic agent, or
homo economicus. In many ways this can be seen as the crux of Schumpeter’s argument. It is
only by understanding the central role of these non-economic actors within the functioning of
the economic system that one can begin to grasp the dynamism endogenous to capital.
Whereas the Neoclassicals could only see economic disequilibria occurring at the behest of
exogenous forces, Schumpeter instead presents the entrepreneur as an internal source of
market disruption. As Schumpeter elsewhere writes, entrepreneurs are “certainly not
economic men in the theoretical sense (1991 [1946]: 408).”36
*

*

*

In many ways the divide between these two conceptions of entrepreneurialism
corresponds to the distinction between impact-beyond-capital and impact-as-capital. The
Schumpeterian description of entrepreneurialism, as the motive force of capital’s ‘creative

36

A third interpretation of entrepreneurialism sees it as a general subjectivity. This analysis
is most commonly associated with Foucault (2010), who identifies entrepreneurialism as a
way in which individuality is articulated as a constant process of self-improvement. The
enterprising self is an owner of human capital, capital which must be efficiently allocated,
and always invested in growth. The entrepreneurialism that Foucault identifies is more
closely aligned with the neoclassical model than the Schumpeterian one. As one might
imagine, the hegemony of neoclassical economic theory throughout the 20th century, and still
through to the present, insinuated itself into the depths of popular common sense. That said,
the resurgence of craft-culture - from DIY countercultures to mainstream home improvement
and democratized forms of digital media-making might suggest that there is a strong vein of
Schumpeterian entrepreneurialism - grounded by the joy of creating - that also courses
through our collective pysche. A promising line of future inquiry might re-examine
Foucault’s thesis accordingly.
221

destruction’ presents the entrepreneur as an innovative hero, unfettered from the narrow
rationality of basic economic calculation. As such entrepreneurialism provides an affective
force - a spirit - justifying excitement for the creative possibilities of market activities leading
to innovations that exceed or disrupt the present state of affairs, positioning the practice of
entrepreneurialism as a noble, socially meaningful engagement. On the other hand, the
neoclassical interpretation of entrepreneurialism presents the entrepreneur as a moneymaker
first and foremost, creatively finding ways to engage in market arbitrage while remaining
within the broad precepts of economic rationality. Hence, Schumpeter’s entrepreneur
expresses a creativity beyond the market, whereas the neoclassical entrepreneur expresses a
creativity of the market.
It would be unfair to both interpretations to overly caricature them in one form or
another - yet this distinction does seem to capture an important difference between these two
assessments of entrepreneurialism and its potential impact. Instead of attempting, as scholars
such as Casson (1982) have done, to create a synthesis of these perspectives, it may be best to
leave them as somewhat irreconcilable tendencies, two poles creating a continuum upon
which most actually existing entrepreneurialism rests.

Entrepreneurial	
  impact:	
  From	
  Protestant	
  Ethic	
  to	
  Planetary	
  Ethic	
  

Throughout my fieldwork, I found that most people I spoke with most passionately
identified with a Schumpeterian conception of entrepreneurialism, in which creativity figures
as central, while always acknowledging the pragmatic need to remain capable of working
within the existing market constraints. A consultant (and broker and VC) explains these two
distinct capacities blended together in a process of creative problem solving:
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PQ: I mean listen, being an entrepreneur is probably one of the most creative
aspects in business as you are wearing… how many hats do you wear? You
have to figure out and solve problems... I think people are driven more by
solving problems and doing creative things and being an entrepreneur is a way
that that gets done.

One recent MBA graduate and aspiring cleantech entrepreneur explained to me that being
an entrepreneur “is about the experience of creating something from nothing…” He then
continues on to offer a version of Schumpeter’s second non-financial motivation, the will to
conquer:
JR: I think everybody wants, they want some sort of proof of their worth,
and… I think an even greater way [than family or a job] to show your worth is
to demonstrate that you’ve actually built something that is profitable, that
employs people, provides a service or a good…
In many ways, the will to conquer seems to function as a secular version of Weber’s
Protestant ethic - instead of making money and doing good work to demonstrate one’s
worthiness to God in particular, one instead hopes to demonstrate their virtue more generally
to society at large.
This demonstrated virtue - this proof of one’s worth - is another way to describe
entrepreneurial impact - an outward looking non-financial motivation for creative business
practice. If Weber described a spirit of capital in which one proved their worth in the face of
god, in the cleantech space one proves their worth by making a positive impact in socioecological terms - or we might say, by proving one’s worth in the face of the planet understood not as an external object or thing - not as a ‘nature’ that is somehow distinct from
society - but as a socio-natural assemblage, a planet that is always already a planetary society.
As with any creative practice, entrepreneurial activity exists within a set of cultural
and aesthetic norms that distinguish good art from bad, or in this case, good innovation from
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boring, inconsequential or wasteful alternatives. In this respect, the ‘cleanliness’ of cleantech
provides a standard or ideal against which specific innovations can be regarded as artful, or to
apply the correct vernacular, impactful. Here we can begin to identify what is specifically
‘clean’ about cleantech entrepreneurialism, and its distinct conception of impact.
That said, these norms were not very easy for people to identify. In fact, throughout
my fieldwork, I found that it was easier for people to provide me with examples of their nonimpactful past, or with examples of non-impactful paths not chosen, than it was for them to
explicitly name the impact of their present work in the cleantech space. Perhaps this is fitting.
If we define ourselves in opposition to our others, the not-I whose remainder can cohere into
something resembling a subject, than it should be no surprise that the identification of
cleantech entrepreneurialism comes by way of negation (Mead 2009). Through my fieldwork,
four distinct ‘others’ consistently emerged:
1. Small business
2. Boring business
3. Hippies
4. Wall Street
To summarize: Hippies represent the irrational excesses of too much environmentalism,
too detached from practical business sense. Wall Street represents too narrow of a focus on
money making, blinding one to all non-financial considerations. Small business represents
too inconsequential of a scale of operation. Boring business represents participation in the
not-clean, or waste-making economy. After reviewing each of these four ‘others’ in turn, I
will conclude with some brief reflections linking these identity forming binaries back to the
varieties of green capitalism presented in the prior section.
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Table 8: Four Foils of Cleantech Entrepreneurialism
Small Business
Boring Business
Hippies/environmentalists
Wall Street

Too inconsequential of a scale
Too focussed on the status quo economy
Too focussed on environmentalism
Too focused on making money

Not	
  Boring	
  Business	
  

One afternoon I visited an entrepreneurial incubator. An incubator is a shared
workspace for startups (in this case many of which, but not all, were cleantech related).
Typically, companies that are selected to join an incubator get access to cheap cubicle space,
the conference rooms and other business amenities, and perhaps most importantly, a number
of events and networking opportunities for early stage entrepreneurs. I came to this incubator
to visit one of the companies that presented at the Funder’s Forum and to interview the
incubator’s director, TW. After a brief wait in their reception area, TW took me to a central
seating area surrounded by pods of cubicles, where the numerous incubating startups worked.
Each startup could be identified by a large vinyl banner, laminated placard or other such
display intended for trade fair use, protruding out of their space and serving as de facto office
decor. TW points out the cleantech companies scattered amongst the lot.
Prior to being in cleantech, TW was in the video game industry, which he described
as “part of the waste economy.” Making video game apps, he reflected, was essentially
participating in a market for time wasting software. From there he explains his move into
cleantech,
TW: I wanted to do something meaningful, where I could really make a dent.”
JG: What does that mean to you?
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TW: I’m not sure. Where I was at, I mean, basically before I was helping
people waste time. And I wanted to ultimately leave the world a better place
then I found it and do something that had more impact – so that was job
creation and it was making the place I grew up in and love and live in now a
more livable place for my kid and our kids’ kids, so yeah.
After meeting with TW, I spoke with some of the entrepreneurs at the incubator. One,
CN, was a member of this incubator but didn’t actually work there; his team was too large for
the space available. He maintained his membership, paid his cubicle-rent, and tried to work
there at least one day a week, to keep a connection to the incubator and all of its networking
opportunities. At the time, CN was 24 years old, a recent graduate of a prestigious business
school where he met his business partner - an engineering student at the same institution.
They knew that they wanted to create a large company together, though they had not yet
figured out that it would be in cleantech. He tells me,
CN: I am a serial entrepreneur - my dream was to do or to create something
that hasn't been done or created before that would have a very positive impact
globally.
JG: What does it mean to make a positive impact?
CN: It can be energy reduction. Less carbon emissions, less coal power plants.
JG: But at the time you weren't committed to cleantech, so what was positive
impact than?
CN: It is an interesting contrast. At the time I was consulting for Reynolds
wrap I was literally talking to CEOs and COOs about aluminum foil gauge
and you know I was giving great advice, I understood the market very well but
I said what the hell am I doing? Then this opportunity to save energy in
buildings by 20 to 40% came along - I said this makes sense I can have fun
and develop great technology but I can also have an impact.

In business school CN learned that he wanted to make an impact, before he was even
sure what that meant. In the professional world, he learned that doing so would require
entering an industry that he believed in. This happened to be cleantech. In other words, being
an entrepreneur was not enough, making a profitable business or working for a profitable
business was not enough. In order to feel impactful, CN wants to be part of a larger project 226

a social project, a collective effort to create the clean economy. This is what provides a
motivating factor, beyond ‘mere’ entrepreneurialism, in the cleantech space.
The impactfulness of cleantech entrepreneurialism is about changing the world - how,
and in what ways remains unclear, though there is a clear sense of what sorts of industries
and endeavors will not change the world. Better paper clips, mailing services, video games;
in other words the perpetuation of mass consumer society and the production of waste disposability and distraction - these are decidedly not impactful pursuits. A young (late 20s)
cleantech professional explains to me,
JR: I just decided that I did not want to be in an industry that I didn’t give a
shit about… It just wasn’t a good atmosphere for me. I just didn’t feel like
they were adding much value to society – I mean obviously they are, they are
enhancing wealth, but for who? The wealthiest of the wealthy?
Another individual, a broker (and hedge fund manager and translator and researcher)
explains how he left a job in finance, where he was employed to sell “boring” companies. He
continues,
SC: My heart was not in it. I was so bored I couldn’t give a damn. This wasn’t
changing the world.
Here we see echoes of the general war against waste, one of the dominant themes of
planetary improvement, which as we will come to see, is predicated on the fact that there
must be something to green, clean, or improve in the first place; an industrial landscape made
by dirty industries offering ‘boring’ jobs that is not-yet clean.

Not	
  Wall	
  Street	
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For entrepreneurs, or those within entrepreneurial spaces such as cleantech, making
something new - a business, a service, a technology - matters just as much as making money or so I am told. To the extent that this is true, it is a Schumpeterian attempt to distinguish the
entrepreneur from the rationally profit-maximizing figure of homo economicus, for whom
financial accumulation is a sufficient - the sufficient - goal for entrepreneurial activity (Read
2009). For the cleantech entrepreneurs I met with, financial success was as much, if not more,
a measure of non-financial impact as it was a goal in and of itself. JQ provides a good
example. He was trained as an engineer, after which he ended up the CFO of a market
research company, until one day deciding to leave it all behind:
JQ: I very much wanted to do more entrepreneurial and creative things than
debits and credits - but really I was just looking at a bunch of paper on my
desk one day and I said ‘oh I got to get out of here!’
This means, according to his own definition, that he is not a ‘true’ capitalist:
JQ: If you are a true capitalist you should make all the money that you can and
tell them how to make all the money that they can.
After leaving his market research job, he started his own energy efficiency company,
helping medium sized institutions (such as small colleges) save money and energy, with “low
cost, no cost solutions.” The model is simple: he self-finances modest improvements to the
physical plant, and in return he receives a percentage of the estimated savings from reduced
energy use, for a specified number of years. He loves what he does, and wouldn’t ever
consider returning to his old career. As he explains, “I am less interested in stuff like how to
sell cornflakes.”
JQ continues to explain to me his relationship with money. Everything he does
professionally is aimed at saving money for his clients, and since he shares in these savings,
the more he saves for them the more he earns for himself. And yet, he tells me,
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JQ: I think I am extremely not in it for the money, ironically, except for the
fact that the money is a signal that I'm doing it right… I have to sign an
engagement with them that says I'm going to save them money so ethically I
have to do that but I do think money is a good signal. It gives me a rush
because it means I was successful, not because I'm going to take the money
and go out and spend it.
As JQ understands it, while his creativity is rewarded financially - it is the creativity and
not the money that justifies his pursuits. Money may be the medium and measure of social
wealth, but there still remains a sense that as an entrepreneur he works for more than ‘just’
money. Here the resonance between this newer entrepreneurial spirit of green capitalism and
Weber’s analysis of the Protestant ethic could not be more clear. For Weber, financial
success signaled one’s predestination for salvation. For entrepreneurs such as JQ, financial
success is signal of creative, entrepreneurial and in this case planetary salvation.
As another one of the regularly attending consultants at the Funders Forum explains to
me,
PQ: It's hard for me to think of a case where someone has set out to be an
early-stage cleantech entrepreneur solely because they're driven by the profit
motive. If you're solely driven by the profit motive it seems to me you should
go straight to Wall Street.
Wall street is where you go to make money, entrepreneurship is where you go to
make an impact. Finance - or Wall Street - is one of the ‘boring’ or at least less inspiring, less
impactful industries that cleantech entrepreneurialism is positioned against. Money may be
important for cleantech entrepreneurs, but it is not just about the money. On Wall Street, it is
just about the money.
Cleantech investors also distinguish themselves from the crass profiteering of Wall Street.
They see themselves as ‘impact investors’ - not the sort that self-define as such, but investors
who choose the sectors in which they invest and the projects they fund with intention. More
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than anyone though, it is the entrepreneurs that see themselves in opposition to Wall Street.
As Henry Ford would have said, entrepreneurs are producers, not parasites. CN explains to
me the difference between his community of cleantech founders and peers who work on Wall
Street:
CN: From what I have seen these are guys that don't necessarily love their jobs
but go in there day in day out with their suits on just to make money. I have
been working investment bank hours for years without making investment
banking dollars - because I am more concerned about impact and changing the
world and doing really cool things than having a nice house and a boat. You
hope that eventually there is an overlap between having an impact and
developing new technologies and starting cool companies and capital - but
making a lot of money is not the only driver. It is part of the big picture but it
is not the only thing. Plus I want to enjoy what I do. I never want to get
anxiety on Sunday evenings because I have to go to work on Monday.”
Are they just telling me what I want to hear?
In numerous conversations with entrepreneurs and inventors discussion would often
begin with statements of impactful aspirations beyond ‘just’ making money, only to
eventually descend back into the details of financial and commercial strategies, how to
maximize income, how to avoid dilution as an investor/owner, etc. I found myself on
multiple occasions interjecting:
JG: But I thought you said it wasn’t about the money?
VG: It’s not. It’s not only about the money.
When these sorts of exchanges first occurred I would say to myself “gotcha!” thinking I
had just revealed that my interviewee’s seemingly altruistic commitments were not, in fact, as
important as he or she made them out to be. Only after a fair bit of reflection have I come see
things differently; that I had been reducing these exchanges to something like a hunt for false
consciousness. There is no point in trying to deduce whether impact or personal gain is the
‘true’ or dominant motivator; or whether a stated desire to ‘save the planet’ is simply what
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one is expected to say and not an honest commitment. This misses the point entirely. The key
- and this is what defines the spirit of cleantech - is that these two motivations are mutually
inclusive. One cannot be impactful in the cleantech space without both. One consultant (and
internet radio producer and entrepreneur and entrepreneurial coach) explains:
FJ: The entrepreneur who's just doing a business to make money will never
truly be great. The really great entrepreneurs are the ones that are out to
change the world, to create something beautiful and amazing and tremendous
that has never been seen before. Almost any entrepreneur who is really really
really successful is because they had a dream that they were pursuing, they
were making a gift of the passion - it was not about the money. Not that some
aspects weren't about the money, but the dream wasn't about the money.
JG: Help me understand this. You can't be an entrepreneur and succeed
without at least making some money?
FJ: It is not about that. The thing is the focus is not about making money. The
focus is about doing things the most efficiently, the most effectively, about
changing lives, about creating something new and different… In the process
of doing that you need to be a good business person, which means you need to
keep an eye on the bottom line.”

Not Small
At the time we met, CN’s company was primarily funded by friends and family - one
family member in particular - who had put in half a million dollars. Recently however, they
attracted their first angel - a well known, Boston based investor who put in 50k. Though this
latter investment was only a tenth the size of their familial patron’s stake, this was the money
CN was excited about. This was their first installment of ‘smart money,’ and therefore their
first true market legitimization. CN explained the significance of this investor to me,
CN: He invests in founders that are so passionate about their businesses that
they will do anything to see them through. Cutting-edge technologies,
people that want to make a vast difference on a global scale - major impact.
When we talk to him about revenues of hundreds of thousands he wants to talk
about billions.
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CN and his team are currently scouting Angel List and VC firms, looking to see
where they can get more smart money. He explains, “we need smart money as opposed to
just cash.” We will hear more about smart money in the next section. Smart money comes
from investors with useful relationships, or with experience in the specific field that a new
firm is entering into. Venture capital is, essentially, smart money. When I ask CN what he
thinks it will be like to have a venture investor, he explains,
CN: It is exciting to have the opportunity to grow quickly, but it is a bit - it can
be a bit daunting… having somebody breathing down your neck is certainly
not what any founder wants while running their business. But it is a necessity
to grow. If you don't grow at a certain rate you can get pushed out or you're
not going to have a large company, you’re going to have a lifestyle business.
JG: What's the difference?
CN: A lifestyle business is a couple million dollars of revenues. As a founder
you have a nice salary you have a comfortable life but you don't have systems
that are deployed nationally in buildings from coast-to-coast. [Our angel
investor] was the first to sort of introduce us to that. He said, ‘guys do you
want a lifestyle business or do you want to grow this business into a big
business?’ [My partner] and I could definitely install energy monitoring
systems for the next 10 years and grow a very nice small company and cruise
along - but we want to be monitoring school systems and building portfolios
and public transportation and municipalities…
JG: What is it about the bigness that appeals to you?
CN: [My partner] and I have always had this dream where you could be
making really cool products and manage really big teams and have a profound
impact - and having a profound impact by our definition is to have your
technology touching as many people as possible.
CN’s entrepreneurialism, and his sense of impact, displays a world-making impulse,
expressed within an economy (and culture) that primarily relies upon quantitative measures
of success. The logical progression is quite straight forward: business is impactful, so more
and bigger business means more and bigger impact. The danger, as we will explore in depth
in the next chapter, is that scale can be allowed to substitute for, as opposed to magnify,
qualitative transformation. In other words, simply being big, in whatever capacity, tends to
signify one’s impact, regardless of what specifically that big impact happens to actually be.

232

Not much needs to be added to CN’s definition, though it is interesting to note that his
sentiments run counter to recent scholarship on ‘ecopreneurship’ which points to such
lifestyle considerations as an important dimension of new impact-focused, social or
environmental entrepreneurship (Gibbs 2009; Schaper 2010). While it is true that CN wants
to enjoy what he does (in contrast to his peers on Wall Street, he believes), for him this is
about believing in what he is doing, working for a purpose and a passion - more so than
creating an explicitly comfortable or nurturing workplace environment.
Not	
  a	
  hippie/environmentalist	
  
LD: There is a blindness which the environmentalists on the most part are
such pains in the asses that they are easily dismissed because they are
considered anti-industrialist they are considered anti-progress, they sell shame
and impose their morality on other people, and the reality is it's just a function
of the numbers.
Consider one more interaction: At the May, 2013 Funder’s Forum, I ask the presenting
entrepreneur if he considers his business (software that helps plant managers increase the
efficiency of their operations) to be cleantech. He grimaces:
EN: Saving the world is a noble cause, no one would argue with that. When
speaking with my team I can tell them, “Hey, lets make a difference.”
However when I go to speak with potential clients, I have to put on a different
hat.
JG: You jumped from cleantech to saving the planet. Is that what cleantech is
about?
EN: Oh yes, definitely. But that’s the problem. If you talk too much about
cleantech people will think you’re some sort of out there hippie or something
like that.
JG: Has this ever happened to you?
EN: No, because I don’t use that kind of language.

Impactfulness seems to be a balance of pragmatism and vision. If Wall Street represents
pragmatic money making without vision, hippies and environmentalists represent vision
without pragmatic moneymaking. Anyone that is too passionate about non-commercial goals
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- about world making or about saving the planet - is disparaged as a hippie or an
environmentalist. As one consultant explained to me, there are two types of green - the
treehugger idealist who wants to save the world and the realist who sees a new money
making opportunity - the latter will always win.
MQ, an angel investor who regularly attends the Funders Forum breakfasts,
complains about the heirs of productive fortunes - second and third generation heirs and
heiresses that have moved to places like Vermont, where his son lives. There, he explains,
MQ: There is an organic, open-air market every Saturday, at a parking lot in
town. And there you find the grandchildren of Charles Watson with their
organic farm. All the 2nd and 3rd generations who are in Vermont, paying
incredible taxes, who basically don't work, or all the Rockefeller heirs… They
have given up a life of being productive.
The hippie/environmentalist represents an idealistic commitment to an impactbeyond-capital that is disconnected from impact-as-capital and therefore is interpreted, by
figures just as MQ, as impact-against-capital. Certainly there is truth to this assessment much of the history of modern environmentalism has leveled a categorical critique of
industrial production and mass consumer society. The shift to business environmentalism and
the related production of the entrepreneurial environmentalist is - and this may very well be
where the dynamism of capital’s spirit is derived - both energized and haunted by the traces
of this critique. Something of a dialectic synthesis seems to emerge - what Marx or Hegel
might call aufheben - a synthesis that is at the same time a negation, preservation and
supersession. Accordingly, the cleantech entrepreneur is both a negation of the
hippie/environmentalist and a supersession of this form, realized at a new ‘higher’ level.
This is an ever-present tension that courses through the spirit of cleantech - a tension
that seems to be not fully appreciated in Boltanski and Chiapello’s account of the new spirit
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of capitalism - where capital absorbs critique into a seemingly stable and coherent new
legitimizing discourse. By contrast, I am suggesting that this absorption is unstable,
incomplete, and constantly threatening to come undone. The spirit that emerges is not merely
a legitimization of a new status quo or a new ideology for a new round of capital
accumulation. It is an expression of contradictions inherent to capital as a system, and an
attempt to sublate those contradictory tensions, directing their inconsolable and frenetic
energy into a motivating and directional force - into a very specific form of techno-social
progress as opposed to interference.
The promise that cleantech can and will deliver more than ‘mere’ profits has to be
kept at a distance, simultaneously gestured at and kept at bay. Accomplishing this requires
work; one does not simply embrace an impact-beyond-capital and impact-as-capital without
developing and internalizing a number of strategies for reconciling and redirecting their
inherent and often contradictory tensions. In the next section, I’ll review some of the most
prevalent strategies I found for managing these contradictions.

Interlude:	
  Gaming	
  the	
  System	
  

As mentioned previously - improvement is a discourse of ‘right practice,’ a way to
distinguish morally and socially sanctioned profits from unsanctioned, improper profits.
Contrary to the neoclassical fixation on the pure profit seeking individual – homo economicus
- whose ideological positing has helped fuel and legitimize the regime of financial
improvement that has become neoliberal commonsense, the cleantech spirit is fundamentally
committed to the idea that some profits are better than others. Whether such standards are
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adhered to in practice is another matter entirely - but as a discourse of right-production,
cleantech harkens directly back to those first agricultural improvers, with similarly strong
edicts about how and in what ways agricultural production should be profitably expanded.
The dual admonition of Wall Street and of ‘boring’ industries is testament to these morethan-profit seeking standards. A conversation with one of the Funder’s Forum’s regularly
attending angel investors (who also happens to be an oil prospector and a climate change
skeptic) bears this out. We were discussing the problems inherent in the waste-making
economy, from disposability to pharmaceuticals and the preference in this industry for
maintenance drugs, which insure lifelong patients, as opposed to researching singular
treatments or even cures. Frustrating as this may be, I suggest, it is hard to deny that from a
business standpoint, these are good tactics. MQ disagrees vehemently:
MQ: It isn’t good business. If you can cure somebody that’s a better thing than
simply maintaining them.
JG: According to whose standards?
MQ: My standards. Any human standards.
JG: But its not good business.
MQ: Doesn’t matter. Good business is what eventually does the best for the
world. Theres a moral standard to it. Theres a total moral standard. We don’t
do things that are wrong.
JG: We don’t?
MQ: We do but we shouldn’t. It’s not a model, its not a paradigm. Money
will go there, but gaming the system and getting money is not what we’re on
earth for. Its not a good way to be. And you’re not going to be happy with
yourself, you’re not going to be happy with your family and you’re not going
to happy with others around you.
JG: So is this just about greed?
MQ: You have to earn a living. That’s the other side. And If you don’t have
the ability to go out and create something, you’re going to have to game the
system in some way shape or form.
With that, MQ chuckles. He likes this idea a lot. “I can see this as a doctoral thesis –
gaming the system.”
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MQ, more than anyone else I spoke with, embodies an ecoFordist spirit. Despite the
fact that he is a life-long investor who began his career on Wall Street, he now identifies with
the entrepreneurs that he helps to finance. Accordingly, he is a producer, not a parasite. He is
contributing to the innovation economy, to ‘good business’ as opposed to those just seeking
to make money any way possible.
I didn’t end up taking MQ’s suggestion for the title of my work, but I do want to
highlight the importance of his conclusions. If you’re not capable of producing something
meaningful, but you still need to feed your family, you will instead need to find a way to
game the system. In other words, so long as we are structurally excluded from producing in
meaningful ways, we will have no choice but to ‘game the system’ or to contribute to the
waste-making economy. This is important - it reminds us that our spirit - our desire to be
impactful, our visions of how and in what ways we could potentially improve the human
condition, are far more noble, far more adventurous, far more creative and innovative and
virtuous, then we are given the ability to act upon. And by ‘we’ I do not simply mean me and
you, or any specific set of people - but the more general we - the collectively laboring and
thinking social body currently patterned by capitalist social relationships. These rhythms are
powerful, but they are not all-encompassing. Our spirit - however one wants to make sense of
such a thing - is always exceeding these bounds, remaining creative, innovative, and capable
of producing thinking and transforming a world that capital could never dream of, or survive
within.
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Chapter	
  6:	
  Capital	
  Denial?	
  Managing	
  Contradictions	
  in	
  and	
  of	
  the	
  Cleantech	
  
Project	
  

TW suggested that I speak with his friend OG, a young venture capitalist working in
the cleantech space. A few weeks later, I went to visit with OG at his office. The elevator in
his building deposited me in the reception area of what I would soon discover is workspace
shared by a number of separate firms. There was no receptionist. Unclear what to do - the
room was cluttered with furniture but empty of people - I sat in what most closely resembled
a waiting area… and waited. While sitting there, my imagination began to race. I was still a
bit awestruck by the venture capital mystique; these were, according to their own selfperpetuated popular wisdom, the most powerful figures in the cleantech space - more
important even than the founders, as ultimately, they were the ones that got to choose which
companies were worthy of funding, and which ones were not.
As every venture capitalist will tell you, they receive a veritable avalanche of
proposals from start up companies - an inbox filled, every day, with the hopes, aspirations,
and financial projections of new companies looking - somewhat desperately these days - for
their “A Round” of funding. At networking events, it is always possible to tell who the
venture capitalists are. There is undoubtedly a small gaggle of entrepreneurs, boutique
investment bankers and strategic consultants swarmed around them, pitching them on their
current endeavors; projects they are working with - either directly or as a broker. The venture
capitalists preside over these crowds regally, entertaining their ad hoc retinue, listening to
pitches, accepting and at times exchanging business cards, and exuding that very particular
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form of confidence that accompanies wealth, or at least the temporary control thereof. Its like
watching an empowered consumer, browsing his or her options, nonplussed by the
cacophany of sales pitches, special offers, limited deals, new and improved upgrades, but
certain that in time, and on their terms, a purchase will eventually be made. Consumer
sovereignty of the highest magnitude.
While sitting in OG’s reception area, waiting to be seen, I overheard a conversation in
the adjacent conference room - a group of young men passionately discussing something,
detailing with precision the mechanics of what must have been - I could only imagine - some
innovative new technology that they were deciding whether or not to fund. I strained my ears
to try and listen, to get a glimpse of what they were deliberating upon. As it turns out, one of
them was explaining to the others a complicated drinking game he had played the night
before.
Before long, a well-dressed thirty-something exited the elevator, noticed me sitting
there looking a bit lost and introduced himself. It was OG. He apologized for being late and
took me back to his office, which was - along with most of the venture capital offices I
visited - relatively underwhelming. A mixture of artwork and ephemera hung on his walls:
prints, photographs, and old maps - one of “Hindustan” and another of Greece. As OG would
explain, it was during some of his world travels (and he is not the only person to tell me such
a tale), working on entrepreneurial projects in the developing world, where he first solidified
his commitment to social entrepreneurship, and why he finds himself now working “at the
intersection of impact and business.”
We speak at length about his investments in the clean economy - not cleantech - both
he and TW use this newer term to differentiate themselves from the increasingly maligned
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field of cleantech. Clean economy investments focus upon less capital-intensive projects that
primarily depend on already available infrastructure. That could mean proven technologies
with established production sites, service based projects (including energy efficiency or solar
financing schemes) or software based projects (whose hardware - the computers and servers
that run them - is a well established infrastructural base).
After speaking for a while about his investments, I notice a row of wooden
cubbyholes above his desk. Most held binders and paperwork, but in two of them were
books, stacked about eight high. The far stack was a compilation of the same green capitalism
texts stacked on my own desk – books such as Plan B, Earth the Sequel, Strategies for a
Green Economy. At a pause in our conversation, I try to ask about these books. “Tell me
about the books you have up there.”
OG turns, and when he processes what exactly I’m talking about, he energetically
complies, lifting out of his chair to pull down the books I’ve inquired about. But as it turns
out, he reaches for the other pile of books, and brings them to the desk between us. This is a
pile of management texts, including Eric Ries’s The Lean Startup (2011), Steve Blank’s The
Startup Owner’s Manual (2012) and Not All Those Who Wander are Lost (2010). He tells me
about them, leafing through a few as he looks for specific pages and charts to show me,
excitedly reciting his favorite pearls of wisdom from each. He explains that he tells all the
founders he meets with to read these books. After indulging him for a while, I ask about the
other pile of books, the one further back towards the corner of the office. He turns to see what
I’m talking about. “Oh, those. Those are the big picture books, the inspiration, the books
about opportunity.”
They never make it out of their cubby.
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Maintaining	
  Separations	
  

There is a conundrum in the cleantech space. ‘Big picture’ ideas are important - they
provide the affective force animating cleantech, grounding an unspoken, unsubstantiated
promise of a socially beneficial impact that can be subdivided into incremental parts, discrete
units of impactful action. And yet the big picture itself, these ideas of systemic challenges,
systemic projects, systemic threats, all must be set aside, so as not to interfere with the
impactful work of making an impact.
This setting aside is not something that can be taken for granted - it can be hard work.
OG’s bookshelf, and his compartmentalization of business and inspiration, present a crude
metaphor for this process, which can also be understood as maintaining the separation
between impact-as-capital and impact-beyond capital.
Kari Marie Norgaard’s Living in Denial (2011) deals with a related problem. Norgaard
tries to explain how everyday people in a Norwegian ski town come to manage the
contradictions of their relationship with the impacts of climate change on their world. They
are well educated, aware of climate change and even the ways in which their national wealth
(largely derived from fossil fuel extractions) is implicated in this global process, and yet
somehow they find ways to insulate their everyday lives from this dire reality. Norgaard calls
this a “double reality” clearly expressed by a young teacher she interviewed, who explains,
“We live in one way, and we think in another. We learn to think in parallel. It’s a skill, an art
of living” (5).
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She turns to Zerubavel’s sociology of cognition, which explores the normative aspect of
various cognitive traditions. Zerubavel (2002) argues that both what we see and what we do
not see are equally socially constructed; both become part of a commonsense or naturalized
conception of a shared world. For Norgaard, this is a form of denial - not an absence or lack
of knowledge, but an absence of deeming it necessary or possible to act upon this knowledge.
She demonstrates how climate change denial is socially constructed, and is less about
knowledge deficiencies than the management of painful and uncomfortable ideas - knowing
that one would prefer not to know.
Robert Proctor takes a more institutional approach in calling this process “agnotology,” a
neoligism meant to explain ‘culturally induced ignorance’ produced by specific institutions his prime example being the tobacco industry’s campaign to obfuscate the health risks
associated with smoking (Proctor 2008; Proctor and Schiebinger 2008). Londa Scheibinger
deploys the concept to explain the management and erasure of Afro-Carribean knowledge of
herbal medicine over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries - through seeking to know
‘nature’ European botanists selectively chose which natures to know and what to know about
them. Knowledge of specific plants’ usefulness for women’s health was not prioritized, and
even at times explicitly dismissed (Schiebinger 2004, 2005). As a result, an entire ‘cognitive
community,’ to use Zerubavel’s term, was dismantled.
In the following chapters, we will explore the agnotology of cleantech, or the ways in
which its commercialization process actively contributes to the production of culturally
induced ignorance. While this can be seen as a form of denial, it is not exactly the same as the
climate denial that Norgaard studies. In fact, the cleantech world actively engages with
climate change - or really the joint issues of resource depletion, climate change and
environmental degradation - in their everyday practices. Their shared project - and its
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intended impact - is expressly defined in response to, as opposed to denial of, climate change
and the need for global transformations.
That said, many of the subtle cultural norms and strategies of denial that Norgaard
identifies do emerge in the cleantech space, only here it may be better to understand them less
as a matter of outright denial than an active, intentional form of management. Perhaps this is
a result of a shift in focus - Norgaard’s exploration of the sociology of emotions and affect
centers on the management of negative feelings - helplessness, fear, loss - whereas I am
focusing on the construction of positive emotional categories and justifications for action, the
primary one being impact. This is a rationalization for action, as opposed to inaction. The two
are clearly related, perhaps even two sides of the same coin. Norgaard’s work explores what
Lefebvre (2008) would call the inherently conservative tendencies of everyday life - holding
on - whereas I’m exploring the innovation aspirations of commercial activity - making new.
Within the cleantech space, one specific cognitive (and economic) community, issues of
climate change and environmental action are refracted through the desire to make an impact,
which can be, as explained in the prior chapter, a contradictory project of making an impactas-capital and an impact-beyond-capital. For cleantech entrepreneurs, operating within their
professional milieu, environmental contradictions are not managed primarily through apathy
and denial, but through the careful maintenance of separations; separations that can suture
seemingly incompatible actions, beliefs and projects into a singularly cohesive justificatory
frame.
To make sense of this process, I’ve identified four distinct - though clearly interrelated strategies by which a simple binary is used to identify, embrace and then disengage from
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impact-beyond-capital, so as not to interfere with one’s financial or commercial objectives or impact-as-capital. These are:

1. Private vs professional
2. Thinking vs doing
3. Concrete vs abstract
4. Now vs later

The first of these four is inward looking. It has to do with maintaining a positive
conception of the self, or what Goffman (2005) would call ‘saving face.’ The next three are
outward looking. These strategies are about maintaining a positive conception of cleantech as
a project worth identifying with.
In many ways, you can think of these separations as two ends of a battery, anode and
cathode; keeping them separate maintains the battery’s charge. This may be an apt metaphor
for capital, or in this case cleantech, and its spirit. On the one side is a strong market focus,
on the other an equally strong focus on clean or green visions of a better world; capital and
spirit, respectively. While it would be easy to fall into a base-superstructure model in which
the latter inflects or ‘colors’ the former, what I propose instead is that economic dynamism
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(broadly construed37) actually resides somewhere in between, in and through the
irreconcilable tensions and contradictions between these poles. In fact, it may be that the
maintenance of this difference is actually what propels capital forward, making it just as
essential to capitalism’s expanded reproduction as the equally intractable tension between
wage labor and capital. As we will see in the next chapter, these two tensions may be more
closely related than one might initially presume.
Personal	
  vs	
  professional	
  

PC: Now I think things are trending, things trend, so there are many ways to
be green. I don't know what the definition of being green is but I pick up every
piece of garbage I see on the ground, that’s a green trend, that is what I do to
be conscientious.

Question: Is cleantech clean?
Answer: We recycle!
(At least at home we do.)
Is cleantech clean? During interviews I would ask my participants whether, at a macro
scale, the cleantech project represents a positive environmental benefit. This question, in the
numerous iterations it took, turned out to be a very productive failure. Initial responses were

37

To be clear - and this is of the utmost importance - ‘economic dynamism’ is not meant
here in a narrow sense as a common justification for capitalism, but more broadly as that
dynamism which is made possible through collective, or more-than-individual, production,
consumption, and distribution of the means of life and liveliness. In fact, one of the primary
goals of this project is to denaturalize the relationships between capital and economy between the one specific way in which economic intercourse is structured in our society, and
the benefits of ‘economy’ more broadly construed.
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often confused at the seeming tautology of my query - as if I had just asked whether blue was
blue. On a few occasions the response was hostile, dismissive and somewhat patronizing: PC
tells me that I make no sense asking such questions, and that in fact doing so threatens my
credibility. LD accused me of sounding like a communist.
Others took a much less aggressive tack, simply reinterpreting the question to a scale that
makes sense to them - individual consumer choice. Many of the people I spoke with readily
found solutions in their everyday lives outside of the workplace, and saw this as a first,
unquestionable step towards meaningful environmental and cultural transformation. We all
must do what we can. FG offers a paradigmatic example:
I’m certainly worried about [climate change] – I am certainly worried about it
for my kids future, my kid’s kids future… I don’t know who at the end of the
day who I believe or what I believe, all I know is that it seems to me that a lot
of the things that we’re doing are not helpful or good for the environment.
Moving forward would I like to change that? Absolutely! And If I have an
opportunity to do something even myself to change that – absolutely I would.
Recycling is a good example… I was one of the 1st ones in my neighborhood
to say this is a great idea. Absolutely, I’m going to recycle anything and
everything I possibly can.

Personal responsibility in the consumer marketplace is a ubiquitous form of agnotology,
with distinct historical and institutional roots (Clapp 2002; Gould et al 2008; Johnston 2008;
Melosi 2005; Rogers 2006). In this case, the ‘ignorance’ being produced is of the relative
magnitude of producer waste streams relative to the consumer wastes that are being mitigated
at an individual scale, as well as a history of alternatives that must be rendered unfeasible,
irrational, or simply anathema to our cherished way of life. The history of beverage
provisioning offers a central example. While the story is somewhat lengthy and complex, a
summary should suffice: After WW2, bottlers of beer and soft drinks had a distinct economic
interest to transition away from refillable glass bottles. The war effort had conscripted them
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into producing a huge amount of one-way (a.k.a disposable) aluminum containers to send to
soldiers overseas, and once the war was over, a surplus of aluminum dropped the material’s
price to historic lows. Further, refillable glass containers required a labor-intensive process of
collection, cleansing and re-bottling, and privileged local, small and medium scale producers,
as opposed to the biggest firms which had produced large centralized plants to serve the war
effort (Fenner and Gorin 1976).
As disposable containers flooded into the domestic consumer market (bolstered by the
newly developed consumer tastes of soldiers returning from war), beverage containers
became one of the main, and most visible forms of post-consumer litter. This made them a
prime target for environmentalists in the 60s and 70s; though inefficient in labor terms,
refillable bottles were much more efficient in material and energetic terms. Also, since the
empty refillable bottles were valuable - due to their deposit - they were not so readily
discarded in public spaces. Environmentalists pushed through successful legislation in
numerous states and localities. Called bottle bills, these new laws forced beverage makers to
put a deposit on all beverage containers - including disposable ones - in the hope that this
would shift the industry back towards refillables (Fenner and Gorin 1976; Rogers 2006).
In response, the beverage industry launched a huge lobbying campaign to defeat these
local laws. Through the industry front group Keep America Beautiful, they also launched a
huge national campaign to divert attention away from the issues of inefficient production,
focussing instead on improper consumption - introducing the “Litterbug” to the American
public. The problem was not with disposable containers, they explained, but with
irresponsible consumers, not doing their part to dispose of these containers properly. In the
60s and 70s this meant putting them in the trash bin, but as recycling became an increasingly
viable alternative, this became the ‘proper’ means of disposal - and remains to this day an
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‘appropriate’ progressive environmental response to disposable products (Pellow et al 2000;
Rampton and Stauber 1995; Rogers 2006). With recycling presented as the ‘solution’ to
consumer waste, the beverage industry’s agnotology is all but complete, and questioning
whether we should turn back towards re-usable containers is practically inconceivable. Or as
Zerubavel would write, this is one of the omissions that defines our ‘cognitive community.’
And so, I shouldn’t have been surprised when respondents responded to my question
about the cleanliness of cleantech by explaining their own personal commitments to
environmental stewardship: we recycle. Two respondents even asked me if I remembered the
memorable Keep America Beautiful commercial, in which a ‘Native American’ (the man was
actually Hispanic) cries for his homeland, distraught at the litter that has not been properly
thrown away.
Throughout my fieldwork, there was a clear sense that personal environmental
commitments had to remain separate from the realities of professional responsibilities. After
speaking at length with one respondent about the need for a carbon tax, the unsustainability
of corporate industrialism, and other related themes, he tells me,
RG: Oh yeah I love that stuff. I’m like very, I have my ideals. But when I’m
working - I try to be very conservative and skeptical. But I have my own
ideals.

Thinking vs Doing
PV: If you make the conversation take so long that you can't get back to okay
how are you going to make money on this then the conversation tends to get
sidelined because people they have to pick up their phone, they have to get
something off to a customer, they have to be available and if it takes them 3
hours to have a conversation about this, they don’t get the point - so maybe
that’s one piece of what has to get sorted through - how to even have that
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conversation in a concise way – I think that would be beneficial. Well good
luck, I'm going to have to go I have a phone call…

In general, recognition of the importance of ‘big picture’ ideas was paired with
frustration at how such ideas can hinder action. The big picture is important - but not when it
distracts from the immediate goal of commercial and financial impact.
Here I want to more formally introduce PC. When I first met PC, he came to the
Funder’s Forum as a sector expert, slated to comment on a waste-to-energy project being
pitched that month. At the time, he worked for a large waste management firm, in their
environmental division. PC attended four breakfasts in early 2012, then disappeared for a
year. He re-emerged in 2013. Re-introducing himself to familiar faces after his hiatus, he
would say, “You might remember me as the waste guy.” Now, he explained, he was in
business for himself as a strategic consultant, ready and willing to help cleantech startups
succeed.
PC was the only interview I conducted on my own turf. Instead of sitting in a small
office, finding a table in one of the many nooks and crannies of Grand Central Station, or
ducking into one of midtown’s countless (and remarkably generic) coffee-deli-sandwich
shops, PC wanted to come to my hood. He said, “take me to your favorite place. I want to
learn about a new part of the city.” So we met in the Gowanus neighborhood of Brooklyn, for
coffee and pie, nearby the Interference Archive.
PC is a salesman by nature. He cut his teeth in the portable toilet business before moving
into grease hauling and now, strategic consulting (though when we met for pie, he was still in
the grease business). During our conversation, he offered me a variation on the seventh
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generation principle, which he turns from a tale of precautionary patience and responsible
usufruct into a legitimization of slowly working through the status quo.
PC: If you ever step back and look at things in time - part of our perspective,
part of what we have to accept has to come from a sense of, ‘hey we’re not
there yet we might not be there in my lifetime we might be there in your kids’
lifetime.’ We have to have that conversation as well because when we do it
relieves the pressure of having to force the issue on something. You never get
a square peg in a round hole. Try and push it and you break apart the whole,
and now you're talking about pain and agony and blood - but it has nothing to
do with pain and agony and blood, it has to do with being stupid and with
pushing.

There is no reason to push violently towards big picture visions of transformation; PC
tells me that we need to take things one step at a time. That said, PC and I both know that
capital has little patience, and so I ask him where this capacity for patient, long term thinking
is going to come from.
PC: I think on this topic we need to create a think tank - maybe its already out
there - but something like that.

For PC, the think tank was his deus ex machina, a space outside of the market where
long-term thinking can be nurtured and developed. Yet as he elaborates, I came to realize that
the ‘think tank’ is not a savior, nor is it a place or institution that PC is all that interested in.
For him, the think tank is somewhat akin to the large grease tanks his fleet hauls around the
metro region, a receptacle for unwanted, waste-thought, a sanitary disposal of long-term
thinking. The think tank was the ‘away’ to which we send useless ideas, ideas that won’t
facilitate money-making right now. I try to push him to explain his environmental
perspective, as well as his understanding of the relationship between capitalism and the
environment. He continues,
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PC: I have not spent any time at all thinking about these things, sitting back
and thinking what is the meaning of the environment - I believe it is
meaningful and I'm trying to work on bringing some of that meaning to life in
what I do every day. I probably don't have the talent or the patience to actually
worry about it. It's very wonderful for an educational thing but for a business
guy that is doing a thousand things, they don't ever resonate with that stuff,
that's for the think tank people.

PC doesn’t want to talk about nature or the environment, he only wants to talk about what
he’s doing. He exudes a strong “boots on the ground” sensibility - where doing something,
anything, is much better than just sitting back and pontificating about everything. I ask him
where ‘green’ exists within his waste hauling business. He explains,
PC: It only exists where we can make money. That is number 1. We are a
profit driven entity. We don't care‚ we are not doing this to be green, we are
looking for green things that make us money.
*

*

*

If PC represents a ‘boots on the ground’ mentality, then JQ, an entrepreneur who runs his
own one-man energy savings company (ESCO) that does energy efficiency retrofits for small
institutions, might be considered “wires in the truck.” As he explains to me (over a very nice
dinner on a balcony overlooking the main terminal at Grand Central Station):
JQ: My biggest concern is that people are absolutely correct when they say
let's cut carbon with use of renewable energy… They say that a lot, they’ve
got a lot of meetings. Okay good - but no one's doing it! Go outside the next
big conference that we have about being green, and open everybody's trunk
when they drive in. I tell you right now if we don't see a bunch of thermostats
and motors and wiring things and stuff in there... [JQ’s] truck is the thing: he's
got a ladder in there, cables, a couple of motors that he is investigating,
fractional horsepower VFD’s, pulleys, wrenches, that is what he has. He gets
to go in. If I open your trunk and I see a bunch of flyers that say ‘get green!’
were going to turn you around and tell you to go back and do something. The
word is do. D-O. I think that the people preaching it just preach louder and
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louder hoping that if you preach louder it will happen. Now Amory Lovins I
think he really does stuff. He raises awareness. So he did it, and its raised and not everybody should only put in thermostats - but I think the ratios are
wrong.

JQ labels these sorts of people do-gooders, and sees them as often more harm than good.
They focus on “prayer and motivation” and at best accomplish a cathartic clearing out of
tensions that can actually encourage people to rest content with the status quo. JQ is different,
JQ: I like to feel uncomfortable when something is wrong in the sense if I
have appendicitis I don't want to take an aspirin - let it hurt worse - and I think
some of his do-gooder stuff is dispensing Prozac to the people… Green is a
siren like it was for Ulysses, that draws people away from the target. Think
about that. You can't argue with it.

Low	
  Hanging	
  Fruit	
  

Talking about big picture ideas like climate change and the environment are not good for
business. PC cautions, “You lose me, you lose most of your audience.” As PC explains,
capturing the ‘low hanging fruit’ now is better than going for the harder to reach prizes
sometime in the future. The fruit metaphor is important. Think about a fruit tree - there is not
much qualitative difference between the fruit growing near the top or the bottom of a tree – it
is all relatively the same. Likewise with the pragmatic expediency of a boots on the ground
mentality, which presumes that all changes are ultimately incremental changes, and all
incremental changes are relatively interchangeable, like a currency one can accumulate. We
might even say that this speaks to a more general commodification of problems, breaking
them up into consumable, interchangeable parts, so that commodity production can step in as
a viable – even preferred – solution.
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The work done by do-gooders, the work done in the think tanks, it is all pontification and
no impact. As far as PC and JQ are concerned, it is completely divorced from the day to day
realities of getting things done. PC and JQ both spent hours speaking to me for this research by far the two longest interviews I conducted. Their generosity and passion are
unquestionable - and their critique, though subtle, is hard to miss. With our pie long finished,
our coffee mugs empty and the bill already paid, PC asks me, frankly:
PC: Look, we all know that once you get done with your research you’ll come
to the same conclusion: we have to do something tomorrow. So what's the
purpose?”
It is a question that we need to hold on to, and look at more directly in the concluding
chapter.

Abstract	
  vs	
  Concrete	
  

While for some, the big picture was relegated to the space of personal ideals or
professional pontificators, for others it is dismissed as too abstract. This relates directly to the
boots on the ground ethos presented above. PC’s critique of think tanks and JQ’s critique of
do-gooders are both very much critiques of abstract thought displacing concrete action. This
separation therefore builds off of the last.
Over the past few decades there has been a defunding of impact science (which measures
global effects of industrial production) in favor of production science (which explores
potential innovations to contribute to industrial production) (Gould 2012; McCright and
Dunlap 2010; Schnaiberg 1980). What became clear through my research is that not only is
the former defunded, but it is also delegitimized, accused of producing only ‘abstract’
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knowledge, as opposed to the concrete innovations that production science generates, and
that cleantech entrepreneurs try to commercialize.
In most of the cleantech spaces I spent time in, directly addressing climate change science
in anything more than a cursory way was considered to be out of line. There are a number of
possible explanations for this collectively endorsed silence. Norgaard describes a form of
denial based on scalar distancing. Climate change is seen as a planetary and national issue, as
opposed to something that can or should be proactively engaged with at a local level. As
such, climate change is understood to be out of place in most discussions of local politics and
action, bolstering an important form of socially produced denial. However, the aversion to
speaking about climate change in the cleantech space cannot simply be due to an aversion to
large-scale concerns. In fact, as we’ve seen, cleantech entrepreneurs embrace the possibility
of operating at the largest scales possible.
Jon Krosnic et al. (2006) observe that people cease to focus on climate change once they
realize that no easy solutions are available. Similarly, John Immerwahr has observed that
people have difficulty discussing climate change because it appears to them as a problem
without any real, or tangible solutions (Norgaard 2011; Immerwahr 1999). These
observations may be important - the ‘abstract’ quality of climate change is likely related to a
percieved lack of discrete, actionable solutions. As such environmental concerns were
considered too abstract to be meaningful for everyday cleantech business practices or the
immediate commercial needs, goals and strategies of whatever entrepreneurial project might
be under discussion. As PC would tell us, abstractions are to be pontificated about in think
tanks and other such distant places, while the business world focuses on concrete actions.
And so, climate change was, just as in Norgaard’s experience, a conversation non-starter, not
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because it represented an issue that was too big, but because it represented an issue that was
too abstract.
Similarly, Susan Opotow and Leah Weiss (2000) describe a form of denial in which
individuals displace any sense of individual or local responsibility for environmental
conditions onto “higher authorities or legitimate decision makers” (Norgaard 2011). Or as
Nina Eliasoph (1998) concludes, mass media outlets such as the local news “made it seem
that politics happens elsewhere” (Norgaard 2011: 55).
This runs parallel to what Swyngedouw and others have identified as a post-political
tendency within modern environmental consciousness (Mouffe 2005; Swyngedouw 2007,
2010; Zizek 1999). For Swyngedouw, one of the key dimensions of the post-political is a
sense that certain problems are best left to technocrats, experts, and elected officials - that
instead of engaging directly with the politics of climate change, it is better to ‘let the leaders
lead’. What is lost, Swyngedouw argues, is the “properly political” a space in which agonistic
debates allow individuals in their everyday lives to engage in matters of political importance,
matters that should not simply be left to experts and politicians at some distant, larger scale of
action and decision making.
Similarly, Norgaard, pace Eliasoph, turns to Hannah Arendt to describe this properly
political practice, in which “power springs up between men” simply through acting, thinking
and talking together (Norgaard: 53, Arendt 1965). Through such civic engagement, the
powerless are able to actively create the ‘public’ with which public officials relate, opening
up topics and concerns for public questioning that might otherwise be normalized, hidden by
a hegemonic common sense of what is naturalized as the way things are (Eliasoph 1998).
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This naturalized worldview or ontology, provides the context within which problems can
be identified and answers, or solutions proposed. It creates a cognitive space in which
conversation - and therefore imagination - is bound, a concrete ground of actually possible
discussions about actually possible efforts to make an impact.
The clefting off of abstraction manifests in a rather clever form of climate pragmatism,
where the effects of climate change can be acknowledged while the process itself can remain
under question. A somewhat confusing example of this separation came during an interview
with KD, the director of climate change advising at a major financial institution. Considering
his job title and institutional affiliation, I asked KD how climate change was affecting the
investment strategies at his institution. His response was abrupt; as if he had to keep the
conversation from developing in ways he did not find interesting.
KD: First, take climate change off the table, because there is no such thing as
climate change. Whether such a thing as climate change does or doesn’t exist
maybe, but there is no such thing as climate change.

Seeing I was a bit confused, he continued on, explaining that the problem with an idea
like climate change is that is too vague and too abstract - it does not map to any specific
measurable variables that can be integrated into quantitative calculations of investment risk.38
Precipitation patterns, severe storms and other discrete weather events are worth discussing,
as well as the status of specific resources: soil, phosphorous, etc., but not climate change.
Climate change is just an umbrella category, too general to be meaningful to the investors
that he advises. Its effects are real, concrete and measurable, whereas climate change is

38

While this may be true for BK, reinsurance firms think otherwise, and are beginning to
adjust their actuarial models accordingly (Kenreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2007).
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abstract, general, and unpredictable. Climate change only becomes legible by first being
broken down into specific variables with direct economic implications. In other words, if his
team can’t operationalize a climatological effect by inserting it into their risk-assessment
algorithms, then it is too abstract to be meaningful.
Climate change or other large scale environmental issues rarely emerge during the
Funders Forum meetings. Even the most liberal and progressive participants adhere to this
unwritten rule. This is not an arbitrary omission. It is a pragmatic attempt to avoid any points
of contention that might disrupt the otherwise collaborative business environment. PL
explains his working relationship with a conservative Texas investor who also happens to be
a ‘climate skeptic,’
PL: We agree on energy security, we agree on energy efficiency, and we don’t
agree on anything else – but at least we can talk.
Throughout the cleantech space, there is a very sophisticated, well-rehearsed middle line
that is towed around climate change. As it was explained to me by numerous research
participants: there is a lot of inconclusive scientific evidence about the anthropogenic origins
of climate change, and a lot of conclusive evidence that the climate is changing. Nothing bad
could come of reducing our ecological footprint - if you don’t believe that anthropogenic
climate change is a threat, you likely do still believe that reliance upon Middle Eastern oil is a
threat, so as one of the venture capitalists I spoke with explains, either way cleantech is
important. As one venture capitalist explains, it is
DS: a good thing for the Earth or a good thing for America depending on how
you view that prior conversation.
The success of cleantech is often attributed to the way in which it can appeal to
arguments for both energy security and environmental security. If the latter is too abstract (or
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the science too inconclusive) the former is somehow far less abstract, and a much more
concrete problem to address. Consider the implications of this logic: Potential terrorists are
real, and lurking everywhere. Potential glacial melt, potential offshore oil-rig blowouts,
potential droughts, desertification, methane off-gassing of Siberian permafrost, ocean
acidification, these are all, somehow, too abstract. Perhaps because there is no singular
character - like the Islamic terrorist - to villify and no general populations - potential terrorists
- to rally against?

Now	
  vs	
  later	
  

LB: I feel like I am small-scale optimistic and grand-scale pessimistic.

As Melinda Cooper (2010) explains in her critique of scenario planning, all arguments
predicated upon imagining transformed futures, or ‘other possible worlds’ are contingent on a
fair amount of presuppositions about what can and cannot change between now and later. In
other words, in this cognitive space, not all big ideas are created equally. While it is
eminently possible for cleantech boosters to imagine some relatively unproven technology
transforming our global techno-social landscape, it is almost impossible for these same
individuals to imagine a relatively unproven social or political transformation having a
similar effect. Hence the power source of automobiles can change, but not the predominance
of the automobile. The process of monitoring energy consumption can change, but not the
unsustainable scale of energy consumption itself. There is an American way of life demanded by consumers-like-us, the sovereigns of the market economy, that is
unquestionable and immutable. Visions of a fundamentally transformed future are concrete
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so long as the fundamentals of consumer society remain unaltered. Otherwise, they are lofty
idealisms, too abstract, or as we will now explore, simply ‘ahead of their time.’
As we’ve already explored, the green capitalism literature is focused far into the
future, concerned with large-scale changes that can and must occur if we are to avoid
devastating, irreversible, and largely unlivable climatologic transformations. The cleantech
sector, on the other hand, is focused on the accelerated timelines of venture funding, on rapid
commercialization of marginal improvements over the status quo, on realizing sufficient
returns to appeal to investors – both those already involved, and those waiting in the wings.
MX, a cleantech investor-turned-academic tried to explain to me the difference between
green capitalism texts and the cleantech market. The former gazes into an idealized future he
says, whereas the latter focus more narrowly on present market possibilities. As far as MX is
concerned, this does not make the two incompatible, it merely represents a “shift in focal
length.” Both, he argues, aim in the same direction, share the same goals and the same
visions, only they approach these things from very different perspectives. The one is focused
on present day market opportunities, immediate and rapid ROI, generous and expedited IRR,
while the other is looking further out, at the possible implications of all this enterprise, as it
somehow aggregates into a greener, cleaner economy. And so, as a result of trying to remain
‘realistic’ within the current investment paradigms, radical ambitions for systemic
transformation are envisioned as incremental changes to the status quo, that ‘low hanging
fruit’ that is expected to accumulate piecemeal until we arrive at a truly transformational end
point, some time in the unspecified future.
Norgaard argues that the characterization of climate change as too abstract of an issue
“reflects a disjuncture between the local sense of time and place… and the sense of time and
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place that would be needed to conceptualize climate change for it to seem “real”” (76). In
Norgaard’s research there is a decided focus on the local as a means of distancing everyday
public discourses from issues such as climate change, which are cast as global - best
approached from a national standpoint. In the cleantech space - and for that matter in the
culture of free market capitalism - this is more a temporal than spatial proximity: shorttermism, immediate market opportunities, and quick returns on investments are the decided
focus, distancing any concerns that may only register in longer term time horizons, such as
climate change.
While Norgaard consistently suggests that her analysis will incorporate political
economy, it remains somewhat unclear what this means for her - beyond the recognition that
Norway is a leading exporter of petroleum products and therefore the wealth and privileges
enjoyed in everyday Norwegian life are a directly result of this climate changing industry.
While this is clearly important, there is another political economy - an everyday political
economy - that may also need to be considered; a culture of capitalism in which market
logics become normalized and dispersed throughout everyday life. Hence, a focus on the
local and on problems for which solutions are readily apparent can be demonstrated by
ethnographic and social psychological research, but then if we want to explain or at least
postulate how and why these affective responses come to be, we may need to look at the
ways in which market logic exerts its own force on surrounding cultures.
The logic of the market privileges short-term gains and immediate profits, The result is a
culture of short term thinking: local thinking about local problems with local solutions,
because these are the sorts of directly actionable issues that market actors can target. This is,
in many ways, an extension of the neoclassical vision of entrepreneurialism - which
translates, as Foucault (2010) contends - into a culture of self-improvement and by extension,
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local improvements; demonstrating that we are making a difference, that our boots are firmly
on the ground. This is not to suggest that there is anything wrong with local actions - not
inherently - but to name them for what they are, and what they are not (Gould et al. 1996;
Sharzer 2012). By contrast, a Schumpeterian entrepreneur might be willing to engage with
the abstract, with the less known, the less immediatley answerable or fixable - the solutions
that are more abstract, (seemingly) more temporally distant - those big ideas which might
otherwise be ‘too far into the future’ or ‘ahead of their time.’
The logic of the market creates a very distinct spatio-temporal reality, one in which a
perpetual present extends indefinitely into the future, improved but never surmounted. The
past reveals a narrative of capital’s emergence and the future portends a process of capital’s
perfection. This is the spatio-temporality implied by MX’s comments, that the gap between
visions of grand transformations and incremental gains are simply a matter of focal length.
Conceptualizing future-possibilities in this way is an attempt to refract all visions into the
space-time of the perpetual present, one whose improvement can lead to any possible future.
Hence it is the hegemonic control of the present over the future (and the past). This is another
way to describe modernist conceptions of progress, including those presumed by ecological
modernization theorists, for whom the gradual emergence of an environmental sphere (which
will come to define an ecological modernity) emerges out of the steady progression of
ecologically minded financiers, entrepreneurs and inventors who will together bring forth a
new green industrial revolution – in almost complete parallel with the motif of planetary
improvement discussed in Section One (Spaargaren and Mol 1992)39. The past is one long
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In fact, though it is not the focus of this present work, there are interesting parallels
between the “commercialization thesis” that Ellen Wood (2002) critiques, in which the rise of
capitalism can be explained by the unfettered of a latent capitalist population from the bonds
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progression to the present, and the future is simply the intensification and further elaboration
of this present; endlessly improved, but never undone.
Foundational economic and cultural tenets of the present can never be radically
transformed, only improved. Hence, even the most revolutionary future-scenarios can be
safely regarded as possible outcomes of present activities and relationships that we are simply
“not ready for” or that are “ahead of their time.” There is no sense, as Norgaard suggests, that
what we may actually need is a qualitatively different time, one that is no longer beholden to
the short term market logic that envisions all actionable problems as local and all possible
solutions as incremental. A time that allows, as Walter Benjamin (1969) wrote, for us to take
“a tiger’s leap into the future.”
This is a subtle imposition of a short-term market logic upon the potentially
transformative imaginary - and attendant techno-social possibilities - that promise to radically
transform our world. It is the hegemony of a currently existing way of life and market logic the bedrock of our normalcy - which persists in and through green capitalist pursuits of
newer, better, cleaner futures.

Conclusion:	
  Planetary	
  Improvement	
  

of the feudal economy – a typical bourgeois revolution. For the ecological modernization
theorists, it is an environmental sensibility – or nature – that is similarly unbound and
allowed to flourish, as if it were a latent force, simply waiting to be released. In either case,
improvement through expanded capitalist development (or for Mol and Spaargaren (1992)
“superindustrialization”) is seen as a progressive, modernizing (and greening) force, inherent
to the already existing social formation.
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By way of conclusion, I want to pull these strategies together and begin to tease out a
worldview or ontology, a sense of what is good, what is right, and what is possible, that is
emerging as the spirit of this cleantech project.
A	
  world	
  that	
  is	
  not-‐yet	
  clean	
  

Occasionally, these contrasting focal lengths would make their way into a presentation
at the Funders’ Forum. For instance, at one of the meetings an entrepreneur representing an
energy storage technology presented a slide that begins with the headline, “The world needs
better batteries,” and then illustrates three reasons why: “To be truly mobile, to transform
transportation, to improve the environment.” In this case, the battery technology being
presented targeted the consumer durables market - cell phones and other high tech gadgets.
As Jevons might predict, their aim was not to make batteries smaller, but to provide these
devices with greater capacity per charge. Hence, their clean technology is meant to
supercharge the waste-making economy that was, we saw earlier, the very antithesis of
cleantech and the promises it affords.
Here, we can see the subtle, unspoken function that these aspirational visions play within
a pitch for this sort of new technology. This longest focal length, which essentially promises
to “improve the planet,” has no bearing on the actual business case being made, it simply
performs a legitimizing role, providing moral and environmental certitude that whatever the
specific business proposition on the table entails, that it is ultimately oriented towards this
larger, shared vision of planetary salvation. This is the promise, or even what Lacan (2006)
referred to as ‘objet petit a,’ that makes cleantech clean, and therefore worth pursuing.
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It wasn’t until very late in my research that I began to realize the full extent to which this
promise exerts its force. It is not just that cleantech is legitimized by this sort of promise. In a
more broad context, cleantech itself serves as a promise, a sense that all technologies, all
industries, all techno-social processes can and should ‘go clean.’ Cleantech promises that
technological fixes are possible, and can begin to chip away at a solution to the planetary
ecological problems that we face. This only became clear me towards the very end of my
fieldwork, at a cocktail party where I met PH.
PH had worked his whole life on Wall Street, until being made redundant a few years
ago. Since then he’s been taking care of his young children, and is only now starting to get
back to work, by starting a boutique investment fund focused on the energy sector. This was
his first foray into the energy sector, he tells me. It is a shift motivated by his
environmentalism, even though, as he sheepishly explains, he is currently investing primarily
in dirty energy, “It’s just the reality of how things work.” I ask him if this includes any
fracking companies. He tells me, “I’m embarrassed to say that I am. I’m not proud of it, but
I’m invested in fossil fuels.”
We keep talking. I tell him about my research, which he latches onto – fascinated, and
also clearly excited to change the subject. He asks me whether I’ve come across anything
promising in the cleantech space. Sure, there are some great projects, I tell him about a few of
my favorites. I ask him whether he sees a path back into his environmentalism with what he’s
currently doing. He offers a sheepish shrug of the shoulders, “I hope so.”
How is it that someone can become a self-proclaimed ‘dirty energy’ investor, and still
tell me that he got into the field because of his environmentalism? PH explains further:
apparently, the promise of cleantech and specifically the possibility of producing meaningful
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quantities of clean energy translates into the possibility – if not the probability – that one day
soon, companies like Exxon Mobil – the ‘dirty’ companies that he invests in - will be
renewable energy companies.
It may not be enough to allay all of his ethical concerns, but one can start to see the
connections that are being made. Cleantech is not merely a sub-sector of the broader energy
economy – it also operates more generally as a field of force, a sanitizing agent for the
entirety of the energy production field. All energy producers can potentially become clean
energy producers. Even the most ‘dirty’ of energy investments are, according to this logic,
not-yet clean. And in fact, a number of clean technologies actually aim to clean up fossil fuel
production – capturing wasted (flared) natural gas on drilling rigs for instance, or fuel
additives that enable oil furnaces to burn cleaner and more efficiently. As Joseph Lacob, a
partner in the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins, explained in a 2007 New York Times
article, ''If we can improve the efficiencies of the oil and gas exploration, in some ways that's
a green message as well” (Richtel 2007).
There is a transitive property to cleantech’s impact. Something does not have to be clean
itself to be available to become cleaner. So long as something is potentially or not-yet clean,
then there is still hope, still the possibility of making an impact. One entrepreneur-inventor
tells me of his cleantech project that aims to improve the waste-to-energy capacity of off
shore oil rigs. Another entrepreneur, presenting at the Funder’s Forum, introduces us to a
technology that captures low temperature waste heat from industrial production sites,
converting it into electricity. In their presentation, they show a slide with a huge plume of
white steam coming out of an industrial facility’s exhaust pipe - representing the wasted heat
they will turn into energy. With a press of the clicker, dollar signs fill the image, overlaid on
top of the exhaust, and the presenter explains that their technology is “100% green.” It is only
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possible to see this device as “100% green” if we take the waste heat being targeted as a
commodity, totally divorced from its connection to a larger process of production and
consumption (and a larger ecology) to which is connected to. In this way, cleantech never has
to question the extent to which their technological solutions are green additions to not-thatgreen processes of industrial production and mass consumption. To avoid damning
connections such as these, industrial processes are separated into their component parts, so
that one single dimension of a total process can be targeted for ‘greening’ or ‘cleaning.’ In
other words, the smoke stacks on the slides represent an isolated problem that can be handled
in more or less clean ways, regardless of the cleanliness or lack thereof of the industrial
facility that this smokestack is connected to.
This transitivity is born out of a modernist worldview in which parts have replaced
the whole and the arrow of time pushes our perpetual present into the marginally improved
future. As a result, this transitivity only goes in one direction: dirty things are potentially
clean, but clean things are never potentially dirty. Household electricity consumption can be
cleansed with the introduction of a solar panel, but solar panels are never ‘dirtied’ by their
deployment in the waste-making economy of consumer excess.
This transitivity provides a clear example of cleantech’s embrace of planetary
improvement. The whole industrial world, in this case the energy sector - is not-yet (but
potentially) clean. Here we can return to the battery metaphor, proposed at the beginning of
this chapter. The separations between now and later, doing and thinking, concrete and
abstract, personal and professional are not static or complete. There is a potential that pulses
between and through these poles, a ‘not-yet’ that represents possibilities for entrepreneurial
innovation, a ‘not-yet’ that affords us all - together, individually - an opportunity to impact
the world.
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The	
  persistence	
  of	
  waste,	
  and	
  the	
  perpetual	
  present	
  

What follows from this conception of a world that is not-yet clean is an unfortunate and
unacknowledged dependency that runs to the core of the cleantech project. In order to make
clean technologies profitable, there must be a dirty world, forever in need of cleansing. In
other words, cleantech actually depends upon the persistence of a waste-producing,
environmentally devastating industrial economy that provides so many pieces of ‘low
hanging fruit’ to incrementally tackle. This means that the reproduction of cleantech requires
the reproduction of low hanging fruit; in other words, the persistence of a wasteful, polluting
economy in need of a cleansing. As Pellow et al. show, urban recycling provides a good
example of how technologies that reproduce the waste stream (such as recycling) are
privileged over technologies that challenge its very existence (Pellow et al. 2000). This
ongoing cycle is what Schnaiberg (1980) has termed the treadmill of production.
If the only problems worth addressing are the ‘low hanging fruit’ of actionable,
incremental change, it is not as if the high hanging fruit will ever get any lower - it will
remain qualitatively distinct, ‘unactionable’ and too abstract, too ahead of our time, forever.
As a result, any vision of possible futures are refracted through a perpetual present, endlessly
improved but never superseded. So for instance, we will see endless improvements in
automobile efficiency: hybrids, electrics, etc., but very little discussion of transitioning
beyond car culture and into a system that relies upon public transportation and a spatial
reconfiguration of how we live on this urbanized planet. These sorts of ideas don’t make
commercial sense, and therefore cannot be active targets for immediate action. Big
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transformative changes such as these will remain permanently ‘out there’ in a permanently
receding future always out of reach, always ahead of our time.
While scholars such as Swyngedouw discuss the apocalyptic character of climate
change politics - as a sense that ultimate devastation is always a future possibility that will
somehow never arrive, here I am making a slightly different though related conclusion.
Cleantech and its market solutions have a similarly apocalyptic character - their visions of
large-scale transformation are forever receding into a future that while inevitable, is never
actually upon us.

Capital	
  denial	
  

But what if - as is increasingly being suggested by the overwhelming climatological
evidence - what if we are running out of time? Does this mean we must speed up our
incrementalism? Infuse it with more resources, more state support? Or, does it mean we need
to reconsider how, in fact, this cleantech ‘project’ can and should be conceived?
That, unfortunately, is a question that I could not ask: is cleantech clean? The question
betrays an uncomfortable knowledge of systemic instability and of a holistic problem that
those with whom I spoke knew that they did not want to know. This, I believe, can be seen as
a powerful form of denial.
Cohen defines denial as “the maintenance of social worlds in which an undesirable
situation (event, condition, phenomenon) is unrecognized, ignored or made to seem normal
(Cohen 2013: 51).” In this sense, climate change is not being denied in the cleantech space 268

far from it - but there is another form of denial - a denial of the macro-economic realities of
the economic relations through which solutions are sought. This is important - at a microeconomic level, one in which parts replace the whole and incrementalism reigns, cleantech
innovations provide real, meaningful solutions to the very discrete, isolated problems each
individual technology or service intends to address. Meanwhile, there is not, and cannot ever
be, a macro-economic reflection on the system-level effects of such a technology and its
commercialization in and through existing (and expanding) circuits of capital accumulation.
Accordingly - in the cleantech space what I found was not climate change denial (though
there is some of that as well) but first and foremost capital-denial. Norgaard writes,
[A] key point in labeling the phenomenon of no direct activity in response to
climate change as denial is to highlight the fact that nonresponse is not a
question of greed, inhumanity, or lack of intelligence… Instead, denial can and I believe should - be understood as testament to our human capacity for
empathy, compassion, and an underlying sense of moral imperative to
respond, even as we fail to do so (61).
Just as Norgaard suggests, this is not a question of greed or inhumanity or stupidity, but a
compassionate and morally thought out commitment to bettering the world - human and non
human alike. It is motivated, first and foremost, by a desire and a need to respond to climate
change with solutions - real concrete solutions – without individual or collective sacrifice.
This is what the market promises, so long as one denies the almost inevitable unintended
consequences of any market-based efforts.
This, ultimately, is the culturally produced denial that defines business environmentalism.
The fact that we can talk about climate change denial is predicated upon a shared sense that
there ‘really’ is a problem called climate change that needs to be immediately addressed.
What would it look like then, if we also agreed that there “really” is another problem called
capitalism - also planetary, and equally abstract and all encompassing and seemingly
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unstoppable - that also must immediately be addressed? This is a challenging proposition.
Questioning capital is a threat to the “ontological security (Giddens 2013)” that undergirds
our culture and is difficult to broach without red-baiting aspersions meant to silence the
inquiry. Nonetheless, might we at least begin by naming and making sense of this culturally
produced market-denial?
This market-denial is built into cleantech’s conception of impact - the denial of any
possible concerns that capitalism, or market based solutions, may not be capable of actually
achieving the cleansing impact that cleantech proponents pursue. Similarly, Immerwahr
(1999) concludes that people feel apathetic towards climate change when they do not believe
that anything can be done:
Our research suggests that what the public is most skeptical about is not the
existence of problems but our ability to solve them. What will make the public
invest energy in these issues is not the conviction that the problems are real,
but that we can do something about them (24-5; quoted in Norgaard 2011:
191-2).
Doug McAdam (2010) refers to this potential for a shared recognition of the possibility
for transformation as cognitive liberation, whereby people come to recognize their collective
strength and capacity to act together, enabling them to take advantage of political
opportunities that may arise. While McAdam is writing about Black liberation struggles, the
connection with cleantech and business environmentalism, or what I have been referring to as
a spirit of green capitalism, should be evident. The justification behind cleantech and the
discourses of business environmentalism, as well as the broader field of green business,
which courts investment - both financially and socially - by promising readily available,
easily attainable (and fundable) solutions, stems from just this sort of cognitive liberation. In
this regard, business environmentalism and the green economy become an opportune outlet
for those with environmental concerns who are unsatisfied with apathy and want to do
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something, anything, to make an impact. The problem - as Eliasoph, Norgaard, and
Swyngedouw all suggest - is that political action is off the table. In the post-political context,
there is no space for everyday political action - leading to the cultures of denial and apathy
that Norgaard recounts, as well as the culture of business environmentalism outlined herein.
Individualism may, as Norgaard and others argue, disempower people politically in the
face of climate change, giving them a sense that there is no where to turn. By contrast, green
entrepreneurialism represents one of the only socially sanctioned, readily available collective
responses to climate change. The individual business is a socially sanctioned collective
response to social needs, and can therefore easily appear to be the best option available.
If we step back for a second, we might begin to understand what motivates business
environmentalism. At its core is a desire to find, encourage and participate in meaningful
collective responses to climate change - to socially produce a better cleaner world. In a
culture where business is far and away the most socially valorized form of collective action,
and where civic activity is denigrated or imagined to be all but extinct, it is not hard to see
why business environmentalism becomes such an enticing way to make one’s impact upon
the world.
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Introduction	
  

There are a number of very public, very wealthy individuals who have embraced the
project of green capitalism, and who perform this commitment on the world stage. Scott
Prudham (2009) argues that the performance of the entrepreneur as an environmental
crusader is essential to the legitimization of green capitalism; a visible and vocal
demonstration that there is indeed a new spirit animating those working towards a green
economy. John Doerr’s performance at the 2007 TedX conference is one of the more notable
examples. Doerr made his fortune as a venture capitalist, funding infotech projects such as
Google and Amazon, and was one of the leading figures in venture capital’s shift into
cleantech. He begins his talk with a confession, “I’m really scared. I don’t think we’re going
to make it.”
His moment of truth came at the behest of his daughter, who told him one night, “I’m
scared and I’m angry. Dad, your generation created this problem. You better fix it.” Fix it he
will: from here Doerr goes on to explain the importance of Wal-Mart going green; the
importance of compact fluorescents and the stupidity of bottled water shipped across the
globe; the necessity of good policy - such as a market in carbon and national fuel mandates;
the potential for cleantech companies such as Amyris to create better biofuels. He announces
that his venture capital firm, Kleiner Perkins, is investing $200 million in new disruptive
technologies. He admits that even this is not enough to meaningfully address the climate
challenges that we face, cautioning that no single investor, or firm, can invest enough money
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on their own to save the planet. What is needed is an entire, systemic transformation. He
continues,
We have to make this economic so that all people and all nations make the
right outcome the profitable outcome and therefore the likely outcome. Energy
is a 6 trillion dollar business worldwide - it is the mother of all markets. You
remember that internet? Well I’ll tell you what, green technologies, going
green is bigger than the internet. It could be the biggest economic opportunity
of the 21st century. More over, if we succeed it is going to be the most
important transformation of life on this planet…
Doerr chokes up at the end of his presentation - barely getting his last lines out. He
exhorts the audience, his peers, his fellow “Tedsters” to “multiply all of our energy, all of our
talent, and all of our influence to solve this problem.” Only then, he explains, will he be able
to look his daughter in the face, and honestly say that he’s done what he can to fix the
world’s climate problems.
*

*

*

In such performances, the relationship between environmental and economic objectives is
simplified into a necessary compatibility. Saving the planet is good business. It has to be;
there is no other alternative. Doerr’s presentation was as much an argument as it was a plea.
The possibility of green capitalism, in whatever shape or form imaginable, ultimately
rests on the shoulders of this single, unconditionally necessary presupposition: green can, and
indeed must become profitable. Profitability is the sine qua non of capitalism, and therefore
green capitalism, can and must follow suit. While it may be the case that a profit-motivated
epoch of industrial expansion is largely to blame for the climate destabilizing and resource
depleting status quo that is in need of being greened and cleaned, blame can easily be shifted
away from profit-making per se, and instead focused on the specific (imperfect, immoral, and
often times anti-social) means by which profits have been generated. This leads to visions of
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ecological modernization (Mol 2002) in which dirty industry can be replaced by clean
industry. Greedy, unscrupulous profit-takers can be replaced by virtuous, socially and
ecologically ‘impactful’ entrepreneurs who are only willing to make ‘good’ profits through
ecologically beneficial endeavors such as cleantech. To simplify, we might say: cleantech
generates clean profits.
Chapter 5 looked at the idea of impact - specifically the tension between wanting to make
an impact-beyond-capital and an impact-as-capital. It examined the ways in which a
separation between these two concepts has to be actively maintained, in order to preserve
some semblance of coherence to the project of cleantech entrepreneurialism. While section
two was about the ‘spirit’ of green capitalism in the cleantech space, this section now shifts to
looking at the way the cleantech space functions as a market. In other words, this section
shifts from motivating and legitimizing ideals to market imperatives and the specific
mechanisms through which they are enacted and performed. Specifically, we will look at the
Funder’s Forum as one node in the market for cleantech startups, where early stage
companies look for investors. If the last section was about managing contradictions, this
section is about discipline, specifically the discipline of the market, or what Moishe Postone
(1993) calls “abstract domination.”
This section explores market imperatives, or the ways in which impact-as-capital
asserts a powerful, almost gravitational force over the cleantech market. Such powers of
attraction are not immutable physical laws, but messy social realities that have to be
negotiated, enacted, or even performed through the everyday interactions of actors in the
cleantech space. Hence, this will be an attempt to understand the performativity of abstract
market imperatives, as they are refracted through the everyday interactions of the market in
cleantech startups. My goal here is to understand how this abstract force, assuming such a
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thing exists, comes to be embodied, materialized and instantiated in this one particular
cleantech space.
Though there are a range of different types of investors active in this market, venture
capitalists remain the most influential - culturally if not always financially. The venture
capitalists are considered to be ‘smart money’, as opposed to other investment sources which
are less actively engaged in the operations of their investments. This active management is
lauded by economic sociologists and business scholars as an integral piece of what makes an
innovation network function and succeed (Ferrary and Granovetter 2009; Florida and Kenney
1998; Gompers and Lerner 2001a, 2001b).
However, there is another side to this active engagement which gets less attention,
namely the disciplinary pressure that this these managers exert on entrepreneurs lucky
enough to receive funding from them. Receiving venture funding entails an imposition of a
very discrete set of market logics, financial expectations and commercial temporalities upon a
startup and their process of development. A corporate structure legally binds startup
entrepreneurs into these newly experienced market imperatives, transforming them from
autonomous, self-employed individuals into employees, whose days are often numbered.
The pressure underlying venture capital’s ‘smarts’ needs to be closely interrogated. While
these ‘smarts’ are presented as simply knowing what works or how to help a firm succeed,
they actually arise from the structure of venture capital (VC) investing and the readily known
yet seldom acknowledged dependency that venture capitalists have on their sources of
funding. VC firms, for the most part, invest other people’s money, and these other people are
most often institutional investors such as pension funds and other large trusts. These investors
will put a portion of their assets into venture funds, trusting that the venture capitalists will
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prudently invest their money and do whatever they can to realize a profit; in fact, the VC’s
have a fiduciary responsibility to do just that. This relationship of fiduciary responsibility is
at the root of venture investing’s frenetic temporality, its strict adherence to ‘the market’ and
its uncompromising imperatives. Hence, when an investor remarks, “it’s just how the market
works” there is an unspoken recognition that it is this thing - the market - that is in charge,
not them. This fiduciary responsibility and deference to the market’s logic establishes their
role as vectors of abstract domination, bearers not only of wealth, but of the specific social
codes, patterns and logics that define wealth, to the extent that it operates through and as
capital.
That said, the venture capitalists are not the only vector of this domination. Abstract
domination extends beyond any discrete nodes of an innovation network to an even more
complex entanglement of actors, including both formally important institutional actors (VC
firms, law firms, etc.) as well as the harder to characterize remainder, all of the numerous
individuals participating in less formal ways as self employed consultants, brokers, and
agents. These “strategic consultants” perform the smarts of smart money, rehearsing this
logic and the best ways to present oneself to an audience of investors. At events such as the
Funders Forum, they go to great lengths to prove (to investors and entrepreneurs and to each
other) that despite their limited funds, they are nonetheless just as smart as smart money (and
therefore just as employable). If venture capital is smart money, these strategic consultants
are smart without money.
Moving away from a network metaphor, I will instead suggest that the process of venture
capitalism gives rise to a more diffuse, hard to dissect social body, what Voloshinov (1986)
understood as a ‘speaking community’ (McNally 2001). This specific speaking community
can be understood as what Marx (1973) somewhat facetiously called the community of
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money. This community is not limited, as might be expected, to only those who actually
possess large amounts of capital, or even to only those who have managerial control over
large amounts of capital, but it is a much broader social body, comprised of any and all who
are willing to perform as if they were in control of a large amount of capital. In other words,
one does not have to have money to act according to the logic, or fiduciary responsibilities,
that money demands. These relations, extending from the formal obligations of venture
capitalists to their limited partners down through to the informal performances of strategic
consultants who act as if this responsibility is their own, demonstrates how the abstract
pressure of market imperatives is expressed within and through the everyday reality of the
cleantech space.
This section is divided into three chapters. Chapter 7 is comprised of three short pieces
providing context for chapters that follow: a brief history of venture capital and the fiduciary
responsibility they owe their limited partners, a general overview of the venture capital
investing model, and third, an overview of the investment landscape that an early stage
cleantech startup faces on its path towards commercialization. Following this, Chapter 8
explores the performative aspects of fiduciary responsibility and abstract domination by
looking at the concept of smart money and the ways in which strategic consultants embrace
and rehearse this venture investing intelligence, as they attempt to prove that they are, or can
be, smart-without-money. Chapter 9 then explores the political economy of this fiduciary
responsibility, and the very discrete forms of discipline and control - what I will call dressage
- that investors impose upon startup entrepreneurs, and the narrowing of creativity that
results.
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Before getting into the specifics of how the venture capital investing model works
(and increasingly, doesn’t work) in the cleantech space, it will be useful to very briefly
review the origins of venture capital as a distinct field. As will be clear, this is not simply a
history of venture capital firms, but also a history of their relationship with their primary
funding source - institutional investors. Combining the two will help contextualize venture
capital firms within the broader context of venture investing, a field in which they are the
central, but not the only actors.
There are a number of important ways in which limited partners implicitly condition and
constrain the general partners managing their money - an influence that trickles down
throughout the innovation ecosystem, and is encapsulated by the unquestioned - yet as we’ll
see historically shifting - fiduciary responsibility that VCs owe to their limited partners.
Venture capital is a special breed of institutionalized private equity investment
capital, focused on high-risk investments in early-stage companies. Its 19th and early 20th
century predecessor was a highly unorganized market for high-risk capital that was
comprised primarily of wealthy families and individuals, such as John D. Rockefeller,
investing in new industries as they saw fit. Only in the 1930s and 40s do some of these
investors begin hiring professional managers to seek out investments for them (Gompers
1994; Reiner 1991).
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In 1946, the first two modern venture capital firms were founded, American Research
and Development Corporation (ARDC) and J.H. Whitney & Company. Unlike professionally
managed family wealth funds (which still operate today, and are referred to as “family
offices”) the new venture firms raised money from a number of unrelated investors,
organizing their investing pools into separate legal entities defined by a partnership
agreement between limited partners (who provide money but have little say in the
management and investment of that money) and general partners (who manage the
investments on behalf of all of the limited partners, and receive both a management fee as
well as a percentage of any profits generated) (Reiner 1991). Nearly all VC firms today are
based on this partnership model, with the VC firms acting as general partners, managing the
wealth of any number of limited partner investors.
ARDC’s founder, George Doriot, is considered by many to be the father of venture
capitalism. Doriot had served as the director of military planning for the Army’s
Quartermaster General and subsequently as deputy director of research and development for
the War Department, helping plan the United States’ industrial mobilization for WWII
(Doriot and Gupta 2004; Hsu and Kenney 2005; Reiner 1991). During WWII, the US Federal
Government encouraged risky industrial ventures, subsuming the risk under the umbrella of
necessary war production. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation financed projects such as
the development of synthetic rubber production, with “tacit recognition of the economic
‘unsoundness’ of the projects and the inapplicability of the criteria of ‘sound finance’ (Reiner
1991, quoting John Glover: 205).”
After the war, Doriot established ARDC to encourage private sector investment in the
commercialization of these wartime innovations. The company is most famous for hitting the
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first VC ‘home run’ - a $70k investment in Digital Equipment Company (DEC) that
increased in value to $355 million by 1957, only 14 years later (Gompers 1994; Reiner 1991).
The success of ventures such as DEC led to post war discussions about the need for
private capital to take more risks. At the time, institutional investors such as pension funds
were becoming the largest pools of investable wealth, and were beginning to be given more
leeway in their investment options. Institutional investors had been bound by rigid guidelines
delimiting what investments were safe enough for them (so as not to unduly jeopardize the
savings of the many people whose money these institutions held in trust). The prevailing
norm had been a ‘legal list’ approach in which the state out right delineated precisely which
investments institutional money managers could make; all other investments were forbidden
(Longstreth 1985).
Around this time however, individual states began supplanting the legal list approach
with the “prudent man rule.” The prudent man rule was not new. It was a centuries old, well
established principle in British trust law, which had made its way into U.S. Trust law a
century prior. In an 1831 Massachusetts Supreme Court decision (Harvard vs Amory), Justice
Putnam wrote:
All that can be required of a trustee is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully
and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds,
considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of the capital to
be invested. (in Longstreth 1986: 11)

In the 1940s, with an increasing sense that institutional investors were being unduly
limited, the shift towards the prudent man rule was an attempt to provide trustees with more
flexibility, so long as they operated with discretion. In the 1940s the Model Prudent Man
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Investment Act developed by the American Bankers Association attempted to formalize the
initial Massachusetts Supreme Court decision (Longstreth 1986; Langbein 1995). As
individual states adopted versions of this rule for their trust law, this allowed institutional
money - public and private trusts alike - to invest in dividend yielding stocks and to make
certain real estate purchases. However, the new rule still did not allow institutional investors
to invest in high-risk projects such as venture capital. In fact, Austin Wakeman Scott’s
Treatise on Trusts (1939) as well as the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Trusts
(1935), two seminal texts in US trust law, establish that investments such as venture capital,
currency hedging, leverage through margin accounts, and second mortgages were explicitly
‘imprudent’ investments (Longstreth 1986).
And so, funding for venture capital firms remained modest through the 60s, relying
primarily on high-net worth individuals to sign on as limited partners. Other models for
venture investing were also experimented with during this time. In 1958 the Small Business
Administration chartered Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) to provide early
stage financing for new enterprises. By the mid 60s there were 700 SBICs, accounting for the
majority of risk capital invested in the US. This form of risk financing unraveled in the
aftermath of the 1973-4 recession that followed the oil embargo. The new enterprises funded
through the program were highly leveraged and could not meet their debt obligations. In 1978
only 250 remained. By 1988 they represented only 7% of total venture financing, down from
a high of 75% twenty-five years earlier (Gompers 1994).
Over this period, the geography of venture capital began to shift. The earliest VC
firms were in Boston and New York. Silicon Valley’s emergence into the world of VC came
a bit later, beginning in 1957 with Arthur Rock’s successful funding of Fairchild
Semiconductor (Kenney 2000). By the 1970s a number of major players in the VC world
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emerged in Silicon Valley, and in 1973 the National Venture Capital Association was
formed. By the early 1990’s the center of VC activity had completely shifted to Silicon
Valley, with 48% of all VC dollars invested (compared to 20% in the Northeast) (Gompers
1994).
While Silicon Valley experienced a string of early successes, institutionally managed
money - representing the largest pools of investable money on the planet - were still legally
prohibited from getting involved. The Prudent Man Rule had last been updated in 1959.
Since then, a rise in new investment products - not only venture capital but also the
emergence of a large selection of mutual funds, stretched the applicability of the rule and had
institutional money managers feeling unfairly constrained (Longstreth 1986).
At this time, modern portfolio theory was being developed, providing a set of algorithmic
justifications for a widely diversified portfolio (Elton and Gruber 1997). Modern portfolio
theory (and its analogue modern investment theory) argued for the virtues of maximizing
financial returns through a diversified portfolio of holdings, as opposed to assessing each
individual investment or holding on its own.
Far from protecting beneficiaries, the Prudent Man Rule was cast as an encrusted legal
prescription that limited the investment opportunities of huge pools of investable money - and
that actually forced fiduciaries into imprudent, non-diversified money management strategies.
As a historian of trust law and the Prudent Man Rule, Longstreth writes, “Widely accepted
lessons of modern economics push hard against these constraining notions of prudence.
Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to observe that today the prudent man rule… would
virtually compel a fiduciary to act imprudently in terms of economic reality (5).”
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Finally in 1978, investment managers of public pension funds - one of the largest classes
of investment capital operating under the Prudent Man Rule - had their way. When the
Employment Retirement Income Security act (ERISA) was first passed in 1974, public
pension investments were still beholden to the Prudent Man Rule. But in 1978, the Labor
Department loosened these safeguards, allowing up to 10% of a pension’s investment
portfolio to be dedicated to high-risk investments, including venture capital (Gompers 1994).
This was a precursor to what would eventually, in 1992, be codified as the prudent
investor rule in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) (Langbein 1995). Unlike the
prudent man, who is to vet the wealth preserving (or in other words non-speculative) safety
of each individual investment in a portfolio, the prudent investor is to vet the quality of an
entire portfolio.
The shift from the prudent man rule to the prudent investor rule is important for two
distinct, yet intimately connected reasons. First, it represents a fundamental transformation in
the interpretation of fiduciary responsibility. What was formerly defined as wealth
preservation in opposition to speculation came to be re-interpreted as wealth maximization
through diversified speculation. Second, in the breakdown of this division between
speculation and fiduciary responsibility, vast amounts of new capital - held in large public
trusts - was newly made available to speculative markets such as venture capital.
As a result, in 1978, venture capital fundraising grew significantly, raising $750 million
on the year. Throughout the 70s venture capital had been outperforming the stock market and
over the next decade pension funds dramatically increased their contributions, from under
$200 million at the end of the 1970s to over $4 billion by the late 1980s (still only a modest
portion of their total assets, which were over $3 trillion at the time)(Gompers 1994).
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As Gompers explains, this influx of institutional investments led to a general
institutionalization of venture capital over the course of the 80s. As mentioned above, the
shift from the prudent man to the prudent investor paradigms entailed a shift in focus from
wealth preservation in opposition to speculation to wealth maximization through a strategic
engagement with speculation. Investment managers were increasingly shifting from a
strategy based in holding long-term assets (whether stocks, bonds or real estate) to one
focussed more on shorter term holdings, bought and sold regularly so as to maximize overall
gains. This shift away from long-term investing is part of a general transformation of the
financial industry often referred to as the shareholder revolution (Ho 2009; Lazonick and
O’Sullivan 2000). Institutional money managers were able to purchase relatively large shares
of corporate stocks and then use these positions to become active advocates for the rights of
shareholders like themselves during shareholder meetings. They could threaten to vote a
corporation’s board of directors out of power if their ‘needs’ were not met. And what were
these needs? Cutting costs any way possible so as to maximize short-term profits, which
would then hopefully translate into (temporarily, or short term) higher stock prices (Ho 2009;
Lazonick and O’sullivan 2000).
This meant that from the late 1970s on, venture capitalists increasingly answered
primarily to institutional money managers and their unrelenting focus on short-term
performance. Gompers (1994) argues that this ‘institutionalization’ of VC funds had a
dramatic, negative impact on the process of VC investing. In 1980 25% of all VC investing
was in the “seed and start-up” category - the earliest stage investments in fledgling firms. By
1988 this had decreased to 12.5% - shifting focus to later stages of financing and to leveraged
buyouts. Furthermore, institutionalization led to lower, as opposed to higher returns. VC
returns steadily rose over the 70s to peak at 31% in 1982, yet by 1989 that had fallen to 8%.
285

The 90s represented the height of the venture capital industry, with venture returns
rising steadily through the 90s and then spiking with the dot.com boom of 1999-2001
(Gompers and Lerner 2001). The successes of VC investing through this period were
inextricably linked with the speculative bubble that they were helping fuel in the stock
market; when this bubble crashed, VC investing did as well. As we’ve seen earlier, in the
wake of this collapse, the VC industry needed a new field to invest the capital they had
already raised. The September 11th attack on the World Trade Center and subsequent military
intervention in Iraq put energy security back into the spotlight, which dovetailed with
environmentalist concerns regarding carbon dioxide emissions and global warming. Out of
this confluence of events, interests and fears, cleantech was born.
As we’ve seen earlier, the venture capital industry is largely responsible for branding this
most recent embrace of alternative energy technologies as cleantech, and has therefore
figured central to this market’s somewhat brief historical trajectory. In actual dollar amounts,
venture capital is dwarfed by project financing and other less-risky forms of investment
capital, yet their positioning as the most important investors in the market for early-stage
technologies keeps them in the center of the most dynamic, or we might say potentially
“disruptive” and therefore exciting field. They are the avant-garde of the investment
community, boldly investing where more staid, risk averse capital dare not go.
While there was some semblance of truth to this narrative in venture capital’s precleantech history, things have not gone quite the same way with this most recent
technological advance. Despite VC money flowing into cleantech for almost a decade and a
sense that the inevitability of climate change has finally paved the way for this new industry
to arrive, the VC model has not been able to replicate its earlier successes with cleantech. The
capital-intensive nature of cleantech projects, as well as their relatively long development
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cycle, coupled with a consolidated (and dampened) IPO market, the financial crisis of 20072008, and the roll out of shale gas/tar sands have all dramatically curtailed the possible
success of cleantech developments in the US (Lacey 2013; Reuters 2013; Nordan 2011,
2013). Further, the rise of cleantech production in China - most notably in solar photovoltaic
panels, has put a damper on the original cleantech vision – so much so that the US is now
imposing ‘antidumping’ tariffs on cheap Chinese solar panels in a last ditch attempt to protect
the US solar industry from complete annihilation (Wang 2012).
When I began my research, in 2011 there was still faith in venture capital, still a sense
that they can and would make things happen in the cleantech space. But by 2013, the
landscape has become somewhat different. There is increasingly less and less faith in the VC
model, which simply did not seem to work for the current state of early stage cleantech
commercialization. A 2012 Report from the Kauffman Foundation titled, “We have met the
enemy… and he is us,” confirms the failures of VC investing since the dot.com bust in the
early 2000s, blaming themselves, as limited partners investing in numerous VC funds, for
what they consider “a triumph of hope over experience (Mulcahy et al. 2012).” As this study
explains, the failures of VC have to do with their inability to create adequate returns for the
limited partners investing in VC funds. Simply put, investors would have been better off
having simply invested in an index fund of small cap stocks over the past twenty years.
There is an increasing sense that the model fails early stage entrepreneurs as well.
While venture capitalists pride themselves on making risky investments in early stage
companies with “infinite upside,” in actual practice they have been moving further and
further away from such high-risk investments, opting instead for safer, later rounds of
funding of already proven technologies and business models, or simply reserving more funds
for follow-up financing needed to keep already existing investments afloat (Lacy 2012a,
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2012b). As a result, early stage cleantech firms are finding it increasingly difficult to find
funding, leaving more and more entrepreneurs without the means to realize their visions.

The	
  Institutionalization	
  of	
  Venture	
  Capital	
  and	
  Implications	
  for	
  Cleantech	
  Venture	
  
Investing	
  

The predominance of institutional investors in venture investing has had significant
implications for the field, shaping the investing model in the cleantech market and beyond. I
will now overview this investment model, focusing on a few specific ways in which this
fiduciary responsibility inflects the process.
When a venture capitalist firm decides to create a new fund, they will first attempt to
raise money from a combination of institutional investors and high net worth individuals
(HNWI) - which in some cases are the venture capitalist(s) themselves. Typically, larger VC
funds almost entirely target institutional investors, whereas smaller funds are more likely to
engage both institutional investors and HNWI. Less established firms operate in a buyers
market, and must sell themselves to potential investors. By contrast, for the most prestigious
firms it is a seller’s market. The opportunity to participate in one of their funds is a privledge
only bequeathed to the most deserving (or well connected) of investors (Gertner 2008).
Once funding is secure, the VCs have a partnership agreement drafted, establishing
their roll as general partner, the fees they will be entitled to receive and the protocols for
“capital calls” which are the instances when the VC firm will ask its investors for cash, as
needed for specific investments made by the fund.
The year that funding for a new fund closes and the partnership agreements are all
signed becomes the fund’s ‘vintage.’ From an investor’s standpoint the money committed to
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a VC fund is all going to be spent over the course of the next two to five years, possibly
longer for investments that need many rounds of follow-up financing. Then, as the fund
matures, the limited partners will hope to see returns on their investment, anywhere from 6 to
10 years later, and increasingly even longer. As with fine wine, one must be patient to enjoy
the fruits of a good vintage… but not too patient; the longer limited partners are made to wait
for their returns, the lower annualized rate of return they will translate into, and therefore the
less satisfied the investors will be with their investment.
These returns will come from successful liquidity events, called ‘exits,’ which usually
entail corporate acquisitions or public offerings on the stock market. Once a VC firm has
closed its funding it will then begin to invest in companies that meet the fund’s pre-defined
investment parameters. The standard VC model is often described as a “spray and pray”
strategy. The firm will invest in a number of start-ups, hoping that at least one results in a
large pay-out. While the logic of each firm, and each fund will differ slightly, and while all
investments are initiated in the hopes that they will be the one to make it big, there is a
general expectation that one or two investments will result in a large “multiple,” a handful
may generate a modest return or break even, and then the remaining investments are likely to
result in a loss, either partial or complete, of the time and money invested.
The multiple refers to a rough estimate of how many times greater a payout is than the
initial investment that went in. So if a $1 million investment nets a $4 million exit, then this
is a 4x return. If it nets $40 million, then we now have a 40x return. The multiple is an
important term in the world of venture investing, as ultimately everyone is on the lookout for
the 10x and 100x investments that are out there - the potential Googles and Apples amongst
the sea of technology-based startups vying for VC funds that will carry a fund and insure
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healthy returns for all of the investors regardless of how the other companies in the portfolio
fare.
Assuming an exit is possible, there are three main variables determining the level of
return that a VC will realize on an investment: valuation of the company upon exit, amount of
money invested, and length of time until liquidity. The valuation of the company determines
the size of the exit - obviously the higher the sales price, the larger the return realized.
Similarly, the ratio of this final sale price to the total money invested determines the multiple:
4x would mean a sales price four times as high as the total money invested. Lastly, the length
of time until liquidity determines how this return ratio translates into an annualized return
figure. So for instance, realizing a 4x return after one year would translate into a 400% return
on capital invested, realizing this same return after four years would only be 41% annualized
and after 12 years it would drop to 12%.
VC investing is, in many ways, a race against time. As TW, the director of an
entrepreneurial incubator describes, for a start-up receiving VC funds, “it’s like strapping a
time bomb on your back.” The longer it takes for portfolio companies to reach a liquidity
event, the longer it will be before the VC’s limited partners are able to realize a return on
their initial investment, therefore diminishing the relative value of the initial investment,
calculated, as most investments are, at an average annualized rate of return. A simple chart
can help illustrate this. Table 9 calculates an annualized rate of return for investments held
from 4 to 12 years, whose final value is 2 to 7 times the size of the initial investment (and
assumes a quarterly reinvestment of interest).
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Table 9: Average Annualized Rate of Return on a Long Term Investment

4yrs

6yrs

8yrs

10yrs

12yrs

2x

18.92%

12.25%

9.05%

7.18%

5.95%

3x

31.61%

20.09%

14.72%

11.61%

9.59%

4x

41.42%

25.99%

18.92%

14.87%

12.25%

5x

49.53%

30.77%

22.28%

17.46%

14.35%

6x

56.51%

34.80%

25.10%

19.62%

16.10%

7x

62.66%

38.31%

27.54%

21.48%

17.60%

In actual practice, the calculations are much more complicated. VC investments come in
multiple installments, and each investment within a portfolio will have its own unique
timeline. However, the basic principle should be clear enough - the longer it takes for a
company to reach a liquidity event, the larger this eventual sale will have to be in order to
result in a decent rate of return.
These calculations are further complicated by the inherent riskiness of venture
investments, a majority of which are actually expected to fail. When planning a portfolio of
investments for a new fund, the VC will generally anticipate a large percentage of
investments failing completely, a smaller percentage breaking even, an even smaller
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percentage realizing a modest return, and then at best one or two investments realizing a
sizeable return.
These sizeable expected returns for the whole portfolio coupled with a low possibility
of realizing such a return for any individual investment bears directly upon the valuation
process, through which a start-up is given hypothetical value, ‘marked to make-believe’ as
they say in the world of finance. There really is no objective way to determine the valuation
of a pre-revenue startup, and the process is therefore generally considered to be more of an
art than a science. The VCs investing in a new firm have every incentive to estimate the
present value of a start up as low as possible, so that their financial contribution can entitle
them to as large an ownership stake in the firm as possible. And for the entrepreneurs, of
course, the opposite holds. While both the entrepreneur and the investors see the potential for
this sizeable return, from the entrepreneur’s perspective this represents a future-inevitability,
whereas from the investors perspective, this is only a vague future-possibility; for them, the
law of averages prevails, and each individual firm is just as likely to fail as all of the rest. The
venture capitalists are more interested in the health of their portfolio than the health of any
individual investment; it is the portfolio that must deliver adequate returns to their limited
partners, and therefore any startups that do not show as much promise as the next risk losing
their funding when the next round of investing is due.

Stages	
  of	
  Commercialization	
  and	
  Funding	
  

Before describing the performative aspect of the cleantech market in early stage startups,
it will be instructive to first provide a broad overview of this market, and in particular the
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commercialization process that cleantech startups face, along with the various sources of
investment capital that they can attempt to enlist through the process.
While there is no singular development or funding trajectory that all cleantech startups
experience, there is a general path which firms more or less follow. With rare exception, a
start-up needs many iterative rounds of funding, which usually steadily increase in scale with
each subsequent round and correlate to progressive stages of development. Figure 4 shows
the typical stages of funding and start-up development, and which types of investors are most
likely to be involved at different stages of the process.
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Discovery	
  (pre-‐seed	
  and	
  seed	
  funding):	
   	
  

This is the earliest stage of a startup’s life course, when initial ideas are first being
validated, and a “value proposition” is first posited - in other words, an identification of a
specific problem or need that can be addressed by a specific process or technology. A
founding team is established, along with a network of advisors and mentors. Eventually, a
basic prototype must be created.
This stage of development can vary significantly in length, depending on the complexity
of the project and the amount of time that founders are able to devote to it. There is almost
definitely no stable funding for a project in its most incipient phase of discovery, which
means that all resources, the most important of which is time, must be donated by the
founding team and its advisors. To the extent that laboratory and fabrication equipment is
necessary, free or cheap access must be secured. Hence, much of this work occurs in
university and to a lesser degree corporate research centers, where researchers can spin-off
their work into entrepreneurial projects - either themselves transitioning into entrepreneurs or
licensing their technologies to entrepreneurs and instead serving a more advisory role. At
some point, additional funds will be necessary, and the first source is almost always the
founding team itself. Hence, we arrive at the first category of investors: friends, family and
fools (or just “friends and family”). This includes inventors and entrepreneurs themselves, as
well as employees who agree to work for free for extended periods of time, in the hopes that
their ‘sweat equity’ will eventually pay off. Beyond those directly involved are people with
close connections to the principals and who are willing to support a loved one and therefore
forego any rigorous due diligence process. These investments would typically be considered
“pre-seed”.
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As the project develops the startup will accumulate costs associated with market
validation, prototyping and potentially beginning to pay additional employees with important,
specialized skills. This may mean that friends and family are tapped for more and more cash,
but this strategy eventually must give way to funding sources without an intimate connection
to the project. Not only is this important financially, but it is also the first true validation that
a startup may be on to something, and has potential value in the eyes of an impartial investor.
Typically, investors that come in at this stage are called angel investors (the ‘fools’
accompanying friends and family). Angel investors are usually high net worth individuals
(HNWI), or networks of HNWI who seek out interesting early stage investments. Angels will
engage in a basic due diligence examination of a firm, but usually this is much less rigorous
of an analysis than is performed in later funding stages. This is largely a matter of scale - the
due diligence process can be costly, and it is harder to justify this cost for the relatively small
investments that angel investors are looking to make.
Angel investments are usually structured as convertible debt. This means that the
investment is initially structured as a loan, but after a predetermined amount of time (usually
1-2 years) if it is not repaid, it converts into equity. This conversion will typically come at a
premium. If an angel investor invests in a firm which then subsequently enters into a round of
equity financing (an “A round”) the angel investor will be able to convert their investment
into equity at a discount relative to the newer investors. So for instance, if shares of the firm
are valued at $1 in this later round, the angel investor may have the option to convert their
debt into equity at $0.75 a share.
The other source of funding - and validation - that a startup can secure in this earliest
discovery phase comes from grants and awards for cleantech startups. There are a number
of highly competitive programs for early stage seed development. This includes ARPA-E
295

awards, SBIR grants, as well as regional awards, such as those offered by NYSERDA to NY
based start-ups.40 The available grants are highly competitive and the application processes
can be tremendously time consuming. A few entrepreneurs who were in the process of
pursuing major grants described it to me as a full time job in and of itself. Even more so than
the prior two forms of funding, grants represent the first funding that comes with the prestige
of having been vetted, and accepted, by a respected institution within the innovation
ecosystem. Accordingly, grants can go a long way in helping to attract later rounds of
funding. This has to do with the fact that many of the programs employ outside review panels
comprised of both technical experts and venture capitalists, the former to assess technological
feasibility, the latter to assess commercialization potential. Not only does the investment
community think favorably about grant funded companies because they won the granting
competition, but also because the money they receive is “non-dilutable” meaning there will
be less investors involved in subsequent funding rounds, looking for a percentage of the startup’s equity.
Validation	
  (seed,	
  series	
  A):	
   	
  
The discovery phase eventually transfers into validation, once the founding team feels
confident that they have identified a problem worth solving and a technology with real

40

ARPA-E stands for the Advanced Research Project Agency – Energy. It was established
as part of the America Competes Act of 2007 and funded in 2009. It was modeled after the
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) to fund new and innovative
technologies in the energy sector. SBIR stands for Small Business Innovation Research. This
program was inaugurated in 1982, during the Reagan administration, though it was based on
a pilot program conducted by the National Science Foundation during Carter’s
administration. The program requires all government agencies with large research budgets to
allocate a small fraction of their funds to support innovative private enterprises. Lastly,
NYSERDA is the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority. Though it
was created in 1975, it has only recently focused its efforts on new energy technologies,
including both cleantech as well as alternative fossil fuel extraction methods such as hydrofracking.
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promise. At this point, prototyping must progress to a scale that can begin to be tested both
internally as well as by external partners and likely customers. Hence, some early provisional
sales, or at least formalized partnership agreements must begin to be secured. Metrics are
required to prove the value of the startup, projecting its ability to generate revenue and
capture a meaningful share of the available market. Usually seed funding must be able to
carry a startup through this validation phase. If all seems to be going well, the firm will begin
to ramp up efforts to secure its first formal round of investment, which is called Series A or
an A round. This can be a difficult process, and often firms find themselves in a funding gap,
with seed funds running out and no new funds yet committed, that is referred to as the valley
of death. Many of the companies presenting at the Funders’ Forum are either in or about to
face this difficult period, making it a term commonly heard at the breakfast sessions.
With Series A funding, this is where venture capital firms first enter into the picture.
What distinguishes the A round from prior rounds of financing is the introduction of a
number of formal documents establishing the legal structure of the start-up as a corporation,
the structure of its board of directors and stock issuance protocols. VC firms, often operating
in syndication with one another, will negotiate a valuation of the company that will establish
how much equity they are entitled to for the money they are investing. Any pre-existing
investors (such as angels that came in at the seed round) will be converted over into shares of
preferred stock, while the common stock is typically reserved for the founding team. This is
usually the first round of investment to be denominated in millions of dollars.
Efficiency	
  and	
  Scale	
  (Series	
  A,	
  B,	
  C…):	
   	
   	
  
When venture capitalists invest in an A round, they assume that multiple additional
rounds of financing will be necessary: a B round, C round, etc. At each round, the company is
re-valued, and this new figure determines how much additional capital the prior round’s
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investors will have to contribute to the new round, so as to avoid diluting their stake in the
firm. This strategy allows the Series A investors to keep a startup on a relatively tight leash;
if the founders want to maintain their stake in their company, they have to meet aggressive
benchmarks that will result in increasingly optimistic valuations at each funding round (when
this does not occur, something called a down round can happen. Here the investors lower
their valuation of the company, meaning not only that they will not have to contribute more
capital to maintain their stake in the firm, but instead, that if the startup wants an infusion of
cash, it will actually have to give up additional equity in return. Hence, a down round often
results in the founding team losing most, if not all, of their stake in the startup.
In this stage of development, the startup is scrambling to achieve the milestones
determined by its investors - which entails refining the value proposition, cutting all
unnecessary costs, increasing market acceptance and achieving rapid growth. This has been
the stage most difficult for cleantech startups to achieve. Many cleantech projects require far
longer periods of development and validation than venture capitalists are willing or able to
tolerate. Making new hardware or biofuels at scale and developing sizeable markets for new
energy technologies – which often require partnering with large, traditionally risk averse
firms (such as utility companies), takes longer than developing new software. Most of the
early vintages of cleantech funds would have been targeting IPOs right around the time of the
2008 financial crisis, when the IPO market froze up almost completely. Growth projections
for potential cleantech IPO candidates were not as ‘exuberant’ as venture investors would
need to extract a sufficient return out of an offering. Lastly, consolidation in the investment
banking world over the 2000’s left fewer options for medium scale IPOs (under $250
million) which is where many cleantech startups would have fallen, forcing them to either
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consider other exit strategies of to continue growing while privately owned – until hopefully
reaching a size where they could go public.
As Figure 4 suggests, it is usually important for a cleantech startup to have already begun
developing strategic partnerships by this stage. These are firms that will agree to pilot test a
new component or process, integrating it into the more established business practice, and
therefore suggesting a real market potential for the startup’s product, as well as a potential
purchaser of the startup outright. So for instance, a firm creating a technology for wireless
recharging of electric vehicles might look to partner with a firm willing to test the technology
on a small portion of their electric vehicle fleet. Or a firm with a waste to energy process
might partner with one specific waste treatment facility that is willing to try the technology
out on their site.
Eventually, once the startup’s business model and technology are sufficiently validated,
the startup can begin to ask for even larger sums of money to expand their operations.
Private equity firms enter into the picture at these latest stages of investment, often to
provide debt-financing for specific infrastructural needs, or to make other relatively risk-free
investments in a mature start-up, whose sale is imminent. This is ultimately the goal for a
startup progressing through these rounds of investment and development, a sale that allows
investors to “exit” and realize a gain on their investment. The dot.com model which worked
so well for the venture capital industry in the 90s and leading up to the 2001 crash was to take
a firm public with an initial public offering (IPO), where shares are made available to a much
wider range of investors through the stock market. At this point there will be no more
valuations determined by a specific set of investors, but instead by the market. As a firm’s
stock is bought and sold, its price will fluctuate accordingly. This model has not worked for
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cleantech, which has increasingly shifted focus towards acquitisions by “strategic partners”
and other related exits that do not require an IPO on the public market (Nordan 2013).
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CHAPTER	
  8:	
  Dress	
  Rehearsals	
  for	
  the	
  Community	
  of	
  Money:	
  Smart	
  Money	
  and	
  
Strategic	
  Consultants	
  

At one event a VC makes the keynote address. He tells the audience about his firm, about
their four funds, about their belief in renewable energy and its possibilities – massive
efficiency gains – but then he brings it back home: “In the end it’s all about profit. For us, It’s
all about profit.” With a staged grimace and a lazily furled brow, he adds, “ I don’t like short
term thinking, but it’s the way the market works.”

Black	
  hole	
  capital,	
  or	
  Abstract	
  Domination	
  

KD, a director of climate change related operations in the New York office of a major
global financial institution, helped me understand his approach to environmental action via
analogy. “Capital,” he explained, “essentially functions like a black hole.” At the center of a
black holes lies a singularity, an infinitely small, infinitely massive point generating a
gravitational force powerful enough to keep just about everything - including light - from
escaping its grasp. KD describes this gravitational field surrounding the singularity as the
black hole’s “basin of attraction.” Anything that falls into this basin of attraction will
inevitably collapse into the central point, becoming part of the singularity. “Capital,” he tells
me, “also has a basin of attraction, and its pull is profitability.” Once something becomes
profitable, it is automatically pulled into capital’s basin of attraction. Therefore, he continues,
if we want something like cleantech to succeed, all we have to do is make it profitable, and
capital will take care of the rest.
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Such naturalized conceptions of the profit motive are nothing new; they harken back to
the classics of political economy, from Adam Smith’s (2003) sense of a natural propensity to
truck, barter and exchange to Mandeville’s (1989) parable of the bees. Such naturalized
visions of capital’s logic as human nature or in BKs case, as a gravitational force, establish a
frame of reference in which capital and the markets operating in its name, cease to be
understood as concrete historical entities, and instead take on the aura of a universal, abstract
law of nature (Perelman 2000; Wood 2002). This is, as we saw in Section One, a recurring
element in the motif of planetary improvement, where the market’s expansion into a not-yet
improved world anchors the belief in and vision of a potentially green or clean economy.
Moishe Postone (1993) offers the concept of abstract domination to describe this
seemingly irresistible force. A full explanation of this term can quickly become complex,
delving into the specificities of Marxian value-theory, but for our purposes, a simplified
version will suffice: Postone sees in Marx’s work an attempt to understand the historically
specific characteristics of the new economic formation that was emerging around him, and
specifically the new mechanisms through which people were being compelled to work in
abominable conditions for wages that barely allowed for their survival. Whereas prior social
formations had relied on direct political relations of servitude, mediated by the threat (or use)
of violence, these new labor relations were more indirect, mediated by market relationships in
which the laboring population was formally free and independent, and therefore could only
be offered wage-labor opportunities, but never forced to work as a direct, political obligation.
Here, Weber’s (2001) account of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism is
situated, providing a religious and cultural explanation of how and why individuals consented
to capital’s radically new and relatively dehumanizing and alienating economic relationships
and logics. While it is clear that Weber did not mean to offer an argument of necessary and
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sufficient causation (Kalberg 2001), his thesis has nonetheless been criticized for implying as
much by Marxists and others who highlight other factors precipitating widespread
participation in the newly emerging capitalist economy (Lehmann and Roth 1995; Wood
1995). Marx’s work provides one compelling account. In the final section of Capital, Volume
1 (1976) as well as in portions of the Grundrisse (1973), Marx describes primitive
accumulation as a forceful violent process of compelling participation in the wage labor
economy. The crux of this process was the production of the doubly freed laborer - free from
the means of production and free to enter the wage labor market. The first freedom was won
through enclosure, or more broadly what David Harvey (2009) has called accumulation by
dispossession. The second freedom was enforced through punitive legislation punishing self
provisioning and acts of non-compliance such as theft and vagrancy, in an effort to encourage
the laboring population to ‘choose’ the path of wage labor (Hay et al. 1975; Linebaugh 2003;
Thompson 1975).
Ellen Wood (1995, 2002, 2003) extends this analysis to also make clear that
employers and business owners were similarly ‘freed’ to enter into these new wage labor
relations. Here the matter is a bit more complicated, as it involves shifting away from a
dominant ‘commercialization’ thesis regarding the origins and development of capitalism,
which sees this historic rise as an unfettering of innate profit-seeking behaviors finally
allowed to flourish once the strictures and limitations of the feudal economy had been lifted.
Such narratives paint a portrait of naturally capitalist actors being liberated (through
bourgeois revolutions of one form or another) to embrace the many opportunities that the free
market availed of them. Instead, Wood, along with Robert Brenner (Aston 1995) and George
Comninel (1987) return to the history of primitive accumulation and specifically the history
of enclosure in England to suggest that capitalists were not waiting to be liberated, but that
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the dissolution of feudalism led to unique conditions that set in motion fundamentally new,
unprecedented social relations leading towards a constantly improving, profit maximizing
process of production, motivated by the price-setting market. In other words, capitalists were
as much a new production as the doubly freed laborers in their employ. Both labor and capital
- here is the important conclusion - were equally compelled to participate in this new
economy. For labor, the fear of starvation and punitive state sanctions compelled
participation, while for capitalists the competitive price setting market served this role,
forcing producers to constantly improve their efficiency and profitability of their operation,
or risk losing access to their means of production and their market. This compulsion
functions through the abstracting logic of the market, which reduces qualitatively distinct
process and products into equivalent and interchangeable values - commodities - which
therefore makes the people producing these values just as interchangeable. To the factory
owner, one worker is as good as the next, and to the purchaser or investor, one factory is as
good as the next, hence the ever present risk of becoming expendable, of being replaced as a
worker or as an entire firm.
Through such compulsions, the accumulation of money, which functions as the
embodiment and measure of an abstract form of social wealth, comes to impose a historically
specific set of social imperatives upon all those operating within its orbit. The opportunity to
compete in the market transforms into an imperative to cut costs and to provide cheap prices;
to remain competitive by any means possible. These are the imperatives that Marx details
throughout the three volumes of Capital, which manifest in tendencies to reduce labor costs
through the introduction of new techniques and machinery as well as the suppression of
wages; to increase both the length and intensity of the working day; and to render an
increasing portion of the laboring population surplus, thrusting them out of the production
304

process entirely, as an ‘army’ of unemployed workers (Jameson 2014). It is the seemingly
unquestionable, almost natural force of these market imperatives, as they impose themselves
upon workers and employers alike, that Marx and subsequently Postone refers to as abstract
domination.
As Postone writes, “Social domination in capitalism does not, on its most
fundamental level, consist in the domination of people by other people, but in the domination
of people by abstract social structures that people themselves constitute (30).” The
abstraction in question has to do with the way that social wealth, including the value of time
spent laboring, is conceptualized within and through market logics that flatten out all of the
qualitative differences between discrete objects and processes into an abstract, quantitative
measure of value, denominated in money of one form or another. This process of translating
local and particular uses into general and abstract values is central to the functioning of
markets, which require a means of equating the relative values of distinct goods and services
in order to facilitate transactions.
But here is where things get confusing. How is it possible that a disembodied or
general set of social relationships, such as the accumulation of money, can exert a real force
of social domination upon the laboring population? Here, naturalized concepts of capital,
greed and profit seeking as little more than expressions of ingrained human nature provide
implicit cover for those who wish to avoid the question altogether. Instead of domination, we
get social Darwinism and conceptions of a Hobbesian world of competitive struggle
(Hawkins 1997; Leonard 2009; Perelman 2000; Wood 2003). Economics as a discipline has
largely taken this path, save the more recent turn towards behavioral economics (Bowles and
Gintis 1993; Clarke 1982). Conversely, those who do address this domination often fall back
upon simple narratives pitting evil capitalists against an innocent, virtuous working class. As
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the argument goes, it is the bosses and the financiers, the wealthy 1%, who enact this abstract
domination upon the rest of us, hence returning to a conception of concrete and direct
domination of some people by other people and allowing for ‘bad apple’ narratives that hold
out faith for simple reforms to rid capitalism of its inequalities (Scheider 2013). This may be
too simplistic of an interpretation. If we take the idea of abstract domination at its word, than
those employers and investors who seem to get the upper hand through this abstract and
abstracting logic of capital accumulation are, in fact, just as much beholden to, or dominated
by this logic as the workers whose lives they manage.
This frames the question I want to explore - how exactly can we bring these abstract
theoretical discussions of capital and abstract domination back down to the mundane world of
everyday practices? Specifically, can we see abstract domination in action, as a real process,
a set of concrete actions, and not merely a theoretical idea? If, as McNally (2004) explains,
capital is a real abstraction, then can we ‘really’ locate this abstraction in the practices of
everyday life?

From	
  Smart	
  money	
  to	
  Smart	
  without	
  Money	
  

KD’s metaphorical description of capital as a black hole suggests that the neoclassical
economic subject of homo economicus, a perfectly rational decision maker, is out there,
awash in perfect information, always making the most profitable decisions possible. While in
the abstract this seems to make sense, in reality markets are rarely if ever that straightforward
(Aspers 2007; Kjelberg and Helgesson 2006; Knor Cetina and Preda 2004; MacKenzie et al
2007). This work in economic sociology has focused on how markets are constituted as
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complex social and environmental networks of interconnected actors. Accordingly, the
“performativity” of markets has become an important focus of analysis (Aspers 2007;
MacKenzie et al 2007; Murdoch 1995). The concept is introduced by way of actor-network
theory, and attempts to understand the complicated web of interactions - or “entanglements”
to use Latour’s (2005) term - that comprise specific markets in specific ways.
Much focus in this literature is on the active role played by non-human actants in the
coproduction of networked relationships. So for instance, Donald MacKenzie (2003) notably
details the formative role that the Black Scholes Theorem - a set of mathematical equations actively plays in shaping the market in derivatives that it purports to passively observe. The
same is argued for much of economic theory. Callon critiques economics for abstracting the
market away from the marketplace - the actually existing spaces in which market relations
are experienced, enacted, and performed. He argues that “economics, in the broad sense of
the term, performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it functions
(Callon 1998:2, Aspers 2005).” Common sense assertions of economic laws are not merely
the codification of passive observations, but actively contribute to the networked reality of
markets and market life (Callon 1998; Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002; MacKenzie et al
2007). Callon sees this argument following from Weber, who argues that accounting methods
are a necessary prerequisite of modern capitalism. This is where Callon’s conception of
performing, or “performation” begins.
Callon (1998) focuses specifically on the figure of homo economicus - the rational,
calculative actor presupposed by neoclassical economic thought. Instead of critiquing the
concept for inaccurately describing real economic actors, Callon sets out instead to
understand how this fictive subject ‘really’ exists as a performative actant in the networks
through which it presents a compelling force. Homo economicus may exist, Callon argues,
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but not as the hidden nature of humanity. Instead it is “the result of a process of
configuration” or a result of “framing.” It is an abstract concept that exerts a real, abstract
force on those interacting with it, approximating it, attempting to perform calculative actions
that mimic or at least gesture towards this fictive character and its status within economic
theory and therefore within the far messier logic of actually existing markets, as a pinnacle of
reason and effective action.
While this may sound similar to the description of abstract domination just presented,
there are important differences to consider. Though there is room in this new economic
sociology for non-human actants such as equations or screens, there is decidedly less focus
on more than human social logics - in particular the logic of capital - as itself a macroeconomic reality that cannot be reduced to a single, isolatable actant, or effect of networked
relationships. By setting aside such “social facts” (Durkheim 1982) the critique of political
economy falls by the wayside (Fine 2003, Miller 2002). The complexity of actually existing
markets is examined as a complex, entangled web of everyday micro-sociological
interactions, and any possible structuring or macro-economic relations are simply left out of
account; to be understood as effects of performative actor-networks, but never a causal force
in and of themselves. Here Callon actually relies on a distinction made by Boltanksi and
Thevenot, between critical sociology and a sociology of critique (Callon 2005; Boltanksi and
Thevenot 2006). Callon (2005) writes,
I consider that social scientists don’t have special access to a truth that would
be inaccessible to actors themselves. They have no particular legitimacy to say
what the sense of history is, who the dominated and the dominant are, or
which points of view are morally just (12).
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Callon disparages his interlocutor Daniel Miller (1998) as well as Boltanksi and Chiapello
(2005), for critiquing “Kapitalism” by which he means “this old dialectical conception that
unifies capitalists” (2005:13nt5) and in which “a cold and abstract monster survives by
trafficking in souls or minds” (15).
JK Gibson-Graham (2006) make a similar critique of what they call ‘capitalocentrism,’ or
a tendency within critical scholarship to lend undue legitimacy to objects of critique (namely
capitalism) by naming it as a more coherent, fixed reality than it may in fact be. While this is
an important corrective, it can also unintentionally insulate one’s analysis from real relations
of domination and exploitation that really do structure our social and economic and
ecological lives in substantial ways. And so, while markets are messy and diverse entities,
and never as clean as KD’s black hole metaphor might suggest, part of this messiness is a
scalar permeability that always links the local and particular markets under microsociological investigation with the broader ‘markets’ of global capital flows and with the
production of value at a systemic scale. These more general and abstract relations factor into
each and every local determination of capital and the specific, messy, performative dynamics
of individual, though never all that discrete, markets.
Here then, I am suggesting that we bridge the gap between “Callonistics” and critical
political economy by asking whether and how we can observe the performativity of abstract
domination, that real abstracting force exerted by and through “the coercive laws of
competition (Marx 1976).”
To this effect, I am using the concept of performativity to refer not only to Callon’s use of
the term via actor-network theory, but as well to an ethnomethodological sense of the
performative nature of everyday life. Randal Collins (1981, 1993) introduces the concept of
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“interaction ritual theory” to explain the “emotional energy” that is visible in the
microsociology of macro processes such as power, ideology, values and norms. Garfinkel’s
(1963, 1984) ‘breaching experiments” in ethnomethodology demonstrate how “everyday,
taken for granted routine is a source of emotional security and anxiety reduction for most
people (Goss 2005: 208).” The performativity of economic thought might just as easily be
seen as an attempt by members of a group (or network, as Callon would write) to internalize
the normal or accepted precepts of a shared world. Garfinkel focused on how such work was
motivated by an attempt to maintain social order, in our case we are looking specifically for
attempts to maintain an economic order.

Smart	
  Money	
  and	
  Strategic	
  Consultants	
  

The remainder of this chapter attempts to understand the performativity of abstract
domination in the market for early stage cleantech startups. I focus on the ways in which
‘Smart money’ serves as an ideal of venture investing, enacted and performed by all those
operating with the market. As such, smart money can be seen as a performative embrace of
venture capital’s logic, and therefore, I will argue, of capital’s abstract domination more
broadly conceived.
The ways in which smart money pervades the cleantech market results in at least three
distinct, yet interrelated performances. First, the performance of “smart money” itself, by
venture capitalists and other investors proving that they are rightfully the sovereign
consumers of this marketplace. Second, the startup pitch, where founders present their
company to potential investors (smart money) and attempt to demonstrate that they are a
smart investment. Third, the ways in which a whole range of “strategic consultants”
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internalize, coach and rehearse both of these first two attempts to be smart and attractive - or
as in other words, to perform their ability to be smart-without-money.
In the following chapter, we will then turn to an exploration of the structural conditions
underlying these ‘smarts’, entangling them with the more general, or global circuits of capital
out of which they arise, and therefore filling out our understanding of the ways in which
abstract domination takes shape in and through this cleantech market.
Smart	
  Money	
  
Money, inasmuch as it possesses the property of being able to buy everything
and appropriate all objects, is the object most worth possessing. The
universality of this property is the basis of money’s omnipotence; hence it is
regarded as an omnipotent being… (Marx 1992: 375)

In Karen Ho’s (2009) ethnography of Wall Street investment banking culture, she details
an obsession with pedigree and intelligence. Banks sell themselves to potential recruits as
well as potential clients as the repository of the smartest and brightest thinkers, as evidenced
by the elite, Ivy League credentials that their employees can boast. As discussed in the
previous section, the cleantech entrepreneurial space defines itself in opposition to Wall
Street and its overly narrow focus on maximizing profits. Yet, there is still a cult of
intelligence that pervades this early-stage investment space. It is centered upon venture
capitalists as opposed to investment bankers, and pedigree has less to do with Ivy League
diplomas than entrepreneurial experiences. One of the greatest compliments in this early
stage cleantech space is to call someone a “serial entrepreneur.” Hands on experience with
starting new companies (or the appearance thereof) is the only credential that really matters
and that qualifies venture capitalists to discern which new startups are worth investing in.
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Venture capitalists are hands on investors, actively working with their portfolio
companies to help them succeed. Their entrepreneurial experience, not only as founders of
startups themselves but as well with prior portfolio companies, affords venture capitalists
with a wealth of knowledge and connections that they can offer to startups that they fund. In
this regard, venture capital is considered ‘smart money.’ This is in contrast to friends, family
and fools, as well as angel investors (though these latter individuals can, at times, be
somewhat ‘smart’). What determines how ‘smart’ smart money is, is how much that money,
or the people investing, can offer beyond dollars and cents. In other words, the more
connected an investor is within the business world, and the more willing that that investor is
to use these connections for the benefit of an early stage firm, the smarter the money in
question. This is what ambitious founders like CN are looking for: smart money; connections,
networks, access to the people and relationships that can make a new business succeed.
VCs seem to enjoy this designation, as it positions the money they have access to as
somehow more relevant and qualitatively superior to other, less connected forms of wealth.
In many ways it is a reprisal of the boots on the ground myth; VC is money that is willing to
roll up its sleeves and get involved. As one VC told me,
PZ: When you are a public investor you are passive, you don't do anything.
And you know, a private equity investor doesn't really go in when the
innovation is still at risk. They go in when it is more proven… So every stage
has its specialty, but certainly venture capital is a more roll up your sleeves
kind of thing.

Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) outline five specific ways that VC firms contribute to
the health, or in systems terms - robustness - of the Silicon Valley innovation ecosystem.
These functions are broadly applicable to other innovation ecosystems, including that found
in the New York City metro area, where I conducted my fieldwork. These five functions are:
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selection, collective learning, embedding, signaling and financing. We’ve addressed
financing above, which in some ways is the most straightforward of the lot (though, in the
next chapter we will see how even this function can be far more complex than it appears at
face value). However financing alone is not what distinguishes venture capital, as there are a
number of other sources of investment capital in an innovation ecosystem. It is the other four
functions that really set venture capital apart, and which establish these particular investors as
particularly ‘smart’ money.
Through making their funding decisions, venture capitalists play a central role in
selecting which companies will have a chance to succeed, embedding these chosen
companies within their business networks, providing guidance grounded in collective
learning born of many previous efforts, and signaling to this network that the chosen startup
has promise. Hence it is venture capitalists’ ability to plug investments in to their business
networks that qualifies them as ‘smart’ money. This is different than the pure, abstract and
undifferentiated wealth most often associated with capital, or that grounds Postone’s
conception of abstract domination. It is instead a very specific, concrete wealth with specific
concrete relationships with other investors, other business leaders and other professionals that
can help a startup succeed. That said, these relationships alone would never be sufficient.
Ultimately, it is that first and most important function - financing - that establishes these
particular networks and relationships as the pinnacle of smart money.
These smarts boil down to two main capacities: the ability to make the right choices as consumers in a marketplace of investments - and the ability to help companies succeed.
We will deal with the latter of these two in the next chapter. Here we’ll focus on their ability
to choose the right companies to invest in. As alluded to in the prior section, the venture
capitalists position themselves as the sovereign consumers of this marketplace. As such,
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venture capital must distinguish their status from other investors, or ‘dumb money,’
maintaining a sense that they are not your average market actor. Their smarts allow them to
make better decisions, to more closely resemble the properly functioning market where
informed actors make informed decisions.
Beyond their direct capacity to choose whether or not to fund specific companies,
venture capitalists are involved in a wide range of roles focused on their prowess in making
the best decisions. Venture capitalists find themselves well represented on the panels of
expert judges presiding over pitch competitions, on panels deciding admission to startup
accelerators and incubators, and even on panels administering federal and state grant
competitions.
Venture capital, or smart money, comprises the core audience targeted by startup
founders as they look to make their pitch, proving to these smart investors that they are, in
fact, a smart investment.
Smart	
  Investments	
  

The firms presenting at the Funders’ Forum are all somewhere in the development and
validation stages of their life course, still either trying to raise seed capital or spending their
seed capital as they prepare to pilot test their product and attract an A round of investment.
The specifics of where exactly they are in this early stage process are secondary to one key
fact - they are, almost always, working towards an A round of funding. As we will see in the
following chapter, a lot changes once a startup secures their A round. One of the most notable
shifts is perhaps the most obvious - once an A round of funding is secured, a startup need not
devote as much time to finding funders. At this point their funders are, more or less locked in.
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Prior to this however, a huge amount of effort goes into finding investors and therefore
making pitches.
At the heart of the pitch is a short slide presentation which overviews what the startup is
making, who they will sell to, why they are better than their competition, and how their
projected finances translate into a potentially lucrative investment. Early stage companies
must be attractive according to a set of standards that extend from the concrete (does the
technology work? Is the intellectual property protected?) to the abstract (is the entrepreneur
entrepreneurial enough? Will their charisma or gravitas be able to attract strategic partners?
Will the market embrace their solutions?).
The Funders’ Forum is a convening centered upon the pitch. Each month one startup is
featured. The schedule for the event is as follows:
8am Networking
9am Introductions
9:15am Startup Pitch
9:45am Sector Expert
10am Networking (until 11am the absolute latest)
The sector expert varies with each presentation, ranging from a collaborator or strategic
partner of the startup for that month, to policy makers or potential institutional purchasers of
the proposed product or service. Typically, experts are chosen who will provide friendly,
supportive context for the presenting founder.
The Funders Forum is one pitch event out of many. Other events are hosted by angel
investor networks, law firms, and companies like Ultralight Startups, whose sole purpose is
to host and promote pitch events. Ultralight’s cleantech event is called “Future Energy” and as is common in the startup community - it is structured as a competition. The largest and
most established cleantech pitch event is the Cleantech Open, which hosts regional
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competitions, whose winners are then sent to a national event. While each of these events is
structured slightly differently, the basic model involves entrepreneurs attempting to entice
their audience (and most importantly potential investors) with an extremely brief PowerPoint
presentation, and then being somehow vetted - whether by a panel of judges or the audience until finalists and winners are determined or deals are made. For instance, at Ultralight’s
event, eight entrepreneurs present to a room full of eager spectators, all of whom have paid
$20 to eat pizza, drink soda, do a little networking, and then watch each entrepreneur give a
three minutes pitch, followed by three minutes of questions from a panel of four investors
and then three more minutes of advice from these investors.
The performative nature of this process becomes most clear during those months
where there is either a particularly successful or unsuccessful pitch. The successful
presentations wow the room with a concise and confident presentation – just enough
technological detail to establish legitimacy and the substantive value of the IP, seamlessly
transitioned into an analysis of the very targeted, and very large market they will potentially
capture (preferably illustrated with a clear graphic), a brief yet convincing dismissal of
competing technologies, and then either financial projections or some other confident
timeline showing a rapid path to commercialization (the “hockey stick graph” as PL calls it),
all of which is predicated of course on receiving the funding that they are currently searching
for, expressed at the least as a total dollar figure with a clear top line budget of what its
needed for – and for the truly sophisticated, an outline of how they have actually structured
the funding round – warrants, stocks, convertible debt, etc.
These polished presentations set the bar for the event, and endow the meetings with
some much needed legitimacy – without which it would be hard to attract a consistent
audience willing to pay the $50 price of admission. The unsuccessful presentations – which
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are thankfully rare – typically result from an imbalance in the above ingredients: this could
mean an overly detailed financial projection presented without ever sufficiently dealing with
challenges to market acquisition or technological feasibility. Conversely, it could be an
overly technical presentation that never demonstrates a clear path to commercialization, or
ability to capture a sufficient share of any existing market. The most truly challenged
presentations come from inventors without any experience in communicating with the
investment community – or in some cases without experience communicating in public at all.
These acts provide a veritable checklist of what not to do in a public presentation:
PowerPoint slides loaded with paragraphs of 10pt type, rambling, structure-less presentations
with no clear sense of what would make the technology into a feasible business, often due to
unrealistic expectations about the value that end users will attribute to the efficiency gains
that their technology promises to achieve.
Dress	
  Rehearsal	
  Space	
  

As a pitch event, the Funders Forum is unique. Most events feature more than one startup
and are structured as competitions, or at the very least as a marketplace of startups, not so
subtly emphasizing that each is but one investment opportunity/commodity out of many. Not
only does the Funders Forum highlight only a single firm, but this firm is given 30 minutes to
present and answer questions, an almost unheard of amount of time relative to other public
events. In this regard, the event is modeled after the sort of one-on-one meeting that a startup
might eventually make for an individual investor (and in fact, as PL explained to me, a
number of venture capitalists in his network don’t attend the Funders Forum because, as they
tell him, if after reading the announcement they’re interested in the company they’ll just have
the company come to their office for a private show).
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Funders Forum meetings are more intimate than the larger pitch competitions, with only
15 to 30 attendees all sitting around a large conference table, more than half of whom are
regular attendees and therefore know many, if not most, of the others in the room. Instead of
allowing only a panel of expert investors to ask questions and provide feedback, the entire
room is given this opportunity, making for a much more open, convivial, and at times uneven
experience, that betrays one of the unspoken truths about this, and all pitch events: the vast
majority of attendees are not investors (the one exception are events held by angel investor
networks - where everyone is an investor and the price of admission can run into the
thousands). So who does attend? As mentioned earlier, service providers and strategic
consultants make up the majority of attendees.
The success of a pitch event is judged by the success that its participants find in securing
funding, or in other words, the extent to which an entrepreneur’s pitch actually results in new
investments. This does not bode well for the Funders Forum, as there are few if any examples
of funding occuring as a direct result of the breakfast. In response to a hesitant entrepreneur,
considering presenting but worried that the cost in time and money might not be worth it, PL
explains in an email:
I don't know for certain about investments that have come out of these
meetings. These are often confidential and they may happen without me
knowing. I do know that a hedge fund manager and several investors generally
attend and there is activity going on about our last presenter. Also, there are a
good number of VC's on my list who receive the information and follow up on
their own if they are interested. There are about 450 people on my list in NYC.

While on the surface the breakfast is presented as an investor pitch session, in truth there
are only a handful of investors present at any given session (and some of those present have
little to no money available to invest). As a result, PL laments, “not a lot of checks have been
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written.” However, this does not discredit the event, or its potential value to presenters and
participants alike.
PL: I find that in the beginning when they hear this, most are disappointed
because they all want check writers in the room. But at the end of it they
usually realize that although they are still disappointed about the money thing,
it was a pretty useful discussion.
There are two primary reasons that an entrepreneur might find the Funder’s Forum useful.
First, it allows them to make potentially helpful connections with the professionals who are in
attendance. Second, it provides entrepreneurs, many of whom are only just beginning to
prepare for the long and arduous ‘road show’ of presentations to individual investors, a
chance to rehearse their pitch.
If figures such as Doerr and Branson represent the front stage proclamations of green
capitalism and cleantech, then the Funders Forum might best be considered the backstage
venue, where ideas are rehearsed and refined. In fact, many of the participants I spoke with
described the Funder’s Forum as a dress rehearsal space, a place for entrepreneurs to practice
the art of the pitch. However, this is not the only rehearsing going on, or for that matter the
most interesting.

Smart	
  without	
  money	
  

In a space like the Funders’ Forum, there is not a lot of smart money, not a lot of
investors and not a lot of money available to be invested. And yet, there is no shortage of
money’s ‘smarts’. In other words, those who are present, despite their fiscal limitations,
nonetheless embrace money’s logic and the specific sorts of smarts that make smart money
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so enticing. In other words, there is a concerted effort to be smart without money. Here,
strategic consultants play an important role, internalizing and rehearsing the intelligence of
venture capital, proving to themselves, to entrepreneurs, to investors and to one another, that
they are just as smart as smart money.
The strategic consultants are the active remainder of the cleantech space, accounting
for all those involved who do not have some other, more formal designation. If we relate this
to a network model, such as that presented by Ferrary and Granovetter, these are the men and
women who fill out all of the spaces between nodes - who may be loosely connected to one
or more nodes yet operate themselves as independent agents of one sort of another. They are
not a node in any cohesive sense, but more like a general medium, or connective tissue,
permeating the complex system that they are apart of.
Some refer to themselves as strategic consultants. Others are broker-dealers, boutique
investment bankers, entrepreneur coaches, former entrepreneurs, serial entrepreneurs,
independent researchers or event planners, and likely they identify as more than one of these
things. In one guise or another, these are (mostly) men looking for employment or consulting
fees from startup companies, and/or finders fees for connecting a startup with funding. These
strategic consultants are the least formally connected and therefore the least formally
powerful actors within the innovation ecosystem, operating in and through the margins of
deal flows that they desperately want to be included in.
And yet, despite this relative marginality, these strategic consultants exert a subtle,
albeit diffuse, influence over the cleantech space, as they enact, perform or rehearse the
culture of their market.
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Events such as the Funders’ Forum are some of their most familiar terrain. They
participate keenly, filling the gaps between anxious entrepreneurs and disinterested investors,
hinting at their access to other inventors, entrepreneur and investors; to opportunities beyond
this room that they can provide. These strategic consultants very literally occupy the
cleantech space. They are its commoners, its denizens, the rank and file white collar workers
of this green economy.
They do not have the security or luxury of large amounts of investable venture capital
at their disposal, which would make whatever they say or do, by extension, smart. Instead,
they must enact the intelligence of the cleantech market - of smart money - through their
everyday performances of and in the market they call home.
Strategic	
  Consultants	
  at	
  the	
  Funders	
  Forum	
  

When I first arrived at the Funders’ Forum, it was an intimidating space; a large
conference room on the 32nd floor of a midtown skyscraper, filled with (mostly) men in suits,
most of whom seemed to already know one another. I made myself a plate of fruit and bagel,
and took a seat at the table next to MF, who introduced himself as a boutique investment
banker. At the time, I didn’t know what made some investment banks “boutique.” The whole
industry conjured images of Wall Street investors who acted as if they were masters of the
universe, and MF did not disappoint. He seamlessly shifted our conversation - which was
about resource extraction in Africa - into tales of the large scale deals he regularly handles;
deals in the tens and hundreds of millions; as he explained, project finance rarely goes
smaller. Coming from a graduate school context where finances are significantly more
austere, it was hard not to be impressed, and as I realize now, that was the intent – to wow the
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uninitiated with large numbers, and the ease with which he discusses them. As I would
eventually find out, the “boutique” qualifying MF’s investment banking credentials
essentially meant that he was a self-employed consultant, scouring events such as the Funders
Forum for potential deals and leads on future work.
When you first meet consultants like MF, it is easy to get taken in by their boasts - the
ease with which they talk about small $5 million raises and $200 million equity financing
rounds. These are astronomical figures for an average person’s day to day realities - which
makes it all the more impressive when they seem so at home with them. But the more you see
them, hear them, watch them operate, watch them tell the same stories, make the same quips,
offer the same pithy (read boilerplate) advice, the more you realize how much of an act the
whole thing is - and how just under the surface, events such as the Funders Forum are filled
with precariously financed people vying for access to other peoples money, other peoples
projects, other peoples inventions. They want to turn their excitement and their ability - self
assessed - to navigate the tumultuous waters of funding, bankers, investments, raises,
convertible debt, bond issues, etc. into a legitimate, value added contribution to early stage
cleantech projects - and to be rightfully compensated for their efforts.
During my time at the Funders’ Forum, I watched strategic consultants regularly take
on the persona of smart money. Without the backing of actual capital available to be invested,
strategic consultants would compensate by presenting an appearance that such capital is well
within their grasp, and has been in the past. Boasting of large deals, promising connections
and past successes is common - suggesting to all that they are merely between projects for the
moment. For some, this is certainly the case. But for many, this in between ‘moment’ can be
quite long, and becomes a project in and of itself.
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And unfortunately for them, it is not a very well compensated project. Almost all of
the strategic consultants I spoke with either had other means to support themselves, such as a
spouse with a regular income or savings from a past profession, or were in a relatively
precarious economic position. The range is staggering. One consultant offers to meet over
expensive tapas (his treat, he insists), while another asks if I can pay for his pasta lunch; he is
so broke, he explains, that he has to ride a bicycle around the city instead of using the
subway. All told, there are few regularly paying gigs for these consultants in the cleantech
space. They will occasionally receive a finder’s fee for helping connect an investor with a
startup (serving as a broker-dealer in this case), and on some occasions will receive an
upfront retainer for helping a startup seek out investors. A few have been able to make money
writing research reports, and one is paid to provide translation services for French startups.
But the challenge they all face is structured into their chosen project: it is difficult to extract
money from a startup that is still just scraping by as it tries to raise money. This frustration
was regularly voiced by strategic consultants, who felt that their expertise was being unduly
devalued. “You have to spend money to raise money,” I was told, more than once.
So what exactly should one spend money on? What exactly are these skills, these
services that are being devalued? Essentially, the strategic consultants see themselves as
repositories of the same sort of smarts as smart money, and therefore in a position to help a
startup better communicate to investors. Strategic consultants boast of having important
connections to important people - just like venture capitalists - only for the strategic
consultants, many of their important connections are to investors, including venture
capitalists. The consultants are confident that they can get clients exclusive audience with
investors ready to cut a check, so long as they like what they see and hear. This leads then to
the second set of skills that the consultants claim to offer - the ability to help improve a
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startup’s pitch; to make them look and sound like an attractive investment opportunity; a
smart investment for smart money.
Earlier, I suggested that we see this market as a speaking community, a set of
individuals with a shared language that both forms and is formed by those using this language
to communicate with one another. Accordingly, the strategic consultants often act as the
community’s elocution specialists, coaching the uninitiated - which could include almost
anyone: academics like myself, journalists, fellow consultants, entrepreneurs, and even at
times investors - on how to speak with smart money (for entrepreneurs) and how to speak as
smart money (for everyone else).
A number of consultants that attend the Funders’ Forum breakfasts are entrepreneurial
coaches, participating in programs affiliated with either a cleantech business plan competition
(such as the cleantech open), with one of the cleantech incubators, and/or with NYSERDA.
NYSERDA, in partnership with a number of local tech incubators, runs an entrepreneur in
residence (EIR) program, which pairs a startup with a consultant that can help them develop
their business. In this specific instance, NYSERDA pays for 80 hours of consulting. After
those hours are exhausted, the consultant and startup are free to negotiate a new arrangement,
which in the best of circumstances might result in the consultant being offered a position on
the companies board of advisors, or even board of directors (assuming they’ve made it
through a successful A round).
Another common broker of free consulting services is the Cleantech Open, which
pairs multiple consultants with the competing startups. Unlike the NYSERDA program,
consultants must donate their labor for the Cleantech Open. This is in exchange - as someone
involved in the process explains to me - for “exposure” and “a great chance to meet new
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people.41” And so, the coaches agree to work without pay for the duration of the contest, after
which they may try to become a paid consultant with the startup they’ve advised, or even try
to get involved in some more formal capacity, as an employee, director or advisor.
Entrepreneurial coaching is not limited to these formal arrangements, and at the
Funders Forum, every session entitled a fair dose of this service, provided free of charge. PC,
who we met in the last section, was one of the most unabashed purveyors of such pro bono
services. He spent most of his career as a salesman in one capacity or another, and now, as a
strategic consultant, he quickly settled in to the idea of selling himself. When in attendance,
PC would regularly interrupt an entrepreneur’s pitch with questions meant to demonstrate his
excitement for the project and the potential services he could provide, helping the startup
realize its vision.
At one session I attended with PC, there was a particularly unpolished pitch
presentation, made by an utterly unprepared presenter from rural Pennsylvania, somewhat
frozen by stage fright and the pressure of his first presentation in ‘the big city.’ PC, along
with a few other attendees, attempted to salvage the session by turning it into a more
interactive, workshop process. They quizzed the presenter about what he wanted to sell,
where and to whom. How his project might be structured as a business and what sorts of
funding this might entail. At one point, PC decides to offer the presenter - and by extension
the entire room - some general advice. “Before you come to these things you should watch
Shark Tank for a week.” The whole room responded with an approving chuckle, a few people

41

The parallels between the role of mentor and the role of an intern are interesting, and
worth further reflection: two different forms of unpaid labor in the neoliberal creative
economy for two different populations of precariously (un)employed professionals, justified
along remarkably similar lines.
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looking over to PC directly, and nodding more direct approval of his suggestion, prompting
him to reiterate the point three more times over the remainder of the session.
Shark Tank is a British television program modeled after an investor pitch
competition. Three entrepreneurs pitch their business to a panel of venture capitalists, who
carefully, and dramatically vet the businesses being presented in the ten minutes of airtime
allotted for each contestant, after which they decide whether or not they want in on the
investment. When PC suggested that it was important to watch this program before attending,
he was most directly addressing the presenters, who were clearly unprepared to make a
succinct pitch. But he was also addressing the entire room - not so subtly revealing where the
script for his performance as an audience member at this event was derived. As the reception
of PC’s comment made clear, this is a shared script. Smart money is a televised performance,
to be consumed, rehearsed and internalized by all those working in a venture investing space
such as this cleantech market, where being part of this community of money requires
demonstrating that one understands how to operate as if they were a venture investor, or as
I’ve suggested, to be smart without money.
At the end of this session, PL and I reflected on what had just happened. We were
both impressed at how well the room reacted to what was by far the most amateurish
presentation at the Funders’ Forum in a long time. The amount of constructive support,
willingness to offer advice and encouragement was duly noted. “It really felt like a
community,” PL says to me. It is a community, a network of professionals all committed to
cleantech in some way shape or form, and all committed to the commercialization process
and its inflexible logic. This is a rehearsal space for the community of money, helping the
uninitiated learn to walk the walk and talk the talk.
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Conclusion	
  

The most fascinating rehearsal of being smart without money came during an
interview with KL. KL is a retired company man, looking to see if he can get into cleantech
for one last go at the business world before retirement. He was laid off from his position as an
insurance claims manager in 2006, and after his outplacement counseling he decided to try
and get into solar financing. At each breakfast, during the round of introductions, he provides
the same line, “KL, solar financial analyst.” He attends the Funders’ Forum breakfasts as a
way to be involved, but has not yet secured a deal in his new profession. He tells me,
KL: I’ve talked the walk a lot of times and educated a lot of people but I
haven’t made a lot of money from it.
JG: Is there a time limit for you?
KL: I think I’ve passed it.
So far, it has not been going well for him. He comes to the breakfast for exposure, to meet
some of the players who are actively making things happen. He comes to get a taste and a
view of the inside, where deals are happening, where money flows and people are employed.
(This is the same space that others, who are a bit more plugged in, critique for its lack of deal
flow - but perceptions still matter.)
After one of the breakfasts, we walked over to Grand Central Station and found a
place to sit at a table in the seating area downstairs – no meal, no drinks – just KL’s empty
disposable Poland Spring bottled water bottle between the two of us. Sitting there, KL
rehearsed his commitment to the market for me. He demanded speedy returns for his nonexistent clients, “Show me the money now – I want 30% now, not bonds or feed in tariffs or
money 5 years out – I want the sure thing tomorrow.” He pounded his fist on the table,
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proclaiming his business logic, the logic of this market that he so desperately wants to be a
part of.
KL spoke the truth of his markets and of his deals without having either.

He speaks

the language and personality and perspective of money - even though he has no money to
invest. He tells me that he would buy a Leaf if he could afford it. He's looking to get some
fire sale solar panels for his farm - where he doesn't really grow much of anything for the
market, but he could. It is a gentlemen's farm, his fallback. If all else fails, he can invest in his
farm - he’ll finance his own deals if he can't finance someone else's - even if, as he
disparagingly acknowledges, he'd ultimately be doing it out of heart.
KL’s performance during my interview with him was not uncommon. Many strategic
consultants would recite for me their sense of how things should work - what entrepreneurs
should and shouldn’t do, how investors should and shouldn’t make investments. It was
almost as if there was a script being recited - not just because they think its what I want to
hear - but also in the breakfasts themselves, it is a script that they want each other to hear as
well. With such performances, it becomes clear that venture capital as an ideal, embodied in
the concept of smart money, operates as a common sense, internalized logic in and amongst
this speaking community.
Just as entrepreneurialism functions as a more general set of ideals and orientations
that extends beyond the specific individuals at the helm of new businesses, the same is true of
venture capital. As a process, venture investing entails a whole network of actors, from
accountants and engineers helping to perform due diligence reviews to lawyers structuring
the specifics of shareholder agreements to strategic consultants helping broker deals. Hence,
even though very few venture capitalists are in attendance at the Funders’ Forum, we can still
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consider it part of the venture investing process, broadly construed. While there are of course
specific networks of specific interpersonal connections grounding this process, as much
network analysis in economic sociology would suggest (Granovetter 1990) there is also
something more than this network that must be considered, a more abstract, relational space
(networks are comprised in relative spacetimes) of venture investing, establishing its more
general and diffuse precepts, norms and patterns; what some might call its cultural field
(Bourdieu 1983,1993) a pervasive common sense (Gramsci 1971) or everyday rhythm
(Lefebvre 2004). In other words, that which makes this, or any market more than the sum of
its parts. The concept of smart money provides one window into this more general and
generalizing culture of venture investing. By looking at the ways in which a broader network
of professionals operate within the cleantech space, embracing, refining and reworking this
specific intelligence, or ‘smarts’, we can begin to see the complex messy and performative
nature of venture capital as a process extending far beyond specific venture capitalists.
As we will now show, this general performative effect allows abstract domination to
permeate the entire cleantech field, operating as a medium through which the market operates
according to ‘coercive laws of competition’ that are well established and relentlessly obeyed.
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Chapter	
  9:	
  Kill	
  the	
  Inventor!	
  

Fiduciary	
  Responsibility	
  
It’s the training that counts: that imposes, that educates, that breaks-in
(Lefebvre 2004: 41).
The self-identity of venture capital as a field is one of adventuresome, risk-taking
pioneers, operating at the cutting edge of technological innovation and centrally contributing
to the motor of progress. In the field of cleantech, this self-image becomes one of
technological salvation - by investing in the most innovative, most “disruptive” clean
technologies, venture capitalists are working to reshape our world, commercializing the
techno-social foundations of a better, cleaner economy. These sorts of grand ambitions were
peppered throughout my fieldwork, and embodied in the clear sense that making an impactbeyond-capital can and must proceed by making an impact-as-capital. This is precisely what
they do, and one of the reasons that they consider themselves to be ‘smart money’.
As we’ve seen, these ambitions are by no means limited to the venture capitalists alone.
In the last chapter we saw how the performance of venture investing cannot be limited to the
self-congratulatory individuals who directly identify as such, introducing the cadres of
strategic consultants who work hard to demonstrate that they are smart-without-money.
With all of this work to be smart-like-money at the Funders Forum, it became clear that
venture capital, or smart money, has an active presence in its absence. This absence takes a
number of forms. It is the market - that mystical and all knowing collective intellect - whose
reaction to newly proposed commodities must be anticipated. It is the investors that brokers
and boutique investment bankers promise to know, networks and rolodex’s that will lead to
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private meetings, subsequent pitches and those all too elusive checks, signed and delivered.
And to extend this one step further, it is the investors’ investors, the actual repositories of
capital that venture capitalists speak for, the ‘other people’ whose money they bear, and to
whom they are bound by a legal responsibility to deliver adequate returns.
These absentee investors play an important role in cleantech’s innovation ecosystem.
Most venture capital - and here I am referring to the capital itself (a.k.a. investable money) is
structured in funds that are administered as general partnerships. The venture capitalists
operate as general partners, making all decisions on behalf of the capital under their
management. But there is another half of this partnership - the limited partners who have
made their capital available to be invested. Since limited partners are, by legal definition,
passive participants in the venture investing process, it is easy to lose sight of their
significance, and the active role that they play in disciplining venture capitalists, and
therefore by extension the entrepreneurs and startups who receive venture funding. Perhaps
more than anything else, the limited partners fit most neatly into KD’s black hole metaphor,
providing the gravitational force of capital’s basin of attraction. Their wealth is, in many
respects, the singularity at the heart of capital’s black hole; an absent center pulling all that
reaches the event horizon into its undifferentiated mass, forcing all to succumb to its
seemingly irresistible gravitational pull.
The limited partners hold an important sway over venture capitalists, who have a
fiduciary responsibility to their investors and must therefore make their investment decisions
accordingly. This relationship, this bond of fiduciary responsibility, casts an all
encompassing net, all but compelling venture capitalists to make their investment decisions
according to the disciplinary logic of ‘the market’ and its expectations of maximized short
term gains. It is, to return to Postone, a legal expression of the abstract domination that
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demands participation in the flows of capital accumulation, and that structures the ‘smarts’ of
smart money accordingly.
Does this mean that fiduciary responsibility is performative? Perhaps, but even more
importantly, it has a structural, or structuring effect as a legal and financial obligation that
binds the cleantech market to the much broader, even global, flows of finance capital.
Perhaps it is just a matter of semantics, but instead of seeing fiduciary responsibility as
performative, I suggest we think in terms of discipline (Foucault 1977), or even what
Lefebvre (2004) discusses as dressage. As Lefebvre writes,
One can and one must distinguish between education, learning and dressage or
training. Knowing how to live, knowing how to do something and just plain
knowing do not coincide. Not that one can separate them… To enter into a
society, group or nationality is to accept values (that are taught), to learn a
trade by following the right channels, but also to bend oneself (to be bent) to
its ways. Which means to say: dressage. Humans break themselves in like
animals. They learn to hold themselves (39).
Like the process of breaking in a wild animal, dressage entails a disciplining that is at
once self-discipline and a forcefully imposed discipline. While this is akin to Foucault’s
discussion of governmentality and the micropolitics of biopolitical control, Lefebvre focuses
less on the state per se, its institutional presences and absences, than on the ways in which the
rhythms of everyday life, and the repetitive patterns of recurrent interactions pattern
themselves into and upon the bodies comprising the social, at every scale. Thus, Lefebvre
writes, “in us, presenting ourselves or presenting another entails operations that are not only
stereotyped but also consecrated: rites” (39). Here ‘rite’ can be interpreted in a double sense,
as both the ritualized passages that permit entry into a social group and as ‘rights’ or the
routinized rehearsal of right actions, ideas, beliefs, life. Just as Lefebvre is famous for
arguing that space is produced (1991), here he asks us to consider the same for our bodies
and our selves; productions that are both dominated and appropriated, bending and bent.
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Fiduciary responsibility exerts a similarly direct, often violent force, actively shaping the
world it permeates. As we will see below, this fiduciary responsibility largely determines the
fate of cleantech entrepreneurs, whose creativity is narrowed, molded and patterned into
conformity with the needs and desires of capital.
Through this process of dressage, the legal relationship of fiduciary responsibility
becomes an all encompassing expression of abstract domination; venture capital is patterned
by its limited partners, and in turn must actively, forcibly shape its investments by bending
them into the role of labor that is managed, controlled and put to work by capital. Venture
capitalists operate as the managers, as opposed to owners, of capital. In this regard they are
agents of capital; well compensated but ultimately beholden to their financial masters;
trainers, and themselves trained.

Kill	
  the	
  inventor!	
  

At one of the Funders Forum events, a chemical engineer cum inventor cum entrepreneur
presented his startup technology: a means of capturing flare gas and transforming it into
liquid fuel, using a regenerating liquid catalyst instead of the Fischer Troupe technique.
While the latter is incredibly efficient at large scales, his process is incredibly efficient at
smaller, distributed scales. The room is intrigued. One of the venture capitalists in attendance
- a regular attendee at the Funders Forum - asks how much time and money he will need to
produce a demonstration scale prototype. He explains that it will take $6.6 million and 22-24
months to create a fully functional, full-scale machine. Most of this time and money needed
is not due to the difficulty of the process, he explains, so much as it is due to safety
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precautions that all chemical engineers must deal with. Always looking for efficiencies, the
venture capitalist asks, “how much would it cost and how long would it take without the
safety concerns?” The chemist-entrepreneur grins, “I can’t do that, my kids want a dad to
come home to.” The audience responded with a round of modest laughter, seemingly
unconvinced that these are actually necessary costs, and not - as they’ve come to expect - the
foot dragging perfectionism of “mad entrepreneurs” who have yet to fully embrace the
realities of commercialization.
This sentiment was a recurring theme throughout my fieldwork at the Funders Forum,
best summed up by JB, who boiled this down to a simple maxim. As he explained to a
younger attendee, “One of my first rules when dealing with small business is kill the
inventor.” You have to get to commercialization as fast as possible he explains; inventors
often slow this process considerably. This is not blood lust; it is simply a matter of economic
prudence. As I would be repeatedly told (by everyone except inventors), the problem is that
inventors (or entrepreneurs being castigated for acting like inventors) care more about
making things, and making them well, then they do about making a successful business. As
one entrepreneur explains to me after his presentation, exasperated by his partner, the
inventor of the technology they are trying to commercialize, “he just wants to make things…
he doesn’t care about the money, that’s why it took him so long to make the first prototype.”
During my time at the Funders Forum, kill the inventor! was an unsuspected, and clearly
sensationalist refrain - endlessly repeated in various iterations, at times directed at presenting
entrepreneurs, at times thrown into conversations with fellow attendees as a shared piece of
wisdom that confirmed their ability to think as and with smart money.
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For JB, it summed up a number of important lessons about succeeding as a startup, and
about making the sort of pitch that will actually attract investors. As should be clear, the
“inventor” was meant both concretely and figuratively. On the one hand, there are real people
involved with creating the technologies at the heart of cleantech startups. And on the other
hand, there is a more general affect that ‘the inventor’ was meant to name - an unbridled
excitement about the disruptive potential of new technology, a commitment to careful, patient
and rigorous development of a technology, and a constant expansion of its potential
applications. In other words, a fidelity to the techno-social possibilities of the cleantech
project independent of the challenges presented by the market.
Now of course no one wanted to actually kill any inventors - not physically at least - but
there was a general sense that for the most part, inventors - by which was meant
entrepreneurial founders who exhibit the characteristics of an inventor - are often not fit for
the role of running a successful venture capital funded business. It was repeatedly explained
to me that it takes a different sort of mentality, and a different set of skills to invent a product
than it does to create a business. The problem with inventors is twofold: First, they do not
want to give up control over their invention and the business that forms around it. Second,
when representing their companies, they do not present the sort of leadership that investors
are willing to fund. Simply put, they are either control freaks and/or bad performers.
Addressing these sub par performances was one of the core deliverables offered by
strategic consultants providing service as entrepreneurship coaches. Just as Henry Higgins
was determined to get rid of Eliza Doolittle’s cockney accent, strategic consultants are
determined to help rid entrepreneurs of an inventor ‘accent’ that limits their ability to
successfully communicate with funders.
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While the performative critique was important - that inventors are bad at performing the
pitch, the allegation of being a control freak was even more important, for ultimately, Kill the
inventor! is a demand that one be willing to subject themselves to the market; to play along
and be manageable, moldable, and controllable. Inventors, I was regularly told, have too big
of an ego - as do the entrepreneurs that are like them - and these egos must be put in their
place. Lefebvre calls this dressage, referring to the process of breaking in a wild horse physically and mentally subduing the active and creative energy of the beast, so as to produce
a docile, domesticated animal, available to be put to work.
In the cleantech market, this process of dressage entails turning the entrepreneur-creatorinventor into an entrepreneur-employee. This is an important part of the pitch process that
often goes overlooked by presenting entrepreneurs. Investors are not just looking at the
content of the pitch. They are also assessing the team making the pitch, and trying to judge
just how willingly they will submit to management. For instance, in a draft prospectus for a
new early stage investment fund that circulated at the Funders Forum, the general partners
explain that they will only target early stage companies, and that “Stable, controllable
company management will be an absolute.”

Understanding	
  the	
  Entrepreneur,	
  and	
  how	
  capital	
  has	
  a	
  love	
  hate	
  relationship	
  with	
  
creativity	
  

This is a crucial, and often overlooked point: the fundable entrepreneur is an entrepreneur
who is willing to become an employee, and to place their work in the hands of capital. Of
course an entrepreneur may be both an owner and an employee - and often this is the case.
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But in order to adequately understand the specificity of each of these roles, they must be
separated out from one another, even when performed by the same person. As an employer,
the entrepreneur must focus on the fiduciary responsibilities that come with good ownership,
while as an employee the entrepreneur should continue on with a creative - though controlled
and obedient- process of innovation.
The community of money has a complex relationship with creative producers such as
inventors and entrepreneurs. On the one hand these figures, or processes, are a source of
economic dynamism, and as such they are embraced by the market, exalted - in the case of
entrepreneurs - as the pinnacle of heroic economic activity (Bechhofer and Elliot 1981; Dodd
and Anderson 2007; Lindgren and Packendorff 2002; Ogbor 2000). And yet, on the other
hand, these egotistic figures and self-determining creators represent a threat, a force that must
constantly be brought under control.
This tension can easily be overlooked in accounts of entrepreneurship and innovation that
presume entrepreneurs and investors are all part of the same capitalist class, the same
innovation ecosystem and therefore ultimately working towards compatible ends. For
instance, to return to Ferrary and Granovetter’s analysis of venture capital’s role in Silicon
Valley’s innovation ecosystem, they present a picture of symbiotic network relationships;
Silcon Valley is a success, and venture capital is a large part of that success. As a result, any
sense of power, conflicts, domination or exploitation in the innovation ecosystem are
downplayed and even erased. Missing, I suggest, is the fundamental class conflict at the heart
of this commercialization process, a struggle between entrepreneurs - as creative laborers and investors, who hope to corral this creativity into a subservient relation of employment.
The process of venture investing ultimately turns on transforming innovators into employees;
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a docile, malleable and ultimately disposable factor of production. As one inventorentrepreneur explained to me,
EL: The venture capitalists are pretty much hopeless for our purposes. I mean
a venture capitalist first of all wants control. As you are well aware most
scientists refer to them as vulture capitalists, because of their persistent
tendency to take the company and pick it clean and get rid of scientific
initiators. I have wasted time talking to them, I think it is a waste of time.

Entrepreneurship	
  as	
  creative	
  labor	
  

In order to understand this contentious relationship between entrepreneurs and investors,
we need to return to theorizations of entrepreneurialism, and derive from them a class
analysis of entrepreneurship.
In section two we reviewed two main paradigms of entrepreneurship. The first, the
neoclassical conception, sees the entrepreneur as a rational, profit-maximizing market actor
and therefore an embodiment of the creative capacities of the market, or capital, itself. The
Schumpeterian model, on the other hand, understands the entrepreneur as a non-market actor
endogenous to the market, a disruptive creator, capable of developing new innovations and
thinking independently of any overbearing market logic. In fact, as Schumpeter (1934)
explains, the entrepreneur need not necessarily be primarily (or at all) concerned with
accumulating money. Other factors can - and do - motivate this work, such as a desire to
accumulate prestige or status, as well as the sheer joy of creation.
Hence, for Schumpeter the entrepreneur is a creative producer, whereas for the
Neoclassicals, the entrepreneur is a creative capitalist. There is an important distinction
between the two - so long as the entrepreneur is seen to be coextensive with capital, there is
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little room to understand any possible class conflicts between capital and the entrepreneur as
distinct class relations or positions. Instead, the entrepreneur competes as one capitalist
amongst many, an autonomous agent in control of his or her own fate. With the
Schumpeterian model however, it is possible to understand a difference between capital and
the entrepreneur, and therefore to connect with a Marxian analysis of the class relationships
governing their interaction.
One of Schumpeter’s most important observations, which mirrors a similar critique
earlier leveled by Marx, has to do with the limitations of capital and its inability to innovate.
While money can control creative processes, it cannot itself be creative. Such is the logic of
capital and its singular focus on expanded self-reproduction. People are creative, and for
Schumpeter, entrepreneurs are the specific people that provide capital with its creative (and
destructive) dynamism.
Schumpeter is careful to explain that entrepreneurship is a process and not a position.
Hence there is no reason to understand an entrepreneurial class, but instead to see the activity
of entrepreneurship as something that some people do some times. This has important
implications for a class analysis of entrepreneurialism, understood as a process of innovating
and therefore as a form of work.
Blaug (1985) argues that Ricardo, and by extension Marx, treated the process of business
innovation as a near automatic effect of market pressures and opportunities. There was little
interest in the differences between capitalists - the decisions they made about what to
produce, when, where and how - all of which were the dominion of creative entrepreneurial
actors. Blaug further argues that Marx followed Ricardo in conflating the entrepreneur and
the capitalist. He then goes on to argue that “Marx, who claimed to be alone in truly
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analysing the “laws of motion” of capitalism, had simply no explanation to give of the actual
source of the acknowledged technical dynamism of capitalism” (79). While it is true that
Marx afforded little space - none in fact - to the glorification of innovative capitalists - he did
have an explanation for the source of capital’s technical dynamism, or what in the Grundrisse
(1973) he refers to as “general industriousness.” For Marx this dynamism was first and
foremost a product of the collectively laboring social body, and only secondarily (or
parasitically) a product of capital and those operating in its name. He explains this dynamic
in the middle portion of Capital, Volume 1 (1976). First, in a chapter on cooperation he
shows how working together in an organized fashion, workers are able to produce far more
than the sum of their individual parts (which they are presumably individually compensated
for with a wage). This excess of productive capacity is instead credited to management and
by extension to capital, which appears to have contributed to the process of production with
this mental, coordinating role. Later, in Capital, Volume 3 (1991), Marx will continue on to
suggest that this coordinating capacity is not in fact attributable to capital, but is itself a
product of the laboring population, a form of universal labor which accounts for “all
scientific work, all discovery and invention. It is brought about partly by the cooperation of
men now living, but partly also by building on earlier work” (199).
Accordingly, innovation, or general industriousness, is the result of the accumulated
knowledge and capacities of the social body, manifest in science and technology, culture and
art. This is a product of a social body unfettered from the narrow constraints of prior
economic formations - in which production decisions were beholden to customs of one form
or another. Capital, Marx (1973) argues, unleashes this creative potential, making possible
the pursuit of sciences, technologies, arts, all of which together comprise a ‘general intellect’
that is, in the end, the true source of capital’s technological dynamism.
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And so while it is true that Marx did not directly address the entrepreneur as a creative
laborer, it is possible to extrapolate from his work a conception of entrepreneurial creativity
as part of this general intellectual capacity of the working population. If capital is, to use
Marx’s diagrams, primarily concerned with m-m’, the entrepreneur, as a creator, is primarily
concerned with c-c’, or the making of new things. And while this creativity is ultimately
enlisted into the process of capital accumulation, or the circuits of m-c-m’, we might also
consider an additional circuit responsible for these creations in the first place, flowing in and
through the general intellect (i) as opposed to money: i-c’-i’. In other words, it is important
when conceptualizing how capital works not to become absorbed with only the flows of
capital, and to forget all of the other flows of not-capital that provide for capital’s conditions
of possibility in the first place. The flow of creativity is incredibly important to capital’s
expanded reproduction; there can be no ‘creative destruction’ without creativity.
This formulation does not directly contradict those placing entrepreneurs at the center of
innovation and dynamism, it merely reframes the position of the entrepreneur in relation to
the class dynamics of capitalism. For Blaug, and by extension most of entrepreneurial
studies, the entrepreneur is the most innovative branch of the capitalist class. For Marx, and I
would argue for Schumpeter as well, those operating as entrepreneurs and those acts
considered entrepreneurial are first and foremost instances of creative labor - and therefore
part of a general intellectual capacity of the social body. Entrepreneurship is work - not
drudgery (at least not in principle - though in actual practice the work of entrepreneurship is
incredibly demanding, precarious and all consuming) - but the most exciting, world-making,
risk-taking work that has been separated out from the social body so as to appear as if it were
a contribution made by capital and not the laboring population.
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Marx did not need to wait for venture capitalists or cleantech to emerge to observe how
the costs of developing and commercializing a new technology are much greater than merely
reproducing and maintaining such a technology. As a result, he writes,
Pioneering entrepreneurs generally go bankrupt, and it is only their successors
who flourish, thanks to their possession of cheaper buildings, machinery, etc.
Thus it is generally the most worthless and wretched kind of money-capitalists
that draw the greatest profit from all the new developments of the universal
labor of the human spirit and their social application by combined labour
(1991: 199).
Here then we begin to arrive at a far less triumphalist version of creative destruction where capital is less a motor of innovation than a parasite.

Becoming	
  employees	
  -‐	
  the	
  A	
  round	
  

As with all work, capital’s class relationship is predicated upon ‘doubly freeing’ those
with the capacity to do such work, separating them from any means of production, and then
inviting them to participate in the production process as employees (Marx 1976).
Entrepreneurs are no exception. They have been freed from the means of production (hence
their need for financing) and they are being invited to participate in a commercialization
process to the extent that they are willing to become employees.
This ‘invitation’ has, for the majority of the laboring population, been shrouded in the
violence and coercion of the labor market and the legal and institutional arrangements that it
depends upon (Foucault 1977; Thompson 1991; Marx 1976). E.P. Thompson (1991), for
instance, makes clear how the shift to waged labor required a complete transformation of the
temporality of workers’ lives, a process that has only increased in intensity over the centuries,
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with figures such as Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford determined to mold men into the
workers that could meet the increasingly stringent requirements of accelerated and routinized
production (Braverman 1998).
Here, our focus shifts from the industrial wage laborer to the flexible and creative labor of
the entrepreneur, who despite glorification as capital’s wellspring of innovation and growth,
is nonetheless subjected to similar, even if more subtle and seemingly benign forms of
dressage. While passive and indirect forms of coercive pressures abound, and are very much
tied up with the pervasive celebration of ‘smart money,’ there is also a much more direct
mechanism through which smart money imposes its will upon the entrepreneurs it chooses to
invest in - namely, the standardized structure of “A Round” financing.
As discussed above, the A Round names the first round of funding in which venture
capital enters directly into a startup’s life-course. Prior to this, funding comes from some
combination of friends and family, grants and angel investors, all of whom are choosing to
invest their own money. With the A Round, startups have their first introduction to investors
who are investing other people’s money, and therefore who bring along with them an
institutional pressure - or fiduciary responsibility - to maximize their returns.
When VCs enter in to the commercialization of a new venture, there is not only the
rapid development of organizational discipline, but as well a looming “exit” only years away.
The venture is no longer functioning in relation to an undifferentiated, extended future, but
there are now benchmarks, timelines, deadlines – all of which are largely established by the
dictates of VCs, acting on behalf of their investor’s fiduciary interest and the need to see a
sufficient return on their portfolio investments within a few years time.
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Receiving money from a venture capital firm through a successful A round of funding
most often results in the first efforts to structurally transform a fledgling business into a
corporation. Sophisticated shareholder agreements and organizational hierarchies have to be
developed, so as to clarify the specific avenues of power and authority that the new partial
owners - the venture capitalists - will be afforded.
As a result, the VCs get to impose their ‘smarts’ upon their portfolio companies, and
the result is a stricter market discipline than the startup has yet to have experienced. The
imposition of market discipline is warmly received by some entrepreneurs, as a welcome
dose of professionalism that helps provide structure for a new enterprise (bending, as
opposed to being bent). That said, the terms of this new structure often come at a steep price.
There is now a board to answer to, investors who want their due return, and an expert sense
of how business should be run, and who should be running it.
Prior to an A Round, it is unlikely that there has been any serious attempt to determine
the value of a startup. This is largely because the valuation process can be time consuming
and costly, involving business and financial analysts, legal analysts (assessing intellectual
property claims, for instance) and engineers (assessing any technologies involved). As a
result, prior to the A Round, most investment relationships either guess at a rough valuation
in order to establish the amount of equity provided in return for a specific investment, or in
the case of most angel investments, the investment is structured as convertible debt. These
arrangements basically assume that for the company to succeed, they will have to attract
significantly more capital, at a scale which will demand that a valuation is performed and
more formal legal documents are drawn - at that point the angel investors will convert their
debt to equity at a discounted price.
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Through the A round, venture capitalists are entering into an agreement to take an equity
stake in the startup. For the start-up, this often means establishing for the first time a
corporate structure that allows for such a transaction. There are a number of standard
documents that get produced during and for this transaction. This includes a term sheet,
establishing the specifics of the sale, an investor rights agreement, a voting agreement, and a
right of first refusal and co-sale agreement.42
The two most important documents are the certificate of incorporation and the stock
purchase agreement. The first establishes the structure of the new entity, including the
relationship between the firm and both common stockholders and preferred, series A stock
holders. The former represents the entrepreneur(s) and the latter represent the new investors.
Typically the venture capitalists involved in a deal want at least a 30% stake in preferred
stock, as well as an established pool of equity out of the founders common stock that will be
reserved for strategic hires. The preferred stock has dividend preference and liquidation
preference and also comes with anti-dilution rights - which means that if there are future
raises, they can put in more money to keep their total share of the company at the same
percentage. The certificate of incorporation also establishes the composition of the board of
directors: how many seats are elected by the common shareholders, and how many seats are
elected by the preferred share holders. The stock purchase agreement establishes that the
company is in good standing, with no hidden debts or obligations, and clearly delineates the
relationship between stockholders, the board of directors, and the company.

42

The National Venture Capital Association publishes a set of model legal documents on
their website: http://www.nvca.org. The following analysis of standard venture capital
document is based on these forms, last accessed January 14, 2014.
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The net result of these legal formalities is the creation of a corporation governed by a
board of directors and owned by a combination of common and preferred stock holders. As
one corporate lawyer explained to me, “You’re taking other peoples money so you have an
obligation to them.” The formal obligations include a lot of reporting - quarterly financial
reports, board meetings, management calls, annual audited financials, and even at times
provisional budgets to be approved by the board of directors.
For our purposes, the key shift occurs in the legal status of the entrepreneurial
founders selling their company to the new investors. Through this sale, the self-employed
owner-operators in control of their startup are transformed into a dual existence as owners of
common stock and ‘key employees’. These are distinct roles within the newly formed
company. As owners of common stock they are entitled to vote a predetermined set (usually a
minority) of seats on the company’s board of directors. Beyond such voting rights, they hold
little power as shareholders, though they stand to gain financially from the company’s
potential growth.
They are also now “Key employees.” In the stock purchase agreement, ‘key
employees’ are defined as
Any executive-level employee (including division director and vice presidentlevel positions) as well as any employee or consultant who either alone or in
concert with others develops, invents, programs or designs any Company
Intellectual Property (Section 1.5(f)).43
This is followed with a later section on employees, in which the document states,

43

In a Series A round at a high-tech start-up, it is likely that the only key employees in addition to
management, if any, are those who are responsible for developing the Company’s key intellectual property
assets. It may be simpler for these early-stage companies to list the Key Employees by name. In later rounds, it
may be appropriate to include others, e.g., important salespeople or consultants and define Key Employees by
function (e.g., division director).
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To the Company’s knowledge, no Key Employee intends to terminate
employment with the Company or is otherwise likely to become unavailable to
continue as a Key Employee, nor does the Company have a present intention
to terminate the employment of any of the foregoing. The employment of each
employee of the Company is terminable at the will of the Company (Section
2.16(d)).
The entrepreneur is now an employee - an important employee - but an employee
nonetheless, that can be fired at the discretion of the “the company” - or in other words, at the
discretion of the board of directors in which they most likely have a minority representation.
In other words, the entrepreneur is no longer in control; their status as owner has been
wrested away from their work as a creator. They are now merely an employee with a really
generous stock plan. As we will see, this transformation bears directly on what sorts of
commercialization efforts get funded in the cleantech space.

Cash	
  and	
  Control	
  

JB: The VCs will cut your legs off if you don't deliver on time, they will
basically own your company or you will be out on your ear because you never
be able to bring any more money in… They drive a very hard bargain.

A major part of the new spirit of capitalism outlined by Boltanski and Chiapello
involves the embrace of flexibility, the reality of which often means bending to the needs of
post-industrial capital and its precarious labor markets. The becoming-employee of
entrepreneurs in this cleantech market is quite similar, though here malleability is less about
the ability or willingness to move from project to project, but about the ability to be
controlled, told what to do and how to do it by a board of directors who know best how to
succeed.
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Janeway makes this clear in his theoretical memoir, Doing Capitalism in the
Innovation Economy (2012). A former corporate raider turned venture capitalist, Janeway’s
analysis begins with some basic observations about how successful venture capitalists need to
reign in entrepreneur-inventors. In his own version of the kill the inventor trope, Janeway
recounts an adage from his VC days, “No business is so good that it cannot be destroyed by
incompetent management” (55).
Janeway discusses ‘cash and control’ as the basic principle of success in the
innovation economy. Both, Janeway argues, provide a level of autonomy from the market
that allows a new business to make the decisions necessary to succeed. This control should be
in the hands of the VCs like himself; rational, business saavy investors who know what is
best for a firm’s commercial and financial health. He explains, “The venture capitalist’s
responsibility… is to follow the cash with intense focus in order to observe in timely fashion
when the entrepreneur’s vision and the recalcitrant reality of the market deviate too far from
each other” (78). He regales his readers with tales of successful iterations of this process,
where businesses were rescued from their incapable entrepreneurs, and recast on solid
footing. He rehearses the golden rule of venture capital: “Whoever has the gold, makes the
rules” (59).
Janeway recalls his mentor, who helped him become a venture capitalist:
Fred’s excellence lay in his ability to take a business apart analytically and
dissect the interaction of its functional operations and its financial cash flows.
He was a notoriously difficult human being, treating CEOs as subordinates
and subordinates as trash (53).
While some of the entrepreneurs I interviewed welcomed the discipline that venture
investors would bring their project, others were far more skeptical, and understood the risks
that working with venture capitalists could entail. FP, an inventor I met at the Funder’s
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Forum, is a good example. He is working on a groundbreaking technology that transforms
low-density hydro-kinetic energy into electricity. He has received grants from both the Navy
as well as NYSERDA for this work. The latter gave him access to their EIR program. The
entrepreneur in residence that he was assigned to suggested he take her class, entitled “So
you want to be an entrepreneur?”
“How presumptuous” he tells me. “No. No, I never wanted to be an entrepreneur. I have
to become an entrepreneur because it is the only way I can continue to develop this
technology.”
FP thoroughly understands how inventors are treated as a disposable element in the
commercialization process – a nuisance, hanging on to the intellectual property that they’ve
created, getting in the way of this intellectual property functioning like an optimally profitgenerating commodity. They are an inefficiency, a drag on commercialization, a fetter on the
path of commercialization. He tells me,
FP: It doesn't matter to them - I mean what if you're a sex trafficker - you need
the beauty of these young women but you don't give a damn about them. Its
the same thing, its a commodity and as soon as the inventor has served their
purpose then you just get rid of them as fast as possible. And without
recognizing that they do, what they have, is what gave you your success.

Mad	
  entrepreneurs	
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FP’s sensational metaphor holds a fair bit of truth. Once an A round has been completed,
it is not uncommon for founders to be ousted from their startup, in favor of management that
the new board of directors finds more suitable to the task at hand.44
Venture capitalists explain this transition in a slightly more positive light. One tells me:
PZ: Well it kind of goes with the territory that people who start companies are
not necessarily the ones that should lead them once they are bigger. I mean
there are plenty of examples of people that do both but it is a very different
skill set. Someone that sets something early may be bored by the time that it is
discovered or isn’t a people person or isn’t a bureacrat, and so as companies
get bigger they need professionals; professional management that sometimes
entrepreneurs can step up to but sometimes they can’t or they don’t want to.

PC, a boutique investment banker from the Funders Forum, has collapsed the creative
production of inventors and entrepreneurs into the single category of the ‘mad entrepreneur.’
These are people who may have great technologies and ideas, but “they don't want to give up
their 1st child, so that is why they never become anything other than a great idea.” PC
continues,
PC: The mad entrepreneur or the mad scientist is somebody who has a great
idea and they may be onto something very good but they don't have the
capital. They've got their 2nd mortgage going; they have tapped out their
friends and family; they think it's a great idea but they're never going to get it
to market because they don't want to give up control… If I put them in front of
an investor, that investor’s going to be mad at me and I've had it happen... It
doesn't take long - a couple of wrong answers from the mad scientists…

44

When founding entrepreneurs are let go, their stock is subject to a repurchase agreement
which assures that if they leave - whether voluntarily or not - the company can purchase their
stock back from them at the lesser of the fair market value at time of agreement or at the
present time (a new valuation determined by the board of directors). The company will need
this equity to offer to new employees who they may want to attract as replacements.
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PC is clearly frustrated by these mad entrepreneurs that refuse to give up control, and
who are, as a result, unable to make a convincing pitch to investors. As a strategic consultant,
he is frustrated that these inventors will never allow themselves to become a smart
investment for smart money:
PC: The entrepreneur doesn't realize that we could make him or her more
money than they thought ever possible - even if they don’t own a majority
interest because we are going to bring resources to bear to make this a viable
significant business. And the math is simple: what is 100% of 0? If I’m the
mad entrepreneur and I own hundred percent control of my business it's going
to be worth 0. That's one end of the scale; versus going with giving up control.
10% of a lot is a lot.

Another consultant, LD, tells me that the problem with companies presenting at the
Funders Forum is that “most of the time the crazy inventor is still at the helm because he
thinks he's got the world's leading technology that's worth $25 billion and he doesn't want to
let it go which is the impediment to almost all of those new companies.”
TC, an entrepreneur-inventor in his own right, explains the inventor’s inflated sense of
self importance; they invent something new, a few people tell them ‘hey, that’s really great,’
and then
TC: Their ego takes a 360 or 180 and they are just king of the world. And
there's nothing you can do about it. I've seen guys take [really large] checks
and push them back across the table saying ‘not good enough’.

After pausing for a moment, he has a moment of self reflection:
TC: I think it is in all of us. I often thought… Well, my dad is a working
class guy and… I have traveled all over North America and you know I have
had big paychecks and I've had small paychecks, and I have worked for people
just because I wanted to learn but… the 1st time I was offered $5 million, for a
part of a company — there was a large company that wanted to buy a rubber
de-vulcanization process that I had half of. I owned half of it. I was made the
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offer: $5 million. I had to go home and think about it. During the night I
realized that I was also one of these people - I thought that $5 million wasn't
enough. I looked at it and I thought jeez I can spend $1 million there, and I can
do this and this, and I thought this is not enough and by midnight I was
disgusted with myself, I figured God this could easily happen to anybody. I
realized that you can make a moral judgment it's just that when you are faced
with that what do you do and how you react?

TC is an interesting character that I observed go through a subtle transformation disciplined by the market - over the course of my fieldwork. TC presented at one of the first
meetings I attended. He was a perfect example of the “mad entrepreneur,” giving a terrible
pitch that left most of the room - PC included, entirely disappointed. After his presentation,
TC lamented with me about how investors want their returns too quickly, how money is
squeezing out any possibility for there to be a Tesla or Edison today. But a year later, after
becoming an investor in his own startup (thanks to a home equity loan), and even enlisting
another Funders Forum regular to serve as his CEO, his tune had changed noticeably. He was
no longer convinced that it was investors who were limiting the innovation process. Instead,
he told me of a number of “game changers that have never happened” not due to the effects
of big business or investors. Instead “A lot of them are shut down by inventor’s egos and just
getting ahead of the curve or falling ahead of the curve.” These inventors were guilty of being
“ahead of their time,” and not sufficiently focused upon making immediately
commercializable innovations.
TC identifies the problem as too much ego - inventors are too self-absorbed and have an
overly inflated sense of their importance and of the value of their work. As we’re leaving the
diner, TC tells me about his ideal research agenda:
TC: I feel that I am very good at what I do and I know that I don't have a high
ego. I have often said to other people that if there is one thing that I could do
in my life it would be to create a doorway where you walk through and your
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ego falls out. Because that is the worst part of design; you can have a team of
people in a room... but it just takes one person to screw it up.

With statements such as these, the struggle to control creativity is cast as a battle between
smart money and irrational egos - whose irrationality is precisely in their unwillingness to
submit to smart money’s knowledge, guidance and control. These egos are what get in the
way of making an impact-as-capital.
From the perspective of smart money, such recalcitrant egos are a clear warning sign.
As one venture capitalist explains to me,
OG: Let’s say you sit down on week two of looking at a possible investment
you sit down with the scientist and talk about the management and you know
that they are the wrong guy just from the personality - but they are insistent
that they be the guy to run it - then you probably don’t make the investment…

Schumpeterian	
  Waste	
  

For Janeway, “the waste generated by experimentation is essential to progress and
tolerance of that waste is a prime condition for leadership at the frontier (168).” By
‘toleration’ it is clear that he means the ability to accept the responsibility of ruthlessly
managing and controlling this surplus creativity. Janeway’s worldview is instructive in this
regard. In order to succeed in the innovation economy, inventors, experimenters and tinkers
all represent a vast sea of waste that must be tolerated and eventually harnessed. This sea of
waste is virtually indistinguishable from what we earlier discussed as the general intellect, or
what Hardt and Negri (2009) would describe as the common. As I’ve argued elsewhere, these
two concepts - the waste and the commons - have been intertwined since the earliest
instances of agrarian capitalism (Goldstein 2013). Whereas ‘Kill the inventor!’ represents a
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general frustration with this waste, there is also a clear acknowledgment of its importance.
Frustrating as they might be, there would be no innovation economy without an innovative,
creative, and inventive population concerned with more than ‘just’ making money.
What results is a complicated, love-hate relationship between capital and creative
labor - the latter is understood to be both necessary and necessarily wasteful. This field of
creative potential can be thought of as the unkempt, untapped and uncontrolled wilderness of
the ‘infosphere,’ a wasteland to be brought under the yoke of planetary improvement - which
in this particular case means the watchful eye of the entrepreneur, disciplined by the venture
investor, disciplined by the limited partners for whom they invest.
This necessary waste of creative producers is, for capital, dangerously uncontrollable.
This is a problem in general with knowledge or information, which we might consider, pace
Polanyi, as a fourth fictitious commodity (Goldstein and Johnson 2014). Knowledge requires
a number of creative legal arrangements in order for it to approximate a commodity, as
intellectual property (IP). And even then, with cutting edge technologies, IP laws are often
not sufficient to allay investor fears. As a result, many VC firms can be secretive about their
investments, keeping them in ‘stealth mode’ so as not to attract unwanted press or copycat
attempts (Gertner 2008).
Creativity always comes with a dangerous remainder, a supplement and potential
surplus that is difficult to contain. FP felt this way about his technology - he was hesitant
even to show me computer illustrations of his technology, and the little I’ve said about his
work is to respect his intense desire for secrecy. Who is to say whether FP is over-reacting?
He explained to me that while his patents can protect specific techniques, he is well aware
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that the work he is doing has far broader implications, and that it would be incredibly easy for
others to develop rival patents that might ultimately eclipse his work.
Out of fear of being outcompeted, he will keep his ideas to himself. This is an
unfortunate, anti-modern turn of events - the shadow reality of a neoliberal digital economy
boasting of open and free information sharing through the peer to peer networks made
possible by the web.
Cleantech	
  and	
  Disruptive	
  Technology	
  

	
  

An entrepreneur presenting at a cleantech event tells the audience, “we think
there is potential for real disruption.” Though in the end, he continues, “we
want to deliver a solution without changing the world.”

As a result of trying to remain ‘realistic’ within the current investment paradigms, radical
ambitions for systemic transformation are envisioned as incremental changes to the status
quo, which are expected to accumulate piecemeal until we arrive at a truly transformational
end point, some time in the unspecified future. This dynamic finds a clear expression in the
contradictory relation between disruption and incremental change. A new clean technology’s
affective force derives from the possibility that it could be truly ‘disruptive,’ yet its
commercial viability most often depends on the exact opposite; limiting novelty to
incremental changes within existing markets. One	
  patent	
  lawyer	
  explains	
  to	
  me,	
  

	
  

FG: I think its great to have disruptive technology, that’s what we need to
move forward and hopefully get out of these economic doldrums that we’re in
right now. But the way things are going to innovate, going forward you’re not
necessarily going to have those, those are rare and most of the things that are
successful are the things that are just slight increments on what already exists,
where it’s innovative enough to overcome obstacles that were not overcome
with the original concept … but only making that minute improvement.
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FG	
  goes	
  on	
  to	
  explain	
  that	
  disruptive	
  technologies	
  are	
  simply	
  “ahead	
  of	
  their	
  time”	
  
and	
  society	
  is	
  not	
  yet	
  ready	
  to	
  accept	
  them,	
  hence	
  their	
  tenuous	
  commercial	
  viability.	
   	
  
	
  

The	
  term	
  ‘disruptive	
  technology’	
  is	
  derived	
  from	
  Harvard	
  Business	
  School	
  

Professor	
  Clayton	
  Christensen’s	
  1997	
  book	
  The	
  Innovator’s	
  Dilemma	
  in	
  which	
  he	
  coins	
  
the	
  term	
  “disruptive	
  innovation.”	
  For	
  Christensen,	
  this	
  refers	
  to	
  a	
  product	
  or	
  service	
  
that	
  initially	
  takes	
  root	
  in	
  smaller	
  markets	
  with	
  lower	
  gross	
  margins,	
  but	
  that	
  once	
  
established,	
  can	
  eventually	
  displace	
  more	
  established	
  competitors,	
  by	
  providing	
  a	
  
fundamentally	
  more	
  efficient	
  or	
  desirable	
  means	
  of	
  addressing	
  a	
  broad	
  need.	
   	
  
	
  

In	
  the	
  cleantech	
  space,	
  the	
  term	
  has	
  largely	
  been	
  taken	
  out	
  of	
  context	
  of	
  

Christensen’s	
  work,	
  and	
  is	
  instead	
  used	
  to	
  refer	
  more	
  generally	
  to	
  technologies	
  with	
  the	
  
potential	
  to	
  radically	
  transform,	
  or	
  disrupt	
  prevailing	
  market	
  patterns.	
  This	
  leaves	
  a	
  fair	
  
amount	
  of	
  leeway	
  for	
  the	
  term.	
  Through	
  month	
  after	
  month	
  of	
  fieldwork,	
  as	
  every	
  
technology	
  presented	
  at	
  the	
  Funders	
  Forum	
  was	
  described	
  by	
  one	
  person	
  or	
  another	
  as	
  
disruptive,	
  or	
  at	
  the	
  very	
  least	
  “potentially	
  disruptive”	
  it	
  became	
  clear	
  that	
  these	
  
disruptions	
  can	
  be	
  anything	
  from	
  seizing	
  market	
  share	
  in	
  a	
  well	
  established	
  market	
  to	
  
radically	
  transforming	
  how	
  urban	
  transportation	
  systems	
  function.	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  who	
  
or	
  what	
  is	
  disrupted	
  is	
  left	
  relatively	
  unspecified,	
  allowing	
  the	
  concept	
  to	
  shift	
  between	
  
visions	
  of	
  impact-‐as-‐capital	
  and	
  impact-‐beyond-‐capital.	
  Regardless	
  of	
  its	
  presumed	
  
referent,	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  disruption	
  betrayed	
  a	
  techno-‐fetishistic	
  belief	
  that	
  the	
  right	
  new	
  
technologies	
  can	
  both	
  radically	
  transform	
  our	
  industrial	
  society	
  while	
  simultaneously	
  
capturing	
  a	
  massive	
  share	
  of	
  existing	
  markets	
  -‐	
  those	
  very	
  markets	
  that	
  depend	
  upon	
  
the	
  industrial	
  society	
  being	
  disrupted	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  place.	
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Venture	
  Capitalists	
  consider	
  themselves	
  well	
  attuned	
  to	
  identifying	
  potentially	
  

disruptive	
  technologies.	
  This	
  is	
  part	
  of	
  what	
  makes	
  them	
  such	
  ‘smart’	
  money.	
  
Furthermore,	
  this	
  focus	
  on	
  disruption	
  is	
  part	
  of	
  what	
  the	
  broader	
  cleantech	
  community	
  
embraces	
  as	
  the	
  more	
  general	
  and	
  generalized	
  intelligence	
  of	
  their	
  market.	
  Cleantech	
  is	
  
-‐	
  almost	
  categorically	
  it	
  would	
  seem	
  for	
  some-‐	
  disruptive	
  technology.	
  
	
  
Adulteration	
  of	
  Cleantech	
  Innovation	
  

In the shift of control from the entrepreneur-creator to the investor-capitalist, there is
a narrowing of innovation, a closing off of all the socio-technological possibilities that are not
profitable enough. When economic sociologists assess the success or failure of an innovation
system, this limiting effect is left unacknowledged (cf Ferrary and Granovetter 2009).
Instead, the investment decisions of smart money represent a virtuous social Darwinism, in
which only the deserving are given a chance to succeed. As a result, innovative potential is
collapsed into market potential; the only viable and valuable instances of the former are those
who support the latter. Or we might say: the laws of beauty that breathe life into the creative
process are constantly being channeled through the laws of the market.
The result is nothing short of a violence enacted upon creativity - the creativity that lies at
the heart of innovation and runs through the core of cleantech’s sense of impactfulness. This
is, as I have suggested, an extension of the violence of the wage labor relationship, not just
because funded entrepreneurs are technically employees, but because all entrepreneurs, or
entrepreneurialism more broadly, gives voice to the creative potential of the laboring
population, while at the same time this creative potential is constantly being disciplined, and
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brought in line with the dictates of capital. In this last section, I ask that we shift focus from
the entrepreneurs themeselves to the creativity that they channel - the innovations that they
conceive, some small portion of which actually come to re-shape, or even ‘disrupt’ our
shared world.
Just as Boltanski and Chiapello show us how critique is recuperated by capital into new
legitimizing discourses, the same can be said of innovation, invention and creativity. Ideas
with the potential to disrupt the everyday functioning of our economy, to transform consumer
society and with it the foundations of capital’s profitability, are consistently being developed,
and as such presenting an ever present threat to capital, which in order to maintain its
expanded reproduction both needs this exogenous creativity, and needs to make sure it
remains sufficiently under control. The result is akin to the recuperation of critique - only
here it is a recuperation of disruption, the re-articulation of new techno-social possibilities in
and through the logic of venture investment and commercial gain.
Consider, for instance the shift in what “good enough” signifies in relation to clean
technologies. JB explained to me after a startup presented a new battery technology at the
Funders Forum,
JB: That’s a pretty good battery - good enough - not the best, but sometimes
you just need good enough. It doesn’t need to be the best paper clip, just a
good enough paper clip.
The transformation of what it means to be ‘good enough’ is worth reflecting upon. Alex
Madrigal’s (2011) history of renewable energy technologies begins with the recognition that
much of what is considered to be cleantech entails rediscovering past technologies,
improving them and then presenting the improvement as new, cutting edge innovations. For
instance, throughout the medieval period and through until the 19th century, wind power was
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an essential technology. As the US population expanded westward, small windmills dotted to
the Western Plains, providing the power necessary to pump water out from underground
aquifers, and making widespread irrigation possible. These windmills were local, do-ityourself productions. Families with little resources had to rely on their own manufacturing
capabilities – and the result was a profusion of homemade, yet perfectly functional windmills
varying in shape, size, and material. Their names were as diverse as the bricoleurs who
constructed them: “jumbos, merry-go-rounds, battle-axes, mock=turbines, dutch (46).” One
way or another, these windmills provided the power necessary to pump water out from
underground.
These windmills held their ground until cheap coal, railroads and eventually, in the
beginning of the 20th century, rural electrification all eventually supplanted what had been,
for the small farms that had created them, good enough. However, a new form of ‘good
enough’ was gaining currency at the time, the good enough of the consumer marketplace.
Whereas relatively inefficient technologies such as windmills were ‘good enough’ because
they met the productive and reproductive needs of household producers, relatively inefficient
commodities were ‘good enough’ because they satisfied just enough consumer need for just
enough time so as to remain viable (Schumacher 1999; Slade 2006; Strasser 1999). In other
words, cheaply made, disposable commodities were good enough, so long as their lack of
quality or durability did not dissuade consumers from making a purchase.
These windmills were precisely the sort of local, distributed “appropriate
technologies” that would later be embraced by 60s and 70s countercultural movements, and
even proposed as a cornerstone of Amory Lovins’ soft energy path. These were ‘good
enough’ technologies that would sacrifice economic efficiency for affordability,
environmental sustainability and community control. Many of the technologies being
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developed as cleantech can be traced directly back to this period, and these appropriate
technologies. And yet, with cleantech, appropriate technology comes to be twisted into a
much different conception of ‘good enough’ - now expressed as ‘good enough for the
market’ as opposed to good enough to meet local and particular needs. Inefficient
technologies for efficient social reproduction are supplanted by inefficient technologies for
efficient capital accumulation (short turnover times that maximize sales) (Schnaiberg and
Gould 1994).
This transformation was regularly on display at the Funders Forum, where presenters
were pushed to focus on the recurring revenue streams that their new technologies might
generate, as opposed to any disruptive or transformative possibilities. Often JB and PL would
call this the “razor blade model,” referring to the innovative early 20th century marketing
innovation of Gillette, who sold cheap razor handles that only worked with their proprietary
disposable blades, hence turning a durable goods market (the razor) into a disposable goods
market (the blades).45 With this razor blade model, efficiency of life gives way to efficiency
of profit – and relatively durable, relatively inefficient gives way to potentially efficient,
relatively disposable (Schnaiberg 1980).
For instance, at one Funders Forum a waste-to-energy company presented. They used
a plasma-based pyrolysis process to treat waste-water and create a potent synegas in the
process. One of the more ‘inventive’ members of their team gave a spirited overview of how
the technology worked, explaining that they see the possibility to one day become energy

45

We’re all too familiar with this strategy, still in operation today. Not just with razors, but
printer cartridges, water filters, and a number of other disposable components of otherwise
semi-durable goods.
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positive - in other words, to generate more energy as an output then the energy used as input.
Upon hearing this, JB immediately interrupted the presentation,
JB: I’m not here because I’m interested in perpetual motion machines. I’m
here because I’m interested in business.
He continues, telling the presenter, and the room, that the problem with pyrolysis
technologies is that they can be too efficient.
JB: Give me three million dollars and I can get rid of all the disposed tires in
Florida. But then what? What do I do then? You need recurring revenue to
make a business.
The most fundamental embrace of this commercial logic was built into a standard
dimension of investor pitches, which we can call ‘presuming the market.’ A successful
presentation must identify a market, quantify it, and then make the case that they can capture
all or at least a significant portion of this market. These are imperfect projections, to say the
least – the size of the market is determined ceterus paribus – and therefore does not take
likely feedback mechanisms into account – or the ways in which the market-in-waiting will
shift with the introduction of new technologies. In some ways it is an important assumption –
that the market will remain at near or above its present state – coupled with the presumption
that the new technology is providing whatever resource is in question in a more economically
efficient way, we then have the presumption of Jevon’s paradox – that the decreases realized
from efficiency savings will be offset by an increase in total use.
In other words, there is a way in which the market is naturalized, presumed as that
which clean technologies target, and then insulated from the effects clean technologies might
ideally have upon the market. For instance, if the market in indoor lightning is $5 billion, and
I claim to have an alternative that cuts down total costs (such as a durable LED bulb that lasts
10 times as long as alternatives) Then if we assume demand stays the same, our technology
361

has the potential to reduce this to a $500 million dollar market. We could push these
hypothetical equations even further: let’s say that the market in washing machines is $5
billion and the market in consumer refrigerators is $5 billion. New energy efficient
appliances will still tap into these markets without much change, but what about an even
‘cleaner’ option? One presenter at the Funder’s Forum was developing an integrated
commercial property that would use a central heat pump to produce cold air for one business
(that required large coolers) and hot air and water for another business (such as a
laundromat). What if such a technology were used to create neighborhood scale communal
laundromats and coolers? A large-scale transformation to such technology would
dramatically reduce the scale of these two aforementioned markets, not to mention overall
energy consumption, and is, as one might imagine, entirely out of the realm of feasibility in
the cleantech space.46
The possibility that the markets targeted by clean technologies may themselves be a
sign of the waste that needs to be eliminated or ‘disrupted’ is a taboo subject in the cleantech
space, an encroachment into the sacred domain of consumer sovereignty. It is a challenge to
the sanctity of our American way of life which remains - even if critiqued in any number of
ways - from our absurd climate control to our large cars and consumptive habits - the
unspoken engine of economic activity. Cleantech is, accordingly, built in and upon the wasteeconomy or “treadmill of production (Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994)” of a
20th century economy predicated upon excessive consumption and disposability. Any ‘smart’

46

Schnaiberg (1980) writes about the ideology of feasibility, a discourse that is still very
much in effect.
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entrepreneur will present their cleantech solutions in ways that do not challenge this
economic paradigm.
In some ways, this speaks to a central conundrum facing cleantech; in order to be
profitable enough one must succeed in the waste-producing markets of consumer excess that
have largely created - or at least tremendously exacerbated - the very ecological conditions
that have precipated the need to go green/clean. To the extent that making a good business
requires something akin to the razor blade model of recurring revenue, there is a sense that
making a good business means complying with the logic of disposability and consumer
excess that fuels the markets that green technologies are meant to capture… and then clean.
What if the very status of being a good business, so long as good businesses are those
which are profitable within the context of the currently existing economy, means that clean
can only ever be tethered to that which is dirty? We came upon a related idea in the last
section - ‘clean’ is a transitive, relational concept. Something must first be dirty if it is to
eventually become clean, and therefore clean technologies always presuppose and depend
upon a dirty environment/industry/economy as their terrain of wasted potential.
As Schnaiberg and his colleagues have argued, this is, ultimately, the intractable flaw
with theories of ecological modernization or visions of green capitalism (Schnaiberg and
Gould 1994; Pellow et al 2000). The naturalized pressures of market competition may (as my
father has, for decades, reminded me) spur innovation, but as should now be clear, this is a
highly selective, narrowing process, predicated on the preservation and expansion of capital
first and foremost. Should we succeed in also doing some modest good for the environment
or society, this is – as LoGerfo explained – a welcome, though not necessary, side effect.
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The vision of techno-social salvation presented by green capitalism or ecological
modernization ignores this financial and economic sidelining of ecological considerations,
and focuses instead on the congruence between the market and those few green technologies
that it is able to support. Were we to consider these commercially viable technologies as
representative of the universe of possible and desirable socio-ecological innovations, then
indeed, capital can and will lead us towards a new ecological modernity. But, to the extent
that we acknowledge the partiality of this sample, the limited set of technologies that are
‘good enough’ for venture capital and commercial markets, a different sort of picture
emerges. The techno-social possibilities imagined in the utopian visions of green capitalists
texts or in ecological modernization theorizing are for the most part excluded, delegitimized
and left unfunded by capital’s embrace of innovation. What we know to be possible, our
capacities as an enterprising, innovation social body, capable of making a greener, saner
world, are being corralled, disciplined, narrowed or even adulterated by the necessity of
making money. Disruptive technologies are expected to disrupt market shares, and not the
unsustainable patterns of socio-ecological reproduction that we’ve come to normalize as our
‘modern’ way of life.

Adulteration of Cleantech Innovation
Throughout my fieldwork, individuals told me, in more or less straightforward ways, that
fiduciary responsibility was a fetter upon smart investments. No one would directly present
me with a critique of fiduciary responsibility - the concept is as naturalized and normalized as
the idea of a market - fiduciary responsibility is not malleable or up for question, it just is.
However, during my interviews, I would regularly have people tell me what they would do if
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they had the sort of money that someone like Bill Gates or Mark Zuckerberg has (it was
almost always these two). With that sort of money they would be willing to make risky
investments in cleantech, they would be willing to support the technologies that are getting
passed over by smart money. These are self-made entrepreneurial success stories, and
therefore as billionaires they are still - so it is assumed - just as unencumbered and
autonomous as they were as leaders of their respective firms. Hence unlike venture
capitalists, who have to invest other peoples money and therefore operate ‘responsibly’ these
billionaires can - if they so choose - invest their own money, and therefore have to answer to
no one but themselves. They can be as ‘foolish’ as investors as they were as entrepreneurs;
they can be true risk-takers and visionaries. As opposed to venture capital, they would, or
could, be entrepreneurial capital. So many of the individuals I spoke with seem to think that
were they to have unmediated access to money, they would create alternative standards - they
would not necessarily make the decisions forced upon them by limited partners and fiduciary
duties.
PL: I mean if I was investing if I had my own money it would be a different
thing I would have a much different criteria.

If we abstract here for a moment- it appears that these professionals see the power of
money - the power of putting large accumulations of social wealth to work. This is the power
to produce at a general scale; it is what makes the general industriousness of capital possible and not unlike Marx, they are enticed by the idea, by the world-making potential of
accumulating and directing collective social wealth towards the production of beautiful
technologies, products, worlds. These are businesspeople who currently are in the business of
making money, but who would very likely prefer to be in the business of making worlds.
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On the one hand, this is merely an expression of money as the encapsulation of social
wealth: power, prestige, and the capacity to act. But on the other hand, there is a sense that
money - or social wealth - is being limited in the actions that it can take as ‘responsible’ or
‘smart’ money. In other words - money may be too smart for its own good, too committed to
its own reproduction, and therefore incapable of taking the necessary risks or supporting the
necessary wastes of experimental excess that can lead to transformative innovations. Money
may be powerful, and smart and magnetizing, but it is also uncreative, self-preserving, and
somewhat stifling. Hence, we hear calls for capital-beyond-capital, wealthy individuals or
wealthy states playing the role of capital unbound from its responsibility to privilege its own
expanded reproduction above all else.
This is the creative, virtuous dimension of entrepreneurial modernity, embodied in a
desire to create, to make and to disrupt. Now of course, their techno-fetish needs to be
critiqued - as well as the masculinist (and neo-colonial) bias implicit in much of this
modernizing drive (Merchant 1982). However, perhaps this need not be a critique of the drive
itself, of this desire to manage and direct the productive capacity of social labor, but only of
the ‘laws of beauty’ orienting these particular efforts: a vision of technological solutions to
ecological problems for a world that largely holds on to the excesses of first world privilege
and simply attempts to extend and secure them for many (but certainly not most) of our
planet’s inhabitants.
Venture capital beyond capital
During my interviews, I regularly asked participants whether it was possible for a good
technology to make for a bad business. The question elicited two very different responses.
For some, including a number of venture capitalists, this was incontrovertibly the case. They
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had themselves seen countless technologies that were socially useful but not economically
viable fail to get funding and therefore stall in their tracks.
For others, the very question was confusing, garnering quick responses such as,
“Well, I guess by definition if it can’t find its way to commercialization then it’s not good.”
While it was undeniably the case that ‘smart money’ had a lot of say in what technologies
were able to proceed down the path of commercialization, for some this a good thing - smart
money would pick the smartest technologies - and for others it was an unfortunate limitation
on what is possible. Those who maintained faith in the wisdom of smart money and the
system of investment it held sway over could be considered planetary improvers, where the
only problem with money is that there is just not enough of it to go around. The logic of
investment capital, the smarts of money, does not need to change, but must simply expand to
the scale of opportunity that saving the planet affords it. Those who were willing to be more
critical however, and recognize the limitations of the venture investing model that dominated
the early stage cleantech space, instead expressed an interesting version of green
developmentalism, very much akin to Mazzacuto’s proposal for an entrepreneurial state or
Janeway’s prescriptions for success in the innovation economy. Only here, the vision was
expressed as a desire for an innovation economy in which smart money could operate
unconstrained by the fiduciary duty that binds it to a short-term profit driven investment
paradigm that is ill-suited for a large portion of the clean technologies that they truly want to
see succeed. What we might call venture capital beyond capital.
Janeway’s argument is important here - it is a Keynesian, Minskyian argument for the
role of the state in the making of a healthy innovation economy. Essentially he argues that
there are portions of the innovation economy that are simply not financeable in the private
sector - they are too risky and the rewards are therefore not sufficient to pass any test of
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fiduciary responsibility. The entrepreneurial state has two primary roles that distinguish it
from Adam Smith’s night watchman state, “to invest in speculative science and technology
before commercially motivated firms and their investors can envision either an economic or
financial return; and to ensure that the burden of Keynesian waste on economic growth is
minimized”(279).
The key, Janeway argues, is that the innovation economy has always and will continue to
depend upon “sources of funding that are decoupled from concern for economic return” (1).
The numbers do not add up; they should not add up, because the market mechanisms in
which the numbers operate are structurally incapable of supporting the ‘wasteful’
development of new technologies. This is a fundamental shift - from a vision of all-knowing
and all capable markets that can do no wrong and have no equal - to a vision of the world in
which some things - some incredibly important economic things and investments - the market
simply cannot support. In other words, there are capable economic actors that must supersede
the market - accomplish what the market cannot accomplish.
Oh	
  wait	
  the	
  state	
  has	
  a	
  trillion	
  dollars	
  
	
  
Here is where the calls to ‘be like China’ that we found in green developmentalism are
echoed directly in the cleantech space. Throughout my fieldwork China would regularly enter
into conversations as a place with two mythologized characteristics. First, it was where
intellectual property law was weak, and all new technologies were at extreme risk of being
stolen and copied. Second, it was a nation unified by a strategic green industrial policy, as
encoded in their 5-year plans and evidenced in the ways the state banking system would
provide financial support to cleantech enterprises (as well as the new colonial expansion of
land grabbing throughout Africa and the rest of the less-developed world).
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The closest U.S. equivalent of China’s 5-year plan is the quadrennial energy review
(QER) recently proposed by the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST). While not as targeted as China’s plan, the QER would lay out plans for short,
medium and long term energy policy objectives, addressing economic, environmental and
security priorities. Of course, it matters a great deal who is conducting this review - and one
can only imagine that the body would be somewhat similar to the composition of PCAST,
which was composed almost entirely of industry leaders. Hence, far from being a
counterweight to the market, the proposal can likely become a means of further entrenching
corporate interests into the fabric of governance.
So here then is the unspoken tension - there is a desire for the state to have stronger
authority over and in the market - but then visions of how this authority might actually
operate are simply extensions of corporate or market logic into the state. Such visions are not
looking for a state to control the market or to provide a double movement in any liberal or
Polanyian sense, but for the state to function as an even more powerful agent of capital capital that does not need to reproduce itself - but can instead rely upon the manna of state
budgets (whether tax base, debt base, bailouts or likely all three) to endlessly fund investment
and market expansion.47
This speaks to an imaginary that I regularly came across in a number of different guises the desire to both operate as capital and to operate without or beyond the rules of capital. Part
of what defines the Schumpeterian entrepreneurial spirit is an embrace of explicitly non-

47

In many respects this is a return to the state examined in Baran and Sweezy’s work,
Monopoly Capitalism (1966). Schnaiberg (1980: 241) quotes Sweezy and Magdoff:
“Like a leaking tire, the economy must be unflaggingly pumped if it is not to go flat and
come to a full stop… In principle, government finances can operate to inflate or deflate the
economy. In practice, they almost always operate as an inflator.”
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rational activity - what Steve Jobs famously expressed at a Stanford University
commencement speech as “staying foolish” (Mazzucato 2013). For Janeway, this is
characterized as the necessary ‘Schumpeterian waste’ of an innovation economy - a
willingness to allow entrepreneurs to experiment and fail. For Mazzucato, the good green
developmentalist state would be allowed to make ‘foolish’ investments in high-risk
technologies and entirely new paradigms of techno-social advance. Mazzucato discusses this
as a regime of patient capital - which suggests that the two are linked, that it is ‘foolish’ for
capital to be patient. Smart money would agree. There is a noticeable resistance to these
smarts, a frustration with the limitations that they place upon innovation and most
importantly, in realizing an impact-beyond-capital. Accordingly, there is a desire to be in
control of social wealth, and to deploy that wealth as irresponsible, ‘foolish’ capital meaning capital that does not have to justify its circulation through its own self-expansion.
Prometheus has been displaced - it is capital that needs to be unbound.
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Chapter	
  10	
  (conclusion):	
  Occupy	
  our	
  entrepreneurialism?	
  

Plasma	
  fusion	
  beyond	
  capital	
  
	
  
One of the most fascinating technologies I saw presented at the Funders Forum was
an a-neutronic plasma fusion reactor being produced by Eric Lerner48 and his company,
Lawrenceville Plasma Physics (LPP). LPP is one of a handful of firms attempting to develop
a viable means of generating energy from controlled nuclear fusion reactions in small-scale
reactors. Lerner’s technology relies on knotting filaments of plasma upon themselves in a
reactor filled with a non-radioactive boron-based fuel. The plasma knot creates the
astronomically high temperature (over one billion degrees Celsius) required to create a fusion
reaction, whose output is a small amount of excess energy that can then be harnessed. As he
explains, his reactor is currently able to create extremely short pulses of fusion that each
generate about the same amount of energy that is in four pistachio nuts. If they can cycle
these pulses fast enough (which is what they are currently working on) the reactor will be
able to produce a useful amount of energy with minimal negative side effects.
Lerner was brought to the Funders’ Forum by DD, who was working at the time in a
consulting capacity, trying to help LPP raise the capital they need to continue with their very

48

Lerner is the only research subject who waived his right to confidentiality that I have
chosen to identify directly – largely because the singularity of his work would make it almost
impossible to tell his story without revealing who he in fact was.
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early stage work.49 DD has been a salesman his whole life - from carnival prizes to windows
to cleantech companies. It is quite likely that each of his products was hocked with equal
fervor, but nonetheless, when I met him LPP was the pitch-du-jour and he assured me, as
well as anyone at the Funders’ Forum who would listen, that “This focus fusion thing has
biblical implications.”
DD has complete faith in Lerner, who would likely be much further along if he just had a
steadier stream of funding, but much less faith in a the world that seems intent on
withholding its capital from the project. He tells me, “There is no vision in this world. There
are no visionaries… that have money.”
Of course there are visionaries – DD would likely count himself as one – but it is
visionaries with money that matter. The problem, he explains - and others tell me the same is that most rich people conduct their investments through professional firms that operate
‘responsibly’ on their behalf. This fiduciary responsibility, as we’ve seen, separates
individuals from their money, and therefore separates potential visionaries from the means
with which they could, potentially, make their visions matter.
Lerner himself knows that it is a tall order for investors, who really do have to believe in
something big. As he explains to me,
EL: I personally think that it will be difficult to fully implement a technology
as disruptive as focus fusion under capitalism, but it can be started. We can do

49

In the past Lerner recieved money from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab, and in truth, the
work he is doing is far more likely to be found in state-funded academic labs than in the
commercial sector. However, for a number of reasons Lerner has not been able to access
institutional support and therefore currently is attempting the hurculean task of bootstrapping
a plasma physics lab and nuclear fusion reactor in a small commercial space in central New
Jersey.
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the science and we can get it started and I don't think that I am deceiving my
investors that they could have a big return but the problem is a complete
transition would radically undermine all the values that [their wealth is based
upon].

Marx, Schumpeter and Innovation
It is not that too much wealth is produced. But from time to time, too much
wealth is produced in its capitalist, antagonistic forms (Marx 1976: 367)

For Marx, there was a fundamental and fundamentally unstable and unsustainable
contradiction between “the general social power into which capital has developed and the
private power of individual capitalists over these conditions of production (1976: 373).”
Marx held faith that capital’s modernizing drive, its expanding base of general production
and the flourishing of universal and communal labor would lay the grounds for a general and
communal form of social production, unmediated by capital’s historically specific,
contradictory form of value and the abstract domination that it entails. He called this process
of liberated production and reproduction communism. The concept has been much maligned
ever since, in no small part due to Marx’s critique, but even more so to the calcifying cold
war politics that defined communism as the specific form of authoritarian state capitalism
promoted by Stalin, and the cultural politics - or red scare - that has ensued ever since.
But if we pull back from this politically charged precipice for a moment, we can
appreciate the substance and spirit of Marx’s hopeful critique, and the ways in which it
resonates with an embrace of Schumpeterian entrepreneurialism. Schumpeter argues that the
entrepreneur need not be motivated by profit, and that therefore innovation and the dynamism
it affords are actually quite possible in other social formations. As Blaug (1985) explains, “If
we taxed away the profits of entrepreneurship or cut off industrial entrepreneurship by
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collectivizing the means of production, all we might do, according to Schumpeter, is to drive
entrepreneurship into non-economic activity (86).” And for Marx,
In so far as the work of the capitalist does not arise from the production
process simply as a capitalist process…in so far therefore as it arises from the
form of labour as social labour, from the combination and cooperation of
many to a common result, it is just as independent of capital as is this form
itself, once it has burst its capitalist shell. To say that this labour, as capitalist
labour, is necessarily the function of the capitalist means nothing more than
that the vulgus cannot conceive that forms developed in the womb of the
capitalist mode of production may be separated and liberated from their
antithethcial capitalist character (Marx 1976: 511).

There is an emerging sense that money and its markets are not as omnipotent and
independently virtuous as was supposed in and through neoliberal common sense. There is a
rift opening - I think - between the acknowledgment of money’s power - its ability to
mobilize social wealth - and the logic of money - the way it operates as capital. I don’t mean
to blow this too far out of proportion - I’m not suggesting that there is an emerging
revolutionary conscience brewing in the cleantech space - but I do think there is an
interesting desire for non-market coordination and rationality that is beginning to surface in
numerous places, and that is worth considering, identifying, and pushing. If not the market,
than who? That is the question we get to ask after neoliberalism. Once we’ve stopped
believing in the market as the ideal decision making apparatus, we get to re-engage with
those classic political questions that have been so successfully expunged from economic life who will or should be making decisions? What sorts of decisions? What are we trying to
accomplish even? Who is this we?
There are - of course - institutions asking such questions - in particular the military. The
U.S. military has and continues to play a large role in the funding of early stage technologies.
From Doriot’s WWII work to dedicated funding programs such as the Defense Advanced
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Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the U.S. military has been one of the most consistent
state agencies funding the research and development of early stage technologies (Block and
Keller 2011; Hooks and Smith 2005). When green developmentalists call for a green
‘Manhattan Project’ the intent is to suggest that large scale, state-funded research is
necessary. However, it is not inconsequential that this particular reference is to a project that
gave rise to weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. state, via its military research projects in
particular, has been quite effective at supporting innovation and early stage technologies, but
we also can’t forget that the primary technological product of the US (by value) is weapons
systems (Hooks and Smith 2005). While this present analysis has focused on the narrowing
effects of capital and the pressures of fiduciary responsibility, it is also important to
interrogate further the narrowing effects of military funding and the pressures of national
security, and not simply accept the technophilic celebration of the R&D arm of the military
industrial complex for ‘creating the internet’ (cf., Block and Keller 2011; Turner 2008).
Beyond their R&D efforts, other arms of the U.S. military are planning for a future of
instability; they are planning to remain in control - they are the ‘we’ asking what should we
be doing. If we took Randy Martin’s (2007) analysis at its word, and saw neoliberal
militarization as a financialized process of securitization, risk creation and management then what seems to be emerging in and through this ongoing process is a counter-moment to
neoliberalism, one concerned instead with planning for stability, for coordinating basic and
essential resources - for remaining in control.
We need more than just military versions of non-market coordination and control. The
cleantech space - though in many ways beholden to the military for funding - has so much
potential to be more than a mere appendage of the warfare state. In fact so much of the core
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technologies they are focusing on rehash appropriate technologies of earlier periods that were
developed in opposition to militarism and capital (wind power, solar power, to name two).
Politically then, it seems important to acknowledge this shift - the fact that ‘we’ do not
think the market is the only thing out there that can or should be making decisions - so that
we can re-humanize decision making and re-engage with what Swyngedouw calls the
‘properly political’ agonistic debates over who how and why and what and where we should
be making our world.
Appropriate Innovation
Written just prior to the financial meltdown of 2008, Krupp and Horn’s Earth: The Sequel
guides readers through a fascinating world of new energy technologies and the
entrepreneurial personalities involved. Their unabashed advocacy for a cap and trade solution
to global warming is thoroughly trusting of the financial markets, more so than fickle state
regulators, too easily influenced by lobbyists and too quick to turn towards ‘command and
control’ forms of regulation that are anathema to innovation and progress. Only a cap and
trade system, they argue, will fully harness the power of markets, and therefore “fully unleash
the powers of innovation” that are chronicled in the text.

	
  

We can raise a small, but important objection: Maybe we don’t want to unleash the “full
powers of innovation.” Maybe we would be better off tapping only the partial powers of
innovation - the part that is productive and thoughtful, the part that is committed to the
health, safety and well being of our world, human and non human alike, as opposed to the
part whose innovations entail premature disposability (and death), making money for some,
and instability for the rest. Speaking for myself, the innovations that arise from this latter part
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of our collective innovative spirit are not innovations I am interesting in seeing unleashed
upon the world.	
  
‘Technology’ is neither good nor bad, that much is clear. However, certain technologies
in certain ways can be dangerous, or anti-social, or productive of socially deleterious effects,
once ‘really’ subsumed by the logic of capital. What then does this mean for a politics of and
with innovation? Here is where ecological modernization theorists are rightfully critical of
their detractors on the left who have not done a very good job articulating an alternative
approach to the techno-social innovation – at a planetary scale – that will be necessary to
transition our world into a more ecologically and socially sane place (Mol 2002). Whether we
advocate for a model of local and distributed technologies, embrace the degrowth movement
or argue for a decommodified and decarbonized economy built on entirely new political and
economic grounds, we will not, cannot simply think away the toxic legacies of our current
modernity. As mentioned in the introduction to this work, the disaster at Fukushima (to name
but one) has made this painfully clear: no mater how green our new lives may potentially
become, some very dirty work will persist, and very likely expand. We cannot dismiss
cleantech and many of the innovations being experimented with simply because their current
investment stream has narrowed the field into a somewhat hollow shell of what’s possible; of
what ‘we’ are capable of.

Sulfcrete	
  

So in the end, what do I make of cleantech? I don’t think there is a simple or
straightforward answer. Each technology presents its own complicated story. A good
example is Sulfcrete, who presented at the Funders’ Forum in March 2014. This company has
licensed a technology developed by Brookhaven National Laboratories for a process of
making sulfur-polymer concrete.
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The traditional and standard production of Portland cement - the binding agent in
concrete - is made primarily out of limestone, superheated into a sludge called ‘clinker’
which is then mixed with a binding agent to stabilize the material in its new form as its
temperature drops back down. Portland cement is then mixed with a filler to produce a
pourable concrete. The process is incredibly energy intensive, and combined with the
massive scale at which concrete is produced and used globally - an estimated six gigatons per
year - it represents a significant contribution to global CO2 emissions.
Around 40 years ago, the U.S. Bureau of Mines began to experiment with using sulfur
instead of limestone as a basis for Portland cement. While they succeeded in developing a
sulfur based concrete that had many far superior characteristics to standard Portland cement,
the binder that they used was incredibly expensive, making the material commercially nonviable for most practical purposes. Scientists at Brookhaven National Laboratories picked up
this project more recently, and have discovered a way to use a new, far less expensive
binding agent, to create the sulfur-based material. This is the technology that sulfcrete has
licensed, and is now trying to commercialize globally.
Sulfcrete - their licensed name - is made entirely out of waste products generated by
the energy industry. The sulfur as well as the binder that they use are products of the oil and
gas refining process - in fact the majority of the world’s supply of elemental sulfur comes
from this industry. The filler that they combine their sulfur based substitute for Portland
cement with is fly ash, produced by electricity-generating power plants. The resulting
material, sulfcrete, is an ideal product for any precast applications of cement. It cures faster
than typical cement, is as strong if not stronger, and far less susceptible to break down when
in contact with corrosive agents. Further, it can actually be re-used, or as McDonough and
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Braungart would say, upcycled. With the application of high heat, sulfcrete can be reclaimed
into its liquid form up to five times, each time poured or cast into a new application.
As a green technology, sulfcrete seems to be an unequivocally positive improvement
upon current practices. It has the potential to create more durable infrastructure, such as
waste-water treatment facilities (whose concrete pipes are regularly corroded by the fluids
they are in contact with) and hazardous materials storage containers. Furthermore, refineries
around the globe have huge stacks of sulfur blocks that must be properly stored so as not to
create any local environmental problems. This, as well as fly ash, represent two waste
streams that can be productively diverted into a very useful and durable material.
However, as positive an improvement as it may be, sulfcrete can never escape the wastemaking economy that provides for its inputs to production. As is, global oil refining is the
only source of sulfur at a scale sufficient to supply the production of sulfcrete, and even then,
the company’s founders estimate that if the entire global surplus of sulfur was used to
produce their material, it would still only represent less than 10% of the total annual global
production of cement - a figure that it is contingent on the continued refining of oil and gas at
current, unsustainable rates.
So how is one to make sense of these contradictions? On the one hand, sulfcrete has a lot
of positive industrial applications - and can help create more durable infrastructure if used in
strategic applications. And while its production depends upon the pre-existing production of
refined oil and natural gas, it itself represents both a diversion of waste streams as well as a
net reduction in energy consumption and CO2 emissions relative to its best alternative Portland cement. And so, while it can never really be considered a post-petroleum solution,
or even a post-waste solution, nor can its introduction to the industrial ecosystem somehow
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justify oil and gas refining as more of a ‘closed loop’ system, sulfcrete does represent a
potentially important transitional technology. For as long as we continue to refine oil and gas
- a process that is not likely to cease in the near or even medium term future - the production
of sulfcrete provides an opportunity to produce socially and environmentally improved
infrastructural materials. In other words, sulfcrete could, we might imagine, provide a more
durable infrastructure for any post-carbon system that might eventually have to follow.
Whether we like it or not, there will be hazardous materials in any actually existing post or
low carbon world. Perhaps we will be better served with sulfcrete containment vessels than
we would with other existing alternatives.
These are the unpleasant equations we are left to make as we plan for and envision any
actually existing ‘utopias’ that we may hope to work towards. While I have criticized the
ways in which green capitalist discourse and ideology naturalizes various aspects of capitalist
social relations and then presumes that any future-possible world will have to incorporate
them as an unchanging, or un-improvable ‘human nature’, here I am suggesting that there are
in fact residues of this capitalist economy - a toxic remainder that has come to define the new
nature that we are left to defend, accommodate, and to try and embrace.

Cleantech	
  in	
  the	
  Anthropocene	
  

This is, of late, being discussed as the nature of the anthropocene, a world - an entire
planet - that has been so thoroughly transformed by the effects of human civilization as to
create the conditions for a new geological and climatological epoch on a planetary scale
(Crutzen and Steffen 2003; Johnson et al 2014; Steffen et al 2011). Evidence suggests that
this transformation is well underway and likely irreversible. What we must now come to
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terms with is just how messy, violent, inhospitable and undesirable our new natures are likely
to be. This is not so much a doomsday prognosis as it is an attempt to lay bare the realities of
our socio-natural lives in the wake of an ongoing and largely unchecked industrial capitalism
- what Kevin Surprise (2013) terms the ‘capitalocene.’
And yet we go on assuming that we can simply improve or green our present state of
affairs – that solutions are within our grasp. Here the name ‘anthropocene’ may actually
create a false sense of hubris – if humans have finally dominated nature at a planetary scale,
than who is to say that we cannot tackle a problem of somewhat less magnitude – such as
‘fixing’ capitalism? The problem – of course, is that the anthropocene is not a suggestion that
we have dominated planetary nature but that we have irrevocably transformed it, set into
motion new dynamics new climatological patterns, new conditions that are every bit as out of
our control as Kant’s object of sublime reflection.
Roy Scranton (2013) says we must embrace the reality that in every geological sense,
this civilization is already dead. The sooner we confront this problem, and the
sooner we realize there’s nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we
can get down to the hard work of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new
reality.
Scranton appeals to our protestant ethic, that very first spirit of capitalism Weber
identified; he says we must let go of this civilization so that we can get on with the
meaningful, hard work that lies ahead. We must unfetter this work of living on and with a
transformed planet from any no-longer-rational faith in civilization. But what does he mean
by civilization? What sorts of adaptation does he propose and how is this different than the
incremental gains of green capitalism? They too represent adaptations to new market
opportunities and new ecological realities. In fact, it is hard not to recognize that capitalism
itself is one of the most resilient, or adaptive, systems we currently face. Capitalism – along
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with some form of the global society that it supports and that supports it – will adapt to new
ecological conditions – at least in the short and medium terms, this seems to be largely
unquestionable. But will these adaptations be humane? Will they be ecologically desirable?
What will “the hard work of adapting” entail: military securitization or post-capitalist
resurrection?
These are political instead of policy recommendations. It is unfortunate that we’ve
collectively allowed capital to progress as far as it has, to have enabled so much incredible
technological social and cultural production while at the same time threatening the very
conditions of our lives. For almost two centuries now, Marx’s work has been warning us that
this is - whether we like it or not - the contradictory nature of capital’s unique organization of
socio-natural production.
Marx was optimistic that capital could and would provide the organizational,
technological and scientific seeds of its own dissolution; that the general intellect made
possible by the production of and for the accumulation of abstract wealth would eventually
reveal and unseat the irrationality and violence of capital’s expropriating foundations; that the
laboring population would eventually realize just how capable we are of producing a
beautiful world without the constraints of capital’s self-justifying, socially and ecologically
corrosive narcissism; that we might begin to love one another, instead of money.
Regardless of how terrible our ecological situation is and will continue to become, we
still have to focus on what we can and should do with one another. How we want to live in
this environment that is very much not of our choosing. The danger with much of the recent
discussion of adaptation - as opposed to mitigation - is a sort of resignation to this new,
unfortunate nature that we’ve created. If we are only left to adapt to a new nature that is, we
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lose sight of the active process of making-nature to which we are inescapably bound. For
better and largely - it would seem these days - for worse, we make our (socio)natures and will
continue to do so for the foreseeable future (Sterman 2013).
So what natures can, should and could we make? These questions are increasingly on the
table - not simply in the form of far-fetched geo-engineering schemes, but also in more social
terms, evidenced in all of the many visions of a newly ‘engineered’ green economy. It is
worth considering the spirit of green capitalism accordingly, as providing fragments of a
proposal for new socio-technical approaches to making our future - not just how we will
make things in some distant, utopian future - which is too often where the green capitalist
texts and discourses limit their analysis, but also how we will make the future now, how we
will actually transform our presently accelerating social and ecosystemic destabilization into
something else – into a different ‘project’ altogether.

What	
  is	
  our	
  project?	
  

Boltanski and Chiapello talk of this newest, entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism operating
in a ‘projectionist’ city, where long-term affiliations and occupational identities have
dissolved into a tapestry of networked projects that we - entrepreneurial selves - are to shift
between, constantly finding new ways to make ourselves useful and to continue to improve
our employability - the only truly stable (and isolated, fragmented, individualized) project
that persists through this neoliberal world. One sees here traces of the post-modern condition
that Jameson (1991) and others have detailed, in which the ‘grand narratives’ of modernity
increasingly find themselves without currency, cast as antiquated narratives for a simpler and
no longer existent era. There is certainly some truth to these tendencies, and to the networked
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ideologies of neoliberal entrepreneurialism. However, there are also ways in which the
‘green’ spirit of capitalism does not neatly conform to this fragmentation of historical
pastiche. An overarching sense that we can and must save the planet provides a justification
for green capitalism - whether cleantech or otherwise - that is not fragmentary, self-directed
or inherently networked. It is a totalizing vision for a total project, reminiscent of the
justifications for agricultural improvement and the colonization of the known world,
promoted in the spirit of economic gain and productive use. Three centuries ago, Adam
Smith argued that the health of the nation depended on the wealth of the nation. Today the
equations have been flipped: the wealth of the planet depends on the health of the planet.
Saving the planet, saving capitalism, saving our selves - these all blur together into a singular,
grand and ambitious project - a collective and total project to make a better world.
Cleantech is likely not ‘the’ project. Technological fixes are not likely to enable our
escape from the planetary problems we have created (Huesemann and Huesemann 2013). But
what I do respect from the cleantech space and from the green economy in all of its many
guises is this burgeoning recognition that we do need to define a project - one that has to do
with making a better world socially and environmentally - and the further recognition that
market fundamentalism cannot and will not ever get us there.
Here I am drawing a very different conclusion than that presented by Swyngedouw, who
sees in these sorts of universalizing gestures a populism feeding into a general ‘post-political’
condition. Swyngedouw (2010) argues that the post political environmental consensus is
fundamentally reactionary. It forestalls ‘proper’ agonistic politics which, as Badiou claims,
“must revolve around the construction of great new fictions that create real possibilities for
constructing different socio-environmental futures (228).” While I agree with him and with
brand that there is an urgent need for new stories – I wonder whether we maybe need to look
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at some of the new stories that are already out there – presented on and as the terrain of green
capitalism.
The idea that an undifferentiated “we” can and save an undifferentiated “nature” or
“planet” is, for Swyngedouw, symptomatic of a refusal to engage with the difficult, agonistic
politics that might ask what natures are to be saved and for whom. I largely agree with
Swyngedouw’s analysis, and have shown how these radical, large-scale ambitions for
planetary salvation can and are recuperated into a new legitimizing discourse, or spirit of
green capitalism. However, I want to also consider whether there is another dimension to this
story, one that may not be reducible to the post-political condition that Swyngedouw asks us
to beware.
And	
  so	
  my	
  question,	
  an	
  open	
  question	
  still	
  waiting	
  to	
  be	
  answered	
  by	
  a	
  history	
  yet	
  to	
  
unfold,	
  is	
  how	
  these	
  green	
  capitalist	
  texts	
  will	
  be	
  articulated	
  within	
  a	
  populism	
  that	
  is	
  
decidedly	
  less	
  post-‐political	
  than	
  Swyngedouw	
  presents.	
  Perhaps,	
  as	
  Swyngedouw	
  
suggests,	
  climate	
  change	
  has	
  replaced	
  communism	
  as	
  the	
  specter	
  haunting	
  liberal	
  
society,	
  resulting	
  in	
  a	
  post-‐political	
  struggle	
  against	
  the	
  destruction	
  of	
  our	
  planet.	
  And	
  
yet,	
  as	
  it	
  becomes	
  increasingly	
  clear	
  that	
  there	
  will	
  be	
  no	
  ‘end’	
  to	
  climate	
  change,	
  that	
  its	
  
apocalypse	
  is	
  permanent	
  and	
  inescapable,	
  could	
  we	
  imagine	
  popular	
  attention	
  shifting	
  
its	
  efforts	
  to	
  ending	
  something	
  else?	
  Something	
  like	
  capitalism?	
  
Money	
  is	
  not	
  enough	
  

There is a common theme coursing through each of the motifs of green capitalism that I
have explored, both in the green capitalist texts as well as in my experiences with the
cleantech space. This commonality is a sense that markets do not always make the best
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decisions; that money - whether markets or finance or global corporations beholden to
shareholders seeking short term gains - is not sufficient for this new project that we have
embarked upon, and we therefore need a better, non-market means of coordinating our work.
Of course, this largely results in calls for reformism of one sort or another, and many of these
can and are problematically uncritical of the destabilizing dynamics of our economy. But that
said - and this is as much a question as an assertion - what if this critique of the market, this
understanding that people need to directly coordinate our shared production and reproduction
and not just rely on abstract market forces - what if this critique is not fully recuperated by a
new, green spirit of capitalism. What if, in fact, there is as well a spirit that exceeds
capitalism, a recognition that we are more and better than this relatively simplistic, inward
looking, self-obsessed logic of capital’s expanded reproduction. This is what Marx saw in the
possibility that capital would produce its own gravediggers; these were not just an angry mob
of unemployed industrial workers - but an angry population - at a much broader and more
general scale - that could see the idiocy of this system that we’ve come to naturalize, and
begin to realize that this system is not likely to be part of a nature that we want to preserve.
Capital’s gravediggers may in fact be those of us that can realize, together, that improving
our planet ultimately depends on recognizing capital itself as the source of waste that must, as
soon as possible, be erased. After this deluge, we will continue to produce and reproduce and
we will continue to make our lives and our technologies and our cultures and our
environments, only without the burden of first appeasing mammon.
Recognition is important, but not at all sufficient. Erasing capital will require more than
an enlightened public. It will require regaining access to the means of production and
reproduction that have been freed from the laboring population, so that we can begin the long
and hard work of transforming our socio-ecological infrastructure. These are grandiose
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claims that can, at times, be difficult to reconcile with a desire for ‘actionable’
recommendations for individual, local or even state responses. This can be frustrating; there
is no singular thing that can be done, no discrete problem that can be matched with an equally
discrete solution. Our problems have become much bigger than this – they are planetary; they
are persistent; but they are not permanent.
As we reach the final pages of this study, we should return to the question that PC
pose to me over coffee:
PC: Look, we all know that once you get done with your research you’ll come
to the same conclusion: we have to do something tomorrow. So what's the
purpose?”

What is the purpose? How can impassioned pleas to act now, to act big, and to act
with conviction tell us something new? There is no shortage of criers telling us that
the sky is falling, and even explaining why. So what will one more voice added to this
mix accomplish? Yes, we have to do something now, but what? What is that
something that we should do? There are no silver bullets, and yet we must still justify
our actions.
At the most basic and abstract level, we need to regain control over strategic parts of our
accumulated social wealth. Here it is important to be clear: there is a difference between
seizing control and redistribution; simply spreading the wealth of modern industrial
civilization in more equitable ways avoids the more pernicious and difficult questions of
whether that wealth, as currently constituted, may in fact be part of our problem. Solar panels
for all? But what if all solar panels depend upon unsustainable resource extraction (Zehner
2012). Regaining control means establishing qualitatively new relations with one another,
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with the wealth that we collectively produce, and with the wealth that we derive from the
non-human world.
The infrastructures of production and reproduction are not only brick and mortar
installations and the material throughputs that they allow. We must also approach the
accumulated wisdom, knowledge and scientific capacities of our collectively creative,
thinking and doing and making and living social body in the same way; as wealth to regain
control over.
Marx referred to the social capacity to innovate and produce increasingly advanced
technologies as a “general intellect” that enables human society to realize a “general
industriousness.” These are actually quite problematic terms (Johnson and Goldstein,
unpublished). They betray something of a Promethean or productivist hubris in Marx’s
analysis of the techno-social possibilities afforded by a system of production that is dedicated
to general, self-reproducing wealth (money-as-capital), as opposed to meeting particular
needs. In explaining general industriousness Marx (1973) even directly denigrates as lazy and
inefficient the lifestyle of the Quashee, a people native to Jamaica, suggesting that their work
would only ever be dedicated to meeting particular, isolated and direct needs of basic
subsistence, and would therefore never display the same sort of general industriousness that
capital encourages.
With passages such as this Marx shows that in many ways he remained a modernist,
committed to an idea of technological and scientific progress. The idea of a ‘general’ intellect
or industriousness takes on the heir of a universal and universally desirable flourishing of
human potential; the social body realizing its highest form and as such, superseding the
narrow bounds of capitalist relations. But as with the example of the Quashee, much is lost in
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this particular generalization; all of the many ways of living, making and thinking that don’t
fit into the modernizing drive of a generally industrious society come to be cast aside as
historical relics, antiquated and outdated footnotes on the march through history. These sorts
of erasures are not unique to Marx’s time; colonial expropriations and the ongoing process of
accumulation by dispossession continue to delegitimize and erase alternative forms of
knowing and making - other possible sciences and other possible ‘innovation ecosystems’
that are deemed inefficient, impractical or unlikely to reap the sorts of global, or planetary
results that we so desperately need.
As we know, the freedom and progress afforded by our very particular form of general
industriousness has come at a steep social and ecological price. Capital’s ongoing process of
expanded reproduction is realized through the systemic violence of wage-labor relations and
the ever-intensifying treadmill of production that accelerates ecosystemic disruption and
entropic decay (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994).
Marx’s excitement for the techno-social possibilities of the general intellect and general
industriousness ground his imminent critique of capital and his hope for a non-capitalist
future. The future would be characterized by a new kind of communality realized through
“call[ing] to life all the powers of science and of nature, as of social combination and of
social intercourse” (Marx 1993: 706).
Here, it may be instructive to recognize some of the connections between Marx’s technooptimism and more recent work advocating for ecological modernization, despite the latter’s
explicit disavowal of Marx and Marxist analyses (Cohen 2006). Ecological modernization
theory hopes to see an ecological intellect supplant the general intellect, and therefore for
ecological industriousness to supplant general industriousness (Andersen and Massa 2000;
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Mol 1996, 2002; Spaargaren 1997). This is, or can be, at the most abstract level, an inspiring
vision of systemic transformation. However, ecological modernization theory tends to veer
towards understanding ecological industriousness as an extension of general industriousness,
as opposed to an alternative to it (cf Mol 2002). Capital’s technological advances are
accepted as the infrastructure of modern society, and ecological modernity - in much the
same was as we saw with cleantech - will simply build upon this base, as opposed to
threatening its sanctity.
Andersen and Massa (2000) suggest that this is not endemic to ecological modernization,
which can and should be framed as a vision of total systemic transformation and not merely
an agenda for reform. Here I am in agreement. It may be that a truly ecological
industriousness will no longer be ‘modern’ in the ways we have taken the latter for granted.
Further, it is important to accept that ecological industriousness will only be born of
struggle. It will require the untethering of our collective, socially productive thinking and
doing body from the logic of capital accumulation, and then vigilantly insulating our
creations (social, intellectual, physical) from inevitable attempts to recuperate this wealth
back into capital’s logic of expanded reproduction. Just as the investors and consultants in my
research boast of ‘killing the inventor’ we may have to respond with an opposing maxim,
something like ‘kill the investor.’ In other words, how do we think about untethering
innovation from the fiduciary responsibility of venture investors, or what I have shown to be
capital’s abstract domination? How do we operate – produce socially – while beholden to a
different sort of responsibility altogether? Accumulating alternative pools of money (money
that is willing to forego its function as self-reproducing capital) may be one step, but this still
leaves open the question of who controls these alternative investment resources and therefore
who controls the decisions as to what technological alternatives are and are not viable.
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Would it be possible to imagine such alternatives functioning in a radically democratic
fashion? Perhaps a more democratic version of the commons sector that Peter Barnes
proposes in his vision of a greener capitalism? Can we see this sort of work already underway
in the numerous social justice movements around the globe that are already attempting to put
into place their visions of other possible worlds? While it is not within the scope of this study
to explore this numerous instances of alternative sciences and technologies emerging out of
the global south, I will conclude with one example from my own experiences, with the messy
and at times contradictory politics of the Occupy movement.

Occupy	
  our	
  entrepreneurialism?	
  

In October of 2012, Slow Money held its 3rd National Gathering in San Fransisco, as
Occupy Wall Street went into its third week in Zuccotti Park, and activists in Oakland were
just beginning their own occupation somewhat closer afoot. Woody Tasch, the author of Slow
Money and the charismatic force behind the small, yet growing movement of socially
responsible investors bearing his book’s name, presided over an audience of roughly 500
guests, telling them in no unsure terms, “They say that the Occupy Wall Street movement
doesn’t know what it wants. We know what it wants. It wants us.”
The day ended with a Quaker-style town hall meeting, during which a woman stood at
her seat in the middle of the auditorium, echoing Tasch’s sentiment,
As people all over the world are occupying their town squares… I couldn't be
prouder or happier to be here with this group as we come up with the solutions
that the whole world is rising up asking for.
(Large applause)
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Whether we like it or not, there is some truth to this connection. Most of my fieldwork
was conducted in the shadow of Occupy Wall Street. I began attending the Funders Forum a
few months before the occupation of Zuccotti Park, and the topic arose - without my
initiating - in most of the interviews that I conducted during that year. There were a few
critics that saw the protesters as a bunch of spoiled kids, ‘sour grapes’ without a meaningful
critique. Many echoed the mainstream media’s critique that OWS did not have a coherent
message or set of demands, making it difficult to understand what they wanted.
But for others, from entrepreneurs to venture capitalists, there was a clear admiration for
the OWS movement, and a sense that they shared in its values. A green financial advisor,
CX, explained his support for OWS:
CX: I would say I am definitely a libertarian - you know Ron Paul is my
guy… The interesting thing about occupy is here's a group that is out there
trying to raise awareness of this kind of break in terms of the social contract.
That's really what it is about… I've been to a number of different protests, I
mean I am there with them because to me it all comes back to the corporation
buying the government.
CX is pro-capitalist and anti-corporate. This was a common refrain I found amongst those
who identified as libertarian. As opposed to taking an extreme anti-government line, they
were more likely to critique the corporate control of government as the cause of its failures. I
was surprised to find a social democratic current underlying these avowedly libertarian
perspectives. For instance, CX continued by explaining the irrationality of public health
policy: “If they were interested in addressing health care than they would address the issues
that are making people sick - public health.” RD, another self-identified libertarian, also
focussed on the irrationalities of spending money on healthcare without first lowering total
systemic costs through basic public health initiatives.
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The key - and here is where I think it is essential that we maintain independent
conceptions of neoliberalism and capitalism - is that for someone like CX, OWS is a broadly
anti-neoliberal, but not anti-capital, movement.
The problem with the neoliberal state is not its existence, but its irrationality, which is
largely blamed upon corporate control. ‘Corporate personhood’ is the paradigmatic problem
(Derber 2000). As FJ explains to me,
FJ: There has to be a recognition that everybody is valuable, that we have an
interdependence in everything that happens and there needs to be a sort of
reasonable tying together...
JG: Where would this tying together come from?
FJ: Unfortunately the only way to do it would be from government regulation.
And I am, I tend to be a little bit more libertarian in my view of things. I don't
really like a lot of government interference in individual lives, but I think there
should be government interference in corporate lives..

CX told me that he regularly attended marches at Zuccotti Park during the occupation,
and Eric Lerner, the plasma physicist we met above, actually played an active role during the
occupation, forming a “demands working group” that attempted to build a platform of
specific demands for the movement as a whole to cohere around. The demands working
group never succeeded, much to Lerner’s chagrin. Their core demand that they wanted the
movement to embrace was “jobs for all.”
I asked Lerner how his work on focus fusion related to the politics of occupy,
EL: Well in the short... you have to give people hope. I mean the problem is
that people do not see the potential for social change they don't really have
hope for the future. The way I see, in the short term, my political and my
fusion work coming together - which I do - is that it does give people hope for
the future.
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Four months after the Slow Money Gathering, in March, I visited the Occupy movement
on its third day occupying Union Square in downtown Manhattan. In the center of the south
side of the park, a stage had been made out of cardboard placards, with a large yellow
Occupy Wall Street banner serving as backdrop. A young man sheepishly entered the space
with a small homemade gadget in hand. In a barely audible voice he explained his invention –
a magnetic flywheel that could power small electronic devices with minimal exertion. His
handler, a fellow occupier, shouted to the crowd, “Free, people! Free energy! Using nothing
but your fingers! Is there an angel investor for this genius over here? This kid has got talent!
Is there an angel investor here?”
Later that afternoon, I found him working in the park. He had a Ron Paul button affixed
to his backpack, which he rummaged through looking for his small butane-fueled soldering
iron. I told him I was interested in his invention and what he was doing, and asked if he
would tell me more.
JG: How does money factor into this? Are you making stuff to get paid?
OW: No, No. I will acquire capital though… You leave me alone, I'll leave
you alone, just give me the money. I'll keep making you money while we
revolutionize the world. We don't have to take all that money away from
them… because money in general doesn't work. We can start creating our own
things. We can start by renting out buildings or by having farms, just make our
own base of capital government. You see, capital is ungoverned… It is a
system that controls itself and no one person controls it and it is scary as fuck
because you know what's happening right now is it's eating the damn world
alive.
JG: But you say that the answer doesn't require taking power away from the
system that’s eating the world?
OW: All we have to do is realize that they do not control us. Its simple… once
we start to realize how powerful we really are, than we can do shit.

From all sides, there is a growing collection of voices determined to convince their public
that a virtuous green economy can and must supersede our wasteful, industrial economy. At
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the most basic level, this is hardly a contentious claim. As the specter of ecological disaster
intensifies its grip on the popular imagination, there is little question - outside the orbit of
reactionary wealth and the faux populism it funds - that something has to change. The
ecological unsustainability of capitalism as we know it may be an all but certain fact, but the
question still remains: is this due to an aberrant form of capitalism, or the aberration that is
capitalism?
I am not so sure that Lerner’s suggestion for universal employment is the answer, not so
long as the options we have for employment remain tethered to a profit-focused capitalist
economy, but I do think he is right to point to work - our ability to make and create for
ourselves, for one another, for our planetary community - as the central issue, or ‘demand’
that we face. Reflecting on my own work at Zuccotti Park, which involved screen printing
(and eventually cohered into the “screen printing working group” and then eventually the
“OWS Screen printers Guild”), I came to a similar conclusion, one that I hope to eventually
share with some of my new entrepreneurial friends, potential collaborators and allies in the
cleantech space:
One of the very palpable undercurrents of the occupation is a prevailing sense
that people want to work. To feel productive. To contribute. To make things
with others. This is what capitalism has stolen from us - this is what people
want returned to them - some semblance of a collective humanity. When you
think about it, it’s actually pretty simple…We don't need capitalism,
corporations, profit motives to organize our collective and creative production.
That’s the punch line. And people are starting to get it.
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Appendix	
  A:	
  Interview	
  Subjects	
  
PC
LB
PL
JQ
JR
KD
PC
RG
KL
SM
BW
FJ
CB
PZ
LD
SC
DG
MQ
JW
KD
TX
FG
CM
JB
TC
HM
VG
PK
ST
DD
TE
CN
LM
DS
PV
PQ
TW
EL
VK
OW

1
F*
Boutique investment banker
2
Strategic Consultant, Angel Investor
3
FF** Strategic Consultant, Organizer of Funders Forum
4
FF
Self-employed engineer, small cleantech business owner
5
F
Recent college graduate, looking for first cleantech job
6
Head of climate change advising at a major financial institution
7
F
Waste Hauler, subesquently a strategic consultant
8
F
Employed by a large cleantech research and consulting firm
9
FF
Unemployed, looking to find work as a strategic consultant
10
Cleantech engineer, employed by a major oil company
11
Wall Street Investor with (one) cleantech firm in portfolio
12
Strategic Consultant and network marketer
13
F
Cleantech entrepreneur
14
Venture capitalist
15
F
Independent researcher and broker-dealer
16
F
Former managing director of a cleantech hedge fund, now a
strategic consultant
17
F
Former cleantech startup employee, currently a strategic
consultant
18
FF
Angel Invester and Broker-Dealer
19
Environmental scientist
20
World bank employee
21
F
Financial advisor, focussed on cleantech
22
FF
Patent attorney
23
Strategic consultant, Latin America focus
24
FF
Project finance lawyer for energy projects, private equity
investor, angel investor
25
F
Engineer and cleantech entrepreneur
26
F
Artist and cleantech entrepreneur
27
F
Angel investor, chemical engineer and cleantech entrepreneur
28
Inventor and cleantech entrepreneur
29
Industrial designer, formerly a cleantech startup co-founder
30
F
Salesman and strategic consultant
31
F
Former CFO for cleantech startup, currently a strategic
consultant
32
Recent college grad and cleantech founder
33
F
Broker-dealer, focussed on cleantech in Africa
34
Venture capitalist
35
Former infotech entrepreneur, currently a cleantech
entrepreneurship coach
36
FF
Former entrepreneur and inventor, currently entrepreneurship
coach and venture capitalist
37
Director of a cleantech incubator
38
F
Physicist, activist, inventor and cleantech entrepreneur
39
F
Boutique investment banker
40
Venture capitalist
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DC
MX
YD
AZ
YR

41
42
author
43
44
45

Venture capitalist
Formerly an investor, now an academic and green capitalist
Green packaging designer
Green building designer and green capital author
Strategic consultant, Latin America focus

*F are individuals initially met at the Funders Forum
**FF are Funders Forum regulars (attended over 25 meetings since 2002)
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Appendix	
  B:	
  Green	
  Capitalism	
  Texts	
  

The following texts (listed chronologically by publication date) were analyzed for this
research. As anyone familiar with the genre will know, this is not a comprehensive list. The
texts were chosen to provide a broad cross-section of themes and approaches to
understanding green capitalism, and are not meant to suggest a comprehensive bibliography.
Full citations can be found in the works cited list.

1992
GORE

Gore, Albert. Earth in the Balance  : Ecology and the Human Spirit

1993
HAWKEN

Hawken, Paul. The Ecology of Commerce  : A Declaration of Sustainability

1997
BIOMIM

Benyus, Janine M. Biomimicry  : Innovation Inspired by Nature

1999
NATCAP

Hawken, Paul, Amory B. Lovins, and L. Hunter Lovins. Natural Capitalism  :
Creating the next Industrial Revolution

2002
C2C

McDonough, William, and Michael Braungart. Cradle to Cradle  : Remaking
the Way We Make Things

2006
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CAP3.0

Barnes, Peter. Capitalism 3.0  : A Guide to Reclaiming the Commons

BRDFRD

Bradford, Travis. Solar Revolution: the Economic Transformation of the
Global Energy Industry

2007
DEEP

McKibben, Bill. Deep Economy  : The Wealth of Communities and the
Durable Future

PORRITT

Porritt, Jonathon. Capitalism as If the World Matters

2008
PLANB

Brown, Lester Russell. Plan B 3.0  : Mobilizing to Save Civilization

HOTFLAT

Friedman, Thomas L. Hot, Flat, and Crowded  : Why We Need a Green
Revolution, and How It Can Renew America

HIRSH

Hirshberg, Gary. Stirring It up  : How to Make Money and Save the World

TRANSTN

Hopkins, Robert. The Transition Handbook: From Oil Dependency to Local
Resilience

ERTHSQL

Krupp, Fred, and Miriam Horn. Earth, the Sequel  : The Race to Reinvent
Energy and Stop Global Warming

SPETH

Speth, James Gustave. The Bridge at the Edge of the World  : Capitalism, the
Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability

$LOW

Tasch, Woody. Inquiries into the Nature of Slow Money  : Investing as If Food,
Farms, and Fertility Mattered

EVOEDG

Taylor, Graeme, and Fereshteh M Sadeghi. Evolution’s Edge the Coming
Collapse and Transformation of Our World

2009
BARON

Humes, Edward. Eco Barons: The Dreamers, Schemers, and Millionaires Who
Are Saving Our Planet

JONES

Jones, Van, and Ariane Conrad. The Green-Collar Economy: How One
Solution Can Fix Our Two Biggest Problems

ASPEN

Schendler, Auden. Getting Green Done  : Hard Truths from the Front Lines of
the Sustainability Revolution

STERN

Stern, N. H. The Global Deal Climate Change and the Creation of a New Era
of Progress and Prosperity

2010
399

THRIVE

Edwards, Andres R. Thriving beyond Sustainability: Pathways to a Resilient
Society

2011
EDGE

Brown, Lester Russel. World on the Edge  : How to Prevent Environmental
and Economic Collapse

GREER

Greer, John Michael. The Wealth of Nature: Economics as If Survival
Mattered

ECOMIND

Lappé, Frances Moore. EcoMind  : Changing the Way We Think, to Create the
World We Want

FIRE

Lovins, Amory B., and Rocky Mountain Institute. Reinventing Fire  : Bold
Business Solutions for the New Energy Era

CLIMCAP

Lovins, L. Hunter, and Boyd Cohen. Climate Capitalism  : Capitalism in the
Age of Climate Change

EAARTH

McKibben, Bill. Eaarth  : Making a Life on a Tough New Planet

2013
MAZZ

Mazzucato, Mariana. The Entrepreneurial State

SHAH

Shah, Jigar. Creating Climate Wealth: Unlocking the Impact Economy
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Appendix	
  C:	
  Green	
  Capitalist	
  Discourses,	
  Research	
  Methodology	
  

Everywhere where there is rhythm, there is measure, which is to say law,
calculated and expected obligation, a project (Lefebvre 2004: 8).

While I did not use any formal discourse analysis software, I did approach each of the
texts included in this research in a systematic manner. After reading through four initial texts,
I developed a worksheet with the following headings:

SUMMARY
CRITIQUE
PLANETARY IMPROVEMENT
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY (UTOPIA)
PRODUCTION
CONSUMPTION
DISTRIBUTION
TECHNOLOGY
SCALE
RECUPERATION
WASTE
VALUE
NATURE
MARKET
SCARCITY/ABUNDANCE
COORDINATION
CHANGE AGENTS

As you can see, one of the four motifs of green capitalism was pre-figured by my initial
categorizations. This has to do with prior research on agricultural improvement (Goldstein
2013) and an interest in understanding how these historic discourses persisted into the
present. The heading “NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY” was appended with (UTOPIA) after
realizing the connection between these two threads and the need to understand not only new
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approaches to political economy, but as well visions of a greener and more livable socionature.
Each text was closely scrutinized through multiple readings and carefully coded, first
by hand (with the still-essential, time-worn tactic of writing marginalia) and then
subsequently in two iterations of word processor documents – the first recording all of the
marginalia (and the passages associated with it), the second coding this marginalia according
to the above worksheet categories.
While I had initially set out to create a mutually exclusive typology of green capitalist
texts, my research was not terribly cooperative. While some texts did exhibit very specific
approaches to green capitalism, and might lend themselves to being labeled as one ‘type’ or
another, I began to sense that a reductive approach such as this would actually do an injustice
to the layered complexity of the genre as a whole. To be perfectly honest, for many months I
was at a loss for how to salvage my attempt at creating a typology of green capitalisms, and
so I put this portion of the work down and shifted focus to my ethnographic account of the
cleantech space.
While I cannot say what exactly it was – likely no more than the clarifying effect of
distance – I eventually found that when pressed into creating short descriptions of my work,
the four categories – or what I’ve called motifs – consistently re-emerged. It is possible – I
am well aware – that this is simply due to the fact that I had, over the past four years, either
written a paper or presented at a conference on each of these themes. Had I been focused on
different histories and different critiques of political economy, I may very well have ended up
with an entirely different framework – and having now become more intimately familiar with
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this genre, I am sure that there are numerous ways to divide, subdivide, distill and typify this
work.
Nonetheless, my debt to Henri Lefebvre and his late work, Rhythmanalysis (2004),
must be fully acknowledged. In this short text, Lefebvre follows his three volumes of the
critique of everyday life with a proposal for a new methodological (empirical and theoretical)
approach to the study of everyday life that focuses on rhythm and a shift from objects to
processes. He writes, “The analysis does not isolate an object, or a subject, or a relation. It
seeks to grasp a moving but determinate complexity (determination not entailing
determinism)” (12). He asks that we leave behind “pure abstraction – the logic of identity”
and instead attempt to grasp “the full complexity of the contradictions of the real” (13).
Instead of studying a set of texts as discrete objects of analysis, I have focused instead on the
complex and contradictory whole that they gesture towards, a process of meaning making, of
finding, naming, proposing and imagining a new coherence out of which new modes of life
can and should emerge: an attempt at “imprinting a rhythm on an era.” To quote Lefebvre
once more:
Objectively, for there to be change, a social group, a class or a caste must
intervene by imprinting a rhythm on an era, be it through force or in an
insinuating manner. In the course of a crisis, in a critical situation, a group
must designate itself as an innovator or producer of meaning. And its acts
must inscribe themselves on reality (14).

While Lefebvre’s proposed methodology was intended for the study of urbanity, or the
interaction between “a place, a time and an expenditure of energy” (15), I found it to be a
fitting model, or at least point of departure, for my analysis of green capitalist discourses. I
have chosen to use the term ‘motif’ to organize my work, in part because it is not a term that
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Lefebvre directly used, and therefore leaves me with some interpretive flexibility. From
Wikipedia:
In music, a motif… is a short musical idea, a salient recurring figure, musical
fragment or succession of notes that has some special importance in or is
characteristic of a composition… It is commonly regarded as the shortest
subdivision of a theme or phrase that still maintains its identity as a musical
idea.

Accordingly, I see the four slices through this green capitalist genre as precisely this –
four distinct motifs, small aspects of the overall work that still maintain their individual
coherence as discrete ideas, while nonetheless only ever being truly understood as part of a
broader composition.
All this is to say, I will not be providing any charts placing each of the texts analyzed
into one category or another. In fact, I have consciously avoided such an exercise, even in the
instances when a specific book clearly demonstrates one of these four motifs almost at the
complete exclusion of the other three. Through my discussion of these four motifs it will
become clear to the reader where to go to find examples of one or the other, without me
having to objectively label each text and therefore risk reducing the ‘complex contradictions
of the real’ to a new taxonomic exercise.
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